## Spencersiouart

At Spencer Stuart, we know how much leadership matters. We are trusted by organizations around the world to help them make the senior-level leadership decisions that have a lasting impact on their enterprises. Through our executive search, board and leadership advisory services, we help build and enhance high-performing teams for select clients ranging from major multinationals to emerging companies to nonprofit institutions.

Privately held since 1956, we focus on delivering knowledge, insight and results through the collaborative efforts of a team of experts - now spanning 56 offices, 30 countries and more than 50 practice specialties. Boards and leaders consistently turn to Spencer Stuart to help address their evolving leadership needs in areas such as senior-level executive search, board recruitment, board effectiveness, succession planning, in-depth senior management assessment and many other facets of organizational effectiveness.

For more than 30 years, our Board Practice has helped boards around the world identify and recruit independent directors and provided advice to board chairs, CEOs and nominating committees on important governance issues. We serve a range of organizations across geographies and scale, from leading multinationals to smaller organizations. In the past year alone, we conducted more than 600 director searches worldwide, and in North America one-third of those assignments were for companies with revenues under \$1 billion.

Our global team of board experts works together to ensure that our clients have unrivaled access to the best existing and potential director talent, and regularly assists boards in increasing the diversity of their composition. We have helped place women in more than 1,800 board director roles and recruited more than 600 diversity executives around the world.

In addition to our work with clients, Spencer Stuart has long played an active role in corporate governance by exploring - both on our own and with other prestigious institutions - key concerns of boards and innovative solutions to the challenges facing them. Publishing the Spencer Stuart U.S. Board Index (SSBI), now in its $32^{\text {nd }}$ edition, is just one of our many ongoing efforts.

Each year, we sponsor and participate in several acclaimed director education programs, including:

》 Next Gen Board Leaders (NGBL), an initiative designed to foster a community of current and aspiring directors to spark discussion around the challenges, opportunities and contributions of a younger generation in today's boardrooms
» The Global Institutes, sponsored by the WomenCorporateDirectors (WCD) Foundation
» The Corporate Governance Conference at Northwestern University's Kellogg School of Management
" The New Directors Program, a unique two-year development program designed to provide first-time, non-executive directors with an exclusive forum for peer dialogue on key issues and "unwritten rules" of corporate boards, produced in partnership with the Boston Consulting Group, Frederick W. Cook \& Co., Davis Polk, Lazard and PricewaterhouseCoopers

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## Spencer Stuart Perspective for 2017

The spotlight on the composition of boards of directors continues to brighten. Active and activist investors are increasingly evaluating whether boards are composed of a diverse mix of skills, qualifications, perspectives and backgrounds aligned with the company's current and future strategic objectives and risks.

Investor interest in boards has never been higher. Today investors expect boards to have meaningful processes - beyond formal policies such as mandatory retirement ages - to refresh the board and maximize board effectiveness. They are requesting details on how boards review and evolve board composition and leadership in light of emerging needs. They are seeking information on how boards evaluate the contributions and tenure of individual directors and the relevance of their experience. And they are calling for greater gender and racial diversity in the boardroom.

Boards are evolving. They are adding directors with fresh perspectives and knowledge of emerging areas of importance. Board or C-suite experience is no longer a prerequisite, with boards increasingly appointing first-time directors and executives with division, subsidiary or other leadership experience. And they are naming more women and minorities as directors - for the first time in the history of our index, just over half of incoming directors on S\&P 500 boards were women or minorities.

But progress is slow in some areas of interest to investors. Board turnover remains low and hinders meaningful progress in the percentage of women and minorities in boardrooms. Directors are older on average. Mandatory retirement policies proliferate, and retirement ages continue to increase. Meanwhile, the percentage of companies reporting some form of individual director assessments is low and largely unchanged - suggesting that mandatory retirement ages remain a primary mechanism for board refreshment.

The 2017 Spencer Stuart U.S. Board Index finds change on many fronts. The following highlights some of the trends we are seeing based on our analysis of S\&P 500 proxies and the results of our annual S\&P 500 governance survey, conducted each year as part of the research for the Spencer Stuart U.S. Board Index.

## 397

## New independent directors

## 45\%

First-time directors among all new directors

## BOARD REFRESHMENT

Investor attention to board refreshment continues to escalate. Today investors are scrutinizing board composition in new ways, beyond simply the independence of directors. A variety of considerations - such as director skills and qualifications, director tenure, "overboarding" and boardroom diversity in terms of gender, race, age and ethnicity - are now top of mind to investors evaluating how each director contributes to the board.

Boards are responding and reshaping. The number of new independent directors elected to S\&P 500 boards during the 2017 proxy year rose to 397, the most since 2004 and an increase of $15 \%$ from 2016. A majority ( $52 \%$ ) of S\&P 500 boards added at least one new director. However, overall turnover remains low at 0.81 new directors per board, compared with 0.72 in 2016.

Boards are casting a wider and deeper net to identify qualified candidates. Slightly more than a third (36\%) of new directors are active or retired C-suite chairs, CEOs, presidents or COOs - down from $47 \% 10$ years ago. Fewer active CEOs are serving on boards - today only $37 \%$ of S\&P 500 CEOs serve on one or more outside public boards, down from $52 \% 10$ years ago.

A record-breaking $45 \%$ of the new directors are serving on their first public corporate board. These first-time directors are more likely than other new directors to be actively employed ( $64 \%$ versus $42 \%$ ). They also are less likely to be C-suite executives and more likely to have other executive experiences such as division/subsidiary leadership. More than half ( $55 \%$ ) of the first-time directors are women or minorities, a significant jump from $37 \%$ a year ago.

Director skills and experiences are changing. Directors with financial backgrounds in banking, finance, investment or accounting are in demand, representing $29 \%$ of new directors in 2017 , up from $19 \%$ in 2007. Of growing interest are directors with investing and investment management experience. Thirteen percent ( $13 \%$ ) of new directors came from the investment field, up from $5 \%$ a decade ago; less than $20 \%$ of these directors (or only 10 individuals) were appointed under publicized settlements with activist investors. Nearly $20 \%$ of new independent directors have backgrounds in the technology or telecommunications industries.

Respondents to our annual S\&P 500 governance survey, conducted each year as part of this index, indicate that director refreshment is on the board agenda. Just under $90 \%$ of respondents say their board has a strategy to encourage regular board refreshment, up from $69 \%$ just last year. The top driver of succession strategies, according to $79 \%$ of respondents, is the desire to add new skills to the board. More than half of respondents say the board or nominating/governance committee regularly reviews the board succession plan - either annually (38\%) or semi-annually ( $19 \%$ ). The vast majority, $87 \%$, say their company's board succession plan includes a matrix of board skills and the anticipated timing of director departures/additions.

## BOARD DIVERSITY

A recognition of the value of boardroom diversity and frustration with the slow rate of progress on the diversity front has led a growing number of institutional investors to advocate for change and challenge perceptions of a lack of qualified diverse candidates. Today some institutional investors are voting against all-male boards of U.S. companies, and in 2017 one of the largest global investors voted against the chair or most senior member of the nominating and governance committee of 400 all-male boards.

Boards are taking steps to enhance boardroom diversity. For the first time in the history of this survey, more than half of the new S\&P 500 directors are women and/or minorities. Female representation among new directors rose to $36 \%$ in 2017, a 20 -year high, while $20 \%$ of new independent directors are male and female minorities, defined as African-American, Hispanic/Latino or Asian.

However, continued low boardroom turnover is a hurdle to significant year-over-year change in the aggregate composition of S\&P 500 boards. As a result, in spite of the record number of new female directors, representation of women on S\&P 500 boards increased incrementally to $22 \%$ of all directors, up from $21 \%$ in 2016 and $17 \%$ in 2012.

Progress continues to be slow when it comes to minority representation at the top 200 S\&P 500 companies. Today, $17 \%$ of directors of the top 200 companies are male or female minorities, up from $16 \%$ last year. Representation of African-Americans and Hispanics/Latinos in the top 200 boardrooms has not significantly changed over the past five to 10 years. (Note: year-over-year comparisons have been adjusted to reflect a 2017 methodology change to classify individuals of Indian descent as Asian, consistent with U.S. Census Bureau methodology.)

#  

## Female directors among all new directors

20\%

Minority directors in incoming class

## $37 \%$

CEOs serving on outside corporate boards

## 42\%

Boards with a mandatory retirement age of 75 or higher

Assessing boardroom diversity can be challenging because current rules, adopted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in 2009, only require companies to disclose whether, and if so how, a nominating committee considers diversity in identifying director candidates. The SEC has yet to act on a 2015 rule-making petition filed by nine public pension funds calling for expanded disclosure of boardroom diversity. Regardless, companies are increasingly voluntarily expanding their disclosures regarding boardroom diversity, and investors continue to press individual companies for disclosure enhancements. Already in anticipation of the 2018 proxy season, one public pension fund announced that it has asked more than 140 companies to disclose a matrix of each director nominee's gender, race, ethnicity, skills, experiences and attributes.

## BOARD EVALUATIONS

Meaningful assessments are viewed by investors as the preferred tool for evaluating and enhancing board and director performance and promoting boardroom refreshment. They consider peer and/or self-assessments "best practices" for providing feedback to directors on their performance, identifying gaps in boardroom skills and perspectives, and facilitating boardroom succession.

All but nine S\&P 500 boards (98\%) report having some form of board evaluation/assessment process. However, individual director assessments appear to be far less prevalent. Just over one-third (37\%) of S\&P 500 companies report some form of individual director assessments in their process - a percentage largely unchanged from five years ago, when $36 \%$ disclosed that they included some assessment of individual directors in their board evaluation.

When asked about individual director assessments, $43 \%$ of respondents to our governance survey say their board assessments include self-appraisals, and $25 \%$ include peer evaluations. Another $8 \%$ take other approaches, such as individual director interviews with the chair, lead director or head of the governance committee.

This year, our governance survey also asked about the changes or improvements boards made based on their annual board evaluation. The majority ( $58 \%$ ) have made changes to board meeting agendas or the allocation of meeting time. Other areas where boards say they made improvements include: board skills (34\%), use of executive sessions ( $30 \%$ ), informal board time such as board dinners ( $26 \%$ ), board oversight of risk (24\%) and CEO succession planning (20\%).

## RETIREMENT POLICIES

Investors view board and director assessments more favorably than mandatory retirement policies as a mechanism for board refreshment. The high percentage ( $73 \%$ ) of companies with retirement policies, along with the steady increase in retirement ages, have raised concerns among investors that formal, age-based retirement policies, instead of meaningful board and director assessments, are a primary driver of board refreshment.

Despite investor views, S\&P 500 boards overwhelmingly rely on formal retirement policies as a way to promote turnover. About three-quarters ( $73 \%$ ) of S\&P 500 boards report having a mandatory retirement age for directors, unchanged over the past five years.

Boards continue to raise retirement ages. Today $42 \%$ of S\&P 500 companies set their retirement age at 75 or older, compared with $22 \%$ in 2012 and just $11 \%$ in 2007. Four boards have a retirement age of 80 . And for the first time, a majority of boards with mandatory retirement policies set the age at 73 or higher.

As retirement ages have risen, so has the average age of independent directors. Today independent directors of S\&P 500 companies have an average age of 63.1, two years older than a decade ago. In that same period, the median age rose from 61 to 64 . Nearly $20 \%$ of directors are 70 or older, and $5 \%$ of those directors are 80 or older. Also during the past decade, the percentage of boards with an average age of 64 years or more has increased to $39 \%$ from $21 \%$ in 2007.

## TENURE POLICIES

Director tenure is a newer issue for investors. Increasingly, investors are questioning the independence of long-tenured directors, and some are classifying directors as independent or non-independent based on their tenure. The average tenure of all directors and the dispersion of director tenures are now metrics routinely used by some investors to assess the robustness of board refreshment efforts.

Few boards have mandatory tenure policies. Only 24 S\&P 500 boards (5\%) set explicit term limits for non-executive directors, with a majority of the policies set at 15 years or more. In 2016, 19 boards (4\%) had director term limits. Nearly two-thirds (65\%) of boards explicitly state in their corporate governance guidelines that they do not have term limits.


Average age of independent directors

## years

Average independent director tenure


Boards separating the chair and CEO roles

In our governance survey, just 3\% say their boards are considering term limits. Twelve percent of respondents report their board is considering other means of encouraging director turnover, such as a mandatory retirement age, annual evaluations and a robust peeror self-assessment process.

Meanwhile board tenure is declining somewhat. The average board tenure of independent directors fell slightly to 8.2 years, from 8.3 last year and 8.6 five years ago. Fewer boards have an average tenure of more than 10 years: $16 \%$ today versus $22 \%$ five years ago. When it comes to individual directors, $36 \%$ of independent directors have served on their boards for five years or less, $25 \%$ have served for six to 10 years, $21 \%$ for 11 to 15 years, and $18 \%$ for 16 years or more.

## INDEPENDENT BOARD LEADERSHIP

Investors expect boards to have some form of robust independent board leadership, and some advocate independent chairs as the best structure. Today, S\&P 500 boards are more likely than in the past to split the chair and CEO roles between two people; for the first time, more than half ( $51 \%$ ) of boards have a separate chair and CEO. Independent chairs - a director who meets the applicable NYSE or NASDAQ rules for independence - are less common, however; $28 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards, versus $27 \%$ in 2016 and 13\% in 2007, have an independent chair.

The number of lead and presiding directors has declined as more boards separate the chair and CEO roles and appoint independent chairs. Eighty-four percent of S\&P 500 boards report having an independent lead or presiding director, compared with 94\% a decade ago.

Our governance survey indicates that many boards regularly review their board leadership structure. Seven percent of respondents say their board separated the roles of chair and CEO in the past proxy year, while $31 \%$ say their board has discussed splitting the roles within the next five years.

## OVERBOARDING

Investors expect directors to have the time and energy to fully commit to the company and perform their board duties and responsibilities. In recognition of the demands of board and committee service, investors increasingly are assessing whether directors may be "overboarded" by serving on multiple boards. Today it's not uncommon for proxy voting guidelines to call for votes against "overboarded" directors.

Boards are self-policing the overboarding issue. Today, more than three-quarters of S\&P 500 boards ( $77 \%$ ) have established some limit on their directors' ability to accept other corporate directorships, up from $55 \%$ in 2007. Most set a cap at four or five public company boards.

Policies are generally tougher for directors who are CEOs or otherwise fully employed. Of the $24 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards with restrictions for these directors, most set limits of two other public company boards.

S\&P 500 directors have 2.1 public corporate board affiliations on average, which has been consistent for five years. Nearly two-thirds (64\%) serve on two or more public boards; $11 \%$ four or more. Eight directors (less than 1\%) serve on six boards.

## SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT

Shareholders increasingly want to engage with boards on a range of governance issues, including succession, compensation, risk oversight and other concerns. And many boards value the opportunity to meet with shareholders to gain a sense of how the company is viewed externally versus competitors and reduce the chance that they will be surprised by activists or proxy votes.

According to our governance survey, interactions between shareholders and boards are on the rise; $55 \%$ of respondents, versus $39 \%$ last year, said they were contacted formally by large institutional investors and/or largest shareholders specifically regarding a governance-related topic. Eighty-two percent of respondents said management or the board proactively reached out to the company's large shareholders. The most common topics about which companies proactively engaged with shareholders were "say on pay" and environmental/social/governance (ESG) issues ( $48 \%$ each), followed by board refreshment (43\%).

As in past years, public and private pension funds were the most likely to initiate contact with the boards, accounting for $40 \%$ of shareholder inquiries, followed by mutual funds (23\%) and other shareholder proponents (14\%). Top issues for shareholders contacting boards included sustainability, board refreshment, shareholder engagement and companies' political contributions/activities.

84\%
Boards with a lead or presiding director


Average number of board meetings

## Editor's Note

[^0]
## S\&P 500 Boards: Trends Over One, Five and 10 Years



$2017^{\text {a }} \quad 2016^{b} \quad 2012^{c} \quad 2007^{\text {d }} \quad$| 5-year |
| :---: |
| $\%$ change | | 10-year |
| :---: |
| \% change |

Retirement age

| Boards with mandatory retirement age | $73 \%$ | $73 \%$ | $73 \%$ | $79 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $-8 \%$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Boards with mandatory retirement age of $75+$ | $42 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $91 \%$ | $282 \%$ |  |
| Boards with mandatory retirement age of $72+$ | $96 \%$ | $95 \%$ | $85 \%$ | $67 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $43 \%$ |  |

Committee meetings (average number)

| Audit committees | 8.6 | 8.6 | 8.7 | 9.5 | $-1 \%$ | $-9 \%$ |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Compensation committees | 6.0 | 6.1 | 6.4 | 6.0 | $-6 \%$ | $0 \%$ |  |
| Nominating committees | 4.7 | 4.8 | 4.6 | 5.0 | $2 \%$ | $-6 \%$ |  |

Audit committee chair

| Retired/not actively employed - <br> all backgrounds | $73 \%$ | $74 \%$ | $68 \%$ | $\mathrm{n} / \mathrm{a}$ | $7 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Financial exec/CFO/treas/public acct exec - <br> active or retired | $43 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $30 \%$ |

Non-employee director compensation

| Total average compensation ${ }^{\dagger}$ | \$288,909 | \$285,065 | \$242,385 | \$211,179 | 19\% | 37\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average annual retainers | \$120,409 | \$118,521 | \$96,649 | \$68,560 | 25\% | 76\% |
| Median annual retainer ${ }^{\text {g }}$ | \$100,000 | \$100,000 | \$75,000 | \$55,000 | 33\% | 82\% |
| Boards paying board meeting fee | 14\% | 16\% | 33\% | 52\% | -58\% | -73\% |
| Average board meeting fee | \$2,197 | \$2, 155 | \$2,224 | \$2,027 | -1\% | 8\% |
| Boards offering stock option program | 13\% | 14\% | 25\% | 42\% | -48\% | -69\% |
| Boards paying equity in addition to retainer | 77\% | 76\% | 76\% | 72\% | 1\% | 7\% |

Committee compensation

| Boards paying committee chair retainer | $96 \%$ | $95 \%$ | $92 \%$ | $88 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $9 \%$ |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average committee chair retainer | $\$ 20,443$ | $\$ 20,425$ | $\$ 17,873$ | $\$ 8,007$ | $14 \%$ | $155 \%$ |  |
| Boards paying committee member retainer | $45 \%$ | $41 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $31 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $45 \%$ |  |
| Average committee member retainer | $\$ 11,560$ | $\$ 11,271$ | $\$ 10,202$ | $\$ 1,375$ | $13 \%$ | $741 \%$ | $-65 \%$ |
| Boards paying committee meeting fees | $19 \%$ | $21 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $54 \%$ | $-42 \%$ | $-3 \%$ | $7 \%$ |
| Average committee meeting fees | $\$ 1,653$ | $\$ 1,677$ | $\$ 1,703$ | $\$ 1,550$ | -3 |  |  |

${ }^{\text {a }}$ Data based on proxy year May 16, 2016, through May 19, 2017.
${ }^{\text {b }}$ Data based on proxy year May 15, 2015, through May 15, 2016.
${ }^{\text {' Data based on proxy year May 15, 2011, through May 15, } 2012 . ~}$
${ }^{\text {d }}$ Data based on proxy year June 1, 2006, through May 31, 2007.
elncludes finance management/CFO/treasurers, investment management/investors, retired accounting partners and bankers/investment bankers.
${ }^{\text {f }}$ Based on non-employee director compensation tables included in 49 (2017), 477 (2016), 485 (2012) and 385 (2007) proxies.
${ }^{\mathrm{g}}$ Not including stock beyond retainer.
$\mathrm{n} / \mathrm{a}=$ not available.

## Board Composition

## 2017 Snapshot


$45 \begin{aligned} & \text { of new directors are } \\ & \text { serving on their first } \\ & \text { public board }\end{aligned}$

19\%
of new independent directors have backgrounds in the technology or telecommunications industries


## highest number of new independent directors elected in OVER A DECADE

» S\&P 500 boards included in our index appointed 397 new independent directors during the 2017 proxy year, the most since 2004.
» The number of new independent directors increased $15 \%$ from last year.
" $52 \%$ of boards appointed at least one new director; $20 \%$ appointed more than one board member.
» Of the 189 boards disclosing the source of director candidates, $11 \%$ reported that the nominees were recommended by shareholders. A decade ago, only $1 \%$ of new director recommendations came from shareholders.
» New directors have an average age of 57.3. The oldest new director is 73 ; the youngest is 28 .

## MORE THAN ONE-THIRD OF NEW DIRECTORS ARE WOMEN; 20\% ARE MINORITY EXECUTIVES

》) Female representation among new directors rose to $36 \%$ in 2017, the highest rate of female representation since 1998 when we began tracking this data for the S\&P 500.
» $20 \%$ are minorities, defined as African-American, Hispanic/Latino or Asian. Individuals of Indian descent have been counted as Asian beginning in 2017, which is consistent with U.S. Census Bureau methodology.
" Eliminating overlap of directors who are both women and minorities, just over $50 \%$ of new directors are female or minority directors, up from $42 \%$ last year.
» New female independent directors are more likely than their male counterparts to be line and functional leaders; $23 \%$ of women are in line or functional roles, compared with $10 \%$ of male directors. Another $16 \%$ of female directors are division or subsidiary presidents, versus $5 \%$ of male directors. By contrast, male directors are significantly more likely than female directors to be active or retired CEOs, chairs, presidents or COOs: $47 \%$ versus $15 \%$.
> New minority directors are more likely than new non-minority directors to be an active CEO/ chair/president/COO/vice chair - $23 \%$ versus $16 \%$ — and also more likely to have an investor/ investment management background - $18 \%$ versus $12 \%$.

## New Director Snapshot



New Director Backgrounds: First-Time Versus Experienced Directors

|  | Firstotime directors | Experienced directors |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Chair/CEO/president/COO | $27 \%$ | $43 \%$ |
| EVPs/SVPs/functional unit heads | $19 \%$ | $11 \%$ |
| Division/subsidiary presidents/heads | $11 \%$ | $7 \%$ |
| Finance management/CFO/treasurers | $7 \%$ | $7 \%$ |
| Investment management/investors | $10 \%$ | $16 \%$ |
| Academics/NFP | $8 \%$ | $4 \%$ |
| Bankers/investment bankers | $6 \%$ | $4 \%$ |
| Government/military | $5 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
| Accountants | $2 \%$ | $4 \%$ |
| Consultants | $2 \%$ | $1 \%$ |
| Lawyers | $1 \%$ | $1 \%$ |
| Others | $2 \%$ | $0 \%$ |

## A DEEPER LOOK: First-time directors

## $45 \%$ of the incoming class of directors are serving on their first public board

» Nearly half, $45 \%$, of the new directors are first-time independent directors, serving on their first public company board, up from $32 \%$ last year. This is the most since we began tracking the data in 2006.
» Nearly two-thirds of first-time directors, $64 \%$, are actively employed, compared with $42 \%$ of experienced directors.
" First-time directors are younger, with an average age of 55.2 , compared with 57.3 for all new directors.
» $42 \%$ of first-time directors are women, compared to $32 \%$ in 2016.
" $21 \%$ of first-time directors are minorities, up from $10 \%$ last year.
» Eliminating overlap, $55 \%$ of first-time directors are female or minorities or both, up from $37 \%$ last year.
» First-time directors are more likely than new directors with previous board experience to be current or former division or subsidiary leaders or functional leaders, but less likely to be CEOs, chairs, presidents or chief operating officers.

## First-Time Director Snapshot

First-time directors

|  |  | 2017 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| New directors elected | 179 | 2016 |
| $\%$ female | $42 \%$ | $32 \%$ |
| $\%$ minority | $21 \%$ | $10 \%$ |
| $\%$ of directors who are female and minority | $8 \%$ | $5 \%$ |
| Percentage of newly elected female or minority directors | $55 \%$ | $37 \%$ |



All New Directors


## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: Board renewal

 Reflecting the growing attention to composition and board succession planning, $89 \%$ of survey respondents said their board has a strategy to encourage regular board refreshment. This compares with $69 \%$ in 2016.For $79 \%$ of respondents, the desire to add new skills to the board is the primary driver of their board succession strategies. Replacing retiring directors and increasing board diversity drive succession strategies for $74 \%$ of respondents.
$87 \%$ said their company's board succession plan includes a matrix of board skills and anticipated timing of director departures/additions. Boards or nominating/governance committees review the succession plan either annually ( $38 \%$ ) or semiannually ( $19 \%$ ), while $43 \%$ say the board reviews the succession plan as needed.

Wish list for new director backgrounds*

| Women | $75 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Minority | $69 \%$ |
| Financial expertise | $62 \%$ |
| Active CEO/COO | $58 \%$ |
| Retired CEO/COO | $56 \%$ |
| Global perspective | $52 \%$ |
| Technology expertise | $50 \%$ |
| Specific industry expertise | $29 \%$ |
| Regulatory/government experience | $29 \%$ |
| Digital/social media expertise | $23 \%$ |
| Cybersecurity expertise | $23 \%$ |
| Marketing expertise | $21 \%$ |
| Other | $15 \%$ |

$N=52$ survey respondents
*Percentages add up to more than 100 as respondents could select more than one category.

## Director recruiting profiles

Boards continue to prioritize the recruitment of women when adding directors: $75 \%$ of respondents said their boards are seeking female directors, compared with $64 \%$ last year. Minority directors also are in demand, with $69 \%$ looking for minority directors, versus $55 \%$ last year.

Other recruiting priorities are directors with financial expertise ( $62 \%$ of respondents), and active and retired CEOs/COOs ( $58 \%$ and $56 \%$, respectively).

Interest in recruiting directors with technology, digital and marketing expertise is on the rise, the survey found. $50 \%$ said technology expertise was on their board's wish list, versus $44 \%$ last year. We also saw an increase in demand for digital and social media expertise ( $23 \%$ versus $21 \%$ ) and marketing expertise ( $21 \%$ versus $19 \%$ ). Demand for cybersecurity experts rose to $23 \%$ from $19 \%$ last year.

Data in this and other sections labeled "Added Perspective" come from our governance survey, conducted in the second quarter of 2017. This year, we heard from 65 S $\mathcal{P} 500$ companies. Respondents include corporate secretaries, general counsel and chief governance officers.

## GLOBAL EXPERIENCE CONTINUES TO BE IN DEMAND

" $8 \%$ of new independent directors are from outside the U.S.
» $29 \%$ of new directors have global professional experience - defined in this report as having worked at an international location. New directors have working experience in diverse global locations, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Mexico, Singapore and the United Kingdom.

## DEMAND FOR FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES GROWS

» Demand for financial backgrounds has been growing in recent years; 29\% of new directors are active or retired executives with banking, finance, investment or accounting credentials, compared with $25 \%$ last year and $19 \%$ in 2007. In particular, we are seeing an increase in directors coming from investing and investment management, which account for $13 \%$ of new directors, up from $5 \%$ a decade ago.

》 $36 \%$ of new directors are active or retired CEOs, chairs, presidents and chief operating officers, which represents a slight decline from $38 \%$ last year. Ten years ago, $47 \%$ of new directors were active or retired executives in these roles.

》 Just over half (53\%) of new independent directors are active senior executives and professionals, the same as in 2016. Over the past decade, however, we have seen a decline in the number of actively employed executives taking on outside board appointments; active executives made up $62 \%$ of new directors in 2012 and $71 \%$ in 2007.

## New Independent Director Functional Backgrounds*

|  | Year |  |  | 2017 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2017 | 2012 | 2007 | Men | Women |
| CEO/chair/president/ COO/vice chair | 36\% | 41\% | 47\% | 47\% | 15\% |
| Active | 18\% | 25\% | 33\% | 22\% | 9\% |
| Retired | 18\% | 16\% | 14\% | 25\% | 6\% |
| Other corporate executives | 24\% | 22\% | 21\% | 15\% | 39\% |
| Financial backgrounds | 29\% | 22\% | 19\% | 27\% | 31\% |
| Financial executives/CFO/ treasurers | 8\% | 9\% | 8\% | 6\% | 10\% |
| Bankers/investment bankers | 5\% | 3\% | 5\% | 3\% | 7\% |
| Investment managers/investors | 13\% | 8\% | 5\% | 15\% | 11\% |
| Public accounting executives** | 3\% | 2\% | 1\% | 3\% | 3\% |
| Academics/nonprofit | 5\% | 7\% | 7\% | 4\% | 9\% |
| Consultants | 1\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 1\% |
| Lawyers | 2\% | 1\% | 2\% | 1\% | 1\% |
| Others*** | 3\% | 5\% | 2\% | 4\% | 4\% |

$\mathrm{N}=255$ men and 142 women in 2017
*Except where noted, all include both active and retired executives.
**All former partners or executives of public accounting firms.
***Includes former government employees, medical executives, a real estate broker, a sports/entertainment agent, among others.

## MORE NEW DIRECTORS HAVE TECH, PRIVATE EQUITY BACKGROUNDS

» $19 \%$ of new independent directors have backgrounds in the technology or telecommunications industries. Other top industry backgrounds for new independent directors are private equity/investment management, consumer goods and services, and financial services, representing $12 \%, 11 \%$ and $11 \%$ of new director backgrounds, respectively. Among new minority directors, $27 \%$ have a tech/telecom background versus $18 \%$ of new non-minority directors.

## New Independent Director Top Industry Backgrounds

|  | Year |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2017 | 2012 | 2007 |
| High tech/telecom | 19\% | 12\% | 11\% |
| Private equity/investment management | 12\% | 7\% | 6\% |
| Consumer goods \& services | 11\% | 18\% | 18\% |
| Financial services | 11\% | 9\% | 12\% |
| Energy/utilities/oil \& gas | 8\% | 8\% | 3\% |
| Industrial/manufacturing | 8\% | 10\% | 13\% |

## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: Director onboarding

» Presentations by key executives are the most common element of new director onboarding programs; $93 \%$ of survey respondents said such meetings are part of onboarding at their companies. $64 \%$ include site visits in their onboarding programs, and $23 \%$ said new directors participate in third-party development/education. $14 \%$ require new board members to attend all committee meetings during their first year.
» It's also common for new directors to meet with key external advisers, including the outside auditor ( $87 \%$ ), compensation adviser ( $58 \%$ ) and outside legal counsel (16\%).

## BOARD SIZE AND INDEPENDENCE REMAIN STABLE

» Boards range in size from five to 18 members and average 10.8 members．The most common board size is 11 ，with $22 \%$ of S\＆P 500 boards being that size．

》 $72 \%$ of S\＆P 500 boards have nine to 12 members today，nearly the same as last year．The number of smaller boards－those with eight or fewer members－continues to decline．Just 10\％of boards fall within this range，compared with $12 \%$ last year．

》 By contrast，the number of larger boards appears to be ticking up； $18 \%$ have 13 or more members， compared with $16 \%$ last year and $14 \%$ five years ago．The majority of these larger boards have 13 or 14 members．
» The two largest boards have 18 members apiece，while the two smallest boards have five directors each．

## Board Size



》 Independent directors make up $85 \%$ of all S\＆P 500 board members，the same as last year．In 2007， $80 \%$ of directors were independent．The ratio of independent directors to non－independent directors on S\＆P 500 boards is 5.7 to 1 ，with boards averaging 9.2 independent directors and 1.6 non－independent directors．

》 As boards have become more independent over time，the CEO is likely to be the only non－independent director on most boards；this is the case for $60 \%$ of S\＆P 500 boards in 2017 ，compared with $43 \%$ a decade ago．

## ANNUAL DIRECTOR ELECTIONS BECOME THE STANDARD

＂Directors stand for election by shareholders on an annual basis on $92 \%$ of boards，unchanged from last year．The remaining boards have three－year terms．
» In line with governance best practices，many boards have implemented declassified board structures in recent years； $62 \%$ of boards in 2007 and $83 \%$ in 2012 had annual director elections．
» We also have seen an increase in boards establishing policies that require directors to offer their resignations if they fail to receive a majority vote from shareholders； $89 \%$ of boards have such policies today，up from $84 \%$ in 2012 ．While these policies have become widespread，boards retain the discretion to accept or decline a director＇s resignation．

## RESIGNATION POLICIES FOR CHANGING DIRECTOR STATUS

## ARE PREVALENT

" Consistent with the past several years, $86 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards have a provision in their corporate governance guidelines requiring directors who experience a change in employment status or significant change in job responsibilities to notify the chair and/or the nominating committee and offer their resignation from the board. Typically, the chair or nominating committee has the discretion to accept or decline the resignation.
» $36 \%$ of boards report having a policy requiring the CEO to submit his or her resignation from the board when the CEO's employment with the company ends. In all cases, however, boards retain the discretion to accept or decline the resignation. This provision is largely unchanged from 2012, when $34 \%$ of boards had such a policy.

## MOST BOARDS RESTRICT DIRECTORS' ADDITIONAL BOARD ACTIVITY

» Limitations on directors' additional board activity have become more common, and more restrictive about the number of additional boards on which a director may serve. Today, more than three-quarters of S\&P 500 boards ( $77 \%$ ) have established some limit on their directors' ability to accept other corporate directorships, an increase from $55 \%$ in 2007.
» $64 \%$ of boards set a numerical limit for other board service applying to all directors; of those, $4 \%$ cap additional directorships at two, $36 \%$ at three, $49 \%$ at four, and $11 \%$ at five or six. Five years ago, $24 \%$ of boards with limits capped corporate directorships at five or six.
» $41 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards restrict the number of other audit committees on which their members may serve; $99 \%$ of these boards allow audit committee members to serve on up to two other audit committees. The other $1 \%$ allow audit committee members to serve on up to three other audit committees.
" $24 \%$ of boards set restrictions for directors who are public company CEOs or are otherwise fully employed; most often, these directors are limited to two other public company boards. No board allows directors who are employed executives to serve on more than three additional boards.
» Only $22 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards set a specific limit in their corporate governance guidelines on the CEO's outside board service; $65 \%$ of those boards limit CEOs to two outside boards, and $32 \%$ set the limit at one outside board. One board does not allow the company CEO to serve on any outside corporate boards, and two boards allow their CEO to serve on three outside corporate boards.
" Among the 177 boards that do not specify a limit on other corporate directorships, $90 \%$ require directors to notify the chair prior to accepting an invitation to join another company board and/or encourage directors to "reasonably limit" their other board service.

## THE AVERAGE INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR SERVES ON TWO PUBLIC CORPORATE BOARDS

» S\&P 500 independent directors serve on 2.1 public corporate boards on average, which has been consistent for five years.
» $64 \%$ of independent directors have two or more public board affiliations; $11 \%$ have four or more. Eight directors (less than $1 \%$ ) serve on six boards.

Number of Corporate Board Affiliations for Independent Directors


## SMALL DECLINE IN AVERAGE TENURE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS

» The average tenure of independent directors on S\&P 500 boards is 8.2 years, a slight decrease from 8.6 five years ago. The median tenure has declined as well in that time, from 8.4 to 8.0. When non-independent directors (such as the CEO) are included, the average tenure is 8.7.
» On the majority of boards, $62 \%$, the average tenure of independent directors ranges from six to 10 years.
» $19 \%$ of boards have an average tenure of 1 ו or more years, compared with $22 \%$ in $2012.19 \%$ have an average tenure of five years or less, up from $14 \%$ five years ago.
» The longest average board tenure is 19 years, and the longest-tenured independent director has served 43 years.
》 $36 \%$ of independent directors have served on their boards for five years or less, $25 \%$ have served for 6-10 years, and $21 \%$ for $11-15$ years. $18 \%$ of independent directors have served on their boards for 16 years or more.

Average Board Tenure


## DIRECTOR TERM LIMITS REMAIN RARE TOOL FOR PROMOTING TURNOVER

» 24 S\&P 500 boards, $5 \%$, specify a term limit for non-executive directors, a modest increase from last year when 19 boards ( $4 \%$ ) had director term limits. $65 \%$ of boards explicitly state in their corporate governance guidelines that they do not have term limits, and $30 \%$ do not mention term limits at all.
» Of the 24 boards with a specific term limit, four cap director tenure at 20 years, one at 18 years, 12 at 15 years, five at 12 years, two at 10 years.
» Rather than set term limits or a mandatory retirement age, some boards report that they consider whether individual directors should be re-nominated during the evaluation process.

## Boards with Term Limits

| Company | Term limits | Company | Term limits |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Navient Corporation | 20 years | Signet Jewelers Limited | 15 years |
| Patterson Companies | 20 years | Sysco Corporation | 15 years |
| Target Corporation | 20 years | Varian Medical Systems | 15 years |
| Vertex Pharmaceuticals | 20 years | The Walt Disney Company | 15 years |
| The Procter \& Gamble Company | 18 years | Xcel Energy | 15 years |
| The AES Corporation | 15 years | AvalonBay Communities | 12 years |
| Air Products \& Chemicals | 15 years | CBRE Group | 12 years |
| Alaska Air Group | 15 years | International Flavors \& Fragrances | 12 years |
| General Electric Company | 15 years | Raymond James Financial | 12 years |
| MasterCard | 15 years | Wal-Mart Stores | 12 years |
| Mondelez International | 15 years | Allegion Public Limited Company | 10 years |
| Qorvo | 15 years | Illumina | 10 years |

## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: Director term limits

» Scrutiny of board tenures has increased in recent years, but few boards have established director term limits as a means of encouraging turnover. $12 \%$ of respondents to our governance survey say their boards have term limits today, compared with $4 \%$ last year. Just $3 \%$ report their boards are considering term limits.
» $12 \%$ of respondents report their board is considering other means of ensuring director turnover, such as a mandatory retirement age, annual evaluations and a robust self-assessment process.

## FOR THE FIRST TIME, MORE THAN HALF OF BOARDS WITH MANDATORY RETIREMENT SET IT AT 73 OR OLDER

» About three-quarters ( $73 \%$ ) of S\&P 500 boards report having a mandatory retirement age for directors, which has remained consistent for more than five years. $11 \%$ report that they do not have a mandatory retirement age, and $16 \%$ do not discuss mandatory retirement in their corporate governance guidelines.
" Mandatory retirement ages have been increasing, with nearly all companies that have them (96\%) setting mandatory retirement at 72 or older, compared with $67 \% 10$ years ago.
» Among boards with a retirement age, $42 \%$ set it at 75 or older, an increase from $39 \%$ last year and $11 \%$ in 2007 . Four boards have a retirement age of 80 .
» The most common mandatory retirement age is 72 , set by $44 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards with a retirement age.

## Mandatory Retirement Age

|  | 2017 | 2012 | 2007 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 70 and younger | $4 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $33 \%$ |
| 71 | $0 \%$ | $1 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| 72 | $44 \%$ | $54 \%$ | $52 \%$ |
| 73 | $4 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
| 74 | $6 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
| 75 and older | $42 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $11 \%$ |
| $N=$ Boards that have set a mandatory retirement age: 358 for 2017,354 for 2012,376 for 2007. |  |  |  |

## INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS ARE TWO YEARS OLDER THAN A DECADE AGO

» The average age of S\&P 500 independent directors is 63.1, two years older than the 2007 average of 61.0. In that same period, the median age increased from 61 to 64.
» S\&P 500 independent directors range in age from 28 to 92 . Nearly half ( $49 \%$ ) are 60 to 69 years old, and $19 \%$ are 70 to $79.4 \%$ of directors are younger than 50 .
» The majority of boards have an average age in the 60 s: $45 \%$ of boards have an average age of 60 to 63 , and $39 \%$ have an average age of 64 and older. 12 boards have an average age of 70 or greater.

Ages of Independent Directors

|  |  | Year |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 2017 | 2012 |
| Average age of all independent directors | 63.1 | 62.6 | 61.0 |
| Youngest average board age | 46 | 43 | 49 |
| Oldest average board age | 75 | 72 | 75 |

## Breakdown by Average Age

| 59 and younger | $16 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $28 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 60 to 63 | $45 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $51 \%$ |
| 64 and older | $39 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $21 \%$ |

## FEMALE REPRESENTATION ON BOARDS RISES TO 22\%

» Women now constitute 22 \% of all S\&P 500 directors, increasing from $17 \%$ in 2012 and $16 \%$ in 2007. On average, boards have 2.4 female directors, compared with 1.7 in 2012.
» $80 \%$ of boards include two or more women, which represents a significant increase over the past decade. The number of boards with two or more female directors was $61 \%$ in 2012 and $55 \%$ in 2007. $27 \%$ of boards include three women directors, compared with $15 \%$ of boards in 2007.

》 As of our May 19, 2017, cut-off date, 31 S\&P 500 companies had a woman serving as CEO, compared with 24 in 2016. Female CEOs now represent $6.2 \%$ of S\&P 500 chief executives, the most ever. This compares with $4.1 \%$ in 2012 and $3.1 \%$ in 2007.
» Companies led by women tend to have more female board directors than those led by men: 33\% of directors on boards of companies with a female CEO are women, versus $22 \%$ for companies with a male CEO. When the female CEO is excluded, however, the gap narrows: $26 \%$ of the remaining directors are women.
» Four boards have no female directors, two in the technology sector, one in healthcare and one in industrials.

## A DEEPER LOOK: Board diversity at the top 200 companies

## Small increase in minority representation since last year

> Despite increased attention to the topic of board diversity, minority representation (defined as men and women who are African-American, Asian or Hispanic/Latino) is only slowly increasing on the top 200 S\&P 500 boards (by annual revenue). The percentage of minority directors on the boards of these 200 companies rose slightly to $17 \%$ from $16 \%$ last year. Ninety percent ( $90 \%$ ) of the top 200 companies have at least one minority director.
» Representation of African-American and Hispanic/Latino directors at the top 200 S\&P 500 companies has not significantly changed over the past five to 10 years.
$-8.9 \%$ of directors are African-American, compared with $8.7 \%$ in 2012 and $9.1 \%$ in $2007.76 \%$ of boards have at least one African-American director, a decline from $78 \%$ in 2007.

- $4.3 \%$ of directors are Hispanic/Latino, down from $4.6 \%$ in 2012 and up from 3.8\% in 2007. 42\% of boards today have at least one Hispanic/Latino director, a decline from $47 \%$ last year but more than in 2007 (35\%).
> $3.4 \%$ of directors are Asian (including directors of Indian descent), versus $2 \%$ in 2016, and 33\% of boards have one or more Asian directors. Year-over-year comparisons have been adjusted to reflect a methodology change to classify directors of Indian descent as Asian, consistent with U.S. Census Bureau methodology.


## A DEEPER LOOK: Board diversity at the top 200 companies (continued)

Minorities as \% of Directors at Top 200 Boards*


Top 200 Boards with at Least One Minority Director

*Beginning 2017, Asian category includes individuals of Indian descent, consistent with U.S. Census Bureau methodology.

## Few top $\mathbf{2 0 0}$ companies led by minorities

》 As of our May 19, 2017, cut-off date, 18 of the top 200 S\&P companies, $8.5 \%$, were led by AfricanAmerican, Hispanic/Latino or Asian CEOs, four more than in 2016.
» Some companies led by minority CEOs have more minority directors than other companies, while at other companies, the CEO is the only minority director. $23 \%$ of the directors of the companies with minority CEOs are minorities, compared with $16 \%$ of directors of companies with a nonminority CEO. Minority representation in the boardrooms of minority-led companies drops to $16 \%$ when the CEO is excluded.

## A DEEPER LOOK: Board diversity at the top 200 companies (continued)

Just over half of the top $\mathbf{2 0 0}$ companies have directors from outside the U.S.
» Just over half of the top 200 S\&P 500 companies, $52 \%$, have at least one non-U.S. director.
» A total of 1 וקו directors of non-U.S. origin serve on the boards of the top 200 S\&P 500 companies, accounting for $7.3 \%$ of all directors.
» International directors represent 39 different countries, but half of non-U.S. directors come from the following four countries: the U.K. (23\%), Canada (11.5\%), Germany ( $10 \%$ ) and France ( $8 \%$ ).
» Major U.S. companies are much less likely to have non-national directors on their boards than boards in other countries, especially in Europe. In Switzerland, for example, 61\% of Swiss Market Index directors are non-nationals (Spencer Stuart 2017 Switzerland Board Index).

## FEWER CEOS SERVE ON AN OUTSIDE PUBLIC COMPANY BOARD

» $37 \%$ of S\&P 500 CEOs serve on at least one public company board in addition to their own board, a $14 \%$ decrease from 2016 and the lowest we have seen. In 2007, more than half of CEOs, $52 \%$, served on at least one additional public board.
» $33 \%$ of CEOs serve on one public board, and $4 \%$ serve on two. CEOs serve on an average of 0.4 other corporate boards, compared with 0.8 in 2007.

## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: CEO succession planning
" The majority of boards, $69 \%$, formally discuss CEO succession annually, according to our governance survey. $20 \%$ of respondents say their board has formal discussions about CEO succession two or three times a year, and $9 \%$ of boards address succession four or more times per year. $2 \%$ address succession less than once a year.
» $74 \%$ of boards have both contingency and long-term succession plans in place, while $21 \%$ have a contingency succession plan only. Two companies have no CEO succession plan in place.
» Boards use several approaches for evaluating succession candidates' readiness for the CEO role. $85 \%$ are briefed on candidates' specific gaps in readiness. $75 \%$ said their process includes formal assessments of internal successor candidates, and $72 \%$ said their boards are familiar with the development plans for potential successors. $66 \%$ - compared with $53 \%$ last year — said the board defines the desired future criteria for the CEO profile as part of its process.
» $28 \%$ said the process for reviewing potential internal successors is supported by an external adviser.
» All of the boards participating in our survey rely on regular interactions during board meetings and presentations to get to know internal succession candidates. $30 \%$ schedule individual meetings between board members and candidates, and $6 \%$ use formal board mentor assignments to become more familiar with potential candidates.
» In the majority of cases (71\%), the outgoing CEO is responsible for onboarding the new CEO. Also taking the lead in new CEO onboarding are the lead director ( $52 \%$ ) and board chair ( $43 \%$ ).

## FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE MAJORITY OF BOARDS SPLIT THE CHAIR AND CEO ROLES

》 $51 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards split the chair and CEO roles between two individuals, compared with $48 \%$ last year. The trend toward separating the roles has been growing steadily for more than a decade. In 2007, $35 \%$ of boards divided the roles.
> $28 \%$ of boards, versus $27 \%$ in 2016, have a truly independent chair - a director who meets the applicable NYSE or NASDAQ rules for independence. The number of independent chairs has remained steady over the past several years, but a decade ago, just $13 \%$ of boards had independent chairs.
> $6 \%$ of board chairs are the former company CEO.
» Among the 106 boards where the chair is separate but not independent, 97 ( $92 \%$ ) have identified a lead or presiding independent director.

## Chair's Relationship with the Company



## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: The chair and CEO split

» $7 \%$ of respondents to our governance survey said their board separated the roles of chair and CEO in the past proxy year, while $31 \%$ said their board has discussed splitting the roles within the next five years. Boards are most likely to split the roles when bringing on a new CEO.
» Of those that have not already separated the chair and CEO roles, $14 \%$ said the board has discussed splitting the roles in the near future.

## MORE THAN HALF OF INDEPENDENT CHAIRS ARE RETIRED SENIOR EXECUTIVES

》 $56 \%$ of the 137 independent chairs of S\&P 500 companies are retired chairs, vice chairs, presidents or CEOs, compared with $51 \%$ last year. Only six independent chairs, or $4 \%$, are active executives in a chair, vice chair, president or CEO role outside of their independent chair responsibility. This includes three private company CEOs, two public company CEOs and one chair of a public company.
» $13 \%$ of the independent chairs are investors or investment managers, and another $12 \%$ are financial executives and bankers/investment bankers.
» Independent chairs are three years older on average than their fellow directors: 66.4 versus 63.1 .
» Nine women serve as independent chairs, $7 \%$ of all independent chairs.

Independent Chair Backgrounds


" Independent board chairs have an average tenure of 4.1 years. $58 \%$ have been in the role for three years or less, including $28 \%$ who have served as chair for one year or less. On the other end of the spectrum, $29 \%$ have served in their roles for six or more years.
> $85 \%$ of the independent chairs previously served as a director on the board before becoming chair, serving 7.9 years on average before moving into the chair role. Last year, $92 \%$ of independent chairs were on the board prior to becoming chair.

## Independent Chair Tenure



## MOST BOARDS HAVE A LEAD OR PRESIDING DIRECTOR, BUT NUMBERS DECLINING

> $84 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards report having an independent lead or presiding director; $2 \%$ of these boards rotate the role among independent directors or committee chairs.
» The number of lead and presiding directors has declined slightly over the past decade as more boards named independent chairs. 94\% of S\&P 500 boards had a lead or presiding director in 2007.
» Lead directors have become preferred over presiding directors during the past 10 years; of the 412 boards with one of these positions, $74 \%$ have lead directors and $26 \%$ have presiding directors, including those identified as "chair" of executive sessions; this compares with $40 \%$ and $60 \%$, respectively, in 2007.
> $47 \%$ of the independent chairs are also named as the lead or presiding director. Another five boards report having a lead/presiding director in addition to the independent chair.
> Nine S\&P 500 boards do not report having a form of independent board leadership - neither an independent chair nor a lead/presiding director. Often, this is a temporary situation during a leadership transition or restructuring.

## Lead Versus Presiding Directors

|  | 2017 | 2012 | 2007 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Lead directors | $74 \%$ | $58 \%$ | $40 \%$ |
| Presiding directors | $26 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $60 \%$ |

» Among the 336 boards ( $82 \%$ ) that disclosed how long their lead/presiding director has been serving in the role, the average tenure is 3.8 years. $29 \%$ have served in the role one year or less, $41 \%$ have served for two to four years, and $30 \%$ have been serving for five years or more. $9 \%$ have a tenure of 10 or more years.
» Retired CEOs, presidents and/or chairs are most likely to serve as a lead or presiding director; 48\% of lead/presiding directors are retired senior executives. $12 \%$ are investors or investment managers, and another $11 \%$ are active or retired other corporate executives. Only $9 \%$ of lead/presiding directors are active CEOs, presidents and/or chairs.

## Lead and Presiding Director Backgrounds*

```
                                    48% Retired chair/president/CEO/COO/vice chair
```



```
12\% Investor/investment manager
\(11 \%\) Other corporate executive
\(9 \%\) Active chair/president/CEO/COO/vice chair
5\% Academic/nonprofit
5\% Banker/investment banker
4\% Financial executive/CFO/treasurer/public accounting executive
4\% Consultant/other
2\% - Lawyer
```

[^1]
## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: Lead director

" Among boards with a lead or presiding director, the majority (58\%) have not established a term length; $19 \%$ have one-year term lengths for the position and $8 \%$ have three-year terms. Other approaches include a three-to-five-year term guideline and a two-year term with the option to renew for an additional two-year term.
» $96 \%$ said the lead/presiding director's term is renewable.
» $71 \%$ of respondents said the lead/presiding director is selected by the full board. At other boards, the lead/presiding director is chosen by independent directors (16\%) or the nominating and governance committee ( $14 \%$ ).

## Board Organization and Process

S\&P 500 boards<br>have an average<br>of

## 2017 Snapshot

## $37 \%$ lisclose that they evaluate



## 32\%

of audit committee chairs are active/retired financial executives

## SMALL DECLINE IN THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF BOARD MEETINGS

» Boards met an average of 8.2 times, down from 8.4 last year. The annual meeting average includes regularly scheduled meetings and special meetings. These meetings may be in-person or telephonic.
» The majority of boards, $51 \%$, met six to nine times. Nine boards met 19 times or more.

Distribution of Board Meetings*


[^2]
## MOST BOARDS HAVE AT LEAST FOUR COMMITTEES

» S\&P 500 boards have an average of 4.2 standing committees and a median of four committees, which has remained consistent during the past decade.
» $74 \%$ have more than the three NYSE-mandated committees (compensation, audit and nominating/governance). One-third have five or more committees.
» The most common committees beyond the compensation, audit and nominating committees are the executive committee and finance committee.
» Several committees have become more prevalent in the past 10 years, including risk; science \& technology; and environment, health \& safety committees. In 2007, for example, $3 \%$ of boards had a risk committee, compared with $11 \%$ today. By contrast, the number of boards with public policy/social \& corporate responsibility committees has declined somewhat.

## Number of Standing Committees



## Prevalence and Independence of Standing Committees

|  | \% with this committee |  | \% composed entirely of independent directors |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2017 | 2012 | 2017 | 2012 |
| Audit | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% |
| Compensation | 100\%* | 100\% | 99.6\% | 99.6\% |
| Nominating/governance | 99.6\%** | 99.2\% | 99.2\% | 99.6\% |
| Executive | 32\% | 35\% | 1\% | 4\% |
| Finance*** | 32\% | 34\% | 76\% | 73\% |
| Risk | 11\% | 8\% | 79\% | 62\% |
| Science \& technology | 10\% | 7\% | 92\% | 78\% |
| Public policy/social \& corporate responsibility | 9\% | 12\% | 86\% | 79\% |
| Environment, health \& safety | 9\% | 7\% | 87\% | 84\% |
| Legal/compliance | 6\% | 5\% | 93\% | 87\% |
| Strategy \& planning | 2\% | 4\% | 78\% | 47\% |
| Investment/pension | 3\% | 3\% | 69\% | 79\% |
| Acquisitions/corporate development | 1\% | 1\% | 40\% | 57\% |

* 12 boards have a combined compensation and nominating committee. They are counted as separate committees for the purpose of this analysis.
**Includes one board with a standing corporate governance committee in addition to the nominating committee. Controlled companies are not
required to have nominating committees.
*** 10 boards have a combined finance and risk management committee. They are counted as separate committees for the purpose of this analysis.


## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: Cybersecurity

» Most boards ( $69 \%$ ) assign responsibility for cybersecurity oversight to a board committee, while $26 \%$ say the full board oversees cybersecurity risk.
» $57 \%$ of respondents said the audit committee has oversight over cybersecurity. At other boards, cybersecurity risk is overseen by the risk committee (7\%), technology committee (4\%) or nominating and governance committee ( $2 \%$ ).
» $64 \%$ of respondents said the board or a committee has developed a crisis response plan to a cyber breach within the past year.

## AUDIT COMMITTEES AVERAGE MORE THAN EIGHT MEETINGS

» Audit committees averaged 8.6 meetings, the same as last year, and roughly one meeting less than the 2007 average of 9.5 .
» The majority of S\&P 500 audit committees, $65 \%$, met eight or more times annually, including $22 \%$ that met 1 וn times or more.
» Compensation and nominating committees met less often than audit committees, averaging 6.0 and 4.7 annual meetings, respectively.
» $45 \%$ of compensation committees held five or six annual meetings.
» $80 \%$ of nominating/governance committees met five times or fewer annually.

## Distribution of Committee Meetings*

|  | Audit committee | Compensation committee | Nominating/governance committee |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 3 or fewer meetings | $1 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $22 \%$ |
| 4 | $6 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $31 \%$ |
| 5 | $9 \%$ | $25 \%$ | $27 \%$ |
| 6 | $10 \%$ | $20 \%$ | $11 \%$ |
| 7 | $9 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
| $8-10$ | $43 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $6 \%$ |
| $11-13$ | $17 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| 14 or more | $5 \%$ | $1 \%$ | $1 \%$ |
| Average | 8.6 | 6.0 | 4.7 |
| Median | 9.0 | 6.0 | 4.0 |
| Maximum | 20 | 19 | 22 |

*Includes in-person and telephonic regular and special meetings.

## NEARLY ONE-THIRD OF AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIRS HAVE CORPORATE FINANCE BACKGROUNDS

" $32 \%$ of audit committee chairs are active/retired financial executives, including CFOs and treasurers, an increase from $28 \%$ last year and $13 \%$ in 2007. Retired CEOs, chairs, presidents and COOs make up the next largest source ( $25 \%$ ), followed by retired public accounting executives ( $11 \%$ ).
» By comparison, just 7\% of S\&P 500 audit committee chairs are fully employed/active CEOs, chairs, presidents and COOs, compared with $18 \%$ a decade ago.
» Retired CEOs, chairs, presidents and COOs are the most common backgrounds of compensation and nominating/governance committee chairs; $38 \%$ of compensation chairs and $33 \%$ of nominating/ governance committee chairs are retired executives in these roles.
" Active CEOs and other top senior executives are somewhat more likely to serve as chair of the compensation and nominating/governance committees than the audit committee. $14 \%$ of directors with these profiles serve as compensation committee chair, and $11 \%$ as nominating/governance committee chair.
» The representation of women in committee leadership roles increased since last year. Women now chair $20 \%$ of audit committees, $17 \%$ of compensation committees and $22 \%$ of nominating committees, compared with $15 \%, 11 \%$ and $20 \%$, respectively, last year.

## Committee Chair Backgrounds*

|  |  | $\%$ of chair" |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Audit <br> committee | Compensation <br> committee | Nominating/governance <br> committee |
| Retired chair/president/CEO/vice chair | $25 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $33 \%$ |
| Active chair/president/CEO/vice chair | $7 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $11 \%$ |
| Financial executive/CFO/treasurer | $32 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
| Retired public accounting executive | $11 \%$ | $1 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| Investor/investment manager | $6 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $14 \%$ |
| Other corporate executive | $9 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $14 \%$ |
| Academic/nonprofit | $3 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $9 \%$ |
| Consultant | $2 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $5 \%$ |
| Banker/investment banker | $5 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $4 \%$ |
| Lawyer | $0 \%$ | $1 \%$ | $5 \%$ |
| Other | $0 \%$ | 480 | $3 \%$ |
| Total number of committee chairs | 481 | 478 |  |
| listed in proxies |  |  |  |

*Except where noted, all categories include active and retired executives.
**Columns may not total $100 \%$ due to rounding.

## NEARLY ALL BOARDS DISCLOSE AN ANNUAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

» $98 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards - all but nine - disclose that they conduct some sort of annual performance evaluation.
» Consistent with the past five years, the majority, $54 \%$, report that their boards evaluate the full board and committees, and one-third ( $33 \%$ ) report evaluating the full board, committees and individual directors annually.
» Twelve boards disclosed that they engaged an independent third party to facilitate and conduct all or a portion of the evaluation process.

## Board, Committee and Director Evaluations



54\% Full board and committees
$33 \%$ Full board, committees and directors
9\% Full board only
4\% Full board and directors
$\mathrm{N}=482$ companies; 9 others did not mention evaluations in their proxies or corporate governance guidelines.

## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey:

 Board evaluations" $98 \%$ of governance survey respondents report that they assess the full board and board committees, an increase from 66\% last year.
" 43\% say their board assessments include self-appraisals, and 25\% include peer evaluations. $8 \%$ take other approaches, such as individual director interviews with the chair, lead director or head of the governance committee.
» The nominating and governance committee conducts board evaluations for $67 \%$ of the boards responding to our survey. The lead director oversees evaluations at $49 \%$ of boards.

Areas of improvement based upon the last annual board evaluation

| Board meeting agendas (allocation of meeting time) | $58 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Board skills | $34 \%$ |
| Use of executive sessions | $30 \%$ |
| Informal board time (e.g., board dinners) | $26 \%$ |
| Board oversight of risk | $24 \%$ |
| Frequency and/or length of board meetings | $24 \%$ |
| CEO succession planning process | $20 \%$ |
| The board assessment process | $18 \%$ |
| Shareholder engagement | $10 \%$ |
| Board renewal mechanism (e.g., retirement age, term limits) | $8 \%$ |
| CEO evaluations | $8 \%$ |
| Board size | $4 \%$ |
| Other | $10 \%$ |
| $\mathrm{~N}=50$ |  |

## ADDED PERSPECTIVE (continued)

» Most boards (65\%) do not engage third parties to support board assessment. $16 \%$ said they use a third party every year, and 6\% do every third year. 12\% engage third parties as needed.
» This year, our governance survey also asked about the changes or improvements boards made based on their annual board evaluation. The majority (58\%) have made changes to board meeting agendas or the allocation of meeting time. Other areas where boards say they made improvements include: board skills (34\%), use of executive sessions (30\%), informal board time such as board dinners (26\%), board oversight of risk (24\%) and CEO succession planning (20\%).

## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: Shareholder engagement

» According to our governance survey, interactions between shareholders and boards are on the rise; $55 \%$ of respondents, versus $39 \%$ last year, said they were contacted formally by large institutional investors and/or largest shareholders specifically regarding a governance-related topic.
» Eighty-two percent of respondents said management or the board proactively reached out to the company's large shareholders. The most common topics about which companies proactively engaged with shareholders were "say on pay" and environmental/social/ governance (ESG) issues (48\% each), followed by board refreshment (43\%).
» As in past years, public and private pension funds were the most likely to initiate contact with boards, accounting for $40 \%$ of shareholder inquiries. Pension funds were most likely to contact boards about sustainability and board refreshment.
» Inquiries from mutual funds, which represented $23 \%$ of shareholder contacts tended to be about sustainability, board refreshment/composition and shareholder engagement.

## Issues formally raised by shareholders in 2017

| ESG/Sustainability | $18 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Board refreshment | $13 \%$ |
| Director tenure | $9 \%$ |
| CEO compensation | $8 \%$ |
| Shareholder engagement approach | $8 \%$ |
| Proxy access | $7 \%$ |
| Disclosure of political contributions/activities | $7 \%$ |
| Independent board chair | $6 \%$ |
| Say on pay | $6 \%$ |
| Company strategy | $5 \%$ |
| Director slate | $5 \%$ |
| Strategic alternatives (e.g., M\&A, divestiture) | $3 \%$ |
| Director compensation | $1 \%$ |
| Other | $4 \%$ |

## Sources of shareholder contacts

| Public/private pension fund | $40 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Mutual fund | $23 \%$ |
| Activist shareholder | $14 \%$ |
| Hedge fund/private equity | $8 \%$ |
| Other | $15 \%$ |

## ADDED PERSPECTIVE (continued)

» Amid growing interest by shareholders in board composition, 8\% of survey respondents reported that their companies' large institutional shareholders recommended changes to board composition, an increase from 3\% last year.
» For most companies responding to the survey, the CEO is responsible for representing the board in non-routine matters with the public and investors: $58 \%$ said the chair/CEO had the responsibility for representing the board, and $28 \%$ said the CEO had the responsibility when there was a separate chair (versus just $14 \%$ of non-CEO chair). $31 \%$ said the lead director represented the board with investors and the public.
» $41 \%$ said directors engage directly with shareholders.

## Director Compensation


$\int \frac{0}{\text { of S\&P } 500 \text { boards }}$
provide stock grants
to directors in addition
to a cash retainer

## 68 <br> S\&P 500 boards (14\%) paid board meeting attendance fees in 2017 - a $16 \%$ decrease

The average annual retainer for S\&P 500 directors is $\$ 120,409$


## AVERAGE TOTAL DIRECTOR COMPENSATION GROWS BY 1\% TO JUST UNDER \$290,000

" The average total compensation for S\&P 500 directors rose $1 \%$ from $\$ 285,065$ in 2016 to $\$ 288,909$. When premium compensation for the independent chair is excluded, the average total compensation per director falls to $\$ 286,119$.
» Stock grants and cash represent the largest share of average director compensation, $56 \%$ and $38 \%$, respectively. Stock option grants comprise $4 \%$ of total director compensation.
" The composition of equity awards has shifted somewhat in the past five years, with fewer companies awarding options and more awarding other forms of stock-based pay. In 2012,50\% of director compensation was paid in stock awards and $8 \%$ in option grants.
» $74 \%$ of boards have deferred compensation plans.

## Breakdown of Director Compensation*


*Based on non-employee director compensation tables in 491 proxies for fiscal year 2017. Includes all board and committee retainers and meeting fees, non-executive chair and lead/presiding director supplemental fees when applicable, the value of equity compensation and all other compensation paid to non-employee directors in 2016. Retiring and new directors are included when paid compensation for at least three quarters of the year.
**Includes deferred compensation amounts.
***Includes, for example, insurance premiums, charitable award programs and incremental cost to company of products provided.

## Changes in Non-Employee Director Compensation

|  | \% of boards paying this type |  | Average paid |  | \% of change in value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Type of compensation | 2017 | 2012 | 2017 | 2012 | 2012-17 |
| Board retainer* | 99.4\% | 99.2\% | \$120,409 | \$96,649 | 25\% |
| Board meeting fee | 14\% | 33\% | \$2,197 | \$2,244 | -2\% |
| Committee chair retainer*** | 96\% | 92\% | \$20,443 | \$17,873 | 14\% |
| Committee member retainer** | 45\% | 38\% | \$11,560 | \$10,202 | 13\% |
| Committee member meeting fee*** | 19\% | 33\% | \$1,653 | \$1,703 | -3\% |
| Stock option program | 13\% | 25\% | \$109,100** | n/a | n/a |
| Stock grants paid in addition to retainer | 77\% | 76\% | \$157,624********) | $\mathrm{n} / \mathrm{a}$ | n/a |

*Dollar amounts for retainer do not include boards that do not pay a retainer or boards that do not provide a dollar-value equivalent for the retainer equity amount.
**Represents an average for audit, compensation and nominating/governance committees. Past indexes reported the lowest committee average.
***Forty out of 63 companies reporting a stock option program and 349 of 379 companies reporting stock grants in addition to a retainer disclosed a value.

## 2\% INCREASE IN AVERAGE ANNUAL BOARD RETAINER

» The average annual retainer for S\&P 500 directors is \$120,409, which is about $2 \%$ more than in 2016 and $76 \%$ more than in 2007, before adjusting for inflation. During the past decade, one-year increases have ranged from as little as $1 \%$ to as much as $11 \%$.
" $52 \%$ of boards provide an annual retainer of \$100,000 or more, up from 14\% in 2007. 19\% provide annual retainers of $\$ 200,000$ or more, compared with $4 \%$ of boards a decade ago.
" Two companies pay an annual retainer of $\$ 325,000$, which is paid partly in equity. Three companies provide no retainer; one of these pays $\$ 900$ per meeting, one pays $\$ 15,000$ per meeting (not to exceed $\$ 60,000$ per year), and one only provides a stock option grant.

## Annual Retainers



## USE OF MEETING FEES FOR DIRECTOR COMPENSATION

## CONTINUES DECLINE

» Only 68 S\＆P 500 boards（14\％）pay board meeting attendance fees in 2017，down from 16\％last year， and $52 \%$ in 2007.

》 The average board meeting attendance fee is \＄2，197 and fees range from a low of \＄900 to a high of $\$ 15,000$ at one company，where meeting fees were paid in lieu of a retainer and capped at $\$ 60,000$ per year． $35 \%$ of companies pay $\$ 1,500$ per meeting， $31 \%$ pay $\$ 2,000$ and $21 \%$ pay more than $\$ 2,000$ ．

## THREE－QUARTERS OF BOARDS GRANT STOCK TO DIRECTORS

## AS PART OF COMPENSATION

》 $77 \%$ of S\＆P 500 boards provide stock grants to directors in addition to a cash retainer，compared with $72 \%$ a decade ago．The average targeted dollar value of annual stock grants is $\$ 157,624$ ．

》 By comparison，stock options for directors have become much less common． $13 \%$ of S\＆P 500 companies now offer option plans，compared with $42 \%$ in 2007．The average targeted value of annual stock option grants is $\$ 109,100$ ．
＂Eight boards，2\％of the total，pay director retainers fully in stock；another pays in stock options．
＂ $91 \%$ of boards disclose having share ownership guidelines for directors，compared with $73 \%$ a decade ago．Typically，these guidelines，which are meant to align directors＇interests with those of shareholders， require directors to own a certain number of shares or a multiple of the retainer value within a specified number of years．

## Equity Compensation

|  | \％of S\＆P 500 boards |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2017 | 2012 | 2007 |
| Stock option program exists | 13\％ | 25\％ | 42\％ |
| Stock grants provided in addition to retainer | 77\％ | 76\％ | 72\％ |
| Stock grants provided as part of retainer | 21\％ | 21\％ | 18\％ |
| Director can elect to receive compensation in cash，stock or stock units | 52\％ | 57\％ | 61\％ |
| Director can elect to receive compensation in stock options | 3\％ | 5\％ | 7\％ |
| Retainer paid fully in stock | 2\％ | 2\％ | 3\％ |

## NEARLY ALL BOARDS PROVIDE A PREMIUM FOR BOARD

## LEADERSHIP SERVICE

》 $96 \%$ of the 137 independent chairs of S\＆P 500 boards receive an additional fee，which ranges from $\$ 25,000$ to $\$ 500,000$ and averages $\$ 162,751$ ．The median premium paid to independent chairs is $\$ 150,000$ ．

》 $66 \%$ of the S\＆P 500 boards with a lead or presiding director provide additional compensation to directors serving in those roles．
» Lead directors are more likely than presiding directors to receive additional compensation：81\％versus $24 \%$ ．The average lead director premium is $\$ 36,868,37 \%$ higher than the $\$ 26,840$ average premium for presiding directors．The average compensation for presiding directors declined by $16 \%$ since last year， while the average for lead directors increased by $10 \%$ ．

## MORE BOARDS PAY A PREMIUM FOR CHAIRING THE

## COMPENSATION COMMITTEE

» $96 \%$ of S\＆P 500 boards included in our study provide a retainer to committee chairs，an increase from $92 \%$ five years ago．Among these boards， $88 \%$ pay a higher retainer to the audit committee chair，and $70 \%$ pay more to the compensation committee chair．That represents a significant increase from last year，when $58 \%$ provided a premium to compensation committee chairs．
）Retainers for audit and compensation committee chairs average $\$ 25,163$ and $\$ 19,983$ ，respectively．The average retainer for nominating committee chairs is $\$ 16,184$ ．
» The lowest committee chair retainer is \＄4，000，while the highest committee chair retainer－paid to an audit chair－is \＄75，000．

## COMPENSATION FOR COMMITTEE SERVICE HAS BECOME MORE COMMON

》 $45 \%$ of boards pay a retainer for committee member service，versus $38 \%$ five years ago．
» $87 \%$ provide a different retainer for audit committee service，which averages $\$ 13,446$ ．
» $46 \%$ of boards now provide a higher premium for compensation committee service，an increase from $39 \%$ last year and $32 \%$ in 2012．The average compensation committee member retainer is $\$ 11,801$ ．
＞ $45 \%$ of boards provide a retainer to nominating committee members，averaging \＄9，434．

## Committee Retainers

|  | Average committee retainers |  | \％of boards paying this type |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2017 | 2012 | 2017 | 2012 |
| All committee members | \＄11，560 | \＄10，202 | 45\％ | 38\％ |
| Audit committee members | \＄13，446 | \＄11，503 | 87\％ | 88\％ |
| Compensation committee members | \＄11，801 | \＄10，915 | 46\％ | 32\％ |
| Nominating committee members | \＄9，434 | \＄8，189 | 45\％ | 38\％ |
| All committee chairs | \＄20，443 | \＄17，872 | 96\％ | 92\％ |
| Audit committee chairs | \＄25，163 | \＄22，504 | 88\％ | 86\％ |
| Compensation committee chairs | \＄19，983 | \＄18，079 | 70\％ | 45\％ |
| Nominating committee chairs | \＄16，184 | \＄13，035 | 96\％ | 92\％ |

## USE OF COMMITTEE MEETING FEES CONTINUES TO DECLINE

》 Similar to board meeting attendance fees, committee meeting fees have declined as a component of director compensation. $19 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards pay committee meeting fees, compared with $33 \%$ five years ago. The average committee meeting fee is $\$ 1,653$.
» Only three boards (less than 1\%) pay meeting fees to committee chairs, compared with $3 \%$ five years ago. The average chair committee meeting fee is $\$ 2,550$.

## DIRECTOR COMPENSATION IN HEALTHCARE SECTOR TOPS S\&P 500 AVERAGE BY 23\%

》) Director compensation within the healthcare sector declined by $4 \%$ to $\$ 355,177$ since last year, but it still is $23 \%$ higher than the S\&P 500 average. By contrast, the $\$ 242,009$ average paid to directors in the real estate sector, which has the lowest average compensation of all sectors, is $16 \%$ less than the S\&P 500 average.
» Cash represents a larger share of compensation in industry sectors such as utilities and telecommunication services, $47 \%$ and $44 \%$, respectively, and a smaller share in the healthcare and information technology sectors, $32 \%$ and $34 \%$, respectively.
» Stock awards account for $61 \%$ of director compensation among information technology companies and $58 \%$ in consumer discretionary companies, but just $50 \%$ of director compensation for companies in the industrials sector.

Average Compensation per Non-Employee Director by Industry*

|  | \% of total compensation |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Industry | Total average compensation | \% increase versus 2016 | Stock awards | Cash fees** | Option grants | All other compensation |
| Consumer discretionary | \$272,990 | 6\% | 58\% | 36\% | 4\% | 2\% |
| Consumer staples | \$278,499 | -2\% | 57\% | 37\% | 4\% | 2\% |
| Energy | \$306,996 | -2\% | 57\% | 37\% | 3\% | 3\% |
| Financials | \$272,920 | 5\% | 53\% | 43\% | 2\% | 2\% |
| Healthcare | \$355,177 | -4\% | 53\% | 32\% | 12\% | 3\% |
| Industrials | \$272,785 | 2\% | 50\% | 43\% | 4\% | 3\% |
| Information technology | \$321,358 | 2\% | 61\% | 34\% | 4\% | 1\% |
| Materials | \$278,030 | 4\% | 55\% | 41\% | 1\% | 3\% |
| Real estate | \$242,009 | n/a | 56\% | 40\% | 3\% | 1\% |
| Telecommunication services | \$292,461 | 6\% | 55\% | 44\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Utilities | \$256,267 | 5\% | 51\% | 47\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Average | \$288,909 | 1\% | 56\% | 38\% | 4\% | 2\% |

*Based on non-employee director compensation tables in 491 proxies for 2017 . Includes all board and committee retainers and meeting fees, non-executive chair and lead/presiding director supplemental fees when applicable, the value of equity compensation and all other compensation paid to non-employee directors in fiscal year 2016. Retiring and new directors are included when paid compensation for at least three quarters of the year.
"Includes deferred compensation amounts.
***Includes insurance premiums, charitable award programs and incremental cost to the company of products provided to directors.

## MIDWEST, NORTHWEST REGIONS SEE THE LARGEST GAINS IN <br> DIRECTOR COMPENSATION

> Director compensation for boards of companies headquartered in the Western U.S., already the region with the highest director compensation, grew by $5 \%$ to $\$ 319,730$.
» The largest regional increase was $14 \%$ in the Midwest, bringing average director compensation there to $\$ 294,366$, followed by a $10 \%$ increase in the Northwest, where average compensation rose to $\$ 284,554$.
» The Southwest had the largest decrease in average compensation, declining $8 \%$ to $\$ 269,874$.

## DIRECTOR COMPENSATION AT SMALLEST COMPANIES 6\% LESS THAN AT

 LARGEST COMPANIES》 Average compensation for directors of companies with revenue less than $\$ 2.5$ billion declined by $1 \%$ to $\$ 280,102$, after increasing $8 \%$ the prior year.
") Directors of the largest companies, with revenue greater than \$10 billion, received \$297,543 in annual compensation on average, $6 \%$ more than the average compensation for directors of companies with revenue less than $\$ 2.5$ billion.

Average Director Compensation by Region and by Sales

| By region |  | By sales |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| West | \$319,730 | Less than \$2.5 billion | \$280, 102 |
| Northeast | \$304,817 | \$2.5-\$10 billion | \$279,577 |
| Midwest | \$294,366 | Greater than \$10 billion | \$297,543 |
| Southeast | \$290, 157 |  |  |
| Northwest | \$284,554 |  |  |
| Southwest | \$269,874 |  |  |

## Comparative Board Data

## Methodology:

Based on the S\&P 500 as of May 19, 2017. Fiscal year 2016 company sales data obtained from Hoovers; industry/sector categories from Capital IQ. All remaining data were culled from the most recent DEFi4A proxy statements released between May 15, 2016, and May 19, 2017. Total average compensation per non-employee director is based on non-employee director compensation tables included in 491 proxies. The number includes all board and committee retainers and meeting fees, supplemental non-executive chair and lead/presiding director fees, the value of equity compensation, and all other compensation paid in fiscal year 2016.

# Comparative Board Data 



CONSUMER DISCRETIONARY
Advertising

| Advertising |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| The Interpublic Group of Companies | 7,846.6 | 9 | 8 | N | 66 | 9 | 74 | 7 | 100,000 | b | 334,594 | 35\% | 60\% | 0\% | 5\% |
| Omnicom Group | 15,416.9 | 12 | 10 | Y | 70 | 15 | 75 | 9 | 90,000 | b, c | 265,889 | 53\% | 47\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Apparel Retail |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Foot Locker | 7,766.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 64 | 11 | 72 | 5 | 140,000 | b,c,d | 260,200 | 41\% | 59\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| The Gap | 15,516.0 | 10 | 8 | Y | 61 | 12 | 72 | 6 | 80,000 | b | 251,431 | 47\% | 53\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| L Brands | 12,574.0 | 11 | 8 | N | 72 | 18 | - | 8 | 223,800 | d | 293,292 | 49\% | 51\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Ross Stores | 12,866.8 | 11 | 7 | Y | 62 | 14 | - | 5 | 210,000 | d | 237,725 | 41\% | 59\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| The TJX Companies | 33,183.7 | 11 | 9 | Y | 64 | 11 | 75 | 6 | 80,000 | b | 309,262 | 38\% | 62\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Apparel, Accessories \& Luxury Goods |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Coach | 4,497.8 | 9 | 8 | Y | 53 | 5 | - | 5 | 75,000 | b,c,e | 228,145 | 42\% | 29\% | 29\% | 0\% |
| Hanesbrands | 6,028.2 | 10 | 8 | Y | 64 | 8 | 72 | 7 | 95,000 | b | 236,663 | 45\% | 55\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Michael Kors Holdings Limited | 4,493.7 | 8 | 6 | N | 64 | 5 | - | 4 | 70,000 | b | 265,739 | 44\% | 56\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| PVH Corporation | 8,203.1 | 12 | 11 | N | 58 | 8 | 72 | 6 | 85,000 | b | 250,913 | 42\% | 58\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Ralph Lauren Corporation | 7,405.0 | 11 | 7 | Y | 71 | 12 | - | 5 | 70,000 | b | 311,842 | 29\% | 71\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Under Armour | 4,825.3 | 10 | 9 | N | 63 | 8 | 75 | 14 | 75,000 | b, c | 207,620 | 40\% | 60\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| V.F. Corporation | 12,019.0 | 13 | 11 | Y | 58 | 8 | 72 | 8 | 90,000 | b,c,e | 246,132 | 41\% | 29\% | 29\% | 1\% |

Auto Parts \& Equipment

| BorgWarner | 9,071.0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 64 | 8 | 72 | 4 | 92,000 | b | 250,439 | 51\% | 49\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Delphi Automotive | 16,661.0 | 12 | 11 | Y | 65 | 6 | 75 | 10 | 265,000 | c, d | 282,886 | 34\% | 66\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Automobile Manufacturers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ford Motor Company | 151,800.0 | 14 | 11 | Y | 61 | 9 | 72 | 7 | 250,000 | c,d,f | 307,597 | 35\% | 49\% | 0\% | 16\% |
| General Motors Company | 166,380.0 | 11 | 9 | N | 65 | 5 | 72 | 8 | 285,000 | c,d,f | 316,736 | 21\% | 72\% | 0\% | 7\% |


| Automotive Retail |
| :--- |
| Advance Auto Parts |
| AutoNation |
| AutoZone |
| CarMax |
| O'Reilly Automotive |


| Broadcasting |
| :--- |
| CBS Corporation |
| Discovery Communications |
| Scripps Networks Interactive |
| TEGNA |


| Cable \& Satellite |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Charter Communications | 29,003.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 55 | 5 | - | 5 | 100,000 | b | 255,807 | 26\% | 74\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Comcast Corporation | 80,403.0 | 10 | 8 | $N$ | 62 | 6 | 72 | 11 | 100,000 | b, c | 329,225 | 44\% | 56\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| DISH Network Corporation | 15,094.6 | 10 | 5 | N | 61 | 8 | - | 6 | 60,000 | e | 133,997 | 58\% | 42\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Casinos \& Gaming |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Wynn Resorts Limited | 4,466.3 | 10 | 8 | N | 69 | 8 | - | 12 | 60,000 | b,e | 385,580 | 35\% | 65\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Computer \& Electronics Retail |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Best Buy Co. | 39,528.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 58 | 6 | 75 | 4 | 85,000 | b, c | 282,392 | 33\% | 67\% | 0\% | 0\% |


|  | NUMBER OF DIRECTORS |  |  | INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS |  |  |  | board fees（\＄） |  |  |  |  | percentace of total compensation |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \frac{2}{2} \\ & \stackrel{N}{m} \\ & \stackrel{n}{m} \\ & \stackrel{n}{2} \\ & \underset{m}{n} \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \frac{z}{n} \\ & \frac{n}{z} \\ & \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  | 砶 | $\begin{aligned} & n \\ & \hat{0} \\ & \underset{x}{n} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & \stackrel{0}{0} \\ & \stackrel{1}{0} \\ & \text { 年 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\Gamma} \\ & \stackrel{0}{0} \\ & \text { 志 } \\ & \text { 䇗 } \end{aligned}$ |
| Consumer Electronics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Garmin | 3，018．7 | 6 | 4 | Y | 67 | 10 |  |  | 5 | 85，000 | b | 205，628 | 39\％ | 61\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Department Stores |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Kohl＇s Corporation | 18，686．0 | 10 | 9 | N | 58 | 9 | 7 | 2 | 6 | 100，000 | b | 245，610 | 55\％ | 45\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Macy＇s | 25，778．0 | 12 | 10 | Y | 56 | 8 | 7 | 4 | 9 | 70，000 | b，c | 235，940 | 39\％ | 59\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| Nordstrom | 14，757．0 | 12 | 9 | Y | 56 | 4 | 7 | 2 | 6 | 85，000 | b，c | 271，670 | 36\％ | 62\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| Distributors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Genuine Parts Company | 15，339．7 | 11 | 8 | Y | 62 | 7 | 7 | 2 | 5 | 60，000 | b | 276，122 | 28\％ | 72\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| LKQ Corporation | 8，584．0 | 10 | 7 | Y | 63 | 8 |  |  | 6 | 100，000 | b，c | 238，147 | 54\％ | 46\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Footwear |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NIKE | 32，376．0 | 12 | 9 | N | 59 | 9 | 7 | 2 | 5 | 90，000 | b | 284，150 | 32\％ | 61\％ | 0\％ | 7\％ |
| General Merchandise Stores |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dollar General Corporation | 21，986．0 | 8 | 7 | Y | 60 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 85，000 | b | 262，538 | 36\％ | 63\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Dollar Tree | 20，719．0 | 11 | 9 | Y | 69 | 13 |  |  | 5 | 180，000 | b，c，i | 280，077 | 73\％ | 27\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Target Corporation | 69，495．0 | 12 | 11 | N | 59 | 6 | 7 | 2 | 6 | 260，000 | c，d | 268，903 | 27\％ | 73\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Home Furnishing Retail |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bed Bath \＆Beyond | 12，215．8 | 10 | 7 | Y | 65 | 13 |  |  | 5 | 100，000 | b，c | 201，071 | 55\％ | 45\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Home Furnishings |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Leggett \＆Platt | 3，749．9 | 9 | 7 | Y | 67 | 15 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 215，000 | c，d | 282，224 | 32\％ | 58\％ | 0\％ | 10\％ |
| Mohawk Industries | 8，959．1 | 9 | 6 | N | 64 | 8 | 7 | 5 | 5 | 80，000 | b，c | 173，651 | 49\％ | 51\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Home Improvement Retail |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Home Depot | 94，595．0 | 13 | 12 | N | 59 | 7 | 7 | 2 | 7 | 280，000 | c，d，f | 302，500 | 21\％ | 76\％ | 0\％ | 3\％ |
| Lowe＇s Companies | 65，017．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 62 | 5 | 7 | 2 | 5 | 90，000 | b，c | 234，290 | 35\％ | 65\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Homebuilding |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| D．R．Horton | 12，157．4 | 5 | 4 | Y | 65 | 12 | 7 | 5 | 4 | － | b | 386，835 | 20\％ | 80\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Lennar Corporation | 10，950．0 | 10 | 8 | Y | 68 | 14 |  |  | 6 | 130，000 | c，d | 260，244 | 39\％ | 60\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| PulteGroup | 7，668．5 | 12 | 11 | Y | 57 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 11 | 235，000 | d | 258，070 | 40\％ | 60\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Hotels，Resorts \＆Cruise Lines |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Carnival Corporation | 16，389．0 | 10 | 8 | Y | 65 | 11 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 110，000 | b | 277，583 | 41\％ | 58\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Marriott International | 17，072．0 | 14 | 11 | Y | 64 | 7 |  | 2 | 7 | 85，000 | b，c | 243，996 | 39\％ | 57\％ | 0\％ | 4\％ |
| Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd． | 8，496．4 | 12 | 11 | N | 65 | 11 |  |  | 5 | 80，000 | b | 232，637 | 45\％ | 50\％ | 0\％ | 5\％ |
| Wyndham Worldwide Corporation | 5，599．0 | 8 | 7 | N | 65 | 10 | 7 | 5 | 4 | 210，000 | b，c，d | 512，488 | 26\％ | 45\％ | 0\％ | 29\％ |
| Household Appliances |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Whirlpool Corporation | 20，718．0 | 13 | 11 | N | 62 | 8 |  | 2 | 6 | 130，000 | b | 265，509 | 50\％ | 47\％ | 0\％ | 3\％ |
| Housewares \＆Specialties |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Newell Brands | 13，264．0 | 12 | 9 | Y | 64 | 11 | 7 | 5 | 6 | 115，000 | b | 280，016 | 48\％ | 52\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Internet and Direct Marketing Retail |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Amazon．com | 135，987．0 | 10 | 9 | N | 66 | 10 |  |  | 4 | 288，000 | d，g | 288，000 | 0\％ | 100\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Expedia | 8，773．6 | 13 | 6 | Y | 60 | 8 |  |  | 5 | 45，000 | b | 326，166 | 23\％ | 77\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Netflix | 8，830．7 | 9 | 8 | N | 58 | 10 |  |  | 5 | － | e，g，j | 359，786 | 0\％ | 0\％ | 100\％ | 0\％ |
| The Priceline Group | 10，743．0 | 12 | 9 | Y | 61 | 9 |  |  | 16 | 60，000 | b | 397，655 | 18\％ | 82\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| TripAdvisor | 1，480．0 | 8 | 5 | Y | 46 | 5 |  |  | 4 | 50，000 | b，c | 337，759 | 20\％ | 80\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Leisure Products |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Hasbro | 5，019．8 | 12 | 11 | N | 58 | 8 | 7 | 2 | 7 | 95，000 | b，c | 322，743 | 19\％ | 61\％ | 0\％ | 20\％ |
| Mattel | 5，456．7 | 11 | 9 | Y | 61 | 9 | 7 | 3 | 6 | 100，000 | b | 277，713 | 43\％ | 50\％ | 0\％ | 7\％ |

## Comparative Board Data

|  | NUMBER OF DIRECTORS |  |  | INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS |  |  |  | board fees（\＄） |  |  |  |  | percentage of total compensation |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 会另莓 |  |  |  |  | 否 | $\begin{aligned} & n \\ & \stackrel{n}{x} \\ & \underset{x}{n} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & \stackrel{0}{1} \\ & 0 \\ & \text { 葒 } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Motorcycle Manufacturers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Harley－Davidson | 5，996．5 | 10 | 9 | Y | 55 | 6 |  | 75 |  | 4 | 110，000 | b，c | 257，500 | 51\％ | 49\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Movies \＆Entertainment |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Time Warner | 29，318．0 | 9 | 8 | N | 64 | 9 |  | 75 |  | 10 | 160，000 | b，c | 288，736 | 46\％ | 34\％ | 20\％ | 0\％ |
| Twenty－First Century Fox | 27，326．0 | 13 | 8 | Y | 56 | 7 |  | － |  | 6 | 280，000 | d，f | 307，473 | 41\％ | 59\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Viacom | 12，488．0 | 10 | 8 | Y | 61 | 3 |  | － |  | 11 | 100，000 | b，c | 283，151 | 43\％ | 57\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| The Walt Disney Company | 55，632．0 | 11 | 9 | N | 62 | 10 |  | － |  | 10 | 110，000 | b，c | 306，671 | 40\％ | 56\％ | 0\％ | 4\％ |
| Publishing |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| News Corporation | 8，292．0 | 11 | 6 | Y | 55 | 4 |  | － |  | 6 | 245，000 | d，f | 301，935 | 38\％ | 60\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| Restaurants |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Chipotle Mexican Grill | 3，904．4 | 8 | 7 | N | 55 | 5 |  | － |  | 10 | 195，000 | d | 235，881 | 49\％ | 51\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Darden Restaurants | 6，933．5 | 8 | 7 | Y | 57 | 3 |  | 73 |  | 8 | 75，000 | b，c | 217，992 | 45\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| McDonald＇s Corporation | 24，621．9 | 11 | 10 | Y | 62 | 10 |  | － |  | 8 | 110，000 | b，c | 271，485 | 42\％ | 56\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| Starbucks Corporation | 21，315．9 | 14 | 12 | N | 57 | 7 |  | 75 |  | 7 | 260，000 | c，i | 230，742 | 0\％ | 62\％ | 38\％ | 0\％ |
| Yum！Brands | 6，366．0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 59 | 4 |  | 72 |  | 8 | 240，000 | d，g，h | 238，174 | 1\％ | 80\％ | 18\％ | 1\％ |
| Specialized Consumer Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H\＆R Block | 3，038．2 | 11 | 10 | Y | 62 | 8 |  | － |  | 10 | 205，000 | d，f | 273，749 | 36\％ | 63\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Specialty Stores |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Signet Jewelers Limited | 6，408．4 | 12 | 11 | Y | 64 | 6 |  | 75 |  | 12 | 245，000 | d | 299，677 | 45\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Staples | 18，247．0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 59 | 7 |  | 72 |  | 11 | 75，000 | b | 284，042 | 18\％ | 82\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Tiffany \＆Co． | 4，001．8 | 11 | 9 | N | 66 | 11 |  | 74 |  | 6 | 80，000 | b，e | 250，275 | 37\％ | 32\％ | 31\％ | 0\％ |
| Tractor Supply Company | 6，779．6 | 8 | 7 | Y | 62 | 10 |  | 72 |  | 5 | 75，000 | b | 224，030 | 50\％ | 50\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| ULTA Beauty | 4，854．7 | 11 | 10 | Y | 62 | 8 |  | 75 |  | 7 | 230，000 | d | 242，286 | 48\％ | 52\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Tires \＆Rubber |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Goodyear Tire \＆Rubber Company | 15，158．0 | 13 | 11 | N | 64 | 8 |  | 72 |  | 8 | 125，000 | b，c | 290，908 | 47\％ | 53\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| TOTAL CONSUMER DISCRETIONARY |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average |  | 10.7 | 8.7 |  | 61.7 | 8.4 |  | 73.4 |  | 7.1 | 130，365 |  | 272，990 | 36\％ | 58\％ | 4\％ | 2\％ |
| Median |  | 11.0 | 9.0 |  | 61.9 | 7.9 |  | 72.0 |  | 6.0 | 100，000 |  | 271，485 |  |  |  |  |

## CONSUMER STAPLES

Agricultural Products

| Archer－Daniels－Midland Company | 62，346．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 62 | 6 | 75 | 9 | 275，000 | c，d | 289，420 | 33\％ | 65\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Brewers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Molson Coors Brewing Company | 4，885．0 | 14 | 9 | Y | 61 | 7 | 70 | 7 | 100，000 | b，c | 295，927 | 37\％ | 46\％ | 0\％ | 17\％ |
| Distillers \＆Vintners |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Brown－Forman Corporation | 3，089．0 | 12 | 5 | Y | 62 | 6 | 71 | 6 | 185，000 | c，d，f | 282，001 | 50\％ | 43\％ | 0\％ | 7\％ |
| Constellation Brands | 7，331．5 | 10 | 8 | Y | 60 | 8 | 70 | 6 | 70，000 | b，e | 224，444 | 44\％ | 38\％ | 18\％ | 0\％ |
| Drug Retail |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CVS Health Corporation | 177，526．0 | 12 | 11 | Y | 65 | 6 | 74 | 7 | 280，000 | c，d | 315，987 | 25\％ | 75\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Walgreens Boots Alliance | 117，351．0 | 10 | 7 | Y | 62 | 7 | 75 | 12 | 95，000 | b，c | 299，703 | 35\％ | 56\％ | 0\％ | 9\％ |
| Food Distributors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sysco Corporation | 50，366．9 | 14 | 12 | Y | 65 | 8 | － | 14 | 100，000 | b，c | 337，279 | 45\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |


|  | number of DIRECTORS |  |  | INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS |  |  |  |  | board fees（\＄） |  |  |  | PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL COMPENSATION |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 等。 $2 \frac{1}{7}$良 <br>  | $\stackrel{\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\underset{~}{2}}}}{ }$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 垔 | $\begin{aligned} & \hat{n} \\ & \hat{0} \\ & \hat{n} \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| Food Retail |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Kroger Co． | 115，337．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 62 | 10 |  | 72 | 5 | 85，000 | b | 265，856 | 38\％ | 62\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Whole Foods Market | 15，724．0 | 12 | 10 | Y | 63 | 12 |  | 72 | 6 | 40，972 | b，e | 158，069 | 65\％ | 22\％ | 11\％ | 2\％ |
| Household Products |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Church \＆Dwight Co． | 3，493．1 | 10 | 8 | Y | 60 | 10 | ） | 72 | 5 | 110，000 | d，e，g，h | 226，750 | 7\％ | 41\％ | 52\％ | 0\％ |
| The Clorox Company | 5，761．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 62 | 7 | － | 72 | 8 | 100，000 | b，c | 250，250 | 48\％ | 52\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Colgate－Palmolive Company | 15，195．0 | 10 | 9 | N | 61 | 7 |  | 72 | 8 | 65，000 | b，c，e，h | 289，457 | 27\％ | 56\％ | 15\％ | 2\％ |
| Kimberly－Clark Corporation | 18，202．0 | 13 | 11 | N | 64 | 12 |  | 72 | 6 | 100，000 | b | 278，744 | 36\％ | 62\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| The Procter \＆Gamble Company | 65，299．0 | 10 | 9 | N | 63 | 9 | \％ | 72 | 8 | 110，000 | b，c | 295，500 | 41\％ | 59\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Hypermarkets \＆Super Centers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Costco Wholesale Corporation | 118，719．0 | 12 | 7 | Y | 69 | 13 |  | － | 5 | 30，000 | b | 359，208 | 10\％ | 90\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Wal－Mart Stores | 485，873．0 | 11 | 7 | Y | 53 | 5 | ） | 75 | 5 | 90，000 | b，c | 319，131 | 40\％ | 58\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| Packaged Foods \＆Meats |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Campbell Soup Company | 7，961．0 | 12 | 11 | Y | 64 | 13 | － | 72 | 6 | 238，000 | c，d | 277，008 | 50\％ | 50\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| ConAgra Foods | 11，642．9 | 11 | 10 | Y | 64 | 8 | － | 72 | 15 | 90，000 | b | 248，802 | 32\％ | 65\％ | 0\％ | 3\％ |
| General Mills | 16，563．1 | 13 | 12 | N | 61 | 8 |  | 72 | 8 | 75，000 | b，c | 287，541 | 30\％ | 63\％ | 0\％ | 7\％ |
| The Hershey Company | 7，440．2 | 12 | 10 | Y | 65 | 6 |  | 72 | 13 | 100，000 | b，c | 260，000 | 46\％ | 52\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| Hormel Foods Corporation | 9，523．2 | 14 | 12 | Y | 61 | 8 |  | 72 | 8 | 70，000 | b，c | 251，663 | 33\％ | 64\％ | 0\％ | 3\％ |
| The J．M．Smucker Company | 7，811．2 | 11 | 9 | Y | 61 | 11 |  | 72 | 7 | 90，000 | b | 220，813 | 45\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Kellogg Company | 13，014．0 | 12 | 10 | N | 60 | 5 |  | 72 | 7 | 250，000 | c，d | 275，889 | 40\％ | 60\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| The Kraft Heinz Company | 26，487．0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 61 | 3 |  | － | 5 | 110，000 | b，c | 257，231 | 51\％ | 49\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| McCormick \＆Company | 4，411．5 | 11 | 9 | N | 61 | 9 |  | 72 | 7 | 90，000 | b，e | 273，931 | 31\％ | 37\％ | 32\％ | 0\％ |
| Mondelez International | 25，923．0 | 13 | 12 | N | 65 | 5 | ） | 75 | 14 | 110，000 | b | 287，796 | 41\％ | 58\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Tyson Foods | 36，881．0 | 11 | 9 | Y | 59 | 8 | I | 72 | 8 | 100，000 | b，c | 265，000 | 43\％ | 57\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Personal Products |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Estee Lauder Companies | 11，262．3 | 15 | 9 | Y | 62 | 12 |  | － | 5 | 150，000 | b，d，e | 267，354 | 35\％ | 28\％ | 37\％ | 0\％ |
| Soft Drinks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Coca－Cola Company | 41，863．0 | 14 | 11 | Y | 67 | 9 | \％ | 74 | 6 | 250，000 | c，d，f | 264，852 | 22\％ | 76\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| Dr Pepper Snapple Group | 6，440．0 | 9 | 8 | Y | 61 | 6 |  | 70 | 8 | 100，000 | b，c | 249，375 | 40\％ | 60\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Monster Beverage Corporation | 3，049．4 | 10 | 6 | N | 71 | 19 |  | － | 6 | 60，000 | b | 247，684 | 33\％ | 67\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| PepsiCo | 62，799．0 | 14 | 13 | N | 60 | 5 |  | 72 | 6 | 275，000 | c，d | 304，080 | 40\％ | 59\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Tobacco |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Altria Group | 25，744．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 66 | 7 | （ | 75 | 6 | 110，000 | b，c | 327，567 | 42\％ | 53\％ | 0\％ | 5\％ |
| Phillip Morris International | 74，953．0 | 13 | 10 | Y | 67 | 6 |  | － | 6 | 125，000 | b，c | 339，444 | 48\％ | 52\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| TOTAL CONSUMER STAPLES |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average |  | 11.8 | 9.5 |  | 62.6 | 8.2 |  | 72.4 | 7.6 | 124，382 |  | 278，499 | 37\％ | 57\％ | 4\％ | 2\％ |
| Median |  | 11.5 | 10.0 |  | 62.1 | 7.5 | 5 | 72.0 | 7.0 | 100，000 |  | 276，448 |  |  |  |  |

## ENERGY

| Integrated Oil \＆Gas |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Chevron Corporation | 114，472．0 | 12 | 10 | N | 62 | 5 | 72 | 6 | 150，000 | b，c，i | 399，187 | 29\％ | 56\％ | 13\％ | 2\％ |
| Exxon Mobil Corporation | 226，094．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 64 | 7 | 72 | 12 | 110，000 | b | 302，317 | 36\％ | 64\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Occidental Petroleum Corporation | 10，090．0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 66 | 7 | 75 | 6 | 125，000 | b | 397，843 | 33\％ | 62\％ | 0\％ | 5\％ |

# Comparative Board Data 



## FINANCIALS

## Asset Management \& Custody Banks

| Affiliated Managers Group | 2,194.6 | 8 | 7 | N | 55 | 7 | - | 5 | 80,000 | b,e | 326,258 | 39\% | 25\% | 36\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ameriprise Financial | 11,696.0 | 9 | 8 | N | 65 | 8 | 75 | 8 | 205,000 | c, d | 255,015 | 37\% | 43\% | 0\% | 20\% |


|  | NUMBER of DIRECTORS |  |  | independent DIRECTORS |  |  |  | board fees（\＄） |  |  |  | percentage of TOTAL COMPENSATION |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{r}}}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  | 算 $\underset{{\underset{\sim}{*}}_{\infty}^{\infty}}{\infty}$ |  |  |  | 岢 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { ü } \\ & \stackrel{0}{\hat{n}} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & \frac{0}{1} \\ & \stackrel{y}{0} \\ & \text { 年 } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Asset Management \＆Custody Banks（continued） |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation | 15，237．0 | 13 | 12 | N | 60 | 8 |  | 75 | 14 | 110，000 | b，c | 275，047 | 52\％ | 48\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| BlackRock | 11，155．0 | 18 | 15 | N | 64 | 7 |  | 75 | 7 | 75，000 | b，c，d | 269，672 | 35\％ | 65\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Franklin Resources | 6，618．0 | 10 | 7 | N | 61 | 7 |  | 75 | 5 | 85，000 | b，c | 228，688 | 28\％ | 72\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Invesco | 4，734．4 | 9 | 8 | Y | 67 | 8 |  | 75 | 10 | 120，000 | b | 294，953 | 51\％ | 49\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Northern Trust Corporation | 4，987．8 | 13 | 11 | N | 61 | 8 |  | 72 | 7 | 220，000 | c，d | 243，269 | 54\％ | 45\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| State Street Corporation | 10，635．0 | 10 | 9 | N | 63 | 10 |  | 75 | 9 | 75，000 | b，c | 302，333 | 48\％ | 45\％ | 0\％ | 7\％ |
| T．Rowe Price Group | 4，222．9 | 13 | 10 | Y | 65 | 6 |  | 72 | 8 | 100，000 | b，c | 302，203 | 42\％ | 45\％ | 10\％ | 3\％ |
| Consumer Finance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| American Express Company | 33，823．0 | 14 | 13 | N | 64 | 8 |  | 72 | 8 | 95，000 | b，c | 329，648 | 39\％ | 50\％ | 0\％ | 11\％ |
| Capital One Financial Corporation | 25，501．0 | 10 | 9 | N | 62 | 8 |  | 72 | 18 | 90，000 | b | 339，463 | 45\％ | 50\％ | 0\％ | 5\％ |
| Discover Financial Services | 10，497．0 | 12 | 11 | N | 63 | 8 |  | － | 12 | 100，000 | b | 252，624 | 47\％ | 53\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Navient Corporation | 4，965．0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 62 | 7 |  | 75 | 8 | 100，000 | b | 236，224 | 56\％ | 44\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Synchrony Financial | 15，122．0 | 9 | 8 | Y | 62 | 2 |  | 75 | 12 | 210，000 | d | 226，593 | 47\％ | 53\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Diversified Banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bank of America Corporation | 83，701．0 | 14 | 13 | N | 66 | 6 |  | 72 | 21 | 100，000 | b，c | 322，500 | 35\％ | 65\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Citigroup | 82，386．0 | 15 | 13 | Y | 62 | 5 |  | 72 | 21 | 75，000 | b，c | 343，399 | 57\％ | 41\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| Comerica | 2，960．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 60 | 11 |  | 72 | 13 | 50，000 | b，c | 192，653 | 56\％ | 44\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| JPMorgan Chase \＆Co． | 95，668．0 | 12 | 11 | N | 65 | 8 |  | 72 | 10 | 100，000 | b，c | 364，313 | 27\％ | 62\％ | 0\％ | 11\％ |
| U．S．Bancorp | 21，308．0 | 15 | 13 | Y | 61 | 10 |  | 72 | 8 | 90，000 | b，c | 255，184 | 44\％ | 56\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Wells Fargo \＆Company | 88，267．0 | 15 | 14 | Y | 65 | 9 |  | 72 | 14 | 75，000 | b，c | 373，033 | 51\％ | 48\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Financial Exchanges and Data |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CBOE Holdings | 656.9 | 14 | 13 | N | 62 | 8 |  | － | 13 | 90，000 | b | 219，061 | 54\％ | 46\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| IntercontinentalExchange | 5，958．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 61 | 9 |  | 75 | 10 | 100，000 | b，c | 403，869 | 31\％ | 47\％ | 0\％ | 22\％ |
| Moody＇s Corporation | 3，604．2 | 9 | 8 | Y | 65 | 9 |  | － | 8 | 90，000 | b | 265，023 | 39\％ | 61\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Nasdaq | 3，705．0 | 9 | 8 | Y | 57 | 6 |  | － | 15 | 75，000 | b，c | 303，945 | 15\％ | 85\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| S\＆P Global | 5，661．0 | 12 | 11 | Y | 60 | 6 |  | 72 | 8 | 70，000 | b | 240，972 | 51\％ | 48\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Insurance Brokers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Aon plc | 11，627．0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 67 | 13 |  | － | 5 | 120，000 | b，c | 318，094 | 39\％ | 58\％ | 0\％ | 3\％ |
| Arthur J Gallagher \＆Co． | 5，594．8 | 10 | 9 | N | 67 | 9 |  | － | 6 | 90，000 | b，c | 241，873 | 41\％ | 59\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Marsh \＆McLennan Companies | 13，211．0 | 12 | 11 | Y | 65 | 7 |  | 75 | 10 | 110，000 | b，c | 278，283 | 43\％ | 57\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Willis Towers Watson Public Limited Company | 7，887．0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 63 | 9 |  | － | 7 | 230，000 | d | 270，123 | 44\％ | 56\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Investment Banking \＆Brokerage |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Charles Schwab Corporation | 7，478．0 | 15 | 13 | Y | 69 | 14 |  | － | 7 | 100，000 | b，c，e，i | 320，135 | 49\％ | 28\％ | 22\％ | 1\％ |
| E＊TRADE Financial Corporation | 2，026．0 | 12 | 10 | Y | 66 | 6 |  | － | 19 | 50，000 | b，c | 263，767 | 52\％ | 48\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| The Goldman Sachs Group | 30，608．0 | 11 | 9 | N | 64 | 7 |  | 75 | 14 | 75，000 | b，d，g，h | 600，451 | 5\％ | 92\％ | 0\％ | 3\％ |
| Morgan Stanley | 34，631．0 | 14 | 13 | N | 64 | 5 |  | 72 | 19 | 75，000 | b，c | 357，689 | 28\％ | 72\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Raymond James Financial | 5，520．3 | 11 | 8 | N | 59 | 6 |  | － | 4 | 90，000 | b | 228，090 | 41\％ | 57\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| Life \＆Health Insurance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| AFLAC | 22，559．0 | 14 | 10 | N | 66 | 11 |  | 75 | 4 | 115，000 | b，c，e，i，k | 288，387 | 45\％ | 40\％ | 14\％ | 1\％ |
| Lincoln National Corporation | 13，330．0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 68 | 13 |  | 75 | 4 | 261，000 | c，d，f | 299，356 | 35\％ | 62\％ | 0\％ | 3\％ |
| MetLife | 63，476．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 62 | 7 |  | 72 | 10 | 300，000 | c | 327，593 | 53\％ | 46\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Principal Financial Group | 12，394．1 | 11 | 10 | N | 62 | 13 | 7 | 72 | 10 | 225，000 | c，d | 258，374 | 50\％ | 50\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |

## Comparative Board Data

|  | NUMBER OF DIRECTORS |  |  | INDEPENDENT Directors |  |  |  |  | board fees (\$) |  |  |  | percentage of total compensation |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 吾 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 否 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { n } \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{x} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & \stackrel{0}{1} \\ & \stackrel{1}{0} \\ & z_{n} \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Life \& Health Insurance (continued) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Prudential Financial | 58,779.0 | 12 | 10 | N | 62 | 7 |  | 74 |  | 11 | 300,000 | c, d | 357,273 | 46\% | 53\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Torchmark Corporation | 3,934.6 | 12 | 10 | N | 67 | 12 |  | 74 |  | 5 | 210,000 | c,d,i | 223,903 | 42\% | 46\% | 12\% | 0\% |
| Unum Group | 11,046.5 | 11 | 10 | Y | 61 | 6 |  | 72 |  | 6 | 110,000 | b, c | 290,824 | 47\% | 52\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Multi-line Insurance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| American International Group | 52,367.0 | 13 | 12 | Y | 63 | 5 |  | 75 |  | 12 | 280,000 | c,d,f | 306,021 | 56\% | 42\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Assurant | 7,531.8 | 10 | 9 | Y | 66 | 9 |  | 75 |  | 7 | 100,000 | b,c | 251,700 | 49\% | 50\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| The Hartford Financial Services Group | 18,300.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 63 | 9 |  | 75 |  | 7 | 100,000 | b, c | 276,800 | 21\% | 78\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Loews Corporation | 13,105.0 | 14 | 11 | Y | 70 | 11 |  | - |  | 7 | 100,000 | b | 238,928 | 58\% | 42\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Multi-sector Holdings |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Berkshire Hathaway | 223,604.0 | 12 | 8 | N | 69 | 13 |  | - |  | 3 | - | - | 3,780 | 100\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Leucadia National Corporation | 10,875.3 | 11 | 8 | Y | 67 | 5 |  | - |  | 4 | 115,000 | b | 237,857 | 50\% | 50\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Property \& Casualty Insurance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Allstate Corporation | 36,534.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 62 | 7 |  | 72 |  | 7 | 125,000 | b, c | 269,175 | 44\% | 56\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Chubb Limited | 31,469.0 | 16 | 15 | N | 66 | 8 |  | 75 |  | 6 | 290,000 | d | 293,666 | 28\% | 61\% | 0\% | 11\% |
| Cincinnati Financial Corporation | 5,449.0 | 14 | 10 | Y | 61 | 13 |  | 73 |  | 5 | 80,000 | d | 179,392 | 51\% | 46\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| The Progressive Corporation | 23,447.4 | 10 | 8 | Y | 63 | 10 |  | 80 |  | 6 | 250,000 | d,g,h | 271,261 | 14\% | 86\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| The Travelers Companies | 27,625.0 | 12 | 11 | Y | 66 | 11 |  | 74 |  | 5 | 130,000 | b, c | 300,964 | 45\% | 55\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| XL Group | 10,546.1 | 11 | 10 | Y | 69 | 8 |  | - |  | 7 | 105,000 | b, c | 287,226 | 48\% | 52\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Regional Banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| BB\&T Corporation | 11,538.0 | 16 | 14 | N | 65 | 6 |  | 72 |  | 10 | 60,000 | b | 208,965 | 49\% | 51\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Citizens Financial Group | 4,824.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 67 | 7 |  | 75 |  | 11 | 175,000 | d | 193,920 | 48\% | 51\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Fifth Third Bancorp | 6,889.0 | 12 | 11 | Y | 61 | 5 |  | 72 |  | 12 | 50,000 | b | 276,666 | 59\% | 38\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| Huntington Bancshares | 3,561.5 | 15 | 14 | N | 62 | 6 |  | - |  | 15 | 35,000 | b, c | 238,296 | 53\% | 47\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| KeyCorp | 5,024.0 | 16 | 14 | N | 62 | 6 |  | 72 |  | 14 | 80,000 | b, c | 194,229 | 43\% | 57\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| M\&T Bank Corporation | 5,721.9 | 14 | 11 | N | 71 | 13 |  | - |  | 12 | 85,000 | c | 147,139 | 50\% | 50\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| People's United Financial | 1,347.2 | 11 | 9 | Y | 68 | 14 |  | 76 |  | 12 | 24,000 | b, c | 181,500 | 48\% | 52\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| The PNC Financial Services Group | 15,162.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 64 | 9 |  | 72 |  | 13 | 67,500 | b, c | 306,702 | 41\% | 45\% | 0\% | 14\% |
| Regions Financial Corporation | 5,967.0 | 14 | 13 | N | 66 | 8 |  | 72 |  | 10 | 165,000 | c, d | 227,550 | 53\% | 46\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| SunTrust Banks | 9,161.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 63 | 6 |  | 72 |  | 5 | 70,000 | b | 231,400 | 47\% | 52\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Zions Bancorporation | 2,383.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 62 | 9 |  | 72 |  | 13 | 47,500 | b, c | 164,541 | 48\% | 52\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| TOTAL FINANCIALS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average |  | 12.1 | 10.5 |  | 63.8 | 8.3 |  | 73.6 |  | 9.6 | 120,238 |  | 272,920 | 43\% | 53\% | 2\% | 2\% |
| Median |  | 12.0 | 10.0 |  | 63.5 | 7.6 |  | 73.0 |  | 8.5 | 100,000 |  | 269,897 |  |  |  |  |

HEALTHCARE
Biotechnology

| AbbVie | 25,638.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 62 | 4 | 75 | 11 | 105,000 | b, c,i | 335,343 | 38\% | 55\% | 0\% | 7\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Alexion Pharmaceuticals | 3,084.0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 65 | 7 | - | 12 | 95,000 | b,e | 341,434 | 33\% | 34\% | 33\% | 0\% |
| Amgen | 22,991.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 65 | 6 | 72 | 6 | 100,000 | b | 355,514 | 36\% | 56\% | 0\% | 8\% |
| Biogen Idec | 11,448.8 | 11 | 10 | Y | 62 | 11 | 75 | 17 | 65,000 | b | 447,291 | 37\% | 63\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Celgene Corporation | 11,229.2 | 11 | 9 | Y | 68 | 9 | - | 9 | 75,000 | b,e | 540,010 | 17\% | 21\% | 62\% | 0\% |
| Gilead Sciences | 30,390.0 | 9 | 7 | Y | 67 | 9 | - | 8 | 75,000 | b,c,e | 432,772 | 30\% | 35\% | 35\% | 0\% |
| Incyte Corporation | 1,105.7 | 7 | 5 | N | 60 | 9 | - | 8 | 50,000 | e | 682,139 | 3\% | 7\% | 90\% | 0\% |


|  | NUMBER OF DIRECTORS |  |  | INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS |  |  |  |  | board fees (\$) |  |  |  | PERCENTAGE OF total compensation |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\frac{3}{3}$ |  |  |  |  | 㐓 | $\begin{aligned} & \hat{n} \\ & \hat{0} \\ & \hat{n} \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| Biotechnology (continued) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Regeneron Pharmaceuticals | 4,860.4 | 13 | 10 | Y | 67 | 14 |  |  | 9 | 55,000 | e | 2,098,728 | 4\% | 96\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Vertex Pharmaceuticals | 1,702.2 | 9 | 8 | N | 60 | 8 |  | 72 | 7 | 85,000 | b,e | 683,721 | 18\% | 40\% | 42\% | 0\% |
| Health Care Technology |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cerner Corporation | 4,796.5 | 9 | 8 | N | 68 | 14 |  | 75 | 7 | 66,000 | b | 341,181 | 25\% | 75\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Healthcare Distributors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| AmerisourceBergen Corporation | 146,849.7 | 10 | 8 | N | 63 | 8 |  | 75 | 7 | 100,000 | b, c | 246,926 | 44\% | 52\% | 0\% | 4\% |
| Cardinal Health | 121,546.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 64 | 6 |  | 75 | 6 | 100,000 | b | 263,324 | 38\% | 62\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Henry Schein | 11,571.7 | 15 | 10 | N | 70 | 9 |  | 80 | 7 | 60,000 | b | 270,823 | 28\% | 68\% | 0\% | 4\% |
| McKesson Corporation | 190,884.0 | 9 | 8 | N | 64 | 9 |  | 75 | 9 | 80,000 | b | 310,667 | 38\% | 59\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| Patterson Companies | 5,386.7 | 8 | 7 | N | 61 | 9 |  | 75 | 8 | 206,000 | d | 221,470 | 50\% | 50\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Healthcare Equipment |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Abbott Laboratories | 20,853.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 64 | 8 |  | 75 | 11 | 126,000 | b | 298,685 | 46\% | 50\% | 0\% | 4\% |
| Baxter International | 10,163.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 66 | 10 |  | 72 | 10 | 85,000 | b,i | 285,825 | 39\% | 40\% | 17\% | 4\% |
| Becton, Dickinson and Company | 12,483.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 65 | 10 |  | 72 | 8 | 97,000 | b, c | 286,967 | 35\% | 64\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Boston Scientific Corporation | 8,386.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 59 | 3 |  | - | 6 | 90,000 | b, c,i | 275,901 | 34\% | 64\% | 2\% | 0\% |
| C.R. Bard | 3,714.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 66 | 11 |  | 74 | 6 | 62,500 | b, c | 289,424 | 37\% | 36\% | 0\% | 27\% |
| Danaher Corporation | 16,882.4 | 12 | 9 | Y | 65 | 14 |  | - | 7 | 115,000 | b,c,e | 267,895 | 22\% | 53\% | 25\% | 0\% |
| Edwards Lifesciences Corporation | 2,963.7 | 8 | 7 | N | 63 | 3 |  | 75 | 7 | 60,000 | b,c,e,i | 273,081 | 18\% | 72\% | 10\% | 0\% |
| Hologic | 2,832.7 | 8 | 7 | N | 63 | 6 |  | 72 | 6 | 60,000 | b,e | 256,798 | 28\% | 36\% | 36\% | 0\% |
| IDEXX Laboratories | 1,775.4 | 8 | 7 | N | 63 | 8 |  | 73 | 5 | 65,000 | b,c,e | 251,192 | 30\% | 18\% | 52\% | 0\% |
| Intuitive Surgical | 2,704.4 | 9 | 7 | Y | 63 | 6 |  | - | 6 | 60,000 | b,e | 361,203 | 22\% | 64\% | 14\% | 0\% |
| Medtronic | 28,833.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 62 | 9 |  | 72 | 4 | 175,000 | b | 337,123 | 58\% | 42\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Stryker Corporation | 11,325.0 | 8 | 7 | N | 60 | 16 |  | - | 9 | 60,000 | b, e | 287,650 | 41\% | 31\% | 28\% | 0\% |
| Varian Medical Systems | 3,217.8 | 10 | 9 | Y | 62 | 9 |  | 75 | 6 | 100,000 | b, c | 308,995 | 47\% | 52\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Zimmer Biomet Holdings | 7,683.9 | 11 | 10 | Y | 59 | 7 |  | 72 | 9 | 95,000 | b,c,d,f | 298,569 | 32\% | 66\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Healthcare Facilities |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| HCA Healthcare | 41,490.0 | 11 | 8 | N | 66 | 4 |  | 75 | 7 | 100,000 | b | 304,372 | 43\% | 57\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Universal Health Services | 9,766.2 | 7 | 4 | N | 62 | 15 |  | - | 7 | 40,000 | e | 412,251 | 14\% | 0\% | 86\% | 0\% |
| Healthcare Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| DaVita | 14,745.0 | 11 | 8 | N | 63 | 9 |  | 75 | 6 | 80,000 | b,e | 291,751 | 46\% | 32\% | 22\% | 0\% |
| Envision Healthcare Corporation | 3,696.0 | 13 | 11 | Y | 65 | 9 |  | - | 10 | 90,000 | b, c | 263,602 | 41\% | 55\% | 0\% | 4\% |
| Express Scripts Holding Co | 100,287.5 | 12 | 10 | Y | 65 | 10 |  | 75 | 5 | 100,000 | b,e | 295,591 | 32\% | 34\% | 34\% | 0\% |
| Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings | 9,437.2 | 10 | 9 | N | 59 | 9 |  | 75 | 6 | 105,000 | b | 272,625 | 41\% | 59\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Quest Diagnostics | 7,515.0 | 9 | 8 | N | 66 | 10 |  | - | 7 | 96,500 | b,c,i | 307,897 | 42\% | 58\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Healthcare Supplies |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Cooper Companies | 1,966.8 | 9 | 8 | Y | 70 | 14 |  | - | 13 | 30,000 | b | 400,006 | 29\% | 34\% | 37\% | 0\% |
| DENTSPLY Sirona | 3,745.3 | 11 | 9 | Y | 66 | 13 |  | 75 | 6 | 70,000 | b,c,e | 233,611 | 36\% | 32\% | 32\% | 0\% |
| Life Sciences Tools \& Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Agilent Technologies | 4,202.0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 67 | 10 |  | 75 | 6 | 100,000 | b, c | 299,767 | 38\% | 62\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Illumina | 2,398.4 | 9 | 7 | Y | 63 | 4 |  | - | 8 | 55,000 | b, c | 495,137 | 19\% | 81\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Mettler-Toledo International | 2,508.3 | 9 | 7 | Y | 61 | 10 |  | 72 | 4 | 60,000 | b,e | 218,518 | 38\% | 17\% | 45\% | 0\% |
| PerkinElmer | 2,115.5 | 8 | 7 | N | 62 | 8 |  | 72 | 8 | 90,000 | b | 276,998 | 37\% | 63\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Thermo Fisher Scientific | 18,274.1 | 12 | 10 | Y | $62$ | 8 |  | 72 | 10 | 125,000 | b, c | 292,966 | 44\% | 51\% | 0\% | 5\% |

# Comparative Board Data 

|  | number of DIRECTORS |  |  | INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS |  |  |  |  | board fees (\$) |  |  |  | PERCENTAGE OF total compensation |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 㶪 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { n } \\ & \stackrel{0}{x} \\ & \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \circ \\ & \stackrel{0}{1} \\ & \stackrel{0}{0} \\ & \text { n } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Life Sciences Tools \& Services (continued) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Waters Corporation | 2,167.4 | 9 | 7 | Y | 63 | 18 |  | 72 | 7 | 55,000 | b,c,e | 300,274 | 26\% | 37\% | 37\% | 0\% |
| Managed Healthcare |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Aetna | 63,155.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 69 | 13 |  | 76 | 12 | 95,000 | b, c | 332,441 | 36\% | 51\% | 0\% | 13\% |
| Anthem | 84,863.0 | 8 | 7 | N | 65 | 8 |  | 72 | 19 | 95,000 | b | 324,788 | 41\% | 54\% | 0\% | 5\% |
| Centene Corporation | 40,607.0 | 8 | 7 | N | 69 | 11 |  | - | 12 | 125,000 | c, d, e, f | 415,667 | 7\% | 76\% | 13\% | 4\% |
| Cigna Corporation | 39,668.0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 64 | 11 |  | 72 | 8 | 275,000 | c, d | 319,830 | 43\% | 56\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Humana | 54,379.0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 60 | 12 |  | 73 | 19 | 105,000 | b, c | 313,856 | 44\% | 49\% | 0\% | 7\% |
| UnitedHealth Group | 184,840.0 | 9 | 8 | Y | 70 | 15 |  | - | 10 | 125,000 | b,c | 364,522 | 38\% | 57\% | 0\% | 5\% |
| Pharmaceuticals |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Allergan plc | 14,570.6 | 12 | 10 | N | 64 | 8 |  | - | 9 | 150,000 | b | 464,994 | 36\% | 64\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Bristol-Myers Squibb Company | 19,427.0 | 11 | 9 | N | 62 | 5 |  | 75 | 11 | 90,000 | b, c | 322,707 | 42\% | 53\% | 0\% | 5\% |
| Eli Lilly \& Company | 21,222.1 | 14 | 13 | N | 60 | 7 |  | 72 | 7 | 110,000 | b, c | 295,082 | 43\% | 54\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| Johnson \& Johnson | 71,890.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 58 | 6 |  | 72 | 10 | 110,000 | b | 298,286 | 41\% | 55\% | 0\% | 4\% |
| Mallinckrodt Public Limited Company | 3,380.8 | 10 | 9 | Y | 66 | 4 |  | 72 | 5 | 100,000 | b | 428,329 | 28\% | 72\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Merck \& Co. | 39,807.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 64 | 9 |  | 72 | 8 | 110,000 | b, c | 305,486 | 40\% | 0\% | 0\% | 60\% |
| Mylan N.V. | 11,076.9 | 13 | 10 | Y | 62 | 10 |  | - | 7 | 100,000 | b,e | 382,065 | 38\% | 43\% | 13\% | 6\% |
| Pfizer | 52,824.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 64 | 8 |  | 73 | 9 | 137,500 | b, c | 356,922 | 44\% | 53\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| Zoetis | 4,888.0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 64 | 4 |  | - | 6 | 270,000 | c,f | 296,389 | 43\% | 57\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| TOTAL HEALTHCARE |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average |  | 10.4 | 8.8 |  | 63.8 | 9.0 |  | 3.7 | 8.4 | 97,653 |  | 355,177 | 32\% | 53\% | 12\% | 3\% |
| Median |  | 10.0 | 9.0 |  | 63.6 | 8.8 |  | 3.5 | 8.0 | 95,000 |  | 305,486 |  |  |  |  |
| INDUSTRIALS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Aerospace \& Defense |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Arconic | 12,394.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 64 | 4 |  | 75 | 11 | 120,000 | b, c | 282,496 | 79\% | 21\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| The Boeing Company | 94,571.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 63 | 7 |  | 74 | 7 | 135,000 | b, c | 332,480 | 42\% | 50\% | 0\% | 8\% |
| General Dynamics Corporation | 31,353.0 | 11 | 9 | N | 65 | 9 |  | 75 | 8 | 85,000 | b,c,e | 311,462 | 53\% | 23\% | 23\% | 1\% |
| L3 Technologies | 10,511.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 71 | 11 |  | - | 8 | 110,000 | b, c | 263,333 | 49\% | 51\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Lockheed Martin Corporation | 47,248.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 66 | 9 |  | 75 | 11 | 290,000 | c, d | 306,915 | 52\% | 47\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Northrop Grumman Corporation | 24,508.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 66 | 6 |  | 75 | 9 | 262,500 | c, d, f | 336,726 | 40\% | 58\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Raytheon Company | 24,069.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 63 | 7 |  | 74 | 6 | 105,000 | b, c | 282,039 | 46\% | 52\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Rockwell Collins | 5,259.0 | 9 | 8 | N | 68 | 11 |  | 74 | 7 | 100,000 | b, c | 257,965 | 44\% | 55\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Textron | 13,788.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 68 | 11 |  | 75 | 7 | 235,000 | c, d, f | 255,318 | 51\% | 47\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| TransDigm Group | 3,171.4 | 9 | 7 | N | 64 | 8 |  | - | 4 | 60,000 | d, e | 86,382 | 39\% | 35\% | 0\% | 26\% |
| United Technologies Corporation | 57,244.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 66 | 8 |  | 72 | 8 | 280,000 | c,d,f | 306,910 | 23\% | 77\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Agricultural and Farm Machinery |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Deere \& Company | 26,644.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 61 | 8 |  | 75 | 5 | 125,000 | b, c | 249,977 | 50\% | 49\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Air Freight \& Logistics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| C.H. Robinson Worldwide | 13,144.4 | 8 | 7 | N | 63 | 9 |  | - | 6 | 80,000 | b, c | 226,429 | 45\% | 55\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Expeditors International of Washington | 6,098.0 | 11 | 9 | Y | 63 | 6 |  | 72 | 5 | 65,000 | b | 291,567 | 31\% | 69\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| FedEx Corporation | 50,365.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 60 | 10 |  | 75 | 8 | 120,000 | e | 265,278 | 47\% | 0\% | 53\% | 0\% |
| United Parcel Service | 60,906.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 52 | 8 | 7 | 75 | 6 | 105,000 | b | 282,836 | 40\% | 60\% | 0\% | 0\% |


|  | NUMBER OF DIRECTORS |  |  | INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS |  |  |  | board fees（\＄） |  |  |  | PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL COMPENSATION |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \overrightarrow{+} \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{r} \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{2} \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  | 会另䒸 |  |  |  | 合 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { n } \\ & \stackrel{0}{n} \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| Airlines |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Alaska Air Group | 5，931．0 | 10 | 9 | N | 62 | 10 | 72 | 10 | 150，000 | c，d | 172，590 | 39\％ | 52\％ | 0\％ | 9\％ |
| American Airlines Group | 40，180．0 | 13 | 12 | N | 63 | 4 | 75 | 8 | 100，000 | b | 333，787 | 40\％ | 49\％ | 0\％ | 11\％ |
| Delta Air Lines | 39，639．0 | 11 | 9 | Y | 62 | 5 | 72 | 11 | 90，000 | b | 295，110 | 41\％ | 54\％ | 0\％ | 5\％ |
| Southwest Airlines Co． | 20，425．0 | 11 | 9 | N | 68 | 9 | 75 | 6 | 70，000 | b | 242，911 | 46\％ | 54\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| United Continental Holdings | 36，556．0 | 15 | 12 | Y | 59 | 4 | 75 | 16 | 85，000 | b | 303，947 | 48\％ | 43\％ | 0\％ | 9\％ |
| Building Products |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Allegion Public Limited Company | 2，238．0 | 6 | 5 | N | 63 | 4 | 70 | 5 | 140，000 | b | 221，508 | 68\％ | 32\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Fortune Brands Home \＆Security | 4，984．9 | 8 | 7 | Y | 62 | 5 | 72 | 5 | 90，000 | b | 270，319 | 48\％ | 50\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| Johnson Controls | 36，866．0 | 11 | 9 | N | 60 | 4 | 72 | 7 | 275，000 | c，d | 271，479 | 48\％ | 52\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Masco Corporation | 7，357．0 | 10 | 8 | Y | 61 | 8 | 72 | 5 | 250，000 | d | 279，496 | 52\％ | 47\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Construction \＆Engineering |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fluor Corporation | 19，036．5 | 13 | 12 | N | 65 | 8 | 75 | 5 | 115，000 | b | 277，682 | 45\％ | 54\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Jacobs Engineering Group | 10，964．2 | 9 | 7 | N | 68 | 10 | － | 7 | 100，000 | b，e | 229，977 | 40\％ | 42\％ | 18\％ | 0\％ |
| Quanta Services | 7，651．3 | 9 | 8 | Y | 61 | 9 | 73 | 8 | 85，000 | b | 277，631 | 43\％ | 57\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Construction Machinery \＆Heavy Trucks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Caterpillar | 38，537．0 | 13 | 12 | Y | 62 | 8 | 72 | 9 | 275，000 | c，d | 290，809 | 54\％ | 43\％ | 0\％ | 3\％ |
| Cummins | 17，509．0 | 10 | 9 | N | 64 | 10 | 72 | 6 | 250，000 | d | 266，269 | 41\％ | 56\％ | 0\％ | 3\％ |
| PACCAR | 17，033．3 | 11 | 8 | Y | 63 | 7 | 72 | 4 | 100，000 | b，c | 261，687 | 50\％ | 50\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Diversified Support Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cintas Corporation | 4，905．5 | 9 | 6 | N | 65 | 7 | 73 | 4 | 57，000 | b，c，e | 192，420 | 46\％ | 27\％ | 27\％ | 0\％ |
| Electrical Components \＆Equipment |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Acuity Brands | 3，291．3 | 10 | 9 | N | 68 | 10 | 75 | 5 | 205，000 | c，d，f | 210，000 | 40\％ | 60\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| AMETEK | 3，840．1 | 10 | 8 | Y | 65 | 11 | 75 | 10 | 90，000 | b，c，e | 214，004 | 44\％ | 28\％ | 23\％ | 5\％ |
| Eaton Corporation | 19，747．0 | 12 | 10 | N | 63 | 9 | 72 | 4 | 265，000 | c，d | 320，857 | 49\％ | 46\％ | 0\％ | 5\％ |
| Emerson Electric Company | 14，522．0 | 10 | 9 | N | 64 | 9 | 72 | 10 | 240，000 | d | 282，034 | 49\％ | 50\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Rockwell Automation | 5，879．5 | 11 | 9 | Y | 61 | 8 | 72 | 6 | 175，000 | b，c，d | 236，313 | 44\％ | 52\％ | 0\％ | 4\％ |
| Environmental \＆Facilities Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Republic Services | 9，387．7 | 10 | 9 | Y | 57 | 6 | 73 | 5 | 80，000 | b | 325，570 | 32\％ | 68\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Stericycle | 3，562．3 | 10 | 8 | Y | 66 | 9 | － | 4 | 80，000 | b | 122，044 | 13\％ | 35\％ | 52\％ | 0\％ |
| Waste Management | 13，609．0 | 9 | 8 | Y | 65 | 9 | 75 | 10 | 110，000 | b | 278，889 | 46\％ | 54\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Human Resource \＆Employment Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Robert Half International | 5，250．4 | 6 | 4 | N | 60 | 7 | － | 6 | 40，000 | b | 333，060 | 16\％ | 84\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Industrial Conglomerates |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3M Company | 30，109．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 65 | 7 | 74 | 6 | 285，000 | c，d | 291，529 | 46\％ | 54\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| General Electric Company | 123，693．0 | 18 | 17 | N | 60 | 6 | 75 | 17 | 275，000 | c，d，f | 303，295 | 15\％ | 80\％ | 0\％ | 5\％ |
| Honeywell International | 39，302．0 | 13 | 11 | Y | 64 | 9 | 72 | 12 | 100，000 | b，c，e | 316，937 | 61\％ | 16\％ | 16\％ | 7\％ |
| Roper Technologies | 3，789．9 | 9 | 8 | N | 66 | 13 | 78 | 6 | 42，500 | b | 744，633 | 8\％ | 92\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Industrial Machinery |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dover Corporation | 6，794．3 | 12 | 11 | Y | 64 | 9 | 75 | 8 | 250，000 | d | 257，523 | 51\％ | 49\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Flowserve Corporation | 3，991．5 | 8 | 7 | Y | 61 | 9 | 72 | 11 | 60，000 | b，c | 225，763 | 45\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Fortive Corporation | 6，224．3 | 7 | 4 | Y | 52 | 1 | － | 4 | 100，000 | b，e | 202，929 | 27\％ | 38\％ | 35\％ | 0\％ |
| Illinois Tool Works | 13，599．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 60 | 8 | 75 | 5 | 135，000 | b，c | 280，426 | 52\％ | 48\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Ingersoll－Rand | 13，508．9 | 10 | 9 | N | 67 | 10 | 75 | 6 | 285，000 | c | 313，219 | 50\％ | 50\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Parker－Hannifin Corporation | 11，360．8 | 13 | 11 | N | 64 | 12 | 75 | 7 | 130，000 | b | 254，705 | 51\％ | 47\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |

## Comparative Board Data



INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

| Application Software |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Adobe Systems | 5,854.4 | 10 | 9 | N | 65 | 15 | - | 7 | 60,000 | b, c | 356,426 | 26\% | 74\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Autodesk | 2,504.1 | 10 | 9 | Y | 57 | 6 | - | 8 | 75,000 | b, c | 403,624 | 20\% | 80\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Citrix Systems | 3,418.3 | 9 | 7 | Y | 57 | 7 | - | 10 | 60,000 | b, c | 421,742 | 41\% | 59\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Intuit | 4,694.0 | 9 | 7 | N | 57 | 6 | 75 | 5 | 60,000 | b, c | 349,561 | 22\% | 78\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| salesforce.com | 8,392.0 | 11 | 9 | N | 66 | 7 | - | 10 | 50,000 | b | 557,945 | 12\% | 88\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Synopsys | 2,422.5 | 10 | 8 | N | 63 | 12 | 72 | 6 | 125,000 | b | 258,409 | 52\% | 48\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Communications Equipment |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cisco Systems | 49,247.0 | 11 | 9 | Y | 60 | 12 | 70 | 7 | 75,000 | b | 335,443 | 36\% | 64\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| F5 Networks | 1,995.0 | 9 | 8 | Y | 60 | 8 | - | 15 | 60,000 | b | 351,971 | 29\% | 71\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Harris Corporation | 7,467.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 66 | 11 | 72 | 6 | 80,000 | b, c | 253,356 | 45\% | 55\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Juniper Networks | 4,990.1 | 9 | 8 | Y | 60 | 9 | 75 | 4 | 60,000 | b | 302,161 | 40\% | 60\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Motorola Solutions | 6,038.0 | 9 | 8 | N | 60 | 5 | 72 | 5 | 100,000 | b, c | 250,723 | 30\% | 70\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Data Processing \& Outsourced Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Alliance Data Systems Corporation | 7,138.1 | 10 | 9 | Y | 66 | 11 | 75 | 9 | 75,000 | b, c | 225,609 | 25\% | 74\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Automatic Data Processing | 11,667.8 | 10 | 9 | Y | 59 | 4 | 72 | 5 | 290,000 | c, d, f | 283,563 | 38\% | 59\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| Fidelity National Information Services | 9,241.0 | 9 | 7 | Y | 66 | 9 | 77 | 5 | 80,000 | b,e | 375,223 | 48\% | 26\% | 26\% | 0\% |
| Fiserv | 5,505.0 | 9 | 8 | Y | 58 | 8 | 75 | 8 | 78,000 | b,c,e | 277,149 | 38\% | 31\% | 31\% | 0\% |


|  | NUMBER OF DIRECTORS |  |  | INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS |  |  |  | board fees（\＄） |  |  |  |  | PERCENTAGE OF total compensation |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\stackrel{\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\stackrel{ }{2}}}}{\substack{2}}$ |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \frac{3}{n} \\ & \frac{1}{z} \\ & \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  | 研 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { n } \\ & \stackrel{0}{n} \\ & \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & \stackrel{0}{0} \\ & 0 \\ & \text { 慈 } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Data Processing \＆Outsourced Services（continued） |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Global Payments | 2，898．2 | 9 | 8 | Y | 64 | 10 | 75 | 5 | 8 | 235，000 | d | 265，818 | 43\％ | 57\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Mastercard | 10，776．0 | 12 | 11 | Y | 61 | 8 | 72 | 2 | 6 | 100，000 | b | 318，038 | 39\％ | 60\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Paychex | 2，951．9 | 9 | 7 | Y | 66 | 15 | － |  | 5 | 75，000 | b，e | 268，178 | 52\％ | 23\％ | 25\％ | 0\％ |
| PayPal Holdings | 10，842．0 | 9 | 7 | Y | 54 | 2 |  |  | 4 | 80，000 | b，c | 361，010 | 35\％ | 65\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Total System Services | 4，170．1 | 11 | 8 | N | 67 | 17 | 75 | 5 | 7 | 75，000 | b，e | 223，216 | 42\％ | 29\％ | 29\％ | 0\％ |
| Visa | 15，082．0 | 9 | 8 | Y | 61 | 7 | 75 | 5 | 17 | 105，000 | b | 329，014 | 44\％ | 53\％ | 0\％ | 3\％ |
| The Western Union Company | 5，422．9 | 11 | 10 | Y | 63 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 8 | 85，000 | b，d，e，h，i，k | 292，130 | 39\％ | 45\％ | 11\％ | 5\％ |
| Electronic Components |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Amphenol Corporation | 6，286．4 | 8 | 6 | Y | 72 | 14 | 72 | 2 | 5 | 80，000 | b，c | 239，119 | 41\％ | 59\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Corning | 9，390．0 | 13 | 12 | N | 64 | 8 | 74 | 4 | 6 | 110，000 | b，c | 295，832 | 47\％ | 52\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Electronic Equipment \＆Instruments |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| FLIR Systems | 1，662．2 | 10 | 8 | Y | 66 | 10 | 75 | 5 | 8 | 70，000 | b，e | 257，905 | 46\％ | 27\％ | 27\％ | 0\％ |
| Electronic Manufacturing Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| TE Connectivity | 12，238．0 | 12 | 10 | Y | 60 | 5 | 72 | 2 | 7 | 275，000 | d | 300，802 | 34\％ | 56\％ | 0\％ | 10\％ |
| Home Entertainment Software |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Activision Blizzard | 6，608．0 | 9 | 7 | Y | 58 | 7 |  |  | 8 | 90，000 | b | 361，543 | 31\％ | 69\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Electronic Arts | 4，396．0 | 10 | 8 | Y | 55 | 8 | 72 | 2 | 6 | 60，000 | b，c | 350，975 | 25\％ | 74\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Internet Software \＆Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Akamai Technologies | 2，340．0 | 12 | 9 | Y | 64 | 7 |  |  | 6 | 300，000 | d，f | 313，990 | 26\％ | 74\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Alphabet | 90，272．0 | 12 | 8 | Y | 65 | 11 |  |  | 5 | 75，000 | b | 430，247 | 18\％ | 82\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| eBay | 8，979．0 | 12 | 10 | Y | 57 | 6 | － |  | 5 | 80，000 | b | 333，778 | 34\％ | 66\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Facebook | 27，638．0 | 8 | 5 | N | 56 | 7 | 70 | 0 | 8 | 50，000 | b | 376，006 | 21\％ | 79\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| VeriSign | 1，142．2 | 7 | 6 | N | 68 | 8 |  |  | 6 | 40，000 | b | 332，659 | 25\％ | 75\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| IT Consulting \＆Other Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Accenture | 34，797．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 60 | 5 | 75 | 5 | 6 | 100，000 | b，c | 319，402 | 37\％ | 63\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Cognizant Technology <br> Solutions Corporation | 13，487．0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 63 | 7 |  |  | 16 | 90，000 | b，e | 342，583 | 38\％ | 31\％ | 31\％ | 0\％ |
| CSRA | 4，250．4 | 10 | 8 | Y | 2 | 2 | 72 | 2 | 3 | 90，000 | b | 155，275 | 27\％ | 73\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Gartner | 2，444．5 | 10 | 9 | Y | 64 | 14 |  |  | 7 | 60，000 | b，d，g，h | 289，688 | 31\％ | 69\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| International Business Machines Corporation | 79，919．0 | 13 | 12 | N | 64 | 8 | 72 | 2 | 9 | 300，000 | c，d，f | 372，373 | 81\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ | 19\％ |
| Teradata Corporation | 2，322．0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 63 | 6 |  |  | 8 | 50，000 | b，c | 330，710 | 21\％ | 79\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Semiconductor Equipment |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Applied Materials | 10，825．0 | 9 | 8 | Y | 57 | 7 |  | 0 | 6 | 65，000 | b，c | 316，560 | 34\％ | 66\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| KLA－Tencor Corporation | 2，984．5 | 10 | 9 | $Y$ | 65 | 9 | 75 | 5 | 13 | 90，000 | b | 319，695 | 37\％ | 51\％ | 0\％ | 12\％ |
| Lam Research Corporation | 5，885．9 | 11 | 9 | Y | 61 | 5 | 75 | 75 | 13 | 65，000 | b | 326，743 | 36\％ | 61\％ | 0\％ | 3\％ |
| Semiconductors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Advanced Micro Devices | 4，272．0 | 8 | 6 | Y | 61 | 5 | 72 | 2 | 6 | 75，000 | b | 338，700 | 38\％ | 62\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Analog Devices | 3，421．4 | 9 | 7 | Y | 62 | 7 |  | － | 12 | 70，000 | b | 296，314 | 34\％ | 33\％ | 33\％ | 0\％ |
| Broadcom Limited | 13，240．0 | 9 | 7 | Y | 65 | 6 | 75 | 5 | 6 | 80，000 | b | 256，747 | 41\％ | 59\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Intel Corporation | 59，387．0 | 11 | 9 | Y | 59 | 10 | 72 | 2 | 11 | 90，000 | b，c | 322，900 | 26\％ | 73\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Microchip Technology | 3，407．8 | 5 | 4 | N | 69 | 16 |  |  | 8 | 65，000 | b | 222，658 | 35\％ | 65\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Micron Technology | 12，399．0 | 7 | 6 | Y | 62 | 9 | 75 | 5 | 6 | 100，000 | b，c | 388，042 | 36\％ | 64\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Nvidia Corporation | 5，010．0 | 12 | 11 | Y | 64 | 13 |  |  | 5 | 75，000 | b | 342，718 | 22\％ | 78\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |

## Comparative Board Data



MATERIALS

| Construction Materials |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Martin Marietta Materials | 3,818.7 | 9 | 8 | N | 65 | 9 | 75 | 4 | 100,000 | b, c | 264,808 | 42\% | 38\% | 0\% | 20\% |
| Vulcan Materials | 3,592.7 | 9 | 8 | N | 59 | 5 | 74 | 5 | 110,000 | b,c | 277,999 | 43\% | 54\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| Copper |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Freeport-McMoRan | 14,830.0 | 8 | 7 | Y | 59 | 7 | - | 10 | 75,000 | b, c | 286,387 | 37\% | 59\% | 0\% | 4\% |
| Diversified Chemicals |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Dow Chemical Company | 48,158.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 64 | 9 | 72 | 7 | 115,000 | b | 263,807 | 49\% | 51\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| E.I. duPont de Nemours \& Company | 24,594.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 63 | 9 | 72 | 12 | 265,000 | d | 298,701 | 44\% | 50\% | 0\% | 6\% |
| Eastman Chemical Company | 9,008.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 66 | 10 | 75 | 5 | 105,000 | b,c | 249,781 | 46\% | 30\% | 0\% | 24\% |
| Fertilizers \& Agricultural Chemicals |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CF Industries Holdings | 3,685.0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 63 | 8 | 74 | 9 | 100,000 | b | 244,217 | 45\% | 53\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| FMC Corporation | 3,282.4 | 11 | 10 | N | 62 | 9 | 75 | 6 | 100,000 | b,c | 258,758 | 26\% | 67\% | 0\% | 7\% |
| Monsanto Company | 13,502.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 60 | 8 | 75 | 11 | 245,000 | c, d,f | 299,776 | 44\% | 56\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| The Mosaic Company | 7,162.8 | 12 | 11 | Y | 61 | 8 | 74 | 7 | 80,000 | b,h | 276,085 | 38\% | 60\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Gold |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Newmont Mining Corporation | 6,711.0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 64 | 8 | 75 | 10 | 115,000 | b | 325,486 | 53\% | 46\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Industrial Gases |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Air Products \& Chemicals | 9,524.4 | 8 | 7 | N | 62 | 6 | 72 | 17 | 100,000 | b,c | 253,594 | 52\% | 47\% | 0\% | 1\% |


|  | NUMBER OF DIRECTORS |  |  | INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS |  |  |  |  | BOARD FEES（\＄） |  |  |  |  | PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL COMPENSATION |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 著 |  |  |  | 否 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { n } \\ & \underset{\tilde{n}}{2} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & \frac{0}{2} \\ & \frac{0}{0} \\ & \text { 合 } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Industrial Gases（continued） |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Praxair | 10，534．0 | 9 | 8 | N | 68 | 11 |  | 72 |  | 9 | 100，000 | b，c | 293，889 | 38\％ | 60\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| Metal \＆Glass Containers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ball Corporation | 9，061．0 | 11 | 9 | N | 64 | 9 |  | － |  | 7 | 85，000 | b | 478，197 | 17\％ | 77\％ | 0\％ | 6\％ |
| Paper Packaging |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avery Dennison Corporation | 6，086．5 | 11 | 9 | Y | 61 | 9 |  | 72 |  | 5 | 100，000 | b，c | 246，142 | 43\％ | 54\％ | 0\％ | 3\％ |
| International Paper Company | 21，079．0 | 12 | 11 | N | 64 | 7 |  | 72 |  | 9 | 255，000 | c，d | 285，732 | 19\％ | 80\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Sealed Air Corporation | 6，778．3 | 10 | 9 | Y | 65 | 10 |  | 75 |  | 9 | 205，000 | c，d | 242，779 | 36\％ | 64\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| WestRock Company | 14，171．8 | 12 | 10 | Y | 61 | 8 |  | 72 |  | 8 | 115，000 | b | 309，790 | 40\％ | 60\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Specialty Chemicals |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Albemarle Corporation | 2，677．2 | 10 | 9 | N | 64 | 5 |  | － |  | 7 | 100，000 | b | 237，480 | 49\％ | 51\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Ecolab | 13，152．8 | 13 | 12 | N | 59 | 6 | － | 72 |  | 7 | 105，000 | b，c，e | 271，781 | 43\％ | 37\％ | 20\％ | 0\％ |
| International Flavors \＆Fragrances | 3，116．4 | 11 | 10 | N | 65 | 7 |  | 72 |  | 6 | 235，000 | d，f | 238，321 | 50\％ | 48\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| PPG Industries | 14，751．0 | 10 | 9 | N | 62 | 10 |  | 72 |  | 10 | 270，000 | c，d | 281，966 | 51\％ | 48\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| The Sherwin－Williams Company | 11，855．6 | 11 | 10 | N | 62 | 6 |  | 72 |  | 11 | 115，000 | b，c | 239，115 | 50\％ | 50\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Steel |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Nucor Corporation | 16，208．1 | 8 | 7 | N | 61 | 7 |  | 72 |  | 4 | 95，000 | b，c | 247，529 | 43\％ | 57\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| TOTAL MATERIALS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average |  | 10.5 | 9.4 |  | 62.7 | 7.9 |  | 73.1 |  | 8.1 | 137，083 |  | 278，030 | 41\％ | 55\％ | 1\％ | 3\％ |
| Median |  | 10.5 | 9.0 |  | 62.6 | 8.0 |  | 72.0 |  | 7.5 | 105，000 |  | 268，294 |  |  |  |  |

REAL ESTATE
Healthcare REITs

| HCP | 2，129．3 | 8 | 6 | Y | 69 | 13 | － | 14 | 80，000 | b，c | 206，434 | 49\％ | 51\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ventas | 3，442．6 | 10 | 9 | N | 62 | 6 | 75 | 8 | 90，000 | b，c | 257，825 | 42\％ | 58\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Welltower | 4，183．2 | 10 | 9 | Y | 66 | 10 | 75 | 6 | 85，000 | b | 225，249 | 45\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Hotel and Resort REITs |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Host Hotels \＆Resorts | 5，430．0 | 9 | 7 | Y | 63 | 9 | － | 7 | 200，000 | c，d | 269，151 | 37\％ | 46\％ | 0\％ | 17\％ |
| Industrial REITs |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ProLogis | 2，533．1 | 10 | 9 | N | 64 | 9 | 72 | 5 | 110，000 | b | 294，984 | 40\％ | 56\％ | 0\％ | 4\％ |
| Office REITs |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Alexandria Real Estate Equities | 921.7 | 7 | 5 | N | 62 | 7 | 75 | 9 | 110，000 | b | 287，152 | 62\％ | 38\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Boston Properties | 2，550．8 | 11 | 9 | Y | 68 | 10 | 75 | 7 | 67，500 | b，c | 197，784 | 42\％ | 58\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| SL Green Realty Corporation | 1，864．0 | 9 | 6 | Y | 65 | 12 | － | 6 | 50，000 | b，c | 404，200 | 26\％ | 74\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Vornado Realty Trust | 2，506．2 | 10 | 8 | N | 74 | 18 | － | 10 | 75，000 | b | 200，136 | 51\％ | 49\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Real Estate Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CBRE Group | 13，071．6 | 11 | 10 | Y | 63 | 8 | － | 6 | 75，000 | b，c | 239，194 | 36\％ | 64\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |

Residential REITs

| Apartment Investment and Management Company | 995.9 | 7 | 6 | N | 66 | 11 | － | 5 | 60，000 | b | 203，158 | 12\％ | 88\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| AvalonBay Communities | 2，045．3 | 10 | 9 | N | 61 | 5 | 72 | 5 | 80，000 | b，c | 203，019 | 28\％ | 72\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Equity Residential | 2，425．8 | 13 | 11 | Y | 61 | 12 | － | 7 | 180，000 | d，e，i | 207，777 | 40\％ | 57\％ | 3\％ | 0\％ |
| Essex Property Trust | 1，294．0 | 9 | 7 | Y | 68 | 12 | － | 5 | 36，000 | e，k | 127，870 | 41\％ | 19\％ | 40\％ | 0\％ |
| Mid－America Apartment Communities | 1，125．3 | 12 | 9 | N | 65 | 5 | 75 | 6 | 55，000 | b，c | 198，209 | 34\％ | 53\％ | 0\％ | 13\％ |

## Comparative Board Data

|  | NUMBER OF DIRECTORS |  |  | INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS |  |  |  |  | board fees（\＄） |  |  |  | percentage of total compensation |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 管。 |  |  |  | 否 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { n } \\ & \stackrel{n}{x} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & \frac{0}{1} \\ & 0 \\ & \text { 慈 } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Residential REITs（continued） |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| UDR | 959.8 | 10 | 9 | Y | 68 | 11 |  | － |  | 7 | 80，000 | b，c | 235，540 | 35\％ | 63\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| Retail REITs |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Federal Realty Investment Trust | 801.6 | 8 | 7 | Y | 60 | 9 | － | 72 |  | 4 | 190，000 | d | 195，396 | 99\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| GGP | 2，346．4 | 9 | 8 | Y | 58 | 5 |  | － |  | 8 | 200，000 | c | 205，000 | 40\％ | 60\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Kimco Realty Corporation | 1，170．8 | 9 | 7 | Y | 71 | 15 |  | － |  | 5 | 60，000 | b，c | 276，091 | 37\％ | 63\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| The Macerich Co． | 1，041．3 | 10 | 7 | N | 63 | 8 |  | 75 |  | 5 | 70，000 | b，c | 208，956 | 47\％ | 53\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Realty Income Corporation | 1，103．2 | 8 | 7 | Y | 64 | 11 |  | － |  | 14 | 15，000 | b | 296，500 | 15\％ | 85\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Regency Centers Corporation | 614.4 | 11 | 10 | N | 64 | 10 | 0 | 75 |  | 16 | 60，000 | b，c | 247，515 | 40\％ | 60\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Simon Property Group | 5，435．2 | 11 | 8 | N | 67 | 9 | 9 | － |  | 5 | 100，000 | b | 279，027 | 41\％ | 59\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Specialized REITs |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| American Tower Corporation | 5，785．7 | 9 | 8 | N | 66 | 10 | 0 | － |  | 10 | 85，000 | b | 265，029 | 40\％ | 60\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Crown Castle International Corp． | 3，921．2 | 11 | 9 | Y | 63 | 14 | 4 | － |  | 6 | 75，000 | b | 250，781 | 33\％ | 65\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| Digital Realty Trust | 2，142．2 | 9 | 8 | Y | 63 | 7 | 7 | 75 |  | 7 | 75，000 | b | 274，840 | 41\％ | 59\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Equinix | 3，612．0 | 10 | 8 | Y | 62 | 8 | 8 | 75 |  | 14 | 60，000 | b | 337，723 | 26\％ | 74\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Extra Space Storage | 997.9 | 7 | 4 | Y | 68 | 8 | 8 | － |  | 8 | 65，000 | b | 179，885 | 44\％ | 56\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Iron Mountain | 3，511．5 | 12 | 11 | Y | 62 | 7 | 7 | 75 |  | 10 | 75，000 | b，c | 241，814 | 43\％ | 56\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Public Storage | 2，560．5 | 9 | 6 | N | 65 | 11 | 1 | 70 |  | 5 | 120，000 | e | 298，657 | 45\％ | 0\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ |
| Weyerhaeuser Company | 6，365．0 | 11 | 9 | Y | 62 | 7 | 7 | 72 |  | 7 | 220，000 | c，d | 234，558 | 47\％ | 53\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| TOTAL REAL ESTATE |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average |  | 9.7 | 7.9 |  | 64.6 | 9.5 | 5 | 73.9 |  | 7.6 | 93，661 |  | 242，009 | 40\％ | 56\％ | 3\％ | 1\％ |
| Median |  | 10.0 | 8.0 |  | 64.3 | 9.4 | 4 | 75.0 |  | 7.0 | 75，000 |  | 239，194 |  |  |  |  |

## TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES

| Alternative Carriers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Level 3 Communications | 8，172．0 | 11 | 9 | Y | 65 | 6 | 73 | 10 | 75，000 | b | 282，331 | 37\％ | 63\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Integrated Telecommunication Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| AT\＆T | 163，786．0 | 13 | 12 | N | 62 | 6 | 72 | 11 | 95，000 | b，c | 330，633 | 46\％ | 52\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| CenturyLink | 17，470．0 | 9 | 8 | Y | 62 | 12 | 75 | 14 | 65，000 | b | 285，309 | 48\％ | 52\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Verizon Communications | 125，980．0 | 12 | 11 | N | 62 | 7 | 72 | 9 | 125，000 | b | 271，871 | 43\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |

TOTAL TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES

| Average | 11.3 | 10.0 | 62.7 | 7.7 | 73.0 | 11.0 | 90，000 | 292，461 | 44\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Median | 11.5 | 10.0 | 62.2 | 6.4 | 72.5 | 10.5 | 85，000 | 283，820 |  |  |  |  |

## UTILITIES

Utilities

| The AES Corporation | 13，586．0 | 9 | 8 | Y | 63 | 6 | － | 5 | 80，000 | b，c，d，f | 296，972 | 30\％ | 70\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Alliant Energy Corporation | 3，320．0 | 10 | 9 | N | 59 | 9 | 70 | 10 | 220，000 | c | 213，731 | 98\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| Ameren Corporation | 6，076．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 64 | 7 | 72 | 10 | 85，000 | b，c | 217，251 | 51\％ | 48\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| American Electric Power Company | 16，380．1 | 12 | 11 | N | 64 | 7 | 72 | 8 | 105，500 | b，c | 283，894 | 45\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| American Water Works Company | 3，302．0 | 8 | 7 | Y | 64 | 7 | 75 | 13 | 85，000 | b | 250，640 | 42\％ | 56\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| CenterPoint Energy | 7，528．0 | 10 | 8 | Y | 63 | 7 | － | 6 | 90，000 | b | 219，304 | 45\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |



TOTAL S\&P 500

| Average | 10.8 | 9.2 | 63.1 | 8.2 | 73.4 | 8.2 | 120,409 | 288,909 | $38 \%$ | $55 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $3 \%$ | 279,027 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Median | 11.0 | 9.0 | 64.0 | 7.0 | 73.0 | 7.0 | 100,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## Footnotes:

a Includes regular, special and telephonic board meetings.
b Equity (stock or stock units) is paid in addition to stated retainer.
c Directors can elect to receive cash compensation fully or partially in stock.
d Equity (stock or stock units) is paid as part of retainer.
e Stock option program for directors exists.
$f$ Equity portion of retainer paid in deferred stock.
g Retainer paid 100\% in stock.
h Directors can elect to receive equity retainer fully or partially in cash.
1 Directors can elect to receive cash and/or stock compensation in stock options.
j Dollar value equivalent for retainer not provided in proxy.
k Directors can elect to receive stock in lieu of stock option grant.

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Singapore
Stamford
Stockholm
Sydney
Tokyo
Toronto
Vienna
Warsaw
Washington, D.C.
Zürich



[^0]:    The Spencer Stuart U.S. Board Index (SSBI) is based on our analysis of the most recent proxy reports from the S\&P 500, plus an extensive supplemental survey. This edition of the SSBI draws on the latest proxy statements from 491 companies filed between May 15 , 2016, and May 19, 2017, and responses from 65 companies to our governance survey conducted in the second quarter of 2017 . Survey respondents are typically corporate secretaries, general counsel or chief governance officers. Proxy and survey data have been supplemented with information compiled in Spencer Stuart's proprietary database.

[^1]:    $\mathrm{N}=404$ lead or presiding directors identified by name
    *All active and retired unless where specifically stated.

[^2]:    *Includes in-person and telephonic regular and special meetings.

