

Spencer Stuart Board Index

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## About Spencer Stuart Board Services

Spencer Stuart is one of the world's leading executive search firms. Privately held since 1956, Spencer Stuart applies its extensive knowledge of industries, functions and talent to advise select clients - ranging from major multinationals to emerging companies to nonprofit organizations - and address their leadership requirements. Through 55 offices in 30 countries and a broad range of practice groups, Spencer Stuart consultants focus on senior-level executive search, board director appointments, succession planning and in-depth senior executive management assessments.

The premier firm for board counsel and recruitment, Spencer Stuart conducts well over half of all director assignments handled through executive search. For more than 25 years, our Board Practice has helped boards around the world identify and recruit independent directors and provided advice to chairmen, CEOs and nominating committees on important governance issues. In the past year alone, we have conducted more than 400 director searches. We are the firm of choice for both leading multinational and smaller organizations. We have worked with onethird of the Fortune 500 during the past 10 years, and more than one-third of our assignments are for companies with less than \$1 billion in revenue.

Our global team of board experts works together to ensure that our clients have unrivaled access to the best existing and potential director talent, and regularly assists boards in increasing the diversity of their composition. We have recruited more than 1,100 female directors for clients worldwide. During the past three years, over $30 \%$ of our placements have been women.

In addition to our work with clients, Spencer Stuart has long played an active role in corporate governance by exploring - both on our own and with other prestigious institutions - key concerns of boards and innovative solutions to the challenges facing them. Publishing the Spencer Stuart Board Index (SSBI), now in its 29th edition, is just one of our many ongoing efforts:
> Each year, we sponsor and participate in several acclaimed director education programs, including:

- The Annual Boardroom Summit, jointly sponsored by the New York Stock Exchange and Corporate Board Member
- The Corporate Governance Conference at Northwestern University's Kellogg School of Management
- The Americas and Global Institutes sponsored by WomenCorporateDirectors
- The New Directors Program, a unique two-year development program designed to provide first-time, non-executive directors with an exclusive forum for peer dialogue on key issues and "unwritten rules" of corporate boards, produced in partnership with the Boston Consulting Group, Frederick W. Cook \& Co., Gibson Dunn, Lazard and PricewaterhouseCoopers


## Spencer Stuart Perspective for 2014

In recent years, there has been a growing conversation about board composition and turnover, among directors themselves as well as investors and governance observers. On the external front, investors have become a potent voice in board composition, calling for annual director elections, demanding more information about the specific skills and experience individual directors bring to the board, and even challenging the nominations of directors in response to concerns about business performance or executive compensation. In addition, governance observers and proxy advisory firms have become more vocal about director tenure, with some questioning whether independence is compromised after many years on the board.

Boards themselves are thinking more broadly about the expertise that is needed in the boardroom. As directors retire, most boards carefully consider what new skills might be needed based on the strategic direction of the business and the current expertise on the board. Nevertheless, few take a formal, longerterm perspective on their own succession, even as they have embraced more rigorous and transparent processes around CEO succession planning. At some level, this is not surprising. Like other succession situations in which individuals have to look ahead to their own replacement, planning for board succession can be uncomfortable.

The need for thoughtful board succession planning is greater today in light of the pace and dynamics of business. Globalization and advancements in technology are giving rise to a slew of competitive and business threats and opportunities. At a time when growth and innovation are top priorities for most organizations, companies are transforming themselves through new product strategies, different product mixes, and expansion into new markets and geographies. In an ideal world, outside directors with relevant experience can serve as valuable advisers to the board and management about the company's market, geographic and product directions. They also can serve as a sounding board for management on the critical issues the company is likely to encounter. Wise boards will want to foresee where the company is headed in the future and have individuals on the board with the expertise to help the company move in that direction as efficiently as possible.

The need for thoughtful board succession planning is greater today in light of the pace and dynamics of business...

## Spencer Stuart Perspective for 2014

> 371
> Number of independent directors added in 2014

## $3 \%$

of boards specify term limits

It's fair to ask what level of "refresh" is appropriate: What evidence is there that companies and shareholders benefit from board turnover? How much change is desirable? To provide perspective on these complex questions, we studied board turnover and shareholder returns for the S\&P 500. Published in Harvard Business Review in April 2014, our analysis revealed that companies that added three or four new directors in a three-year period outperformed their peers, suggesting an optimal amount of turnover. The worst performers tended to be those with either no director changes at all in three years or those with five or more changes. Of course, a company's longterm shareholder return is influenced by many more factors than the strength of its governance practices and board composition, not the least of which are the company's management and strategy. But the correlation between board turnover and performance suggests that board composition and renewal are topics that boards and CEOs should not ignore.

What is happening in practice? In the 2014 proxy year, 371 independent directors were added to S\&P 500 boards. This represents a $9 \%$ increase in director recruiting over 2013 and a $26 \%$ increase in the past two years. Despite the recent uptick, the number of directors added to S\&P 500 boards remains considerably less than a decade ago, when 443 new directors joined S\&P 500 boards.

Over the same period, many boards have increased their mandatory retirement ages, and the average age of S\&P 500 directors has increased. Of the 361 boards that specify a retirement age, $30 \%$ now set it at 75 or older, a notable increase from $24 \%$ just one year ago. A decade ago, only $5 \%$ of boards had a retirement age of 75 or higher. The average age of independent directors is now 63.1 versus 60.5 a decade ago, and $45 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards have an average age of 64 or older, compared with $16 \%$ of boards in 2004.

Despite the increased attention on director turnover and board renewal, term limits remain uncommon among S\&P 500 boards. 65\% of boards explicitly state in their corporate governance guidelines that they do not have term limits, while just 16 S\&P 500 boards, $3 \%$, specify a term limit for directors. $32 \%$ do not mention term limits at
all. Rather than establishing term limits, many boards report that they consider whether individual directors should remain on the board as part of their nomination for election procedures. The average tenure of S\&P 500 boards today is 8.4 years, and $16 \%$ have an average tenure of 11 or more years.

Boards tend to address director succession only on an as-needed basis - when facing an impending vacancy. Director departures or retirements create openings that enable the board to expand or strengthen its skills in certain areas. Most boards take advantage of natural attrition to recruit directors who can add valuable perspectives about the company's strategic direction, for example, directors with experience in a particular market, industry or business model.

But boards also may want to think about composition over longer periods, developing a five-year plan for director succession, for example. The annual board evaluation is a natural platform for the full board to review its composition and discuss the expertise that it will need in the future. Through the evaluation, individual directors and the board as a whole can identify the areas of knowledge the board should possess in the coming years based on the company's strategic direction and the competitive landscape. From there, the board can evaluate whether it currently includes individuals with the relevant backgrounds and, if not, what skills or experience would be valuable to seek in new directors when vacancies occur.

A growing number of boards conduct individual director assessments to understand the performance and contributions of each director to help improve individual performance and to encourage appropriate turnover. Annual evaluations of individual directors as well as the full board and its committees occur on $34 \%$ of boards, compared with $17 \%$ five years ago.

When recruiting new directors, boards increasingly rely on retired executives, candidates with knowledge of disciplines such as digital or social media, finance and emerging markets, and executives who have experience working abroad at some point in their careers. We continue to see an increase in the number of new directors who are
63.1

Average age of independent directors
$30 \%$
Percentage of boards with retirement age set at 75 or older

## Spencer Stuart Perspective for 2014

$30 \%$
Percentage of new independent women directors - the highest ever

## 53\%

More than half of new independent directors are retired senior executives and professionals
serving on an outside public board for the first time - $39 \%$ percent of new directors were "first-time" directors in this proxy year. Other observations about the "class of 2014" directors include the following:

- More than half ( $53 \%$ ) of new independent directors are retired senior executives and professionals, compared with $39 \%$ of new directors in 2009. Conversely, active executives or professionals now represent $47 \%$ of new independent directors, down from 61\% in 2009.
- Active CEOs, COOs, chairmen, presidents and vice chairmen also represent a smaller share of new S\&P 500 directors. In 2014, these senior executives represented $22 \%$ of new directors, compared with $23 \%$ in 2013 and $26 \%$ in 2009.
- The majority of first-time directors, $61 \%$, are active executives.
- Similarly, current CEOs are more likely than retired CEOs to be first-time non-executive directors. Of the first-time directors who are current or former CEOs, $11 \%$ are active CEOs and only $2 \%$ are retired CEOs.
- Division/subsidiary presidents and other line and functional leaders make up 23\% of all new directors, almost double their representation a decade ago.
- Female representation among new directors rose from $24 \%$ in 2013 to $30 \%$ in 2014, the highest level we've seen. In 2009, women represented $17 \%$ of new directors.


## Additional highlights from this year's proxy analysis:

- In the past decade, the percentage of S\&P 500 boards with a declassified structure has increased significantly from 55\% in 2004 to $93 \%$ today.
- Boards are increasingly likely to place limits on directors' ability to serve on other boards. $75 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards have established some restriction on other corporate directorships for their board members, compared with 55\% in 2006.
- More than one-quarter of S\&P 500 boards (28\%) have a truly independent chair - a nonexecutive director or a former executive who has met the applicable NYSE or NASDAQ rules for independence over time - compared with 9\% in 2004, the year we began tracking this trend.
- Boards have reduced their number of meetings since 2009. Boards met an average of 8.1 times, compared with an average of 9.0 meetings five years ago.
- $98 \%$ of boards report that they conduct some form of annual board evaluation, up from 94\% five years ago.
- The average total compensation for S\&P 500 directors is $\$ 263,748,6 \%$ higher than the 2013 average. More than half of director compensation comes in the form of equity.


## S\&P 500 Boards: Five- and 10-Year Trends

|  | 2014 (a) | 2009 (b) | 2004 (c) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 5-year \% } \\ & \text { change } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 10-year \% } \\ & \text { change } \end{aligned}$ | Comments |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Board composition |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average board size | 10.8 | 10.8 | 10.8 | ०\% | ०\% | Average board size stable for 10 years |
| Independent directors | 84\% | 82\% | 80\% | 2\% | 5\% | Share of independent directors has risen slightly |
| Average age of independent directors | 63.1 | 61.7 | 60.5 | 2\% | 4\% | The average director age is at highest level in 10 years |

## New independent directors

| Total number | 371 | 333 | 443 | $11 \%$ | $-16 \%$ | The highest number of new directors in six years |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Women | $30 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $76 \%$ | $25 \%$ | Boards added llo new women, the most ever; almost <br> one-third of new directors are women |
| Active CEO/chair/president/COO/ <br> vice chair | $22 \%$ | $26 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $-15 \%$ | $-33 \%$ | Significantly fewer active senior executives making board <br> commitments <br> Retired CEO/chair/president/COO/ <br> vice chair |
| Financial backgrounds | $19 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $12 \%$ | $73 \%$ | Share of retired senior executives among new directors <br> continues to grow |
| Other corporate executives | $20 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $-16 \%$ | Directors with financial backgrounds are a consistent source <br> of new directors <br> Corporate leaders added to boards at almost double the $\%$ |
| Women directors | $23 \%$ | $21 \%$ | $12 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $92 \%$ | from 10 years ago |
| Women as percentage of all directors | $19 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $19 \%$ | Female representation is increasing |
| Boards with at least one woman director | $95 \%$ | $89 \%$ | $88 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $8 \%$ | $5 \%$ of boards do not have any female directors |

## CEO profile

| Average number of other corporate <br> directorships | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.9 | $-14 \%$ | $-33 \%$ | Sitting CEOs take on fewer outside board commitments |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Women CEOs | 23 | 16 | 7 | $44 \%$ | $229 \%$ | Females lead only $5 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards |
| Boards where CEO is the only <br> non-independent | $58 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $49 \%$ | CEO is the only inside director on more than half of boards |
| Average age | 56.9 | 55.7 | 55.3 | $2 \%$ | $3 \%$ | The average age of CEOs has risen slightly in 10 years |
| Average tenure with company | 18.3 | 14.6 | 14.8 | $25 \%$ | $24 \%$ | The average CEO company tenure has increased four years |
| Chairman independence | $53 \%$ | $63 \%$ | $74 \%$ | $-16 \%$ | $-28 \%$ | More boards are separating the CEO and chair roles |
| CEO is also chairman | $28 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $75 \%$ | $211 \%$ | Independent board leadership structure is becoming <br> more common |
| Independent chairman | $90 \%$ | $95 \%$ | $85 \%$ | $-5 \%$ | $6 \%$ | Most boards have an independent leadership role |
| Boards with lead or presiding director |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Board meetings | 8.1 | 9.0 | 8.0 | $-10 \%$ | $1 \%$ | Average number of meetings peaked about five years ago |
| Average number of board meetings | 7 | 8 | 7 | $-13 \%$ | $0 \%$ | Median returns to 2004 level |
| Median number of board meetings |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Retirement age
Boards with mandatory retirement age
Boards with mandatory retirement age
of $75+$
Boards with mandatory retirement age
of $72+$
2014 (a)
2009 (b) 2004 (c)

5-year \% 10-year \% change change Comments

Retirement age

| Boards with mandatory retirement age | $73 \%$ | $75 \%$ | $79 \%$ | $-3 \%$ | $-8 \%$ | Decline in mandatory retirement requirements over the <br> past 10 years |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Boards with mandatory retirement age <br> of $75+$ | $30 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $100 \%$ | $500 \%$ | Boards are allowing directors to remain on boards <br> much longer |
| Boards with mandatory retirement age <br> of $72+$ | $92 \%$ | $75 \%$ | $49 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $88 \%$ | Nearly all boards with a retirement age set it at 72 or older |

## Committee meetings

| Average number of audit committee <br> meetings | 8.6 | 9.1 | 8.7 | $-5 \%$ | $-1 \%$ | Audit committees do not meet as often as in prior years |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Average number of compensation <br> committee meetings | 6.3 | 6.6 | 5.8 | $-5 \%$ | $9 \%$ | Compensation committees meet more often than <br> 10 |

Audit committee chairmen

| Active CEO/chair/president/vice chair | $8 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $-38 \%$ | $-64 \%$ | Fewer active senior executives serve as audit chair |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Financial exec/CFO/treas/public acct exec | $37 \%$ | $25 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $185 \%$ | Financial executives increasingly viewed as audit chair leaders |

Non-employee director compensation

| Total average compensation (d) | $\$ 263,748$ | $\$ 212,750$ | $\mathrm{n} / \mathrm{a}$ | $24 \%$ | $\mathrm{n} / \mathrm{a}$ | Total average compensation grew $24 \%$ in five years |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| Average annual retainer (e) | $\$ 107,383$ | $\$ 75,893$ | $\$ 49,727$ | $41 \%$ | $116 \%$ | Large gain in retainer values over 10 years |
| Median annual retainer (e) | $\$ 85,000$ | $\$ 60,000$ | $\$ 40,000$ | $42 \%$ | $113 \%$ | Median retainer has more than doubled |
| Boards paying retainer of at least \$70,000 | $75 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $63 \%$ | $368 \%$ | Three-quarters of boards pay a minimum $\$ 70,000$ retainer |
| Boards paying board meeting fee | $25 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $66 \%$ | $-42 \%$ | $-62 \%$ | Fewer boards pay for meeting attendance |
| Average board meeting fee | $\$ 2,229$ | $\$ 2,122$ | $\$ 1,723$ | $5 \%$ | $29 \%$ | While granted less often, attendance fees increase slightly |
| Boards offering stock option program $18 \%$ $37 \%$ | $68 \%$ | $-51 \%$ | $-74 \%$ | Far fewer boards offer option grants |  |  |
| Boards paying equity in addition to <br> retainer | $76 \%$ | $79 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $-4 \%$ | $52 \%$ | Three-quarters of boards provide stock grants |

## Committee compensation

| Boards paying committee chair retainer | $95 \%$ | $89 \%$ | $77 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $23 \%$ | Committee retainers are paid on almost all boards |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| Average committee chair retainer | $\$ 14,110$ | $\$ 11,377$ | $\$ 7,509$ | $24 \%$ | $88 \%$ | Committee chair retainer premium increases |
| Boards paying committee member <br> retainer | $39 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $20 \%$ | $8 \%$ | $95 \%$ | More boards pay member retainers in lieu of meeting fees |
| Average committee member retainer | $\$ 8,411$ | $\$ 7,441$ | $\$ 5,773$ | $13 \%$ | $46 \%$ | Member retainer average also rises |
| Boards paying committee meeting fees | $27 \%$ | $45 \%$ | $63 \%$ | $-40 \%$ | $-57 \%$ | Committee meeting fees fall out of favor |
| Average committee meeting fees | $\$ 1,715$ | $\$ 1,579$ | $\$ 1,374$ | $9 \%$ | $25 \%$ | Meeting fees have increased |

(a) Data based on proxy year May 16, 2013, through May 19, 2014.
(b) Data based on proxy year June 1, 2008, through May 15, 2009.
(c) Data based on proxy year June 1, 2003, through May 31, 2004.
(d) Based on non-employee director compensation tables included in 493 and 488 proxies for 2014 and 2009, respectively.
(e) Not including stock beyond retainer.

## Board Composition

|  | 2014 Snapsho |
| :---: | :---: |
|  | For the first time, more than half of new directors are retired |
|  |  |
|  | 28\% $\qquad$ |

## Number of new directors increases by $9 \%$

> S\&P 500 boards elected 37 I new independent directors in the 2014 proxy year, a $9 \%$ increase over 2013. This follows a $16 \%$ increase in the 2013 proxy year. Boards are replacing directors who have hit the mandatory retirement age, which had been extended in many cases.
> This class of new independent directors is the most since 2008, when S\&P 500 boards added 380 independent directors.

## Boards increasingly draw on first-timers to fill board openings

> Individuals with no prior public company board experience continue to be a growing source of new directors. In all, I45 first-time directors joined S\&P 500 boards in the 2014 proxy year, representing $39 \%$ of all new directors, compared with $38 \%$ in 2013 .
> The majority of first-time directors, $6 \mathrm{I} \%$, are active executives.
> Similarly, current CEOs are more likely than retired CEOs to be first-time directors on an outside public company board. Of the first-time directors who are current or former CEOs, iı\% are active CEOs and only $2 \%$ are retired CEOs.

## More retired executives are tapped for board service, but the mix is changing

> More than half $(53 \%)$ of new independent directors are retired senior executives and professionals, compared with $39 \%$ of new directors in 2009. Conversely, active executives or professionals now represent $47 \%$ of new independent directors, down from $6 \mathrm{I} \%$ in 2009.
> While new directors are increasingly likely to be retired, the representation of retired senior executives - retired CEOs, COOs, chairmen, presidents and vice chairmen - has declined. In 2014, $19 \%$ of new directors were retired CEOs, COOs, chairmen, presidents and vice chairmen, compared with $23 \%$ in 2013.
> In addition, active CEOs, COOs, chairmen, presidents and vice chairmen represent a smaller share of new S\&P 500 directors. In 2014, these senior executives represented $22 \%$ of new directors, compared with $23 \%$ in 2013 and $26 \%$ in 2009.
> Other corporate executives, both active and retired, are being tapped for board assignments in greater numbers. Division/subsidiary presidents and other line and functional leaders make up $23 \%$ of all new directors, almost double their representation a decade ago. Among the line and functional leaders, $60 \%$ are business unit heads or leaders in technology, corporate development/strategy/planning and human resources.

## More women and directors with international experience join boards

> Female representation among new directors rose from $24 \%$ in 2013 to $30 \%$ in 20I4, the highest level recorded in this study. In 2009, women represented $17 \%$ of new directors.
> Of the new women directors, $\mathrm{I} \%$ are current or former CEOs or other senior executives, a significant drop from $24 \%$ in $2013.37 \%$ of female directors are division/subsidiary presidents or line/functional leaders. By comparison, $52 \%$ of the new male directors are current/former CEOs and $\mathrm{I} 6 \%$ are division/subsidiary presidents or line/functional leaders.
> $33 \%$ of new directors have global experience - defined in this report as having worked at an international location - compared with $29 \%$ in 20I3. New directors have working experience in diverse global locations, including Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America.

## New directors represent diverse industry and functional backgrounds

> Demand for director candidates with financial backgrounds rose slightly; $20 \%$ of new appointees have banking, finance, investment or accounting credentials, compared with $18 \%$ in 2013 and $18 \%$ five years ago. Today, $3 \%$ of new directors are retired public accounting professionals, compared with only $\mathrm{I} \%$ five years ago.

## Board Composition

$>39 \%$ of new directors came from the high tech/telecommunications, consumer goods and services and financial services sectors, a decrease from $43 \%$ from these sectors in 2013.
$>$ Among all sectors, representation increased the most in new directors from the government/ military, from $5 \%$ in 2013 to $8 \%$ in 2014 . Overall, however, $16 \%$ of new directors have some working experience in the government or military, compared with $19 \%$ in 2013.
$>$ Several sectors are adding new directors at a higher rate than others. For example, the energy sector accounts for $9 \%$ of S\&P 500 companies, but recruited $12 \%$ of new independent directors. Similarly, the financial and information technology sectors account for $16 \%$ and $\mathrm{I} 3 \%$ of companies, respectively, but $\mathrm{I} 8 \%$ and $\mathrm{I} 5 \%$ of all new directors. Conversely, the consumer discretionary sector represents $17 \%$ of companies, but only $14 \%$ of the new directors.

| New Independent Director Backgrounds* | Year |  |  | 2014 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2004 | 2009 | 2014 | Men | Women |
| CEO/chair/president/COO/vice chair | 44\% | 43\% | $41 \%$ | 52\% | 15\% |
| Active | $33 \%$ | 26\% | 22\% | 27\% | 9\% |
| Retired | 11\% | 17\% | 19\% | 25\% | 6\% |
| Other corporate executives | 12\% | 21\% | 23\% | 16\% | $37 \%$ |
| Division/subsidiary presidents | 5\% | 8\% | 9\% | 7\% | 14\% |
| Line and functional leaders | 7\% | 13\% | 14\% | 9\% | 23\% |
| Financial backgrounds | 24\% | 18\% | 20\% | 19\% | $24 \%$ |
| Financial executives/CFO/treasurers | 8\% | 5\% | 7\% | 5\% | 11\% |
| Bankers/investment bankers | 5\% | 3\% | 4\% | 4\% | 4\% |
| Investment managers/investors | 5\% | 9\% | 6\% | 8\% | 4\% |
| Public accounting executives** | 6\% | 1\% | 3\% | 2\% | 5\% |
| Academics/nonprofit | 10\% | 8\% | 4\% | 3\% | 4\% |
| Consultants | 4\% | 3\% | 2\% | 1\% | 5\% |
| Lawyers | 3\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 5\% |
| Others ${ }^{\text {\% }}$ \% | 3\% | 5\% | 8\% | 7\% | 10\% |
| $\mathrm{N}=261$ men and 110 women in 2014 <br> * Except where noted, all include both active and retired executives. <br> ** All former partners or executives of accounting firms. <br> *** Includes retired government officials and military personnel, designers, television news anchor, medical executive, police commissioner. |  |  |  |  |  |

## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: Recruiting new directors

$>$ During the past several years, the topic of board renewal has gained prominence. This year, in addition to asking about the specific expertise and backgrounds boards are looking for in new directors, our survey of S\&P 500 corporate secretaries asked about how boards approach board renewal.
$>41 \%$ of respondents said their board has a long-term strategy to promote regular board turnover. Among those that do, $93 \%$ said director retirement is the primary driver and $80 \%$ said the desire to add new skills to the board is the main catalyst. $60 \%$ cited the desire to increase the diversity of the board as a driver of long-term board turnover.
> Just over half of respondents said their board is planning to add new directors in 2014, and 39\% said their board expects to add directors in 2015. Replacing retiring directors is the most common reason for adding new directors, cited by $82 \%$ of respondents. Other top reasons for adding new directors are to bring new skills to the board and increase board diversity, cited by $63 \%$ and $45 \%$ of respondents, respectively. Roughly $10 \%$ of respondents said directors are being added to increase the size of the board.

## Director recruiting profiles

$>$ A growing number of boards appear to be taking a holistic view of the capabilities needed in the boardroom. $83 \%$ of respondents said their board has evaluated its cumulative experience against a defined set of desired skills.
> When asked about the specific profiles needed in the boardroom, women and minority directors emerged as the top recruiting priorities, with $71 \%$ of respondents saying their board is looking for female directors and $64 \%$ saying their board is seeking minority directors. In fact, boards did make progress in recruiting women in the current proxy year: $30 \%$ of new independent directors are women, the highest level recorded to date. However, only $12 \%$ of new directors are minorities, a decrease from $18 \%$ in 2013.
> Recruiting an active CEO or COO is a priority for $60 \%$ of respondents, while $40 \%$ said they are looking for a retired CEO or COO. International experience and industry expertise also are in demand, cited by $55 \%$ and $51 \%$ of respondents, respectively. Financial expertise was cited as a priority by $45 \%$ of respondents.
> $28 \%$ of respondents said digital and social media expertise are needed, compared with just $12 \%$ of respondents in 2013.

## Wish List for New Director Backgrounds*

| Women | $71 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Minorities | $64 \%$ |
| Active CEO/COO | $60 \%$ |
| International expertise | $55 \%$ |
| Industry expertise | $51 \%$ |
| Financial expertise | $45 \%$ |
| Retired CEO/COO | $40 \%$ |
| Digital or social media expertise | $28 \%$ |
| Information technology expertise | $27 \%$ |
| Risk expertise | $24 \%$ |
| Marketing expertise | $20 \%$ |
| Regulatory/government expertise | $17 \%$ |

* Percentages add up to more than 100 as respondents could select more than one category.

Data in this and other sections labeled "Added Perspective" come from our governance survey, conducted in the second quarter of 2014. This year, we heard from 108 S $\mathcal{A} P 500$ companies, except where noted. Respondents include corporate secretaries, general counsel and chief governance officers.

## Board Composition

## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: Director onboarding

> Director onboarding programs can vary widely, and the best take into account the specific experience that individual directors bring to the board, including previous governance and industry experience. For the first time this year, we surveyed S\&P 500 boards about their approach to onboarding.
$>98 \%$ said a meeting with the company's auditor is part of the director orientation program. $55 \%$ have new directors meet with the company's compensation adviser.
$>64 \%$ of respondents said new directors participate in site visits, and $39 \%$ said their companies offer a new director orientation in which directors meet with management team members and business unit and functional leaders. $20 \%$ provide access to third-party director education programs.

## Average board size hovers near 11

$>$ For more than Io years, the average size of S\&P 500 boards has been stable, ranging between 10.7 and i0.9. On average, S\&P 500 boards have 10.8 members today. The stability in the average board size has masked a convergence within the 9-12 board member range. Nearly three-quarters of boards now fall within that range, compared with $62 \%$ in 2004 .
$>42 \%$ of boards have io or II members today, compared with $35 \%$ a decade ago. During the same io-year period, the percentage of boards with eight or fewer members fell from $\mathrm{I} \% \%$ to $9 \%$, and boards with 13 or more members declined from 2 I\% to $I 7 \%$.
$>$ CME Group tops the list of largest boards with 24 members, followed by BlackRock and BB\&T, with I8 members each.
> The smallest board — Microchip Technology — has five directors, and three boards have six members.


## Percentage of independent directors dips slightly

> Independent directors now make up $84 \%$ of all S\&P 500 board members. This represents a decrease of just one percentage point from last year, which had the highest representation of independent directors since we began tracking these data in 1998. S\&P 500 boards have 9.I independent directors and I. 7 non-independent directors on average. The ratio of independent directors to non-independent directors is 5.4 to I .
$>$ As the percentage of independent directors has increased over time, the CEO has become the sole non-independent director on the majority of boards. On $58 \%$ of boards today, the CEO is the only non-independent director, compared with $50 \%$ in 2009. In 2004, $61 \%$ of boards had at least one non-independent director in addition to the CEO.

## All but 7\% of boards now have annual director elections

$>$ A growing number of S\&P 500 boards have opted for a declassified board structure; today $93 \%$ of boards have one-year director terms, an increase from 9I\% in 20I3. In the past decade, the percentage of boards with a declassified structure has increased significantly from $55 \%$ in 2004.
> It also has become standard practice for boards to establish policies requiring directors who fail to secure a majority vote to offer their resignation. $86 \%$ of boards now have such policies, up from 65\% in 2009 .
> While these policies have become widespread, boards still retain the discretion to accept or decline a director's resignation following his or her failure to receive a majority vote.

## On most boards, directors and CEOs must provide notification about a job change

$>86 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards have a provision in their corporate governance guidelines requiring directors who experience a job transition or change in job responsibilities to notify the chairman and/or the nominating committee and offer their resignation. Typically, the chair or nominating committee has the discretion to accept or decline the resignation.
$>38 \%$ of boards report having a policy requiring the CEO to submit his or her resignation from the board when the CEO's employment with the company ends. In all cases, however, boards retain the discretion to accept or decline the resignation. In 20II, $32 \%$ of boards had such a provision.

## Three-quarters of boards restrict other public company directorships

$>$ As the time commitment and responsibility required for effective board service has increased, a growing number of boards have placed limits on directors' ability to serve on other boards. $75 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards today have established some restriction on other corporate directorships for their board members. By comparison, $67 \%$ of boards in 2009 and $55 \%$ in 2006 had such restrictions. Some companies limit the number of additional boards for all directors, while others do so only for audit committee members or for directors who are fully employed by public companies.
> $60 \%$ of boards have set a numerical limit for other board service for all directors; of those, $5 \%$ cap additional directorships at two, $3 \mathrm{I} \%$ cap additional directorships at three, $4 \mathrm{I} \%$ at four, and $23 \%$ at five or six. No company limits other directorships to one.
$>\mathrm{I} 6 \%$ of boards restrict the additional board service of directors who are fully employed executives or CEOs of public companies, limiting these directors to serve on one, two or three other boards.
> $46 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards limit the number of other audit committees on which their own audit committee members may serve; $92 \%$ of these boards limit the number of other audit committee memberships to two.
> 124 boards do not specify a limit on other corporate directorships. Of these, however, $91 \%$ require directors to notify the chairman prior to accepting an invitation to join another company board and/or encourage directors to "reasonably limit" their other board service.
> $20 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards set a specific limit on the CEO's outside board service. Of those, $95 \%$ limit outside board assignments to two or fewer. Only one board reports restricting the CEO from taking any external board role.

## The average director serves on two corporate boards

> Although independent directors generally could serve on more, the average S\&P 500 director has 2.I outside corporate board affiliations. This average has remained unchanged during the last three years.
> $65 \%$ of independent directors have two or more outside affiliations; I2\% have four or more. 38 directors serve on six boards.

Number of Corporate Board Affiliations for Independent Directors


## Few boards have director term limits

$>$ Despite increased attention to the question of director turnover and board refreshment, few boards have adopted director term limits as a tool to promote turnover. $65 \%$ of boards explicitly state in their corporate governance guidelines that they do not have term limits, while just I6 S\&P 500 boards, $3 \%$, specify a term limit for directors. $32 \%$ do not mention term limits at all.
> Of the i6 boards with a specific term limit, five cap director terms at i5 years, four at io years and two at 20 years. The longest term limit is 30 years, and no board has a term limit less than io years.

## Boards with Term Limits

| Company | Term limit |
| :--- | :--- |
| The AES Corporation | 14 consecutive one-year terms |
| Allegion Public Company Limited | 10 years |
| FLIR Systems | 7 consecutive three-year terms |
| Frontier Communications Corporation | 15 years |
| Integrys Energy Group | 30 years |
| International Flavors \& Fragrances | 12 consecutive one-year terms |
| International Game Technology | 10 years |
| Juniper Networks | 10 years |
| MasterCard | 15 years |
| Patterson Companies | 20 years |
| The Procter \& Gamble Company | 18 years |
| Target Corporation | 20 years or 5 years after retirement from active employment |
| Varian Medical Systems | 15 years |
| Wal-Mart Stores | 10 years |
| The Walt Disney Company | 15 years |
| Xcel Energy | 15 years |

> Many boards report that, as an alternative to establishing term limits or mandatory retirement, they consider whether individual directors should remain on the board as part of their nomination for election procedures.

## Average board ages continue to climb

$>$ The median age of independent directors is 63 , and the average continues to inch up, to 63 .I from 62.9 in 2013, 6I. 7 in 2009 and 60.5 a decade ago.
$>$ In $2004,35 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards had an average age of 59 or younger, and $74 \%$ of boards had an average age ranging from 57 to 63 . Today, only $11 \%$ of boards average 59 or younger, and $53 \%$ fall in the 57 to 63 average.
$>45 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards have an average age of 64 or older - compared with $16 \%$ of boards a decade ago - and Io of those boards have an average age of 70 or more.

## Board Composition

> The average age of new independent directors has increased by two years over the past io years, from 55.7 in 2004 to 57.6 today. The oldest new director elected in the 2014 proxy year is 79 , and the youngest is 31 .

## Average Age of Independent Directors

|  | 2014 | 2009 | 2004 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Years |  |  |  |
| Average age of all independent directors | 63.1 | 61.7 | 60.5 |
| Youngest average board age | 73 | 52 | 50 |
| Oldest average board age | $11 \%$ | 75 | 74 |
| Percentage of S\&P 500 boards with an average age of: |  |  |  |
| 59 and younger | $44 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $45 \%$ |
| $60-63$ | $45 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $16 \%$ |
| 64 and older |  | $49 \%$ |  |

## Mandatory retirement ages continue to increase

$>73 \%$ of all S\&P 500 boards have established a mandatory retirement age for directors, relatively stable from $72 \%$ in 2013 and $75 \%$ in 2009 . II\% of boards reported that they decided not to set a mandatory retirement age because the practice could deprive the board of experienced members who possess deep knowledge about company operations.
$>$ Of the 36I boards that specify a retirement age, $30 \%$ now set it at 75 or older, a notable increase from just one year ago when $24 \%$ had a retirement age of 75 or higher. $52 \%$ of boards have a retirement age of 72 . Three boards set the retirement age at 80 . A decade ago, only $5 \%$ of boards had a retirement age of 75 or higher, and $40 \%$ set retirement at age 72 .
> In the 20I4 proxy year, one board added a director equal to the retirement age. The company's proxy indicated the new director's appointment was subject to shareholder approval.

## Mandatory Retirement Age

|  | 2014 | 2009 | 2004 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 70 and younger | $7 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $50 \%$ |
| 71 | $1 \%$ | $1 \%$ | $1 \%$ |
| 72 | $52 \%$ | $54 \%$ | $40 \%$ |
| 73 | $4 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $3 \%$ |
| 74 | $6 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $1 \%$ |
| 75 and older | $30 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $5 \%$ |
| $N=$ Boards that have set a mandatory retirement age: 367 for 2014,366 for 2009,385 for 2004 |  |  |  |

## Fewer boards with an average tenure of more than 10 years

$>$ The average tenure of S\&P 500 boards is 8.4 years, a decrease from 8.6 in 2013.
> $16 \%$ of boards have an average tenure of iI or more years, compared with $20 \%$ of boards in 2013. On two-thirds of boards, $66 \%$, the average director tenure is between six and io years. $18 \%$ have an average tenure of five years or less, down from $22 \%$ in 2009.
> The longest average board tenure is 22 years, compared with 24 years in 2013. The longesttenured director has served 50 years.
> With the average tenure for sitting CEOs at 7.3 years, most boards will serve with two CEOs.

## Board Average Tenure



## Women make gains in the boardroom

> 24 S\&P 500 boards, or $5 \%$ of the total, have no female directors, a decline from 2013 , when $7 \%$ of boards did not have a woman. A decade ago, $13 \%$ of boards had no female directors. Boards without female representation are most likely to be in the information technology or energy sectors.
> Women account for close to $19 \%$ of the total number of directors, compared with just under $18 \%$ in 2013. The average number of women on all boards also increased slightly, from I. 9 in 2013 to 2.0 in 2014.
> More than two-thirds, $68 \%$, of S\&P 500 companies have two or more women on the board, up from $66 \%$ in 2013. A decade ago, $46 \%$ of boards had two or more female directors.
$>23$ S\&P 500 companies have a woman serving as CEO, one more than in 20I3. Female CEOs now represent $4.6 \%$ of chief executives of the companies in this study. While the number of women serving in the top role remains small, it is the largest number since we began tracking this data.
> As we have seen in the past, companies led by women are likely to have a greater number of female board directors. In S\&P 500 companies led by women, $30 \%$ of all directors are women. When the female CEO is excluded, the percentage is $23 \%$. In companies with a male CEO, the average is $18 \%$.
> All but one of the companies led by women have two or more female directors, three have five and one company has six female directors.

## Board Composition

## S\&P 500 Female CEOs and Their Boards*

| Company | CEO | Total directors | Women directors | Women directors as \% of total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Archer-Daniels-Midland Company | Patricia A. Woertz | 12 | 2 | 17\% |
| Avon Products | Sheri McCoy | 10 | 6 | 60\% |
| Campbell Soup Company | Denise M. Morrison | 15 | 5 | 33\% |
| Duke Energy Corporation | Lynn J. Good | 15 | 3 | 20\% |
| E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company | Ellen J. Kullman | 12 | 3 | 25\% |
| Frontier Communications Corporation | Mary Agnes Wilderotter | 11 | 4 | 36\% |
| Gannett Co. | Gracia C. Martore | 10 | 3 | 30\% |
| General Dynamics Corporation | Phebe N. Novakovic | 12 | 3 | 25\% |
| General Motors Corporation | Mary T. Barra | 12 | 4 | 33\% |
| HCP | Lauralee E. Martin | 7 | 2 | 29\% |
| Hewlett-Packard Company | Margaret C. Whitman | 12 | 3 | 25\% |
| International Business Machines Corporation | Virginia M. Rometty | 13 | 3 | 23\% |
| International Game Technology | Patti S. Hart | 9 | 3 | 33\% |
| KeyCorp | Elizabeth E. Mooney | 12 | 5 | 42\% |
| Lockheed Martin Corporation | Marillyn A. Hewson | 12 | 4 | 33\% |
| Mondelez International | Irene B. Rosenfeld | 12 | 3 | 25\% |
| Mylan | Heather Bresch | 13 | 4 | 31\% |
| PepsiCo | Indra K. Nooyi | 13 | 5 | 38\% |
| Sempra Energy | Debra L. Reed | 13 | 3 | 23\% |
| The TJX Companies | Carol Meyrowitz | 10 | 3 | 30\% |
| Ventas | Debra A. Cafaro | 10 | 1 | 10\% |
| Xerox Corporation | Ursula M. Burns | 10 | 4 | 40\% |
| Yahoo! | Marissa Mayer | 9 | 3 | 33\% |

Average \% women directors for companies with female CEOs
$30 \% *$
Average \% women directors for companies with male CEOs
18\%

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* Accurate as of each company's most recent proxy released by May 19, }2014
"Excluding the CEO, the average is 23%.
```


## Fewer minorities tapped as new directors

$>\mathrm{I} 2 \%$ of the 37 I new independent directors are minorities (defined as African-American, Hispanic/Latino and Asian), a decrease from $18 \%$ in 20I3. In all, 45 directors with these profiles joined S\&P 500 boards.
$>$ New minority directors are less likely to be active or retired senior leaders (such as CEO, chair, president or COO ) than new non-minority directors, $20 \%$ versus $44 \%$, but more likely to come from the government/military or academic/nonprofit sectors and other executive roles. $20 \%$ of the new minority directors this year are division/subsidiary presidents and $20 \%$ are line or functional leaders, compared with $8 \%$ and $13 \%$ of new non-minority directors, respectively.
$>$ Among the largest 200 S\&P 500 companies, minorities account for $15 \%$ of all directors, consistent with the past several years. $85 \%$ of those companies have at least one minority director, and $46 \%$ have two or more minority directors.
$>$ The representation of individual minority groups among directors in the top 200 companies remained relatively stable from 2013 .

- $8.5 \%$ of directors are African-American, versus $8.9 \%$ last year. $73 \%$ of boards have at least one African-American director, a decline from $79 \%$ in 2009.
- $4.5 \%$ of directors are Hispanic/Latino, compared with $4.6 \%$ in $2013.47 \%$ of boards today have at least one Hispanic/Latino director, up from $40 \%$ in 2009.
- $\mathrm{I} .8 \%$ of directors are of Asian descent, and $20 \%$ of boards have one or more Asian directors, up from $\mathrm{I} 4 \%$ in 2009.




## Fewer than 10 of the top $\mathbf{2 0 0}$ companies led by minorities

> Nine of the top 200 S\&P companies are led by African-Americans, Hispanics/Latinos or Asians, which is one more than in 2013 and represents $5 \%$ of the top 200 companies.
$>2 \mathrm{I} \%$ of the directors at these nine companies are minorities. However, minority representation drops to $13 \%$ when the CEO is excluded. Minority directors represent $15 \%$ of directors of the top 200 companies with a non-minority CEO.

## Board Composition

Top 200 Minority-Led Companies and Their Boards*

| Company | CEO | Total directors | Minority directors | Minority directors as \% of total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| The AES Corporation | Andres R. Gluski | 12 | 3 | 25\% |
| American Express Company | Kenneth I. Chenault | 13 | 3 | 23\% |
| Carnival Corporation | Arnold W. Donald | 9 | 1 | 11\% |
| Delphi Auto | Rodney O'Neal | 11 | 1 | 9\% |
| Express Scripts | George Paz | 11 | 2 | 18\% |
| McDonald's Corporation | Donald Thompson | 13 | 4 | 31\% |
| Merck \& Co. | Kenneth C. Frazier | 12 | 3 | 25\% |
| United States Steel | Mario Longhi | 13 | 2 | 15\% |
| Xerox Corporation | Ursula M. Burns | 10 | 3 | 30\% |
| Average \% of minority directors for companies with minority CEOs |  |  |  | 21\%** |
| Average \% of minority directors for companies with non-minority CEOs |  |  |  | 15\% |

*Accurate as of each company's most recent proxy released by May 19, 2014.
"Excluding the CEO, the average is $13 \%$.

## Slight year-over-year decline in international representation on boards

> Directors of non-U.S. origin account for 8.1\% of directors on the boards of the top 200 S\&P 500 companies, an increase from $7.2 \%$ in 2009 but a decline from $8.6 \%$ last year. However, $\mathrm{I} 2 \%$ of all new independent S\&P 500 directors are from outside the U.S., an increase from $7 \%$ in 2013.
> $55 \%$ of the top 200 companies in the S\&P 500 have at least one non-U.S. director, the same as last year but more than in 2009 when $50 \%$ of this group included at least one board member from outside the U.S. For the purposes of this report, directors of Indian descent are included within the non-U.S. group.
> While these directors represent 29 different countries, $65 \%$ of the non-U.S. directors come from the following five countries: India, the U.K., Canada, France and Germany. 19\% were born in India and $\mathrm{I} 6 \%$ in the U.K.

## CEO outside board representation continues to decline

> $54 \%$ of CEOs serve on no outside boards, compared with $53 \%$ last year and $51 \%$ in 2009. The percentage of CEOs serving on two or three outside boards fell from $16 \%$ in 2009 to $9 \%$ today.
> CEOs serve on an average of 0.6 other corporate boards, the same since 20io. A decade ago, CEOs served on 0.9 outside corporate directorships.
$>$ The average age of S\&P 500 CEOs is 56.9 , versus 55.7 in 2009. The average CEO age has fluctuated between 55 and 57 years for more than a decade.

## More than one-quarter of boards have a truly independent chair

> The number of boards that split the chair and CEO roles between two people continues to grow. This year, $47 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards, 234 companies, split the role, an increase from $45 \%$ in 2013 and $37 \%$ in 2009.
> $28 \%$ of boards ( I 38 ) now have a truly independent chair —a non-executive director or a former executive who has met the applicable NYSE or NASDAQ rules for independence over time - compared with $25 \%$ last year and $9 \%$ in 2004, the year we began tracking this trend.
> Former CEOs are less likely today to serve as chair than io years ago. Today, 4\% of nonexecutive chairs are the former CEO, compared to $15 \%$ in 2004. Conversely, on $13 \%$ of boards today, executives other than the CEO serve as chair, compared with just $\mathrm{I} \%$ in 2004.
> Despite the trend toward splitting the chair and CEO roles, only 14 boards, $3 \%$ of the S\&P 500, have formal policies requiring the separation. And, in fact, the number of boards with a formal separation policy has decreased from 2I companies (4\%) in 20i3. The majority of other companies decide on a case-by-case basis.

## Chairman's Relationship with the Company



## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: The chairman and CEO split

$>45 \%$ of survey respondents said their board has a separate chairman; of those, $47 \%$ are independent chairmen.
> $29 \%$ of boards have recently considered splitting the chairman and CEO roles. Among the boards that recently decided to separate the chair and CEO roles, $80 \%$ said the move was made as part of a CEO transition. The other $20 \%$ said their boards split the roles because it was the best governance approach or the best structure at the time.
$>24 \%$ said they expect that the board will split the roles within the next five years.

## Board Composition

## Retired senior executives are most likely to serve as independent chair

$>55 \%$ of the I 38 independent chairs of S\&P 500 companies are retired chairmen, vice chairmen, presidents or CEOs. Only $6 \%$ of independent chairs are active executives, including six current public-company CEOs.
> $\mathrm{I} 3 \%$ of the independent chairs are investors or investment managers, and another $\mathrm{I} 3 \%$ are other corporate executives, active or retired, including line and functional leaders.
> Academics, nonprofit executives, bankers/financial executives, and others (including a consultant, lawyer and public accounting executive) make up the remaining independent chairs.

## Independent Chairmen Backgrounds


$>$ On average, independent chairmen serve in the role for 4.0 years. $53 \%$ of independent chairmen have been in the role for three years or less: $27 \%$ have been in the role for one year or less and $26 \%$ for two or three years. $23 \%$ of independent chairmen have served in their roles for six or more years. The longest-serving S\&P 500 independent chair has been in the position for 17 years.
$>86 \%$ of the independent chairmen previously served as directors on the board before becoming chair, serving 7.7 years on average before moving into the chairman role.


## All but three boards have an independent chair or lead/presiding director

$>90 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards report having a lead or presiding director, unchanged from 2013 . Of the 446 boards with one of these positions, $60 \%$ have lead directors and $40 \%$ have presiding directors, including those identified as "chair" of executive sessions. In 2004, when we began tracking this information, only $28 \%$ of boards had designated a lead director and $72 \%$ had a presiding director.
$>$ Among the 9I boards where the chairman is separate from the CEO but not independent, 83 (9I\%) have identified a lead or presiding director.
> 93 ( $67 \%$ ) of the boards with an independent, non-executive chairman have indicated that the non-executive chair also serves as the lead/presiding director. Eight boards identify an independent presiding director in addition to the independent chair.
> Only three S\&P 500 boards do not report having a form of independent board leadership neither an independent chairman nor a lead/presiding director.
$>$ Nearly all lead and presiding directors (97\%) are identified by name in the proxy, compared with $87 \%$ five years ago. In $2009,9 \%$ of boards reported that the lead/presiding director role rotated among different directors, either independent directors or committee chairs, at every meeting, compared with only $2 \%$ this year.

| Lead versus Presiding Directors |  |  |  |  |  | Lead directors |  |  | Presiding directors |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 10 | 20 | 30 | 40 | 50 | 60 | 70 | 80 | 90 | 100 |
| 2014 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | 60\% |  |  |  | 40\% |  |
| 2009 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 46\% |  |  |  |  |  | 54\% |  |  |  |  |

## Board Composition

> More boards are disclosing how long their current lead or presiding director has served in the role. Among the 309 boards that disclosed the information this year, the average tenure is 3.7 years, compared with 3.5 years in $2013.8 \%$ of lead/presiding directors have been in the role for less than a year, and $7 \%$ for io or more years. $70 \%$ of lead and presiding directors have held the role for four years or less.
> The backgrounds of lead and presiding directors are generally similar to those of independent chairmen. However, lead and presiding directors are somewhat more likely to be active top executives ( $\mathrm{I} 2 \%$ versus $6 \%$ ). $45 \%$ are retired chairmen, vice chairmen, presidents or CEOs, $\mathrm{I} 2 \%$ are investors or investment managers, and $\mathrm{I} \% \%$ are active or retired other corporate executives.

Lead and Presiding Director Backgrounds


- Retired chair/president/CEO/vice chairman - Active chair/president/CEO/vice chairman - Investor/investment manager
- Active/retired other corporate executive

Financial executive/CFO/treasurer/public accounting executive
Academic/nonprofit

- Banker/investment banker
- Consultant/other

Lawyer
$N=425$ lead or presiding directors identified by name

ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: Lead director

> The full board selects the lead or presiding director, according to $83 \%$ of survey respondents. Just under $20 \%$ said the lead or presiding director is selected by the nominating and governance committee. Another $7 \%$ said independent directors or non-employee directors select the lead or presiding director.
> About one-third of surveyed companies have established terms for the lead director role. $22 \%$ have one-year terms and a combined 10\% have two- or three-year terms. $5 \%$ set the lead director term at five years.

## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey:

## Board leadership roles and responsibilities

> The chairman/CEO is most likely to keep directors informed between meetings, represent the board with investors and the public, and facilitate communication between the board and investors.
> The lead director and chairman/CEO are equally likely to be responsible for developing the board agenda and determining the quality and timeliness of information from management.
> Lead directors and independent chairmen are most likely to chair meetings of independent directors and serve as the principal liaison between the independent directors and the CEO. They also tend to play a primary role in overseeing board and director evaluations as well as the CEO evaluation.

## Primary Responsibility for Board Activities

|  | Chairman/CEO (if combined) | Chairman (if split) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { CEO } \\ & \text { (if split) } \end{aligned}$ | Lead director | Other |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Chairs meetings of independent directors | 6\% | 26\% | 0\% | 65\% | 5\% |
| Acts as principal liaison between independent directors and CEO | 3\% | $33 \%$ | 1\% | 65\% | 5\% |
| Helps develop board agendas/ensures inclusion of critical issues | 43\% | 33\% | 27\% | 44\% | 12\% |
| Determines quality, quantity and timeliness of information from management | 38\% | 22\% | 26\% | 36\% | 10\% |
| Keeps directors informed between meetings | 52\% | 20\% | 39\% | 18\% | 9\% |
| Oversees board and director evaluations | 8\% | 25\% | 1\% | $37 \%$ | 47\% |
| Has the lead role in CEO evaluation | 2\% | 26\% | 3\% | 36\% | 43\% |
| Determines committee membership | 20\% | 19\% | 7\% | 20\% | 61\% |
| Represents board with the public/investors | 47\% | 14\% | 36\% | 11\% | 8\% |
| Facilitates communication between board and investors | 41\% | 12\% | 30\% | 11\% | 19\% |

## Board Organization and Process



## Boards have reduced their number of meetings since 2009

$>$ Boards met an average of 8.I times, compared with 8.0 the previous year, while the median number of meetings remains at 7.0. This included in-person and telephonic regular and special meetings. Five years ago, boards met 9.0 times on average.
$>$ The majority of boards, $54 \%$, met six to nine times.

## Distribution of Board Meetings*

## 18\% <br> 5 or fewer <br> meetings

$19 \%$
10-12
meetings
9\%
13 or more
meetings

## Most boards have four or more committees

$>7 \mathrm{I} \%$ of boards have more than the three NYSE-mandated committees (compensation/HR, audit and nominating/governance). I4\% have six or more standing committees; io years ago, ${ }_{\mathrm{I}} 6 \%$ had six or more committees.
$>$ S\&P 500 boards have an average of 4.3 standing committees. In the previous five years, the average has been 4.2 committees.
$>$ The most common committees beyond the compensation, audit and nominating committees are the executive committee ( $34 \%$ ) and finance committee ( $31 \%$ ). The risk, science \& technology and environment, health \& safety committees are more common than they were Io years ago, but still are represented in less than IO\% of boards each.
> Interestingly, despite shareholder interest in more corporate social responsibility, the percentage of boards with a formal public policy, social \& corporate responsibility committee has continued to decline from $\mathrm{I} 3.3 \%$ in 2004 to $1 \mathrm{II} .4 \%$ in 2009 to $9.3 \%$ of boards today.

| Prevalence and Independence of Standing Committees | \% with this committee |  | \% composed entirely of independent directors |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2014 | 2004 | 2014 | 2004 |
| Audit | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% |
| Compensation/HR* | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 99\% |
| Nominating/Governance********) | 99\% | 98\% | 100\% | 98\% |
| Executive | 34\% | 43\% | 4\% | 1\% |
| Finance | $31 \%$ | 34\% | 77\% | 66\% |
| Public Policy/Social \& Corporate Responsibility | 9\% | 13\% | 85\% | 74\% |
| Risk | 9\% | 2\% | 78\% | 33\% |
| Environment, Health \& Safety | 9\% | 5\% | 93\% | 68\% |
| Science \& Technology | 8\% | 5\% | 76\% | 79\% |
| Legal/Compliance | 5\% | 3\% | 92\% | 87\% |
| Strategy \& Planning | 3\% | 3\% | 53\% | 50\% |
| Investment/Pension | 1\% | 7\% | 100\% | 75\% |
| Acquisitions/Corporate Development | 2\% | 2\% | 38\% | $33 \%$ |
| " 14 boards have a combined compensation and nominating committee. They are counted as separate committees for the purpose of this analysis. "*"Includes two boards that have standing corporate governance committees in addition to their nominating committees. Controlled companies are not required to have nominating committees; there are 16 controlled companies this year. |  |  |  |  |

## Board Organization and Process

## Audit committees meet less often today than five years ago

$>$ Audit committees meet more often than compensation and nominating/governance committees, but less often than five years ago. The average number of audit committee meetings was 9.I in 2009 - after peaking at 9.5 in 2006 and 2007 - compared with 8.6 today.
$>$ Five years ago, $29 \%$ of audit committees convened II or more times, compared with $23 \%$ in this proxy year.
$>$ The highest number of audit committee meetings was 22 ; for compensation, the high was 24, and for nominating/governance, the high was I3.
$\left.\begin{array}{|l|ccc|}\hline \text { Distribution of Committee Meetings* } & & \\ \hline & \begin{array}{c}\text { Audit } \\ \text { committee }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Compensation } \\ \text { committee }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Nominating/ } \\ \text { governance committee }\end{array} \\ \hline 3 \text { or fewer meetings } & 1 \% & 6 \%\end{array}\right)$

## More than half of audit chairs are retired executives and finance leaders

> $28 \%$ of all audit committee chairs are retired CEOs, chairs, presidents and COOs, compared with $26 \%$ in $2004.25 \%$ are active or retired CFOs, treasurers and financial executives, compared with only $7 \%$ in 2004. Public accounting executives, investors/investment managers and other corporate executives also are sources of audit committee chairs, now accounting for $12 \%, 7 \%$ and $8 \%$, respectively.
> Just $8 \%$ of S\&P 500 audit committee chairs are active CEOs, chairs, presidents and COOs, compared with $22 \%$ a decade ago. As the audit committee workload has increased, the percentage of active CEOs serving as audit chair has decreased.

Audit Committee Chairman Backgrounds

|  | 2014 | 2004 |
| :--- | :---: | :--- |
| Retired chair/president/CEO/COO/vice chairman | $28 \%$ | $26 \%$ |
| Active chair/president/CEO/COO/vice chairman | $8 \%$ | $22 \%$ |
| Financial executive/CFO/treasurer | $25 \%$ | $7 \%$ |
| Public accounting executive | $12 \%$ | $6 \%$ |
| Investor/investment manager | $7 \%$ | $6 \%$ |
| Other corporate executive | $8 \%$ | $9 \%$ |
| Academic/nonprofit | $3 \%$ | $7 \%$ |
| Consultant | $3 \%$ | $7 \%$ |
| Banker/investment banker | $4 \%$ | $6 \%$ |
| Lawyer | $1 \%$ | $3 \%$ |
| Other | $1 \%$ | $1 \%$ |

## Retired top executives are the largest source for committee leadership roles

> Retired CEOs, chairs, presidents and COOs are the most common backgrounds of compensation and nominating/governance committee chairs; $45 \%$ of compensation chairs and $30 \%$ of nominating/governance committee chairs are retired top senior executives.
> Active top senior executives are more likely to serve as chair of the compensation and nominating/governance committees than the audit committee. $17 \%$ of directors with these profiles serve as compensation committee chair, and $15 \%$ as nominating/governance committee chair. Five years ago, $26 \%$ of compensation committee chairs and $19 \%$ of nominating/governance committee chairs were filled by active senior executives.

## Board Organization and Process

| Committee Chairman Backgrounds* | \% of chairmen |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Audit committee | Compensation committee | Nominating/ governance committee |
| Retired chair/president/CEO/COO/vice chairman | 28\% | 45\% | 30\% |
| Active chair/president/CEO/COO/vice chairman | 8\% | 17\% | 15\% |
| Financial executive/CFO/treasurer | 25\% | 2\% | 3\% |
| Public accounting executive | 12\% | 1\% | 1\% |
| Investor/investment manager | 7\% | 9\% | 10\% |
| Other corporate executive | 8\% | 14\% | 13\% |
| Academic/nonprofit | 3\% | 4\% | 10\% |
| Consultant | 3\% | 3\% | 5\% |
| Banker/investment banker | 4\% | 3\% | 4\% |
| Lawyer | 1\% | 1\% | 6\% |
| Other | 1\% | 1\% | 3\% |
| Total number of boards reporting this information | 488 | 483 | 482 |

## Annual evaluations nearly universal

> $98 \%$ of boards report that they conduct some form of annual board evaluation, up from $94 \%$ five years ago.
> Annual evaluations of individual directors as well as the full board and its committees occur on $34 \%$ of boards, compared with $17 \%$ five years ago. $51 \%$ evaluate the full board and board committees, a slight increase over $50 \%$ in 2009.
> Reflecting a fundamental responsibility of boards, $99 \%$ of boards report evaluating CEO performance on an annual basis, according to their corporate governance guidelines. This is an increase from $94 \%$ in 201 .

## Board, Committee and Director Evaluations



[^0]
## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: CEO succession planning

$>4 \%$ of boards in our survey discuss CEO succession less than once per year. The majority of boards, $64 \%$, formally discuss CEO succession annually. Succession is on the board agenda two or three times a year for another $24 \%$ of boards, according to survey respondents. $8 \%$ address succession four or more times per year.
$>64 \%$ of survey respondents said their companies have CEO succession plans for both emergency transition needs as well as a long-term planned succession, and $5 \%$ said they had neither an emergency nor a long-term succession plan. $22 \%$ have only an emergency succession plan in place today, and $9 \%$ have only a long-term plan.
> The CEO's role in the process varies across companies. $56 \%$ of survey respondents said the CEO evaluates internal candidates and reports back to the board. The CEO drives the process at 31\% of companies and serves as counsel to the board or committee handling succession at $29 \%$ of companies. $19 \%$ of respondents said the CEO's role is the same as the other directors.

## CEO Involvement in the Succession Process

| Evaluates internal candidates and reports to board | $56 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Drives the process | $31 \%$ |
| Serves as overall counsel to the board or committee handling succession | $29 \%$ |
| Involved at the same level as all other directors | $19 \%$ |
| Other | $4 \%$ |

## Getting to know internal candidates

$>66 \%$ of respondents said their boards have a formal process for reviewing internal succession candidates.
> For $49 \%$ of boards, the CEO succession planning process includes gaining insight into external candidates.
> The most common way by far for boards to get to know internal succession candidates is through regular board meetings and presentations. 100\% of survey respondents said their boards get to know internal candidates through these interactions. Other ways directors gain exposure to internal candidates are through scheduled meetings between individual board directors and candidates (29\%) and director site visits (23\%). Formal mentoring relationships between directors and internal candidates are rare; just $4 \%$ of survey respondents said directors have formal mentor roles with prospective CEO candidates.

## Board Organization and Process

## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: Shareholder engagement

> Public and private pension funds, institutional investors and activist shareholders were most likely to raise governance concerns with boards; according to survey respondents, $31 \%$ of the contacts made about governance issues came from public or private pension funds, $25 \%$ came from other institutional shareholders and $18 \%$ from activist investors.
> $20 \%$ of formal investor inquiries were related to "say on pay" and another $16 \%$ of the inquiries were related to CEO compensation.
> Another top issue for investors was the disclosure of political contributions and activities, which accounted for $20 \%$ of the inquiries. $19 \%$ of investor inquiries were related to board chair independence. Director tenure was raised as an issue in $12 \%$ of the shareholder inquiries.
$>62 \%$ of survey respondents said management or the board proactively reached out to the company's large institutional investors and shareholders during 2013. The most common topics were say on pay ( $47 \%$ ) and CEO compensation (29\%), followed by the director slate ( $17 \%$ ) and chairman independence ( $15 \%$ ). Survey respondents also wrote in more than 20 additional topics, including general governance, business performance and sustainability.

## Issues Formally Raised by Shareholders in 2014

| Say on pay | $20 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Disclosure of political contributions/activities | $20 \%$ |
| Independent board chair | $19 \%$ |
| CEO compensation | $16 \%$ |
| Director tenure | $12 \%$ |
| Repeal of classified board | $7 \%$ |
| Director nominations | $6 \%$ |

## Sources of Shareholder Contacts

| Public/private pension fund | $31 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Other institutional | $25 \%$ |
| Activist shareholder | $18 \%$ |
| Mutual fund | $12 \%$ |
| Individual | $8 \%$ |
| Hedge fund | $3 \%$ |
| Other | $3 \%$ |

## Director Compensation

| 2014 Snapshot |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average per-director compensation rose 6\% to \$263,748 2014 from \$249,168 last year | Annual retainers grew by 5\% over last year and the median more than doubled in the last decade <br> Additional compensation for independent chairmen averages $\$ 164,682$ |  |  |
| Equity mix continues to shift away from options toward stock awards <br> Additional compensation for independent chairmen averages \$164,682 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |

## Director compensation grows by $6 \%$

$>$ The average total compensation for S\&P 500 directors is $\$ 263,748,6 \%$ higher than the 2013 average. For boards with nine independent directors, the average annual cost for director compensation is just over $\$ 2.3$ million.
> When compensation for the independent chairman is excluded, the average total compensation per director falls to $\$ 259,2 \mathrm{I} 6$.
> More than half of director compensation comes in the form of equity. Stock grants represent $53 \%$ of average director compensation, a slight increase from $52 \%$ in 2013. Stock options fell as a share of compensation from $6 \%$ last year to $5 \%$.
> Compensation provided in the form of cash payments represents $40 \%$ of total compensation.
$>74 \%$ of boards have deferred compensation plans.

## Director Compensation

## Breakdown of Director Compensation*



Based on non-employee director compensation tables in 493 proxies for 2014. Includes all board and committee retainers and meeting fees, nonexecutive chairman and lead/presiding director supplemental fees when applicable, the value of equity compensation and all other compensation paid to non-employee directors in 2013 . Retiring and new directors are included when paid compensation for at least three-quarters of the year. "Includes deferred compensation amounts.
"Includes, for example, insurance premiums, charitable award programs and incremental cost to company of products provided.

| Changes in Non-employee Director Compensation | \% of boards paying this type |  | Average paid |  | \% change in value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Type of compensation | 2014 | 2009 | 2014 | 2009 | 2009-14 |
| Board retainer* | 99.6\% | 99.6\% | \$107,383 | \$75,893 | 41\% |
| Board meeting fee | 25\% | 43\% | \$2,229 | \$2,122 | 5\% |
| Committee chair retainer | 95\% | 89\% | \$14,110 | \$11,377 | 24\% |
| Committee member retainer | 39\% | 36\% | \$8,417 | \$7,441 | 13\% |
| Committee member meeting fee | 27\% | 45\% | \$7,715 | \$1,579 | 9\% |
| Stock option program | 18\% | 37\% | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Stock grants paid in addition to retainer | 76\% | 79\% | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| "Dollar amounts for retainer do not include boards that do not pay a retainer or boards that do not provide a dollar value equivalent for the retainer equity amount. |  |  |  |  |  |

## Annual board retainers have more than doubled in 10 years

$>$ The average annual retainer for S\&P 500 directors is $\$$ IO7,3 83 , which represents an increase of it $6 \%$ since 2004, when the average was $\$ 49,727$. In that io-year period, one-year increases have ranged from as little as $\mathrm{I} \%$ to as much as $\mathrm{I} 4 \%$. The average annual retainer increased by $5 \%$ from 2013.
> The median annual retainer is now $\$ 85,000$, up from $\$ 60,000$ five years ago and $\$ 40,000$ in 2004.
$>43 \%$ of boards pay $\$ 100,000$ or more, up from $18 \%$ in 2009 and just $8 \%$ in 2004. Two boards pay the highest retainer amount of $\$ 300,000$; both of these companies pay the retainer partly in equity, and neither provides meeting attendance fees.
> $14 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards today pay a retainer of $\$ 200,000$ or more, compared with $5 \%$ in 2009 and I\% in 2004. Ten years ago, eight boards (2\%) had retainers between \$150,000 and $\$ 199,000$, compared with 35 ( $7 \%$ ) today.
$>$ The change in retainer values is also evident on the other end of the spectrum. $6 \%$ of boards today have retainers less than $\$ 50,000$, compared with $23 \%$ five years ago and $58 \%$ io years ago. Two companies provide no retainer; one of these pays \$900 per meeting and the other, a $\$$ I5,000 per-meeting fee (not to exceed $\$ 60,000$ per year).
$>$ Of the 2IO companies that disclosed the timing of their retainer payments, $73 \%$ pay on a quarterly basis, $\mathrm{I} 3 \%$ pay annually, $7 \%$ monthly and $7 \%$ semiannually.

Annual Board Retainers and Yearly Increases


## One-quarter of boards compensate for meeting attendance

$>25 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards pay board meeting fees today. Meeting fees have been declining as a component of director compensation for many years. In $2009,43 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards provided meeting fees and $66 \%$ did in 2004.
$>$ The average board meeting attendance fee is $\$ 2,229$, a $3 \%$ increase from 2013 . Fees range from a low of \$900 to a high of \$15,000 at one company, where meeting fees were paid in lieu of a retainer and capped at $\$ 60,000$ per year.
$>42 \%$ of boards that provide meeting attendance fees pay $\$ \mathrm{I}, 500$ or less per meeting, and $56 \%$ pay $\$ 2,000$ or more.
$>$ Among the I23 boards that compensate directors for board meetings, 35 boards ( $28 \%$ ) pay a lower fee for telephonic meetings. The average telephonic meeting fee is $\$ \mathrm{I}, 192,8 \%$ more than in 2013 and $2 \%$ less than in 2009. Three boards only pay a telephonic board meeting fee.
$>$ Among the boards that pay meeting fees, four boards pay an additional fee for special board meetings, defined as meetings in excess of regularly scheduled board meetings. Eight other boards pay only for attendance at special board meetings. The average special board meeting fee is $\$ \mathrm{I}, 875$.

## Director Compensation

$>24(5 \%)$ of all S\&P 500 boards pay an excess board meeting fee when the number of meetings per year exceeds a pre-defined level, ranging from four to 15 . The average fee is \$I,852.

## Almost all boards provide additional compensation to committee chairs

$>95 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards today provide a retainer to committee chairmen, compared with $77 \%$ in 2004 and $89 \%$ in 2009.
$>$ Of the 47I boards that do, $86 \%$ pay a larger retainer to the audit committee chair, and $52 \%$ pay more to the compensation committee chair. On average, retainers paid to audit committee chairs and compensation committee chairs are $68 \%$ and $37 \%$ higher, respectively, than retainers paid to other committee chairs.
$>$ The smallest chair retainer is $\$ 3,000$, while the highest committee chair retainer — paid to an audit chair - is \$100,000.
$>$ The average retainer for all committee chairs is \$I4,IIO, a 5\% increase from last year's average of $\$ \mathrm{I} 3,446$. The average retainers for audit committee chairs and compensation committee chairs are $\$ 23,723$ and $\$$ I9,268, respectively.

## Average retainer for committee members increases by $1 \%$

$>39 \%$ of boards pay a retainer to committee members. Of the I94 boards that provide retainers for committee member service, $86 \%$ provide a different retainer for audit committee service and $32 \%$ provide a different retainer for compensation committee service.
$>$ The average committee member retainer across all committees increased by I\% to \$8,4II.
$>$ Retainers for audit committee members average \$II,96I, a $2 \%$ increase. The average retainer for compensation committee members increased $2 \%$ to $\$ \mathrm{II}, 242$. The average retainers paid to audit and compensation committee members are $42 \%$ and $34 \%$ higher, respectively, than the average amount paid to members of other committees.

| Committee Retainers | Average committee retainers |  | \% of boards paying this type |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2014 | 2009 | 2014 | 2009 |
| All committee chairs | \$14,110 | \$11,337 | 95\% | 89\% |
| Compensation committee chairs | \$19,268 | \$15,721 | 52\% | 28\% |
| Audit committee chairs | \$23,723 | \$19,746 | 86\% | 84\% |
| All committee members | \$8,411 | \$7,441 | 39\% | 36\% |
| Compensation committee members | \$11,242 | \$10,663 | 32\% | 19\% |
| Audit committee members | \$11,961 | \$11,337 | 86\% | 85\% |

## About one-quarter of boards now pay committee meeting fees

$>27 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards pay committee meeting fees, down from $45 \%$ in 2009 and $63 \%$ in 2004. The average committee meeting fee is $\$ 1,715$, virtually unchanged from last year.
> $14 \%$ of the 136 boards that provide committee meeting fees pay a higher amount for audit committee meetings. The $\$ 2,287$ average audit committee meeting fee is $33 \%$ higher than the average for all committees. Just four companies pay a higher meeting fee for compensation committee meetings, averaging $\$ 2,500$. This represents a $46 \%$ premium over the average for all committee meetings.
$>26 \%$ of the boards providing committee meeting fees pay a different amount for telephonic meetings, $\$ \mathrm{I}, 006$ on average. Two boards pay a higher fee for telephonic audit committee meetings, averaging $\$ 1,259$.
> Only seven boards ( $\mathrm{I} \%$ ) pay meeting fees to committee chairs, compared with $\mathrm{I} 6 \%$ Io years ago. The average meeting fee is $\$ 2,379$.

## Stock grants are the main source of equity compensation

$>76 \%$ of boards provide equity in the form of stock grants in addition to paying a cash retainer, compared with $50 \%$ a decade ago. The average targeted dollar value of annual stock grants is \$147,722.
> By comparison, stock options for directors have become much less common. 18\% of S\&P 500 companies now offer option plans, compared with $68 \%$ in 2004. The average targeted value of annual stock option grants is $\$ 70,324$.
> More than half of boards, $56 \%$, allow directors to choose to receive their compensation in cash, stock or stock units, but only $5 \%$ provide stock options as an alternative. Eight boards, $2 \%$ of the total, pay director retainers fully in stock.
> 91\% of boards disclose having share ownership guidelines for directors, which are meant to align directors' interests with those of stockholders. Typically, these guidelines require directors to own a certain number of shares or multiple of the retainer value within a specified number of years.

| Equity Compensation |  | \% of S\&P 500 boards |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | 2014 | 2009 | 2004 |
| Stock option program exists | $18 \%$ | $37 \%$ | $68 \%$ |
| Equity paid in addition to retainer | $76 \%$ | $79 \%$ | $50 \%$ |
| Equity paid as a part of retainer | $21 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $24 \%$ |
| Director can elect to receive <br> compensation in cash, stock <br> or stock units | $56 \%$ | $56 \%$ | $59 \%$ |
| Director can elect to receive <br> compensation in stock options | $5 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $9 \%$ |
| Retainer paid fully in stock | $2 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $2 \%$ |

## Director Compensation

## Additional compensation for special committee service

> Fourteen boards (3\%) reported providing additional compensation to directors serving on a special committee. Compensation came in the form of an additional retainer for special committee chairmen and members, ranging from $\$ 5,000$ to $\$ 55,000$.
> Of the seven boards that reported the purpose of the special committee, four were charged with a CEO search or succession planning, one convened for capital planning purposes, one addressed shareholder demands and one provided temporary advisory services.

## Fees for independent chairmen see small decrease; many more boards compensate lead/presiding director

> $96 \%$ of the I 38 S\&P 500 boards with independent chairmen pay those directors an additional fee, which ranges from $\$ 40,000$ to $\$ 765,000$ and averages $\$ 164,682$. The average is down $4 \%$ from 2013, when the average premium for the independent chair was $\$ 17 \mathrm{I}, 620$. The median premium paid to independent chairmen is $\$ 150,000$.
> Among the 446 S\&P 500 boards with a lead or presiding director, $6 \mathrm{I} \%$ provide additional compensation to directors in those roles, compared with $42 \%$ of boards five years ago.
> Retainers are more prevalent and larger in amount for lead directors (48\%) than for presiding directors ( $\mathrm{I} 3 \%$ ), reflecting the additional responsibilities of the lead director role. The average lead director premium is $\$ 29,932$ versus $\$ 24,8$ II for presiding directors. The difference between the premiums paid for lead and presiding directors increased since last year, as the average premium for lead directors grew by nearly $8 \%$ while the premium for presiding directors fell by $6 \%$.
> Overall, compensation for lead and presiding directors ranges from a minimum of $\$ 5,000$ to a maximum of $\$ 125,000$ and averages $\$ 28,690$.

## Large spread in average director compensation across industries

> The difference in average director compensation between the industries with the highest and lowest averages was $\$$ II5,429. On average, directors in the healthcare sector received $\$ 340,055$ in compensation, $24 \%$ higher than the S\&P 500 average. Directors serving in the utilities sector, by contrast, received $\$ 224,626$ on average, $15 \%$ less than the overall average.
> Average director compensation increased $7 \%$ or less over last year in most industry sectors, except for the healthcare industry, which saw a $16 \%$ increase. The consumer discretionary sector saw an increase of $7 \%$, while director compensation rose by $5 \%$ in the consumer staples, industrials and utilities sectors.
> Cash fees as a share of total compensation ranged from a low of $3 \mathrm{I} \%$ in the healthcare industry to a high of $47 \%$ in the utilities sector.
$>$ Stock awards now account for more than half of director compensation on average, and range from $47 \%$ in the materials sector to $60 \%$ among energy companies.
$>$ Option grants have fallen to $5 \%$ of average director compensation value, from $6 \%$ in 2013 . Options do not represent a meaningful share of director compensation in the financials or utilities sectors, but represent $11 \%$ of director compensation among healthcare companies still a decrease from $15 \%$ in 2013 .

| Average Compensation per Non-employee Director by Industry* |  | \% of total compensation |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Industry | Total average compensation | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Cash } \\ & \text { fees } \end{aligned}$ | Stock awards | Option grants | All other compensation |
| Consumer discretionary | \$247,311 | 41\% | 48\% | 8\% | 3\% |
| Consumer staples | \$261,887 | 39\% | 55\% | 5\% | 1\% |
| Energy | \$312,240 | 35\% | 60\% | 3\% | 2\% |
| Financials | \$230,288 | 45\% | 51\% | 2\% | 2\% |
| Healthcare | \$340,055 | $31 \%$ | 56\% | 11\% | 2\% |
| Industrials | \$248,290 | 46\% | 49\% | 3\% | 2\% |
| Information technology | \$294,946 | 33\% | 57\% | 9\% | 1\% |
| Materials | \$237,501 | 46\% | $47 \%$ | 4\% | 3\% |
| Telecommunication services | \$243,156 | 45\% | 50\% | 3\% | 2\% |
| Utilities | \$224,626 | 47\% | 50\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| Average | \$263,748 | 40\% | 53\% | 5\% | 2\% |
| "Based on non-employee director compensation tables in 493 proxies for 2014. Includes all board and committee retainers and meeting fees, non-executive chairman and lead/presiding director supplemental fees when applicable, the value of equity compensation and all other compensation paid to non-employee directors in fiscal year 2013. Retiring and new directors are included when paid compensation for at least three quarters of the year. <br> *Includes deferred compensation amounts. <br> $*$ Includes insurance premiums, charitable award programs and the incremental cost to the company of products provided to directors. |  |  |  |  |  |

## Western director compensation $11 \%$ higher than S\&P 500 average

> Total average director compensation rose in all regions.

- Average per-director compensation in the West increased by io\%, after an $8 \%$ decline last year. The West still has the highest average director compensation at $\$ 292,685$.
- The Southwest has the second highest average at $\$ 283,404$, a $9 \%$ increase from last year.
- The smallest increase among the regions was $4 \%$ for Southeast boards, which have the second-lowest director compensation average of all regions.
> The spread between the highest- and lowest-paying regions has grown since last year. This year the difference between the regions with the highest and lowest average director compensation was $\$ 54,799$, compared with $\$ 39,050$ in 2013 and $\$ 68,66 \mathrm{I}$ in 2012.


## Director Compensation

## Directors of smaller companies see greatest gain in compensation

$>$ Average director compensation ranges from a low of $\$ 249,663$ for companies with revenues between $\$ 2.5$ billion and $\$$ Io billion to a high of $\$ 282$,III for companies with revenues of $\$ 2.5$ billion or less.
> Average director compensation rose by $6 \%$ among companies in the $\$ 2.5$ billion to $\$ 10$ billion revenue range and by $2 \mathrm{I} \%$ for companies with revenues of less than $\$ 2.5$ billion.

## Average Director Compensation by Region and by Sales

| By region |  | By sales |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| West | $\$ 292,685$ | Less than $\$ 2.5$ billion | $\$ 282,117$ |
| Southwest | $\$ 283,404$ | $\$ 2.5-10$ billion | $\$ 249,663$ |
| Northeast | $\$ 267,793$ | Greater than $\$ 10$ billion | $\$ 272,931$ |
| Northwest | $\$ 256,904$ |  |  |
| Southeast | $\$ 250,880$ |  |  |
| Midwest | $\$ 237,886$ |  |  |

## COMPARATIVE BOARD DATA

Methodology: Based on the S\&P 500 as of May 19, 2014. Company sales data obtained from Hoovers also as of May 19, 2014. Industry/sector categories obtained from CapitalIQ. All remaining data were culled from the most recent proxies released between May 16, 2013, and May 19, 2014. Total average compensation per non-employee director is based on non-employee director compensation tables included in 493 proxies. The number includes all board and committee retainers and meeting fees, supplemental non-executive chairman and lead/presiding director fees, the value of equity compensation, and all other compensation paid in fiscal year 2013. Retiring and new non-employee directors are included when paid compensation for at least three-quarters of fiscal year 2013.

## Comparative Board Data



## Advertising

| The Interpublic Group of Companies | 7,122.3 | 9 | 8 | 65 | 74 | 6 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 100,000 | 275,388 | 40\% | 54\% | ०\% | 6\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Omnicom Group | 14,584.5 | 13 | 11 | 70 | - | 11 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | 2,000 | 97,000 | 264,909 | 53\% | 47\% | 0\% | ०\% |

## Apparel Retail

| The Gap | 16,148.0 | 10 | 9 | 60 | 72 | 7 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 75,000 | 251,295 | 40\% | 56\% | 0\% | 4\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| L Brands | 10,773.0 | 12 | 8 | 69 | - | 5 | 180,000 ${ }^{\text {e }}$ | - | 180,000 | 232,578 | 51\% | 49\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Ross Stores | 9,230.4 | 8 | 6 | 61 | - | 5 | 175,000 ${ }^{\text {e }}$ | 1,500 | 182,500 | 209,054 | 40\% | 60\% | ०\% | -\% |
| The TJX Companies | 27,422.7 | 10 | 8 | 61 | 75 | 8 | $50,000^{\text {c }}$ | 1,500 | 62,000 | 250,771 | 38\% | 62\% | 0\% | ०\% |
| Urban Outätters | 3,086.6 | 7 | 5 | 64 | - | 4 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {f }}$ | - | 100,000 | 293,400 | 34\% | ०\% | 66\% | ०\% |

Apparel, Accessories a Luxury Goods

| Coach | 5,075.4 | 9 | 7 | 56 | - | 6 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d.f }}$ | - | 75,000 | 234,596 | 36\% | 32\% | 32\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fossil | 3,260.0 | 11 | 8 | 60 | - | 4 | $52,500^{\text {c }}$ | 1,500 | 58,500 | 195,913 | 39\% | 61\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Michael Kors Holdings Limited | 2,181.7 | 9 | 5 | 64 | - | 4 | $60,000^{\text {c }}$ | 1,500 | 66,000 | 233,483 | 36\% | 64\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| PVH Corporation | 8,186.4 | 12 | 10 | 59 | 72 | 6 | 70,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 70,000 | 229,619 | 41\% | 59\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Ralph Lauren Corporation | 6,944.8 | 13 | 9 | 68 | - | 5 | $60,000{ }^{\text {c.f }}$ | - | 60,000 | 191,046 | 48\% | 26\% | 26\% | ०\% |
| Under Armour | 2,332.1 | 9 | 6 | 63 | 75 | 8 | 55,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 55,000 | 136,692 | 45\% | 55\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| V.F. Corporation | 11,419.6 | 12 | 11 | 62 | 72 | 7 | 60,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d.f }}$ | 1,500 | 70,500 | 215,647 | 44\% | 28\% | 28\% | ०\% |

## Auto Parts $\mathbb{Q}$ Equipment

| BorgWarner | 7,436.6 | 11 | 10 | 65 | 72 | 5 | $80,000{ }^{\text {c }}$ | 1,500 | 87,500 | 222,307 | 53\% | 47\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Delphi Automotive | 16,463.0 | 11 | 10 | 66 | 75 | 6 | $250,000^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 250,000 | 280,527 | 40\% | 60\% | -\% | ०\% |
| Johnson Controls | 42,730.0 | 11 | 10 | 61 | 72 | 7 | 245,000 ${ }^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 245,000 | 247,944 | 48\% | 52\% | ०\% | ०\% |

## Automobile Manufacturers

| Ford Motor Company | 146,917.0 | 16 | 13 | 63 | 72 | 9 | $250,000{ }^{\text {d,e.g }}$ | - | 250,000 | 283,644 | 90\% | ०\% | ०\% | 10\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| General Motors Company | 155,427.0 | 12 | 9 | 65 | 72 | 10 | 200,000 ${ }^{\text {d, }}$ | - | 200,000 | 220,865 | 97\% | ०\% | ०\% | 3\% |

## Automotive Retail

| AutoNation | 17,517.6 | 10 | 8 | 56 | - | 14 | $50,000^{\text {f }}$ | - | 50,000 | 415,996 | 15\% | ०\% | 85\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| AutoZone | 9,147.5 | 11 | 10 | 58 | 75 | 5 | 200,000 ${ }^{\text {e,h }}$ | - | 200,000 | 207,980 | 100\% | ○\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| CarMax | 12,574.3 | 10 | 9 | 64 | - | 4 | $165,000^{\text {e,f }}$ | 1,500 | 171,000 | 201,007 | 47\% | 25\% | 25\% | 3\% |
| O'Reilly Automotive | 6,649.2 | 9 | 5 | 66 | 78 | 4 | $40,000^{\text {c }}$ | 2,500 | 50,000 | 164,629 | 62\% | 38\% | ०\% | ०\% |

## Broadcasting

| CBS Corporation | 15,284.0 | 14 | 9 | 73 | - | 7 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d, }}$ | - | 100,000 | 294,159 | 40\% | 58\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Discovery Communications | 5,535.0 | 11 | 9 | 65 | - | 13 | $80,000{ }^{\text {c,f }}$ | - | 80,000 | 224,957 | 46\% | 26\% | 26\% | 2\% |
| Scripps Networks Interactive | 2,530.8 | 12 | 11 | 57 | 70 | 12 | 50,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d.f }}$ | 2,500 | 80,000 | 255,011 | 40\% | 30\% | 29\% | 1\% |

Cable \& Satellite

| Cablevision Systems Corporation | 6,232.2 | 17 | 7 | 73 | - | 9 | 60,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 2,000 | 78,000 | 196,225 | 43\% | 56\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Comcast Corporation | 64,657.0 | 12 | 9 | 64 | 72 | 7 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 308,182 | 45\% | 55\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| DIRECTV | 31,754.0 | 12 | 11 | 65 | - | 4 | 215,000 ${ }^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 215,000 | 259,606 | 43\% | 50\% | ०\% | 7\% |
| Time Warner Cable | 29,795.0 | 13 | 11 | 66 | - | 17 | $90,000^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 90,000 | 255,339 | 46\% | 54\% | ०\% | ०\% |

## Casinos \& Caming

International Game
Technology
Wynn Resorts Limited

| $2,341.6$ | 9 | 8 | 56 | 72 | 19 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $5,620.9$ | 8 | 6 | 67 | - | 7 |


| $100,00^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 332,039 | $39 \%$ | $61 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: | ---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $60,000^{f}$ | 1,500 | 70,500 | 389,198 | $35 \%$ | $65 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |



## Computer a Electronics Retail

| Best Buy Co. | 42,410.0 | 11 | 10 | 61 | 75 | 6 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 75,000 | 288,919 | 31\% | 69\% | ०\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| GameStop Corporation | 9,039.5 | 11 | 8 | 60 | 72 | 9 | 140,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 140,000 | 305,861 | 18\% | $37 \%$ | ०\% | 45\% |

## Consumer Electronics

| Garmin | 2,631.9 | 6 | 4 | 66 | - | 5 | 50,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 1,500 | 57,500 | 160,435 | 44\% | 56\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Harman International Industries | 4,297.8 | 10 | 8 | 66 | 75 | 10 | 70,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 1,500 | 85,000 | 241,862 | 44\% | 56\% | ०\% | 0\% |

Department Stores

| Kohl's Corporation | 19,031.0 | 10 | 8 | 66 | 72 | 5 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 100,000 | 225,002 | 56\% | 44\% | -\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Macy's | 27,931.0 | 10 | 9 | 64 | 74 | 7 | 70,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 70,000 | 248,034 | 37\% | 54\% | 0\% | 9\% |
| Nordstrom | 12,540.0 | 12 | 9 | 60 | 72 | 5 | $85,000^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 85,000 | 281,278 | 35\% | 60\% | ०\% | 5\% |
| Distributors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Genuine Parts Company | 14,077. 8 | 13 | 9 | 64 | 72 | 4 | 50,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 1,250 | 55,000 | 217,990 | 29\% | 71\% | 0\% | ०\% |
| Education Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Graham Holdings Company | 3,487.9 | 11 | 8 | 63 | 75 | 6 | 150,000 | - | 150,000 | 87,333 | 100\% | ०\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Footwear |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NIKE | 25,313.0 | 12 | 9 | 62 | 72 | 5 | $85,000^{\text {d,f }}$ | - | 85,000 | 282,193 | 32\% | ०\% | 63\% | 5\% |

General Merchandise Stores

| Dollar General Corporation | 17,504.2 | 7 | 6 | 58 | 76 | 6 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c.f }}$ | - | 75,000 | 208,554 | 39\% | 28\% | 33\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Dollar Tree | 7,840.3 | 11 | 8 | 63 | - | 7 | $180,000^{\text {d,i }}$ | - | 180,000 | 208,875 | 83\% | 14\% | ०\% | 3\% |
| Family Dollar Stores | 10,391.5 | 11 | 10 | 65 | - | 8 | $50,000^{\text {c }}$ | 1,500 | 62,000 | 151,746 | 51\% | 49\% | -\% | ०\% |
| Target Corporation | 72,596.0 | 11 | 10 | 57 | 72 | 5 | $260,000^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 260,000 | 304,593 | 23\% | 73\% | 4\% | ०\% |

Home Furnishing Retail

| Bed Bath \& Beyond | $11,504.0$ | 9 | 6 | 63 | - | 11 | $100,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 202,917 | $56 \%$ | $44 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Home Furnishings |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Leggett \& Platt | $3,746.0$ | 11 | 8 | 66 | 72 | 5 | $175,000^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 175,000 | 225,298 | $29 \%$ | $63 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $8 \%$ |  |
| Mohawk Industries | $7,348.8$ | 8 | 5 | 66 | 75 | 5 | $80,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 80,000 | 229,164 | $59 \%$ | $41 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |  |

Home Improvement Retail

| The Home Depot | 78,812.0 | 11 | 10 | 57 | 72 | 6 | $280,000^{\text {de,eg }}$ | - | 280,000 | 294,500 | 21\% | 78\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Lowe's Companies | 53,417.0 | 11 | 10 | 63 | 72 | 6 | $80,000{ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 80,000 | 240,956 | 37\% | 63\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| The Sherwin-Williams Company | 10,185.5 | 9 | 8 | 60 | 72 | 7 | $95,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 95,000 | 228,127 | 47\% | 53\% | ०\% | ०\% |

## Homebuilding

| D.R. Horton | 6,259.3 | 6 | 4 | 62 | 75 | 5 | - ${ }^{\text {c,f }}$ | 15,000 ${ }^{\text {i }}$ | 60,000 | 299,637 | 25\% | 60\% | 15\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Lennar Corporation | 5,935.1 | 9 | 8 | 67 | - | 6 | 90,000 ${ }^{\text {e,f }}$ | - | 90,000 | 229,379 | 37\% | 54\% | 7\% | 2\% |
| PulteGroup | 5,679.6 | 9 | 8 | 58 | 75 | 7 | 235,000 ${ }^{\text {e }}$ | - | 235,000 | 252,857 | 45\% | 55\% | ०\% | ०\% |

Hotels, Resorts \& Cruise Lines

| Carnival Corporation | 15,456.0 | 9 | 7 | 63 | 75 | 6 | $40,000^{\text {c }}$ | 5,000 | 70,000 | 242,189 | 48\% | 50\% | ०\% | 2\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Marriott International | 12,784.0 | 11 | 8 | 63 | 72 | 4 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c. }}$ | - | 75,000 | 216,511 | 38\% | 59\% | ०\% | 3\% |
| Starwood Hotels \& Resorts Worldwide | 6,115.0 | 11 | 10 | 61 | 72 | 5 | 80,000 ${ }^{\text {c,e,h,k }}$ | - | 80,000 | 245,388 | 17\% | 74\% | ०\% | 9\% |
| Wyndham Worldwide Corporation | 5,009.0 | 7 | 6 | 64 | 75 | 5 | 210,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d.e }}$ | - | 210,000 | 404,173 | 33\% | 51\% | ०\% | 16\% |
| Household Appliances |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Whirlpool Corporation | 18,769.0 | 12 | 10 | 60 | 72 | 8 | 120,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 120,000 | 265,515 | 48\% | 50\% | ०\% | 2\% |

## Comparative Board Data



Motorcycle Manufacturers


## Movies Q Entertainment

| Time Warner | 22,120.0 | 12 | 11 | 64 | 75 | 9 | 145,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d,f }}$ | - | 145,000 | 250,213 | 50\% | 34\% | 16\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Twenty-First Century Fox | 27,675.0 | 12 | 7 | 54 | - | 8 | 250,000 ${ }^{\text {e, }}$ | - | 250,000 | 271,857 | 44\% | 8\% | 48\% | ०\% |
| Viacom | 13,794.0 | 13 | 8 | 64 | - | 6 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 285,031 | 47\% | 53\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| The Walt Disney Company | 45,041.0 | 10 | 9 | 58 | - | 6 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 284,956 | 43\% | 53\% | ०\% | 4\% |

Publishing

| Gannett Co. | 5,161.4 | 10 | 9 | 59 | - | 10 | $175,000^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 175,000 | 226,685 | 25\% | 61\% | 10\% | 4\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Restaurants |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Chipotle Mexican Grill | 3,214.6 | 9 | 7 | 62 | - | 4 | 135,000 ${ }^{\text {e }}$ | 2,000 | 143,000 | 160,578 | 47\% | 53\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Darden Restaurants | 8,551.9 | 13 | 12 | 60 | 73 | 8 | $85,000^{\text {c, d, }}$ | - | 85,000 | 241,295 | 49\% | 41\% | ०\% | 10\% |
| McDonald's Corporation | 28,105.7 | 13 | 12 | 65 | - | 9 | $100,000{ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 259,098 | 42\% | 54\% | ०\% | 4\% |
| Starbucks Corporation | 14,892.2 | 12 | 11 | 60 | 75 | 9 | 240,000 ${ }^{\text {d,i }}$ | - | 240,000 | 238,654 | 6\% | 74\% | 20\% | 0\% |
| Yum! Brands | 13,084.0 | 11 | 8 | 62 | 72 | 7 | $170,000^{\text {c,e,f, }, \text {,k }}$ | - | 170,000 | 217,312 | 4\% | 77\% | 16\% | 3\% |

## Specialized Consumer Services



Specialty Stores

| PetSmart | 6,916.6 | 10 | 9 | 61 | 72 | 6 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | $-{ }^{\text {n }}$ | 79,000 | 205,804 | 31\% | 69\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Staples | 23,114.3 | 12 | 11 | 60 | 72 | 6 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 75,000 | 266,641 | 29\% | $71 \%$ | ०\% | ०\% |
| Tiffany \& Co. | 4,031.1 | 10 | 7 | 67 | 72 | 6 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c.f }}$ | - | 75,000 | 234,899 | 36\% | 32\% | 31\% | 1\% |
| Tractor Supply Co. | 5,164.8 | 9 | 8 | 63 | 72 | 7 | $65,000^{\text {c }}$ | - | 65,000 | 168,202 | 50\% | 50\% | 0\% | ०\% |

Tires Q Rubber

| The Goodyear Tire \& Rubber Company | 19,540.0 | 12 | 10 | 61 | 72 | 9 | $115,000{ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 115,000 | 254,119 | 51\% | 47\% | ०\% | 2\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

TOTAL CONSUMER DISCRETIONARY

| Average | 10.7 | 8.5 | 62.3 | 73.1 | 7.0 | 114,428 | 116,726 | 247,311 | $41 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $8 \%$ | $3 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Median | 11.0 | 9.0 | 63.0 | 72.0 | 6.0 | 90,000 | 92,500 | 246,506 |  |  |  |  |



## Agricultural Products

| Archer-Daniels-Midland Company | 89,804.0 | 12 | 11 | 60 | 70 | 6 | $250,000{ }^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 250,000 | 259,765 | 37\% | 63\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

Brewers

| Molson Coors Brewing Company | 4,206.1 | 13 | 8 | 58 | - | 6 | $100,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 237,958 | 48\% | 42\% | ०\% | 10\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Distillers Q Vintners |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Brown-Forman Corporation | 2,849.0 | 10 | 4 | 60 | 71 | 7 | 115,000 ${ }^{\text {de,. } / \mathrm{g}}$ | 5,000 | 150,000 | 208,041 | 70\% | 30\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Constellation Brands | 4,867.7 | 11 | 9 | 61 | 70 | 8 | 70,000 ${ }^{\text {c.f }}$ | 2,500 | 90,000 | 221,097 | 46\% | 32\% | 22\% | ०\% |

Drug Retail

| CVS Caremark Corporation | 126,761.0 | 9 | 8 | 56 | 72 | 12 | $280,000{ }^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 280,000 | 299,835 | 25\% | 75\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Walgreen Co. | 72,217.0 | 13 | 10 | 60 | 72 | 10 | $85,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 85,000 | 303,894 | 39\% | 53\% | ०\% | 8\% |

Food Distributors

| Sysco Corporation | 44,411.2 | 10 | 8 | 68 | - | 9 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 300,572 | 38\% | 62\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Food Retail |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Kroger Co. | 98,375.0 | 13 | 11 | 65 | 72 | 7 | 85,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 85,000 | 258,628 | 36\% | 63\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| Whole Foods Market | 12,917.0 | 11 | 9 | 61 | - | 7 | $37,496^{\text {c.f }}$ | 6,897 | 85,775 | 244,900 | 37\% | 23\% | 40\% | ०\% |

Household Products

| The Clorox Company | 5,623.0 | 11 | 10 | 64 | 72 | 6 | 95,000 ${ }^{\text {c. }}$ d | - | 95,000 | 227,734 | 46\% | 54\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Colgate-Palmolive Company | 17,420.0 | 10 | 9 | 62 | 72 | 8 | $50,000{ }^{\text {c, , f, }, \mathrm{k}}$ | - | 50,000 | 281,321 | 24\% | 59\% | 16\% | 1\% |
| Kimberly-Clark Corporation | 21,152.0 | 12 | 11 | 63 | 72 | 6 | $90,000^{\text {c }}$ | - | 90,000 | 256,500 | 35\% | 64\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| The Procter \& Gamble Company | 84,167.0 | 11 | 10 | 60 | 70 | 12 | $110,000{ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 110,000 | 280,225 | 43\% | 57\% | ०\% | ०\% |

Hypermarkets \& Super Centers

| Costco Wholesale Corporation | 105,156.0 | 14 | 8 | 71 | - | 5 | $30,000^{\text {c }}$ | 1,000 | 35,000 | 315,921 | 12\% | 88\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Wal-Mart Stores | 476,294.0 | 14 | 9 | 62 | 75 | 6 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 75,000 | 287,905 | $37 \%$ | 61\% | 0\% | 2\% |

## Packaged Foods \& Meats

| Campbell Soup Company | 8,052.0 | 15 | 14 | 65 | 72 | 8 | $218,000{ }^{\text {d,e,g }}$ | - | 218,000 | 256,571 | 50\% | 50\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ConAgra Foods | 15,491.4 | 11 | 10 | 64 | 72 | 12 | $85,000^{\text {c }}$ | - | 85,000 | 239,017 | 34\% | 63\% | ०\% | 3\% |
| General Mills | 17,774.1 | 13 | 12 | 67 | 74 | 6 | $75,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 75,000 | 291,630 | 28\% | 62\% | ०\% | 10\% |
| The Hershey Company | 7,146.1 | 11 | 10 | 62 | 72 | 9 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 235,000 | 47\% | 51\% | ०\% | 2\% |
| Hormel Foods Corporation | 8,751.7 | 11 | 9 | 60 | 72 | 7 | $70,000{ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 70,000 | 252,399 | 33\% | 64\% | ०\% | 3\% |
| The J.M. Smucker Company | 5,897.7 | 13 | 8 | 62 | 72 | 4 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 75,000 | 194,063 | 46\% | 54\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Kellogg Company | 14,792.0 | 12 | 10 | 65 | 72 | 8 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 259,178 | 40\% | 60\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Keurig Green Mountain | 4,358.1 | 11 | 10 | 60 | 75 | 10 | $165,000^{\text {de, ef }}$ | 2,000 | 185,000 | 197,738 | 39\% | 37\% | 24\% | ०\% |
| Kraft Foods Group | 18,218.0 | 11 | 9 | 60 | 75 | 7 | 110,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 110,000 | 248,241 | 48\% | 50\% | ०\% | 2\% |
| McCormick \& Company | 4,123.4 | 10 | 9 | 59 | 72 | 7 | 70,000 ${ }^{\text {c,f }}$ | - | 70,000 | 232,378 | 38\% | 42\% | 20\% | ०\% |
| Mead Johnson Nutrition Company | 4,200.7 | 12 | 9 | 63 | 72 | 11 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 100,000 | 291,154 | 44\% | 55\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| Mondelez International | 35,299.0 | 12 | 11 | 64 | 75 | 9 | 110,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 110,000 | 267,978 | 45\% | 54\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| Tyson Foods | 34,374.0 | 9 | 7 | 61 | 72 | 6 | $80,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 80,000 | 216,233 | 41\% | 58\% | ०\% | 1\% |

## Personal Products

| Avon Products | 9,955.0 | 10 | 9 | 63 | 72 | 10 | $190,000{ }^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 190,000 | 253,857 | 48\% | 49\% | ०\% | 3\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| The Estee Lauder Companies | 10,181.7 | 15 | 9 | 60 | - | 5 | $150,000^{\text {c,e,f }}$ | - | 150,000 | 260,164 | 35\% | 27\% | 38\% | ०\% |

## Comparative Board Data



## Soft Drinks

| The Coca-Cola Company | 46,854.0 | 15 | 13 | 66 | 74 | 5 | $250,000{ }^{\text {d.e.g }}$ | - | 250,000 | 263,444 | 22\% | 75\% | ०\% | 3\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Coca-Cola Enterprises | 8,212.0 | 12 | 11 | 60 | 72 | 6 | $230,000^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 230,000 | 243,894 | 49\% | 50\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| Dr Pepper Snapple Group | 5,997.0 | 9 | 8 | 64 | 70 | 7 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 100,000 | 239,375 | 42\% | 58\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Monster Beverage Corporation | 2,246.4 | 8 | 5 | 69 | - | 9 | 180,000 ${ }^{\text {e }}$ | - | 180,000 | 194,989 | 38\% | 62\% | ०\% | 0\% |
| PepsiCo | 66,415.0 | 13 | 12 | 63 | 72 | 7 | $100,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 209,284 | 27\% | 72\% | ०\% | 1\% |

## Tobacco

| Altria Group | 17,663.0 | 11 | 10 | 64 | 75 | 8 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 301,251 | 40\% | 53\% | ०\% | 7\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Lorillard | 6,950.0 | 7 | 6 | 64 | - | 10 | 250,000 ${ }^{\text {e }}$ | - | 250,000 | 248,432 | 45\% | 55\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Phillip Morris International | 31,217.0 | 10 | 7 | 66 | - | 6 | 125,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 125,000 | 333,803 | 48\% | 52\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Reynolds American | 8,236.0 | 14 | 11 | 61 | 72 | 12 | 60,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | 1,500 | 78,000 | 399,244 | 36\% | 63\% | ०\% | 1\% |

TOTAL CONSUMER STAPLES

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Average | 11.5 | 9.3 | 62.6 | 72.3 | 7.8 | 119,628 | 123,379 | 261,887 | $39 \%$ | $55 \%$ | $5 \%$ |
| Median | 11.0 | 9.0 | 62.0 | 72.0 | 7.0 | 100,000 | 100,000 | 256,500 |  |  |  |

## energy

Coal a Consumable Fuels

| CONSOL Energy | 3,299.7 | 12 | 9 | 69 | 75 | 11 | $120,000{ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 120,000 | 236,850 | 45\% | 55\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Peabody Energy Corporation | 7,013.7 | 12 | 11 | 66 | 75 | 7 | 110,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 110,000 | 252,068 | 47\% | 52\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| Integrated Oil Q Gas |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Chevron Corporation | 228,848.0 | 12 | 10 | 63 | 72 | 6 | 150,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d.i }}$ | - | 150,000 | 372,983 | 34\% | 60\% | 4\% | 2\% |
| Exxon Mobil Corporation | 438,255.0 | 12 | 11 | 65 | 72 | 11 | 110,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 110,000 | 333,045 | 34\% | 66\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Hess Corporation | 22,284.0 | 14 | 13 | 64 | 75 | 12 | 110,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 110,000 | 307,909 | 43\% | 57\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Occidental Petroleum Corporation | 25,736.0 | 11 | 10 | 65 | 75 | 16 | 125,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 125,000 | 549,432 | 24\% | 75\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| Oil \& Gas Drilling |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diamond Offshore Drilling | 2,920.4 | 11 | 6 | 69 | - | 5 | $50,000^{\text {f }}$ | 1,500 | 57,500 | 169,667 | 40\% | 34\% | ०\% | 26\% |
| Ensco | 4,919.8 | 9 | 8 | 62 | 70 | 15 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 100,000 | 340,624 | 27\% | 73\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Helmerich \& Payne | 3,387.6 | 10 | 8 | 65 | - | 5 | 70,000 ${ }^{\text {d,f }}$ | - | 70,000 | 173,931 | 44\% | ०\% | 56\% | ०\% |
| Nabors Industries | 6,248.6 | 7 | 6 | 65 | 72 | 5 | $50,000^{\text {c,i }}$ | - | 50,000 | 427,393 | 26\% | 68\% | 6\% | 0\% |
| Noble Corporation | 4,234.3 | 8 | 7 | 57 | 72 | 6 | $50,000^{\text {c.d }}$ | 2,000 | 62,000 | 321,086 | $11 \%$ | 89\% | ०\% | 0\% |
| Rowan Companies | 1,579.3 | 10 | 8 | 66 | - | 6 | 80,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 80,000 | 305,587 | 35\% | 65\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Transocean Ltd. | 9,484.0 | 11 | 10 | 58 | 72 | 8 | 90,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - ${ }^{\circ}$ | 100,000 | 412,464 | 30\% | 62\% | ०\% | 8\% |

Oil \& Gas Equipment \& Services

| Baker Hughes | 22,364.0 | 11 | 10 | 67 | 72 | 7 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c,i }}$ | - | 100,000 | 283,228 | 42\% | 56\% | ०\% | 2\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cameron International Corporation | 9,838.4 | 11 | 10 | 64 | 72 | 7 | $50,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | 2,500 | 67,500 | 339,025 | 26\% | 74\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| FMC Technologies | 7,126.2 | 12 | 11 | 65 | 73 | 5 | 60,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 60,000 | 338,782 | 19\% | 80\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| Halliburton Company | 29,402.0 | 11 | 10 | 64 | 72 | 9 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 325,637 | 30\% | 46\% | ०\% | 24\% |
| National Oilwell Varco | 22,869.0 | 10 | 8 | 60 | 72 | 5 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c.f }}$ | 1,500 | 82,500 | 260,575 | 35\% | 63\% | ०\% | 2\% |
| Schlumberger Limited | 46,459.0 | 11 | 10 | 63 | 70 | 6 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 100,000 | 346,972 | 48\% | 48\% | ०\% | 4\% |



Oil a Cas Exploration a Production

| Anadarko Petroleum Corporation | 14,581.0 | 9 | 8 | 60 | 72 | 8 | 70,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | 2,000 | 86,000 | 379,660 | 33\% | 66\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Apache Corporation | 16,054.0 | 9 | 8 | 60 | 75 | 10 | 150,000 ${ }^{\text {c.,.k }}$ | - | 150,000 | 286,781 | 47\% | 52\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| Cabot Oil \& Gas Corporation | 1,746.3 | 7 | 6 | 69 | 73 | 6 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 75,000 | 290,887 | 29\% | 69\% | ०\% | 2\% |
| Chesapeake Energy Corporation | 17,506.0 | 9 | 8 | 63 | 80 | 11 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 100,000 | 417,909 | 22\% | 78\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| ConocoPhillips | 58,248.0 | 10 | 9 | 62 | 72 | 7 | $115,000^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 115,000 | 320,593 | 42\% | 53\% | ०\% | 5\% |
| Denbury Resources | 2,517.1 | 10 | 9 | 62 | 70 | 9 | $80,000^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 80,000 | 352,667 | 32\% | 65\% | ०\% | 3\% |
| Devon Energy Corporation | 10,397.0 | 10 | 8 | 63 | 73 | 7 | $70,000{ }^{\text {c }}$ | 2,000 | 84,000 | 339,848 | 32\% | 68\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| EOG Resources | 14,487.1 | 8 | 6 | 69 | 80 | 6 | 140,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d.f }}$ | - | 140,000 | 311,241 | 45\% | 45\% | 9\% | 1\% |
| EQT Corporation | 1,862.0 | 11 | 10 | 64 | 74 | 6 | $50,500^{\text {c.d }}$ | 1,500 | 59,500 | 264,133 | 31\% | 61\% | ०\% | 8\% |
| Marathon Oil Corporation | 14,959.0 | 9 | 8 | 61 | 72 | 10 | 150,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 150,000 | 340,000 | 47\% | 52\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| Murphy Oil Corporation | 5,390.1 | 11 | 9 | 62 | 72 | 7 | $60,000{ }^{\text {c }}$ | 2,000 | 74,000 | 349,771 | 33\% | 64\% | ०\% | 3\% |
| Newäeld Exploration Company | 1,789.0 | 11 | 10 | 64 | 72 | 10 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 75,000 | 282,285 | 29\% | 71\% | 0\% | ०\% |
| Noble Energy | 5,015.0 | 10 | 9 | 62 | 75 | 9 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {cf }}$ | 2,000 | 93,000 | 304,472 | 41\% | 33\% | 26\% | ०\% |
| Pioneer Natural Resources Company | 3,489.5 | 11 | 9 | 63 | - | 13 | 275,000 ${ }^{\text {e }}$ | - | 275,000 | 289,804 | 9\% | 90\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| QEP Resources | 2,935.8 | 10 | 9 | 62 | 72 | 8 | 70,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 70,000 | 255,833 | 32\% | 68\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Range Resources Corporation | 1,862.7 | 9 | 7 | 66 | - | 10 | 50,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d.f }}$ | 1,000 | 60,000 | 351,742 | 21\% | 58\% | 21\% | ०\% |
| Southwestern Energy Company | 3,371.1 | 8 | 6 | 63 | 75 | 8 | $50,000{ }^{\text {c.f }}$ | 1,500 | 62,000 | 294,796 | 31\% | 45\% | 21\% | 3\% |

## Oil \& Gas Refining \& Marketing

| Marathon Petroleum Corporation | 100,255.0 | 12 | 11 | 66 | 72 | 8 | 150,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 150,000 | 317,722 | 54\% | 45\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Phillips 66 | 174,809.0 | 8 | 6 | 64 | 72 | 6 | 115,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 115,000 | 308,786 | 40\% | 55\% | ○\% | 5\% |
| Tesoro Corporation | 37,601.0 | 10 | 9 | 64 | 75 | 10 | 235,000 ${ }^{\text {d,e,g }}$ | - | 235,000 | 279,908 | 50\% | 49\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| Valero Energy Corporation | 138,074.0 | 11 | 9 | 64 | 75 | 7 | 115,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 115,000 | 282,303 | 43\% | 57\% | ०\% | ०\% |

Oil \& Gas Storage \& Transportation

| Kinder Morgan | 14,070.0 | 11 | 8 | 64 | - | 9 | 200,000 ${ }^{\text {d }}$ | - | 200,000 | 181,072 | 70\% | 29\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ONEOK | 14,602.7 | 11 | 9 | 64 | 73 | 10 | $195,000{ }^{\text {d,e }}$ |  | 195,000 | 205,556 | 34\% | 66\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Spectra Energy Corporation | 5,518.0 | 10 | 9 | 63 | 74 | 11 | 225,000 ${ }^{\text {e }}$ | - | 225,000 | 260,742 | 53\% | 46\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| The Williams Companies | 6,860.0 | 12 | 11 | 62 | 75 | 12 | 250,000 ${ }^{\text {e }}$ | - | 250,000 | 309,896 | 44\% | 52\% | ०\% | 4\% |

TOTAL ENERGY

| Average | 10.3 | 8.8 | 63.7 | 73.3 | 8.4 | 110,011 | 113,364 | 312,240 | $35 \%$ | $60 \%$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Median | 10.5 | 9.0 | 64.0 | 72.0 | 8.0 | 100,000 | $3 \%$ | $2 \%$ | 100,000 | 309,341 |

FINANCIALS

## Asset Management a Custody Banks

| Ameriprise Financial | 11,199.0 | 10 | 9 | 65 | 75 | 7 | 205,000 ${ }^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 205,000 | 270,549 | 41\% | 43\% | ०\% | 16\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation | 15,326.0 | 13 | 12 | 67 | 75 | 12 | $110,000{ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 110,000 | 247,130 | 50\% | 45\% | ०\% | 5\% |
| BlackRock | 10,180.0 | 18 | 14 | 64 | 75 | 8 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d.e }}$ | 1,500 | 87,000 | 266,599 | 19\% | 81\% | ०\% | 0\% |
| Franklin Resources | 7,985.0 | 10 | 7 | 63 | 75 | 5 | $85,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 85,000 | 216,893 | 42\% | 55\% | ०\% | 3\% |
| Invesco | 4,644.0 | 9 | 8 | 67 | 73 | 10 | 120,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 120,000 | 254,925 | 63\% | 37\% | ०\% | ०\% |

## Comparative Board Data



Asset Management \& Custody Banks (continued)

| Legg Mason | 2,741.8 | 14 | 13 | 66 | 72 | 12 | 50,000 ${ }^{\text {c.k }}$ | 2,000 ${ }^{\text {P }}$ | 64,000 | 237,965 | 55\% | 44\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Northern Trust Corporation | 4,100.1 | 11 | 10 | 60 | 72 | 10 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 212,445 | 52\% | 47\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| State Street Corporation | 10,295.0 | 12 | 11 | 62 | 75 | 8 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | 1,500 | 87,000 | 281,418 | 36\% | 58\% | ०\% | 6\% |
| T. Rowe Price Group | 3,484.2 | 12 | 9 | 66 | 72 | 8 | $100,000^{\text {c.d.f.fa }}$ | - | 100,000 | 305,044 | 33\% | 56\% | 8\% | 3\% |
| Consumer Finance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| American Express Company | 34,932.0 | 13 | 10 | 60 | 72 | 10 | $90,000^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 90,000 | 292,460 | 39\% | 53\% | ०\% | 8\% |
| Capital One Financial Corporation | 24,176.0 | 10 | 8 | 61 | 70 | 12 | 80,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 80,000 | 284,846 | 32\% | 64\% | ०\% | 4\% |
| Discover Financial Services | 9,370.0 | 11 | 10 | 61 | - | 11 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 75,000 | 227,244 | 45\% | 55\% | ०\% | ०\% |

## Diversified Banks

| Bank of America Corporation | 101,697.0 | 15 | 13 | 63 | 72 | 16 | $80,000{ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 80,000 | 283,341 | 35\% | 65\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Citigroup | 92,543.0 | 14 | 12 | 64 | 72 | 19 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 75,000 | 315,250 | 57\% | 43\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Comerica | 2,610.0 | 9 | 8 | 57 | 72 | 8 | $45,000{ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | 1,500 | 57,000 | 153,013 | 58\% | 42\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| JPMorgan Chase \& Co. | 106,283.0 | 11 | 10 | 63 | 72 | 13 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 75,000 | 292,714 | 47\% | 53\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| U.S. Bancorp | 21,059.0 | 14 | 13 | 66 | 72 | 8 | $90,000{ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 90,000 | 238,877 | 45\% | 55\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Wells Fargo \& Company | 88,069.0 | 14 | 13 | 64 | 70 | 9 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | 2,000 | 93,000 | 274,256 | 47\% | 52\% | ०\% | 1\% |

Diversified REITs

| Vornado Realty Trust | $2,503.7$ | 9 | 7 | 73 | - | 7 | $75,000^{c}$ | - | 75,000 | 180,665 | $51 \%$ | $49 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Healthcare REITs

| HCP | 2,099.9 | 7 | 6 | 68 | - | 11 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 75,000 | 253,473 | 37\% | 63\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Health Care REIT | 2,880.6 | 10 | 9 | 64 | 75 | 6 | $80,000^{\text {c }}$ | _' | 83,000 | 189,475 | 50\% | 50\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Ventas | 2,751.8 | 10 | 8 | 63 | 75 | 11 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | - ${ }^{5}$ | 79,500 | 199,400 | 50\% | 50\% | ०\% | ०\% |

## Hotel \& Resort REITS

| Host Hotels \& Resorts | $5,166.0$ | 9 | 7 | 63 | - | 5 | $180,000^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 180,000 | 210,814 | $40 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $17 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Industrial REITs

| ProLogis | 1,750.5 | 10 | 9 | 64 | 72 | 4 | $84,000^{\text {c }}$ | - | 84,000 | 223,949 | $3 \%$ |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

Insurance Brokers

| Aon plc | $11,815.0$ | 12 | 11 | 67 | - | 6 | $105,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 105,000 | 286,143 | $40 \%$ | $58 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $2 \%$ |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Marsh \& McLennan <br> Companies | $12,261.0$ | 12 | 11 | 64 | 75 | 11 | $100,000^{c, d}$ | - | 100,000 | 246,708 | $51 \%$ | $49 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |  |

Investment Banking \& Brokerage

| The Charles Schwab Corporation | 5,539.0 | 12 | 10 | 68 | - | 7 | $100,000^{\text {c.d.,.i. }}$ | - | 100,000 | 276,669 | 46\% | 25\% | 28\% | 1\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| E*TRADE Financial Corporation | 1,961.8 | 11 | 10 | 61 | - | 13 | 50,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 2,500 | 82,500 | 210,813 | 76\% | 24\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| The Goldman Sachs Group | 40,874.0 | 13 | 10 | 61 | 75 | 15 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c,e, }, \text {, k }}$ | - | 75,000 | 521,115 | 7\% | 91\% | ०\% | 2\% |
| Morgan Stanley | 36,848.0 | 15 | 12 | 64 | 72 | 13 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 75,000 | 348,118 | 28\% | 72\% | ०\% | ०\% |

Life Q Health Insurance

| AFLAC | 23,939.0 | 13 | 9 | 65 | 75 | 4 | $115,000^{\text {c,.f.fi, }, ~}$ | - | 115,000 | 266,654 | 47\% | 19\% | 34\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Lincoln National Corporation | 11,969.0 | 11 | 10 | 68 | 75 | 4 | $232,000^{\text {d,e,g }}$ | - | 232,000 | 278,871 | 35\% | 45\% | 15\% | 5\% |
| MetLife | 68,199.0 | 11 | 10 | 62 | 72 | 8 | 260,000 ${ }^{\text {e }}$ | - | 260,000 | 283,606 | 52\% | 46\% | ०\% | 2\% |
| Principal Financial Group | 9,289.5 | 11 | 10 | 63 | 72 | 11 | 205,000 ${ }^{\text {d,e }}$ | 2,500 | 230,000 | 236,692 | 51\% | 49\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Prudential Financial | 41,461.0 | 12 | 10 | 64 | 74 | 10 | $300,000^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 300,000 | 256,250 | 53\% | 47\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Torchmark Corporation | 3,771.9 | 11 | 9 | 64 | 74 | 5 | 190,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d.e. . . i }}$ | - | 190,000 | 210,472 | 43\% | 57\% | 0\% | ०\% |
| Unum Group | 10,353.8 | 13 | 12 | 65 | 72 | 7 | $95,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 95,000 | 228,739 | 44\% | 52\% | ०\% | 4\% |



Multi-line Insurance

| American International Group | 68,678.0 | 14 | 13 | 64 | 75 | 13 | 250,000 ${ }^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 250,000 | 302,398 | 69\% | 30\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Assurant | 9,047.7 | 11 | 10 | 63 | 73 | 9 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 225,075 | 54\% | 44\% | ०\% | 2\% |
| Genworth Financial | 9,403.0 | 10 | 9 | 64 | 73 | 9 | $230,000^{\text {d,e, },}$ | - | 230,000 | 237,857 | 35\% | 60\% | ०\% | 5\% |
| The Hartford Financial Services Group | 26,236.0 | 10 | 9 | 61 | 75 | 9 | 65,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | 2,500 | 87,500 | 275,923 | 45\% | 54\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Loews Corporation | 15,053.0 | 13 | 11 | 67 | - | 7 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {f }}$ | - | 100,000 | 179,485 | 65\% | 35\% | 0\% | 0\% |

Multi-sector Holdings

| Berkshire Hathaway | $182,150.0$ | 13 | 9 | 67 | - | 3 | - | 900 | 2,700 | 2,982 | $100 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Leucadia National <br> Corporation | $10,429.5$ | 9 | 6 | 64 | - | 13 | $120,000^{f}$ | 1,000 | 133,000 | 169,318 | $91 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $0 \%$ |  |

Office REITs

| Boston Properties | $2,135 \cdot 5$ | 11 | 8 | 66 | 75 | 9 | $60,000^{\text {c.d }}$ | 1,500 | 73,500 | 207,468 | $44 \%$ | $56 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Property \& Casualty Insurance

| ACE Limited | 19,261.0 | 14 | 13 | 63 | 74 | 6 | $230,000{ }^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 230,000 | 295,074 | 40\% | 57\% | ०\% | 3\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| The Allstate Corporation | 34,507.0 | 11 | 10 | 62 | 72 | 8 | $90,000^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 90,000 | 258,209 | 39\% | 61\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| The Chubb Corporation | 13,947.0 | 14 | 13 | 64 | 74 | 8 | $60,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | 2,000 | 76,000 | 254,641 | 46\% | 51\% | ०\% | 3\% |
| Cincinnati Financial Corporation | 4,531.0 | 15 | 10 | 59 | 73 | 4 | 80,000 ${ }^{\text {e }}$ | 4,500 | 98,000 | 182,200 | 51\% | 47\% | ०\% | 2\% |
| The Progressive Corporation | 18,170.9 | 10 | 9 | 62 | 80 | 11 | $225,000^{\text {e,h }}$ | - | 225,000 | 244,262 | ०\% | 100\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| The Travelers Companies | 26,191.0 | 12 | 11 | 65 | 74 | 6 | $110,000{ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 110,000 | 282,329 | 43\% | 57\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| XL Group | 7,541.2 | 10 | 9 | 67 | - | 8 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d.f }}$ | - | 101,500 | 288,966 | 48\% | 52\% | ०\% | ०\% |

## Real Estate Services



## Regional Banks

| BB\&T Corporation | 10,444.0 | 18 | 15 | 63 | 72 | 12 | 60,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 1,500 | 78,000 | 154,790 | 62\% | 38\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fifth Third Bancorp | 7,200.0 | 12 | 11 | 61 | 70 | 15 | $50,000{ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | 2,000 | 80,000 | 257,770 | 52\% | 43\% | ०\% | 5\% |
| Huntington Bancshares | 2,858.6 | 11 | 9 | 61 | - | 16 | 35,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | 2,000 | 67,000 | 180,132 | 60\% | 40\% | ०\% | -\% |
| KeyCorp | 4,386.0 | 12 | 11 | 58 | 72 | 8 | $40,000{ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | 1,500 | 52,000 | 157,042 | 49\% | 51\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| M\&T Bank Corporation | 4,822.5 | 14 | 11 | 71 | - | 18 | 85,000 ${ }^{\text {d }}$ | 2,000 | 121,000 | 149,600 | 44\% | 56\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| The PNC Financial Services Group | 16,872.0 | 15 | 14 | 67 | 72 | 12 | 60,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | 1,500 ${ }^{4}$ | 75,000 | 301,419 | 40\% | 43\% | ०\% | 17\% |
| Regions Financial Corporation | 5,665.0 | 13 | 12 | 64 | 72 | 14 | $145,000^{\text {d,e }}$ | 1,500 | 166,000 | 201,231 | 55\% | 45\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| SunTrust Banks | 8,602.0 | 11 | 10 | 65 | 72 | 5 | $60,000^{\text {c }}$ | - | 60,000 | 219,930 | 45\% | 55\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Zions Bancorporation | 2,278.8 | 9 | 7 | 65 | 72 | 17 | $35,000^{\text {c.d }}$ | 1,500 | 60,500 | 159,223 | 54\% | 44\% | ०\% | 2\% |

## Residential REITs

Apartment Investment and Management Company

AvalonBay Communities Equity Residential

Essex Property Trust

| 974.1 | 7 | 6 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1,462.9$ | 9 | 8 |
| $2,387.7$ | 11 | 9 |
| 613.7 | 13 | 11 |

Retail REITs

| General Growth Properties | 2,527.4 | 9 | 8 | 54 | - | 7 | 175,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 175,000 | 182,000 | 46\% | 54\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Kimco Realty Corporation | 946.7 | 9 | 7 | 71 | - | 8 | 50,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d,f }}$ | - | 50,000 | 232,959 | 38\% | 51\% | $11 \%$ | ०\% |
| The Macerich Co. | 1,029.5 | 11 | 8 | 65 | - | 6 | $60,000^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 60,000 | 174,975 | 55\% | 45\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Simon Property Group | 5,170.1 | 10 | 7 | 67 | - | 6 | 70,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 2,000 | 82,000 | 196,500 | 55\% | 45\% | ०\% | ०\% |

## Comparative Board Data



## Specialized Finance

| CME Group | 2,936.3 | 24 | 18 | 62 | - | 8 | $100,000^{\text {d,e }}$ | 1,500 | 112,000 | 137,347 | 45\% | 55\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Intercontinental Exchange | 1,795.0 | 14 | 13 | 66 | 75 | 10 | $85,000^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 85,000 | 266,754 | 29\% | 71\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| McGraw-Hill Companies | 4,875.0 | 12 | 9 | 65 | 72 | 10 | 70,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | 1,500 | 85,000 | 195,455 | 54\% | 46\% | 0\% | ०\% |
| Moody's Corporation | 2,972.5 | 9 | 8 | 63 | - | 6 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 75,000 | 227,505 | 39\% | 60\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| The Nasdaq OMX Group | 3,211.0 | 11 | 9 | 59 | - | 17 | $80,000^{\text {c.d }}$ | 1,500 | 105,500 | 252,409 | 42\% | 58\% | ०\% | ०\% |

## Specialized REITs

| Plum Creek Timber Company | 1,340.0 | 10 | 9 | 64 | - | 4 | 60,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | 2,000 | 68,000 | 209,792 | 44\% | 56\% | ०\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Public Storage | 1,981.7 | 8 | 5 | 63 | 70 | 4 | $40,000{ }^{\text {f }}$ | - | 40,000 | 176,757 | $31 \%$ | ०\% | 69\% | ०\% |

## Thrifts \& Mortgage Finance

| Hudson City Bancorp | 1,400.3 | 9 | 7 | 69 | 75 | 19 | 50,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 1,500 | 78,500 | 245,415 | 57\% | 31\% | ०\% | 12\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| People's United Financial | 1,337.6 | 11 | 8 | 68 | 76 | 12 | $24,000^{\text {c.d }}$ | 950 | 38,400 | 188,107 | 50\% | 50\% | ०\% | ०\% |

TOTAL FINANCIALS

| Average | 11.7 | 9.9 | 64.1 | 73.2 | 9.3 | 100,390 | 106,271 | 230,288 | $45 \%$ | $51 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Median | 11.0 | 10.0 | 64.0 | 72.5 | 8.0 | 80,000 | 86,000 | 236,692 |  |  |  |  |

## healthcare

## Biotechnology

| Alexion Pharmaceuticals | 1,551.3 | 8 | 7 | 68 | - | 7 | $80,000^{\text {c.f }}$ | - | 80,000 | 453,135 | 24\% | 51\% | 25\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Amgen | 18,676.0 | 12 | 11 | 64 | 72 | 6 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c.f }}$ | - | 100,000 | 385,340 | 34\% | 52\% | 8\% | 6\% |
| Biogen Idec | 6,932.2 | 11 | 10 | 59 | 75 | 15 | 50,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 2,500 | 87,500 | 408,143 | 28\% | 72\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Celgene Corporation | 6,493.9 | 9 | 8 | 68 | - | 6 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c.f }}$ | - | 75,000 | 833,119 | 12\% | 44\% | 44\% | ०\% |
| Gilead Sciences | 11,201.7 | 10 | 9 | 71 | - | 4 | $75,000^{\text {c.d.f }}$ | - | 75,000 | 421,019 | 28\% | 36\% | 36\% | ०\% |
| Regeneron Pharmaceuticals | 2,104.7 | 12 | 9 | 69 | - | 6 | $55,000^{f}$ | - | 55,000 | 1,418,207 | 5\% | 95\% | ०\% | 0\% |
| Vertex Pharmaceuticals | 1,212.0 | 10 | 8 | 57 | - | 10 | 50,000 ${ }^{\text {f }}$ | - | 50,000 | 823,373 | 9\% | 91\% | ०\% | ०\% |

## Healthcare Technology

| Cerner Corporation | $2,910.7$ | 9 | 7 | 68 | 75 | 4 | $66,000^{c}$ | - | 66,000 | 317,383 | $27 \%$ | $73 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Healthcare Distributors

| AmerisourceBergen Corporation | 87,959.2 | 10 | 9 | 64 | 75 | 7 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 245,194 | 45\% | 54\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cardinal Health | 101,093.0 | 12 | 11 | 61 | 75 | 11 | 90,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 90,000 | 238,738 | 40\% | 60\% | -\% | ०\% |
| McKesson Corporation | 137,609.0 | 9 | 8 | 68 | 75 | 10 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 1,500 | 90,000 | 288,324 | 42\% | 52\% | ०\% | 6\% |
| Patterson Companies | 3,637.2 | 8 | 6 | 63 | 75 | 4 | $62,000{ }^{\text {c.f }}$ | - | 62,000 | 170,227 | 41\% | 59\% | ०\% | -\% |

Healthcare Equipment

| Abbott Laboratories | 21,848.0 | 11 | 10 | 62 | 72 | 7 | 126,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 126,000 | 262,349 | 51\% | 43\% | ०\% | 6\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Baxter International | 15,259.0 | 13 | 12 | 67 | 72 | 9 | 65,000 ${ }^{\text {c.f }}$ | 2,000 | 83,000 | 278,858 | 41\% | 40\% | 15\% | 4\% |
| Becton, Dickinson and Company | 8,054.0 | 14 | 13 | 65 | 72 | 8 | $85,000^{\text {c, d }}$ | - | 85,000 | 254,798 | 33\% | 66\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| Boston Scientiäc Corporation | 7,143.0 | 11 | 10 | 63 | - | 6 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c,di, }}$ | - | 75,000 | 276,105 | 37\% | 63\% | ०\% | 0\% |
| C.R. Bard | 3,049.5 | 11 | 9 | 66 | 74 | 6 | $50,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | 1,650 | 59,900 | 241,904 | 40\% | 29\% | ०\% | 31\% |
| CareFusion Corporation | 3,550.0 | 9 | 8 | 63 | - | 14 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 100,000 | 273,178 | 43\% | 57\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Covidien | 10,235.0 | 10 | 9 | 60 | 72 | 8 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 100,000 | 283,622 | 39\% | 56\% | ०\% | 5\% |
| Edwards Lifesciences Corporation | 2,045.5 | 8 | 7 | 69 | - | 7 | $40,000^{\text {c.d.f. }{ }^{\text {a }}}$ | - | 40,000 | 255,740 | 9\% | 87\% | 4\% | 0\% |



Healthcare Equipment (continued)

| Intuitive Surgical | 2,265.1 | 9 | 7 | 64 | - | 7 | $50,000{ }^{\text {f }}$ | - | 50,000 | 320,343 | 20\% | 0\% | 80\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Medtronic | 16,590.0 | 11 | 10 | 61 | 72 | 6 | $80,000^{\text {c }}$ | - | 80,000 | 230,269 | 39\% | 61\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| St. Jude Medical | 5,501.0 | 8 | 7 | 61 | 75 | 5 | $100,000{ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 246,117 | 40\% | 60\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Stryker Corporation | 9,021.0 | 9 | 8 | 58 | - | 10 | $60,000{ }^{\text {c,f }}$ | - | 60,000 | 330,287 | 48\% | 27\% | 25\% | ०\% |
| Varian Medical Systems | 2,942.9 | 10 | 8 | 59 | 75 | 5 | $45,000^{\text {c. } \mathrm{c}, \mathrm{f}}$ | 2,000 | 55,000 | 275,192 | 28\% | 36\% | 36\% | -\% |
| Zimmer Holdings | 4,623.4 | 9 | 8 | 59 | 72 | 6 | $95,000^{\text {c.d.e, }, \text { g }}$ | - | 95,000 | 270,122 | 33\% | 64\% | ०\% | 3\% |

## Healthcare Facilities

| Tenet Healthcare Corporation | 11,102.0 | 9 | 8 | 67 | 75 | 15 | 95,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | - ${ }^{\text {- }}$ | 119,000 | 350,781 | 50\% | 50\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Healthcare Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| DaVita Healthcare Partners | 11,764.1 | 10 | 8 | 61 | 75 | 16 | 24,000 ${ }^{\text {ce, }, \text { f }}$ | 8,000 | 152,000 | 515,619 | 10\% | 20\% | 70\% | ०\% |
| Express Scripts Holding Co | 104,098.8 | 11 | 10 | 63 | 75 | 6 | $30,000^{\text {c.f }}$ | 2,000 | 42,000 | 262,545 | 24\% | 38\% | 38\% | ०\% |
| Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings | 5,808.3 | 9 | 8 | 58 | - | 14 | 90,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 90,000 | 254,681 | 39\% | 61\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Quest Diagnostics | 7,146.0 | 9 | 8 | 65 | - | 11 | 35,000 ${ }^{\text {c., }, ~}$ | 1,500 | 51,500 | 307,848 | 27\% | 39\% | 34\% | ०\% |

Healthcare Supplies

| DENTSPLY International | $2,950.8$ | 11 | 10 | 65 | 75 | 6 | $45,000^{\text {c. . . f }}$ | $1,500^{\text {w }}$ | 53,500 | 198,450 | $34 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Life Sciences Tools Q Services

| Agilent Technologies | 6,782.0 | 8 | 7 | 67 | 72 | 7 | $90,000{ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 90,000 | 293,888 | 40\% | 60\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PerkinElmer | 2,166.2 | 8 | 7 | 62 | 72 | 9 | $80,000{ }^{\text {c.f }}$ | - | 80,000 | 245,014 | 37\% | 41\% | 22\% | 0\% |
| Thermo Fisher Scientiäc | 13,090.3 | 11 | 10 | 59 | 72 | 11 | $100,000{ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 281,258 | 43\% | 54\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| Waters Corporation | 1,904.2 | 9 | 8 | 60 | 72 | 7 | 55,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d.f }}$ | 1,500 | 65,500 | 308,450 | 26\% | 43\% | 31\% | ०\% |

## Managed Healthcare

| Aetna | 47,294.6 | 12 | 10 | 67 | 76 | 11 | $85,000^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 85,000 | 291,424 | 32\% | 55\% | ०\% | 13\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CIGNA Corporation | 32,380.0 | 11 | 10 | 63 | 72 | 7 | 275,000 ${ }^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 275,000 | 319,258 | 43\% | 56\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Humana | 41,313.0 | 10 | 9 | 57 | 73 | 8 | $85,000^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 85,000 | 275,039 | 39\% | 51\% | ०\% | 10\% |
| UnitedHealth Group | 122,489.0 | 11 | 9 | 69 | - | 10 | $125,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 125,000 | 331,528 | 50\% | 45\% | ०\% | 5\% |
| WellPoint | 71,023.5 | 10 | 9 | 64 | 72 | 15 | 85,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 85,000 | 309,374 | 43\% | 53\% | ०\% | 4\% |

Pharmaceuticals

| Actavis | 18,791.0 | 12 | 10 | 65 | - | 9 | 65,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 4,000 | 101,000 | 344,416 | 33\% | 65\% | ०\% | 2\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| AbbVie | 8,677.6 | 9 | 8 | 63 | 75 | 11 | $126,000^{\text {c,di }}$ | - | 126,000 | 262,202 | 51\% | 44\% | ०\% | 5\% |
| Allergan | 6,300.4 | 10 | 9 | 63 | 73 | 5 | $60,000^{\text {c., }, \text { i }}$ | 2,500 | 72,500 | 425,782 | 23\% | 63\% | 14\% | ०\% |
| Bristol-Myers Squibb Company | 16,385.0 | 11 | 10 | 63 | 75 | 7 | 90,000 ${ }^{\text {c. }}$ d | - | 90,000 | 313,333 | 38\% | 55\% | 0\% | 7\% |
| Eli Lilly \& Company | 23,113.1 | 14 | 13 | 62 | 72 | 8 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 271,790 | 41\% | 53\% | ०\% | 6\% |
| Forest Laboratories | 3,646.9 | 11 | 9 | 58 | - | 15 | $110,000{ }^{\text {c,f }}$ | 2,500 | 147,500 | 311,048 | 52\% | 24\% | 24\% | ०\% |
| Hospira | 4,002.8 | 11 | 10 | 65 | - | 7 | $65,000^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 65,000 | 329,567 | 32\% | 68\% | ०\% | 0\% |
| Johnson \& Johnson | 71,312.0 | 12 | 11 | 64 | 72 | 8 | 110,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 110,000 | 278,218 | 44\% | 52\% | ०\% | 4\% |
| Merck \& Co. | 44,033.0 | 12 | 11 | 63 | 72 | 7 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 280,904 | 40\% | 60\% | ०\% | 0\% |
| Mylan | 6,909.1 | 13 | 10 | 60 | 72 | 17 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c.f }}$ | - | 75,000 | 293,530 | 32\% | 51\% | 17\% | 0\% |
| Päzer | 51,584.0 | 12 | 11 | 64 | 73 | 6 | $137,500^{c, d}$ | - | 137,500 | 315,531 | 58\% | 39\% | ०\% | 3\% |
| Zoetis | 4,561.0 | 9 | 7 | 63 | - | 6 | $240,000^{\mathrm{e}, \mathrm{g}}$ | - | 240,000 | 229,286 | 39\% | 61\% | ०\% | ०\% |

TOTAL HEALTHCARE

| Average | 10.4 | 9.0 | 63.4 | 73.4 | 8.5 | 83,814 | 91,184 | 340,055 | $31 \%$ | $56 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
| :--- | ---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Median | 10.0 | 9.0 | 63.0 | 73.0 | 7.0 | 80,000 | 85,000 | 291,424 |  |  |  |  |

## Comparative Board Data



## Air Freight a Logistics

| C.H. Robinson Worldwide | 12,752.1 | 10 | 9 | 59 | - | 4 | $80,000^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 80,000 | 143,889 | 65\% | 35\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Expeditors International of Washington | 6,080.3 | 11 | 7 | 64 | - | 8 | $30,000{ }^{\text {c }}$ | 1,000 | 38,000 | 249,276 | 20\% | 80\% | 0\% | ०\% |
| FedEx Corporation | 44,287.0 | 11 | 10 | 59 | 72 | 7 | $80,000^{\text {f }}$ | 2,000 | 94,000 | 240,301 | 46\% | ०\% | 54\% | ०\% |
| United Parcel Service | 55,438.0 | 13 | 11 | 62 | 72 | 5 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 100,000 | 259,880 | 38\% | 62\% | 0\% | ०\% |

## Airlines

| Delta Air Lines | 37,773.0 | 14 | 11 | 64 | 72 | 9 | 85,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 85,000 | 252,717 | 50\% | 45\% | 0\% | 5\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Southwest Airlines Co. | 17,699.0 | 10 | 9 | 67 | 75 | 6 | $70,000{ }^{\text {c }}$ | 1,500 | 79,000 | 195,947 | 49\% | 51\% | ०\% | ०\% |

## Building Products

| Allegion Public Limited Company | 4,043.5 | 6 | 5 | 60 | 70 | 1 | 210,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 210,000 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Masco Corporation | 8,173.0 | 10 | 8 | 63 | 72 | 6 | 180,000 ${ }^{\text {e }}$ | 1,500 | 189,000 | 243,365 | 59\% | 39\% | ०\% | 2\% |
| Construction \& Engineering |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fluor Corporation | 27,351.6 | 13 | 12 | 63 | 72 | 6 | $115,000^{\text {c }}$ | - | 115,000 | 268,803 | 46\% | 50\% | ०\% | 4\% |
| Jacobs Engineering Group | 11,818.4 | 11 | 9 | 64 | - | 7 | $88,000{ }^{\text {c,f }}$ | - | 88,000 | 236,248 | 38\% | 30\% | 32\% | ०\% |
| Quanta Services | 6,522.8 | 10 | 9 | 61 | 73 | 6 | $65,000^{\text {c }}$ | - | 65,000 | 262,119 | 42\% | 58\% | ०\% | ०\% |

Construction, Farm Machinery \& Heavy Trucks

| Caterpillar | 55,656.0 | 12 | 11 | 61 | 72 | 7 | 250,000 ${ }^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 250,000 | 260,259 | 60\% | 38\% | ०\% | 2\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Deere \& Company | 37,795.4 | 11 | 10 | 65 | 72 | 5 | $120,000{ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 120,000 | 230,272 | 47\% | 52\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| Joy Global | 5,012.7 | 8 | 7 | 66 | - | 7 | 85,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 1,500 | 95,500 | 208,095 | 59\% | 41\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| PACCAR | 17,123.8 | 11 | 9 | 61 | 72 | 4 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | 7,500 | 105,000 | 225,264 | 55\% | 45\% | ०\% | ०\% |

## Construction Machinery \& Heavy Trucks

| Cummins | 17,301.0 | 8 | 7 | 62 | 72 | 5 | 250,000 | - | 250,000 | 223,588 | 47\% | 51\% | ०\% | 2\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Diversified Support Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cintas Corporation | 4,316.5 | 9 | 6 | 62 | 73 | 4 | 46,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d.f }}$ | 3,150 | 58,600 | 152,753 | 46\% | 27\% | 27\% | ०\% |
| Iron Mountain | 3,025.9 | 11 | 10 | 60 | 75 | 7 | $70,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 70,000 | 234,361 | 40\% | 59\% | ०\% | 1\% |



Electrical Components a Equipment

| AMETEK | 3,594.1 | 8 | 7 | 67 | 75 | 6 | 70,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d.f }}$ | - | 70,000 | 186,997 | 41\% | 30\% | 28\% | 1\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Eaton Corporation | 22,046.0 | 12 | 11 | 61 | 72 | 4 | 132,500 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 132,500 | 285,644 | 54\% | 46\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Emerson Electric Company | 24,669.0 | 12 | 10 | 61 | 72 | 11 | 205,000 ${ }^{\text {e }}$ | 1,500 | 221,500 | 246,348 | 47\% | $51 \%$ | ०\% | 2\% |
| Rockwell Automation | 6,351.9 | 10 | 9 | 62 | 72 | 7 | 150,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d,e }}$ | - | 150,000 | 208,157 | 44\% | 53\% | ०\% | 3\% |
| Environmental Q Facilities Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Republic Services | 8,417.2 | 10 | 9 | 63 | - | 5 | $80,000^{\text {c }}$ | - | 80,000 | 338,961 | 35\% | 65\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Stericycle | 2,142.8 | 9 | 7 | 67 | - | 5 | 125,000 ${ }^{\text {f., }, \mathrm{k}}$ | - | 125,000 | 156,296 | ०\% | 100\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Waste Management | 13,983.0 | 8 | 7 | 65 | 72 | 8 | 105,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 105,000 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |

Human Resource \& Employment Services

| Robert Half International | $4,245.9$ | 6 | 4 | 63 | - | 6 | $40,000^{c}$ | 1,500 | 49,000 | 282,562 | $23 \%$ | $77 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Industrial Conglomerates

| 3M Company | 30,871.0 | 9 | 8 | 65 | 72 | 7 | $260,000^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 260,000 | 274,722 | 48\% | 51\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Danaher Corporation | 19,118.0 | 10 | 7 | 64 | 72 | 9 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c.,.f }}$ | - | 100,000 | 232,145 | 33\% | 42\% | 25\% | ०\% |
| General Electric Company | 146,045.0 | 17 | 16 | 61 | 75 | 14 | $250,000^{\text {d,e,g }}$ | - | 250,000 | 272,037 | 18\% | 69\% | 0\% | 13\% |
| Roper Industries | 3,238.1 | 8 | 7 | 65 | 74 | 5 | $42,500{ }^{\text {c }}$ | 2,000 | 52,500 | 549,669 | 10\% | 90\% | ०\% | ०\% |

Industrial Machinery

| Dover Corporation | 8,729.8 | 12 | 11 | 65 | 75 | 11 | 240,000 | - | 240,000 | 233,143 | 52\% | 48\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Flowserve Corporation | 4,954.6 | 11 | 10 | 62 | 72 | 12 | $60,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 60,000 | 218,044 | 43\% | 57\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Illinois Tool Works | 14,135.0 | 12 | 11 | 61 | 75 | 5 | 135,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 135,000 | 264,025 | 57\% | 43\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Ingersoll-Rand | 12,350.5 | 11 | 10 | 67 | 75 | 7 | 285,000 ${ }^{\text {e }}$ | - | 287,500 | 262,727 | 100\% | ०\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Pall Corporation | 2,648.1 | 11 | 10 | 60 | 76 | 5 | $55,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 55,000 | 228,914 | 33\% | 66\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Parker-Hanniän Corporation | 13,015.7 | 12 | 11 | 61 | 75 | 5 | 120,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 120,000 | 232,151 | 52\% | 48\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Pentair Ltd. | 7,479.7 | 10 | 9 | 59 | 72 | 5 | 123,000 ${ }^{\text {c.f }}$ | - | 123,000 | 265,563 | 59\% | 20\% | 20\% | 1\% |
| Snap-on | 3,056.5 | 9 | 8 | 62 | 75 | 8 | $85,000^{\text {c, }}$ | - | 85,000 | 230,975 | 39\% | 52\% | ०\% | 9\% |
| Stanley Black \& Decker | 11,001.2 | 10 | 9 | 64 | 72 | 6 | 125,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 125,000 | 262,562 | 52\% | 47\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Xylem | 3,837.0 | 11 | 9 | 61 | 72 | 7 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 205,992 | 53\% | 47\% | ०\% | ०\% |

Office Services a Supplies

| Pitney Bowes | 3,8694 | 10 | 9 | 63 | 72 | 10 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 75,000 | 144,807 | 75\% | 23\% | ०\% | 2\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Railroads |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CSX Corporation | 12,026.0 | 13 | 12 | 63 | 72 | 6 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 75,000 | 284,782 | 29\% | 59\% | ०\% | 12\% |
| Kansas City Southern | 2,369.3 | 9 | 7 | 63 | 75 | 5 | $50,000^{\text {c.d }}$ | 4,000 | 70,000 | 199,623 | 48\% | 45\% | ०\% | 7\% |
| Norfolk Southern Corporation | 11,245.0 | 13 | 11 | 60 | 72 | 7 | $50,000^{\text {c }}$ | - | 50,000 | 286,119 | 35\% | 60\% | ०\% | 5\% |
| Union Paciäc Corporation | 21,963.0 | 11 | 10 | 67 | 75 | 6 | $250,000^{\text {d,e,g }}$ | - | 250,000 | 263,198 | 100\% | ०\% | ०\% | ०\% |

## Research of Consulting Services

| The Dun \& Bradstreet Corporation | 1,655.2 | 9 | 8 | 57 | 72 | 11 | 70,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d.f }}$ | - | 70,000 | 233,698 | 41\% | 51\% | ०\% | 8\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Equifax | 2,303.9 | 10 | 9 | 62 | 72 | 6 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 75,000 | 223,860 | 40\% | 60\% | ०\% | 0\% |
| Nielsen Holdings NV | 5,703.0 | 9 | 5 | 60 | - | 10 | $80,000{ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 80,000 | 212,125 | ०\% | 100\% | ०\% | ०\% |

## Security a Alarm Services

| The ADT Corporation | 3,309.0 | 8 | 7 | 61 | 72 | 13 | 80,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 80,000 | 264,227 | 41\% | 59\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Tyco International | 10,647.0 | 11 | 9 | 62 | 72 | 7 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 100,000 | 246,395 | 47\% | 51\% | 0\% | 2\% |

## Trading Companies \& Distributors

| Fastenal Company | 3,326.1 | 9 | 7 | 58 | 74 | 4 | 55,000 | 4,000 | 71,000 | 100,000 | 100\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| W.W. Grainger | 9,437.8 | 10 | 9 | 62 | 75 | 5 | $85,000{ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 85,000 | 249,669 | 37\% | 62\% | 0\% | 1\% |

## Comparative Board Data



INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

## Application Software

| Adobe Systems | $4,055 \cdot 2$ | 13 | 12 | 61 | 72 | 8 | $60,000^{c, d}$ | - | 60,000 | 273,881 | $29 \%$ | $64 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Autodesk | $2,273.9$ | 10 | 9 | 58 | - | 8 | $75,000^{c, d}$ | - | 75,000 | 400,482 | $23 \%$ | $77 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| Citrix Systems | $2,918.4$ | 9 | 8 | 58 | - | 12 | $40,000^{c}$ | - | 40,000 | 326,931 | $23 \%$ | $77 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| Intuit | $4,171.0$ | 9 | 6 | 60 | 75 | 5 | $60,000^{c, d}$ | - | 60,000 | 381,434 | $32 \%$ | $68 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| salesforce.com | $4,071.0$ | 11 | 8 | 64 | - | 8 | $50,000^{c}$ | - | 50,000 | 657,513 | $14 \%$ | $86 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |

## Communications Equipment

| Cisco Systems | 48,607.0 | 12 | 10 | 59 | 70 | 7 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 75,000 | 320,061 | 36\% | 64\% | ०\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| F5 Networks | 1,481.3 | 8 | 7 | 58 | - | 11 | $50,000^{\text {c }}$ | - | 50,000 | 300,196 | 26\% | 74\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Harris Corporation | 5,111.7 | 13 | 12 | 64 | 72 | 9 | $55,000^{\text {c.d }}$ | 2,000 | 73,000 | 237,784 | 49\% | 50\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| Juniper Networks | 4,669.1 | 11 | 8 | 61 | 75 | 10 | 55,000 ${ }^{\text {c.f }}$ | - | 55,000 | 315,295 | 29\% | 71\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Motorola Solutions | 8,696.0 | 8 | 7 | 62 | 72 | 6 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 255,910 | 33\% | 66\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| QUALCOMM | 24,866.0 | 14 | 12 | 67 | - | 8 | $100,000{ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 363,689 | 35\% | 55\% | ०\% | 10\% |

## Data Processing \& Outsourced Services

| Alliance Data Systems Corporation | 4,319.1 | 8 | 7 | 68 | 75 | 6 | 65,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | 1,500 | 74,000 | 235,542 | 28\% | 71\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Automatic Data Processing | 11,310.1 | 10 | 9 | 59 | 72 | 5 | $220,000^{\text {d,e,g }}$ | - | 220,000 | 232,000 | 39\% | 58\% | ०\% | 3\% |
| Computer Sciences Corporation | 12,998.0 | 9 | 8 | 62 | 72 | 8 | 90,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 90,000 | 291,540 | 39\% | 56\% | ०\% | 5\% |
| Fidelity National Information Services | 6,070.7 | 10 | 7 | 63 | - | 6 | $80,000{ }^{\text {c.f }}$ | 2,000 | 92,000 | 469,409 | 44\% | 29\% | 27\% | ०\% |
| Fiserv | 4,814.0 | 9 | 8 | 60 | 75 | 4 | 60,000. ${ }^{\text {c.d.f }}$ | - | 60,000 | 219,610 | 36\% | 32\% | 32\% | 0\% |
| MasterCard | 8,346.0 | 13 | 11 | 58 | 72 | 5 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 100,000 | 282,624 | 44\% | 55\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| Paychex | 2,518.9 | 9 | 7 | 63 | - | 5 | 70,000 ${ }^{\text {c,f }}$ | - | 70,000 | 207,795 | 52\% | 24\% | 24\% | 0\% |
| Total System Services | 2,132.4 | 14 | 12 | 67 | 75 | 8 | 70,000 ${ }^{\text {c,f }}$ | - | 70,000 | 189,217 | 50\% | 30\% | 20\% | 0\% |
| Visa | 11,778.0 | 11 | 10 | 63 | - | 10 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 100,000 | 326,495 | 43\% | 54\% | ०\% | 3\% |
| The Western Union Company | 5,542.0 | 11 | 10 | 63 | 74 | 8 | $85,000^{\text {c., f, i, } \mathrm{k}_{\text {a }}}$ | - | 85,000 | 272,556 | 38\% | 36\% | 20\% | 6\% |
| Xerox Corporation | 21,435.0 | 10 | 9 | 63 | 70 | 6 | $195,000^{\text {e,g }}$ | - | 195,000 | 207,222 | 37\% | 63\% | ०\% | ०\% |

## Electronic Components

| Amphenol Corporation | 4,614.7 | 8 | 7 | 69 | 72 | 4 | 70,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 70,000 | 214,494 | 39\% | 61\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Corning | 7,819.0 | 12 | 9 | 62 | 74 | 21 | 60,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | 1,750 | 96,750 | 270,748 | 53\% | 46\% | ०\% | 1\% |

## Electronic Equipment a Instruments

| FLIR Systems | 1,496.4 | 10 | 8 | 63 | 75 | 7 | 70,000 ${ }^{\text {c,f }}$ | 1,500 | 80,500 | 243,738 | 37\% | 31\% | 32\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Electronic Manufacturing Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Jabil Circuit | 18,336.9 | 9 | 7 | 64 | - | 4 | $58,000^{\text {c }}$ | - | 58,000 | 224,743 | 33\% | 67\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| TE Connectivity | 13,280.0 | 12 | 11 | 61 | 72 | 6 | 250,000 ${ }^{\text {e }}$ | - | 250,000 | 261,168 | 38\% | 56\% | ०\% | 6\% |



Home Entertainment Software

| Electronic Arts | 3,575.0 | 9 | 7 | 53 | 72 | 10 | $50,000^{\text {c.d.i }}$ | - | 50,000 | 181,819 | 20\% | 60\% | 20\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Internet Software \& Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Akamai Technologies | 1,577.9 | 12 | 9 | 60 | - | 10 | $300,000{ }^{\text {e,f, }, g_{g}}$ | - | 300,000 | 271,234 | 21\% | 79\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Facebook | 7,872.0 | 8 | 6 | 56 | 70 | 7 | $50,000^{\text {c }}$ | - | 50,000 | 444,374 | 13\% | 87\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Google | 59,825.0 | 10 | 7 | 60 | - | 8 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 75,000 | 430,484 | 18\% | 82\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| VeriSign | 965.1 | 7 | 6 | 70 | - | 6 | 40,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 40,000 | 324,129 | 26\% | 74\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Yahoo! | 4,680.4 | 9 | 7 | 61 | - | 15 | 80,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d.i }}$ | - | 80,000 | 330,316 | 9\% | 72\% | 19\% | ०\% |

IT Consulting a Other Services

| Accenture | 30,394.3 | 12 | 11 | 65 | 75 | 5 | $90,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 90,000 | 289,494 | 36\% | 64\% | ०\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cognizant Technology <br> Solutions Corporation | 8,843.2 | 9 | 7 | 66 | - | 9 | $40,000{ }^{\text {c,f }}$ | - | 40,000 | 269,446 | 26\% | 37\% | 37\% | 0\% |
| International Business Machines Corporation | 99,751.0 | 13 | 11 | 66 | 72 | 9 | $250,000{ }^{\text {d,e,g }}$ | - | 250,000 | 305,747 | 84\% | 0\% | 0\% | 16\% |
| Teradata Corporation | 2,692.0 | 9 | 8 | 67 | - | 7 | $50,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 50,000 | 312,841 | 12\% | 88\% | ०\% | 0\% |

## Semiconductor Equipment

| Applied Materials | $7,509.0$ | 12 | 10 | 62 | 70 | 9 | $65,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 65,000 | 290,523 | $33 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| KLA-Tencor Corporation | $2,842.8$ | 10 | 9 | 64 | 72 | 7 | $75,000^{c}$ | 2,500 | 92,500 | 233,078 | $48 \%$ |
| Lam Research Corporation | $3,598.9$ | 11 | 9 | 59 | 75 | 4 | $60,000^{c}$ | - | 60,000 | 240,692 | $30 \%$ |

Semiconductors

| Altera Corporation | 1,732.6 | 9 | 8 | 63 | - | 7 | $50,000^{\text {c.f }}$ | - | 50,000 | 212,526 | 32\% | 68\% | 0\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Analog Devices | 2,633.7 | 10 | 8 | 65 | - | 14 | $60,000{ }^{\text {c.f }}$ | - | 60,000 | 261,579 | 34\% | 33\% | 33\% | ०\% |
| Avago Technologies Limited | 2,520.0 | 9 | 8 | 61 | 70 | 10 | 60,000 ${ }^{\text {c,i }}$ | - | 60,000 | 268,703 | 29\% | 43\% | 28\% | ०\% |
| Broadcom Corporation | 8,305.0 | 9 | 7 | 63 | - | 10 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 75,000 | 382,805 | 22\% | 78\% | 0\% | ०\% |
| First Solar | 3,309.0 | 11 | 9 | 63 | - | 10 | 225,000 ${ }^{\text {e }}$ | - | 225,000 | 247,310 | 46\% | 54\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Intel Corporation | 52,708.0 | 10 | 8 | 60 | 72 | 11 | $80,000{ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 80,000 | 318,288 | 29\% | 70\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| Linear Technology Corporation | 1,282.2 | 7 | 5 | 71 | - | 6 | 60,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 1,500 | 69,000 | 173,190 | 45\% | 55\% | 0\% | ०\% |
| Microchip Technology | 1,931.2 | 5 | 4 | 67 | - | 8 | 59,850 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 2,850 | 82,650 | 151,613 | 49\% | 51\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Micron Technology | 9,073.0 | 8 | 7 | 58 | 70 | 5 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 359,973 | 33\% | 67\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Nvidia Corporation | 4,130.2 | 10 | 9 | 61 | - | 13 | $75,000^{\text {fi., }, 9}$ | - | 75,000 | 319,841 | 23\% | 34\% | 43\% | ०\% |
| Texas Instruments | 12,205.0 | 11 | 10 | 60 | 70 | 9 | 80,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d.f }}$ | - | 80,000 | 291,219 | 32\% | 34\% | 34\% | ०\% |
| Xilinx | 2,382.5 | 8 | 7 | 66 | - | 6 | $60,000^{\text {c }}$ | - | 60,000 | 233,238 | 34\% | 66\% | ०\% | ०\% |

## Systems Software

| CA | 4,643.0 | 11 | 10 | 61 | 75 | 7 | 275,000 ${ }^{\text {e,gh }}$ | - | 275,000 | 305,527 | 24\% | 72\% | ०\% | 4\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Microsoft Corporation | 77,849.0 | 9 | 7 | 62 | 75 | 10 | 250,000 ${ }^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 250,000 | 265,352 | 43\% | 57\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Oracle Corporation | 37,180.0 | 11 | 7 | 67 | - | 7 | 52,500 ${ }^{\text {f }}$ | $3000{ }^{\text {y }}$ | 70,500 | 586,418 | 24\% | 0\% | 76\% | ०\% |
| Red Hat | 1,534.6 | 9 | 8 | 63 | 75 | 10 | $50,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 50,000 | 265,497 | 17\% | 83\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Symantec Corporation | 6,676.0 | 10 | 9 | 57 | - | 10 | $50,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 50,000 | 295,479 | 30\% | 70\% | ०\% | ०\% |

Technology Hardware, Storage \& Peripherals

| Apple | 170,910.0 | 8 | 7 | 65 | 75 | 7 | $50,000^{\text {c }}$ | - | 50,000 | 341,683 | 26\% | 73\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| EMC Corporation | 23,222.0 | 11 | 9 | 63 | - | 6 | 50,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 3,000 | 68,000 | 327,701 | 27\% | 73\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Hewlett-Packard Company | 112,298.0 | 12 | 9 | 58 | - | 9 | $275,000^{\text {d,e, }}$ | - | 275,000 | 294,583 | 22\% | 64\% | 13\% | 1\% |
| NetApp | 6,332.4 | 12 | 10 | 63 | 70 | 8 | $60,000^{\text {d,fi.a }}$ | - | 60,000 | 309,017 | 23\% | 12\% | 65\% | ०\% |
| SanDisk Corporation | 6,170.0 | 8 | 6 | 64 | 70 | 7 | $50,000{ }^{\text {c.f }}$ | - | 50,000 | 280,628 | 31\% | 33\% | 36\% | ०\% |

## Comparative Board Data



MATERIALS

## Aluminum

| Alcoa | 23,032.0 | 12 | 11 | 65 | 75 | 7 | 230,000 ${ }^{\text {d }}$ | - | 230,000 | 247,317 | 98\% | 0\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

## Commodity Chemicals

| LyondellBasell Industries N.V. | 44,062.0 | 11 | 9 | 61 | - | 4 | 225,000 ${ }^{\text {e }}$ | - | 225,000 | 258,905 | 46\% | 53\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Construction Materials |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Vulcan Materials | 2,770.7 | 11 | 10 | 65 | 74 | 6 | $45,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | 5,000 | 75,000 | 188,715 | 52\% | 48\% | 0\% | ०\% |

Diversified Chemicals

| The Dow Chemical Company | 57,080.0 | 10 | 8 | 62 | 72 | 6 | 115,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 115,000 | 265,705 | 49\% | 51\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company | 36,144.0 | 12 | 11 | 62 | 72 | 11 | 230,000 | - | 230,000 | 250,151 | 48\% | 52\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Eastman Chemical Company | 9,350.0 | 12 | 10 | 63 | 70 | 6 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 247,074 | 46\% | 30\% | ०\% | 24\% |
| FMC Corporation | 3,874.8 | 10 | 9 | 60 | 72 | 8 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 75,000 | 216,584 | 18\% | 77\% | ०\% | 5\% |

Diversified Metals \& Mining

| Freeport McMoRan Copper <br> \& Gold | $20,921.0$ | 15 | 11 | 69 | - | 6 | $75,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | 3,000 | 93,000 | 419,044 | $56 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $26 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Fertilizers \& Agricultural Chemicals

| CF Industries Holdings | 5,474.7 | 8 | 7 | 64 | 74 | 7 | $100,000^{\text {c }}$ | - | 100,000 | 211,045 | 43\% | 57\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Monsanto Company | 14,861.0 | 12 | 11 | 61 | 75 | 6 | 235,000 ${ }^{\text {de,.g }}$ | - | 235,000 | 251,767 | 45\% | 54\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| The Mosaic Company | 9,974.1 | 11 | 9 | 59 | 72 | 10 | 90,000 ${ }^{\text {c,k }}$ | - | 90,000 | 267,445 | 37\% | 62\% | ०\% | 1\% |


| Forest Products |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Weyerhaeuser Company | 8,529.0 | 10 | 9 | 63 | 72 | 10 | $180,000{ }^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 180,000 | 198,346 | 47\% | 53\% | ०\% | ०\% |

## Gold

| Newmont Mining Corporation | 8,322.0 | 9 | 8 | 63 | 75 | 10 | 115,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 115,000 | 301,583 | 57\% | 43\% | ०\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Industrial Gases |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Air Products \& Chemicals | 10,180.4 | 12 | 11 | 63 | 72 | 16 | $80,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 80,000 | 230,705 | 47\% | 52\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| Airgas | 5,072.5 | 11 | 9 | 65 | 72 | 7 | $40,000{ }^{\text {f }}$ | - | 40,000 | 185,759 | 35\% | 65\% | ०\% | 0\% |
| Praxair | 11,925.0 | 11 | 10 | 65 | 72 | 6 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 100,000 | 269,685 | 40\% | 56\% | ०\% | 4\% |

## Metal a Glass Containers

| Ball Corporation | 8,468.1 | 10 | 8 | 66 | - | 5 | $85,000^{\text {c }}$ | $-^{2}$ | 85,000 | 248,228 | 34\% | 52\% | ०\% | 14\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Owens-Illinois | 6,967.0 | 12 | 10 | 64 | - | 9 | $67,500^{\text {c,d }}$ | 2,000 | 85,500 | 190,736 | 55\% | 45\% | ०\% | ०\% |



Paper Packaging

| Avery Dennison Corporation | 6,140.0 | 11 | 10 | 60 | 72 | 7 | $90,000{ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 90,000 | 210,453 | 46\% | 51\% | ०\% | 3\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Bemis Company | 5,029.8 | 11 | 10 | 64 | 75 | 5 | $85,000^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 85,000 | 193,589 | 40\% | 59\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| MeadWestvaco Corporation | 5,389.0 | 9 | 8 | 65 | 72 | 8 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | - | 75,000 | 192,500 | 47\% | 52\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| Sealed Air Corporation | 7,690.8 | 10 | 9 | 66 | 75 | 10 | $185,000^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 185,000 | 184,439 | 39\% | 61\% | ०\% | ०\% |

Paper Products

| International Paper Company | 29,080.0 | 11 | 10 | 64 | 72 | 9 | 230,000 ${ }^{\text {d,e }}$ | - | 230,000 | 255,290 | 24\% | 73\% | ०\% | 3\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Specialty Chemicals |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ecolab | 13,253.4 | 14 | 13 | 61 | 72 | 7 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d.f }}$ | - | 100,000 | 237,573 | 47\% | 31\% | 22\% | ०\% |
| International Flavors \& Fragrances | 2,952.9 | 12 | 11 | 64 | 72 | 6 | $225,000{ }^{\text {e,g }}$ | - | 225,000 | 206,977 | 51\% | 46\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| PPG Industries | 15,108.0 | 9 | 8 | 63 | 72 | 9 | $230,000^{\mathrm{d}, \mathrm{e}}$ | - | 230,000 | 242,798 | 50\% | 48\% | ०\% | 2\% |
| Sigma-Aldrich Corporation | 2,704.0 | 10 | 9 | 61 | 72 | 11 | $80,000^{\text {c.f }}$ | $-^{\text {a }}$ | 84,000 | 310,612 | 30\% | 26\% | 44\% | ०\% |

Steel

| Allegheny Technologies | 4,043.5 | 10 | 9 | 65 | 72 | 7 | 160,000 ${ }^{\text {e }}$ | 2,500 | 177,500 | 217,512 | 55\% | 43\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Nucor Corporation | 19,052.0 | 9 | 8 | 63 | 72 | 6 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 75,000 | 211,142 | 38\% | 62\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| United States Steel Corporation | 17,424.0 | 13 | 12 | 64 | 74 | 9 | $200,000^{\text {d,e,g }}$ | - | 200,000 | 209,500 | 45\% | 54\% | ०\% | 1\% |

TOTAL MATERIALS

| Average | 10.9 | 9.6 | 63.3 | 72.7 | 7.8 | 130,750 | 133,667 | 237,501 | $46 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $4 \%$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Median | 11.0 | 9.5 | 63.5 | 72.0 | 7.0 | 100,000 | $3 \%$ | 100,000 | 234,139 |  |  |

telecommunication services
Integrated Telecommunication Services

| AT\&T | 128,752.0 | 13 | 12 | 63 | 72 | 9 | 95,000 ${ }^{\text {c.d }}$ | 2,000 | 113,000 | 319,659 | 48\% | 47\% | ०\% | 5\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CenturyLink | 18,095.0 | 13 | 11 | 62 | 75 | 10 | 65,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 2,000 | 85,000 | 247,195 | 49\% | 51\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Frontier Communications Corporation | 4,761.6 | 11 | 9 | 61 | - | 16 | $180,000^{\text {d,e,k }}$ | - | 180,000 | 161,665 | 39\% | 61\% | ०\% | ०\% |
| Verizon Communications | 120,550.0 | 11 | 10 | 59 | 72 | 19 | 100,000 ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | $-^{\text {ab }}$ | 124,000 | 296,349 | 45\% | 54\% | ०\% | 1\% |
| Windstream Corporation | 5,988.1 | 9 | 8 | 63 | 75 | 13 | $85,00{ }^{\text {c,d }}$ | - | 85,000 | 238,926 | 58\% | 42\% | ०\% | ०\% |

## Wireless Telecommunication Services

| American Tower Corporation | 3,361.4 | 9 | 8 | 62 | - | 10 | 75,000 ${ }^{\text {c.f }}$ | - | 75,000 | 211,908 | 40\% | 30\% | 30\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Crown Castle International Corp. | 3,022.4 | 11 | 9 | 63 | - | 8 | 75,000 | - | 75,000 | 221,483 | 37\% | 60\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| TOTAL TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average |  | 11.0 | 9.6 | 61.9 | 73.5 | 12.1 | 96,429 |  | 105,286 | 243,156 | 45\% | 50\% | 3\% | 2\% |
| Median |  | 11.0 | 9.0 | 62.0 | 73.5 | 10.0 | 85,000 |  | 85,000 | 238,926 |  |  |  |  |

## Comparative Board Data



TOTAL UTILITIES

| Average | 11.8 | 10.6 | 63.9 | 72.9 | 8.2 | 111,967 | 118,858 | 224,626 | 47\% | 50\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Median | 11.5 | 10.0 | 64.0 | 72.0 | 7.5 | 92,500 | 92,500 | 217,937 |  |  |  |  |

TOTAL S\&P 500

| Average | 10.8 | 9.1 | 63.1 | 73.0 | 8.1 | 107,383 | 111,593 | 263,748 | $40 \%$ | $53 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Median | 11.0 | 9.0 | 63.0 | 72.0 | 7.0 | 85,000 | 90,000 | 255,011 |  |  |  |  |

a Includes regular and special meetings; includes telephonic meetings and unanimous written consent when compensation is provided.
b Retainer plus meeting fees assuming full attendance (excludes committee and special fees).
c Equity (stock or stock units) is paid in addition to stated retainer.
d Directors can elect to receive cash compensation fully or partially in stock.
e Equity (stock or stock units) is paid as part of retainer.
f Stock option program exists.
g Equity portion of retainer paid in deferred stock.
h Retainer paid 100\% in stock.
i Directors can elect to receive cash and/or stock compensation in stock options.
j Not to exceed \$60,ooo per year.
k Directors can elect to receive equity retainer fully or partially in cash.
I Dollar value equivalent for retainer not provided in proxy.
m Subject to a maximum of 10 board meetings per fiscal year.
$n \quad$ Per-meeting fee of $\$ 2,000$ for meetings in excess of four per year. Annual board fees include two excess meetings at $\$ 2,000$ each.

- Per-meeting fee of $\$ 2,500$ for meetings in excess of four per year. Annual board fees include four excess meetings at $\$ 2,500$ each.
p Per-meeting fee of $\$ 2,000$ for in-person meetings and $\$ 1,000$ per telephonic meeting beginning with the sixth meeting in the year. Annual board fees include seven in-person meetings at $\$ 2,000$ each.
q Directors can elect to receive stock in lieu of stock option grant.
$r$ Per-meeting fee of $\$ 1,500$ for meetings in excess of four per year. Annual board fees include two excess meetings at $\$ 1,500$ each.
s Per-meeting fee of $\$ 1,500$ for board meetings in excess of eight per year. Annual board fees include three excess meetings at $\$ 1,500$ each.
t Per-meeting fee of $\$ 1,500$ for special meetings. Annual board fees include one special meeting at $\$ 1,500$.
u Per-meeting fee of $\$ 750$ for quarterly scheduled telephonic meetings. Annual board fees include four telephonic meetings at $\$ 750$ each.
v Per-meeting fee of $\$ 3,000$ for meetings in excess of seven per year. Annual board fees include eight excess board meetings at $\$ 3,000$ each.
w Per-meeting fee of \$1,000 for telephonic meetings. Annual board fees include one telephonic meeting at \$1,000.
$x \quad$ Per-meeting fee of $\$ 2,500$ for meetings in excess of six per year. Annual board fees include one excess meeting at $\$ 2,500$.
y Per-meeting fee of $\$ 2,000$ for special meetings. Annual board fees include three special meetings at $\$ 2,000$ each.
z Board retainer includes \$15,000 annual incentive cash achieved for 2013.
aa Per-meeting fee of $\$ 2,000$ for meetings in excess of nine per year. Annual board fees include two excess board meetings at $\$ 2,000$ each.
$a b \quad$ Per-meeting fee of $\$ 2,000$ for meetings held on any other date except the day before or the day of a regularly scheduled board meeting. Annual board fees include 12 meetings at \$2,000 each.
ac Per-meeting fee of $\$ 750$ for meetings in excess of five per year. Annual board fees include two excess board meetings at $\$ 750$ each.

| Amsterdam | London | San Francisco |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| T 31 (0) 20.305.73.05 | T 44207298.3333 | T 1.415.495.4141 |
| Atlanta | Los Angeles | Santiago |
| T 1.404.504.4400 | T 1.310.209.0610 | T 56.2.2.940.2700 |
| Barcelona | Madrid | Sao Paulo |
| T 34.93.487.23.36 | T 34.91.745.85.00 | T 5511.2050 .8000 |
| Beijing | Melbourne | Seattle |
| T 86.10.6535.2100 | T 61.3.8661.0100 | T 1.206.224.5660 |
| Bogota | Mexico City | Shanghai |
| T 57 1.618.2488 | T 52.55.5002.4950 | T 86 21.2326.2828 |
| Boston | Miami | Silicon Valley |
| T 1.617.531.5731 | T 1.305.443.9911 | T 1.650.356.5500 |
| Brussels | Milan | Singapore |
| T 32 2.732.26.25 | T 39.02.771251 | T 65.6586.1186 |
| Buenos Aires | Minneapolis/St. Paul | Stamford |
| T 54.11.4310.9100 | T 1.612.313.2000 | T 1.203.324.6333 |
| Calgary | Montreal | Stockholm |
| T 1.403.538.8658 | T 1.514.288.3377 | T 46.8.5348015 0 |
| Chicago | Moscow | Sydney |
| T 1.312.822.0080 | T 7 495.797.36.37 | T 61.2.9240.0100 |
| Copenhagen | Mumbai | Tokyo |
| T 453334.6700 | T 91.22.6616.1414 | T 813.5223 .9510 |
| Dallas | Munich | Toronto |
| T 1.214.672.5200 | T 49 (o) 89.45.55.53.0 | T 1.416.361.0311 |
| Dubai | New Delhi | Vienna |
| T 971.4.426.6500 | T 9.12.4485.4444 | T 43.1.36.88.700.0 |
| Frankfurt | New York | Warsaw |
| T 49 (0) 69.61.09.27.0 | T 1.212.336.0200 | T 48.22.321.02.00 |
| Geneva | Orange County | Washington, D.C. |
| T 41.22.312.36.38 | T 1.949.930.8000 | T 1.202.639.811 |
| Hong Kong | Paris | Zurich |
| T 852.2521.8373 | T 33 (0) 1.53.57.81.23 | T 41.44.257.17.17 |
| Houston | Philadelphia |  |
| T 1.713.225.1621 | T 1.215.814.1600 |  |
| Istanbul | Prague |  |
| T 90212.315 .0400 | T 420.221.411.341 |  |
| Johannesburg | Rome |  |
| T 27.11.557.5300 | T 39.06.802071 |  |

Geneva
Hong Kong
Houston
Istanbul
Johannesburg
London
Los Angeles
Madrid
Melbourne
Mexico City
Miami
Milan
Minneapolis/St. Paul
Montreal
Moscow
Mumbai
Munich
New Delhi
New York
Orange County
Paris
Philadelphia
Prague
Rome
San Francisco
Santiago
Sao Paulo
Seattle
Shanghai
Silicon Valley
Singapore
Stamford
Stockholm
Sydney
Tokyo
Toronto
Vienna
Warsaw
Washington, D.C.
Zurich



[^0]:    $N=483$ companies; 12 others did not mention evaluations in their proxies.

