## SpencerStuart

# 2016 <br> Spencer Stuart Board Index 

A Perspective on U.S. Boards

## ABOUT SPENCER STUART BOARD SERVICES

At Spencer Stuart, we know how much leadership matters. We are trusted by organizations around the world to help them make the senior-level leadership decisions that have a lasting impact on their enterprises. Through our executive search, board and leadership advisory services, we help build and enhance high-performing teams for select clients ranging from major multinationals to emerging companies to nonprofit institutions.

Privately held since 1956, we focus on delivering knowledge, insight and results through the collaborative efforts of a team of experts - now spanning 56 offices, 30 countries and more than 50 practice specialties. Boards and leaders consistently turn to Spencer Stuart to help address their evolving leadership needs in areas such as senior-level executive search, board recruitment, board effectiveness, succession planning, in-depth senior management assessment and many other facets of organizational effectiveness.

For more than 30 years, our Board Practice has helped boards around the world identify and recruit independent directors and provided advice to chairmen, CEOs and nominating committees on important governance issues. We serve a range of organizations across geographies and scale, from leading multinationals to smaller organizations. In the past year alone, we conducted more than 600 director searches worldwide, and in North America one-third of those assignments were for companies with revenues under \$1 billion.

Our global team of board experts works together to ensure that our clients have unrivaled access to the best existing and potential director talent, and regularly assists boards in increasing the diversity of their composition. We have helped place women in more than 1,600 board director roles and recruited roughly 600 minority directors around the world.

In addition to our work with clients, Spencer Stuart has long played an active role in corporate governance by exploring - both on our own and with other prestigious institutions - key concerns of boards and innovative solutions to the challenges facing them. Publishing the Spencer Stuart Board Index (SSBI), now in its $31^{\text {st }}$ edition, is just one of our many ongoing efforts.

Each year, we sponsor and participate in several acclaimed director education programs including:
» The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Annual Boardroom Summit \& Peer Exchange hosted by NYSE Governance Services
» The Global Board Leaders' Summit hosted by the National Association of Corporate Directors
» The Global Institutes sponsored by the WomenCorporateDirectors (WCD) Foundation
» The Corporate Governance Conference at Northwestern University's Kellogg School of Management
» The New Directors Program, a unique two-year development program designed to provide first-time, non-executive directors with an exclusive forum for peer dialogue on key issues and "unwritten rules" of corporate boards, produced in partnership with the Boston Consulting Group, Frederick W. Cook \& Co., Gibson Dunn, Lazard and PricewaterhouseCoopers

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## Spencer Stuart Perspective for 2016

Investor attention to board performance and governance continues to escalate, and, increasingly, it's large institutional investors - so-called "passive" investors - who are making known their expectations in areas such as board composition, disclosure and shareholder engagement. Long-term investors have shifted their posture to taking positions on good governance, and are increasingly demonstrating common ground with activists on governance topics.

Board composition is a particular area of focus, as traditional institutional investors have become more explicit in demanding that boards demonstrate that they are being thoughtful about who is sitting around the board table and that directors are contributing. They are looking more closely at disclosures related to board refreshment, board performance and assessment practices, in some cases establishing voting policies on governance.

Boards are taking notice. Directors want to ensure that their boards contribute at the highest level, aligning with shareholder interests and expectations. In response, boards are enhancing their disclosures on board composition and leadership, reviewing governance practices and establishing protocols for engaging with investors. Here are some of the trends we are seeing in the key areas of investor concern.

## BOARD COMPOSITION

The composition of the board - who the directors are, the skills and expertise they bring, and how they interact - is critical for long-term value creation, and an area of governance where investors increasingly expect greater transparency. Shareholders are looking for a wellexplained rationale for why the group of people sitting around the board table are the right ones based on the strategic priorities of the business. They want to know that the board has the processes in place to review and evolve board composition in light of emerging needs, and that the board regularly evaluates the contributions and tenure of current board members and the relevance of their experience.

## 345

New independent directors

## 27\%

Boards with an independent chair

Acknowledging investor interest in their composition, more boards are reviewing how to best communicate their thinking about the types of expertise needed in the board - and how individual directors provide that expertise. More than one-third of the 96 corporate secretaries responding to our annual governance survey, conducted each year as part of the research for the Spencer Stuart Board Index, said their board has changed the way it reports director bios/qualifications; among those that have not yet made changes, $15 \%$ expect the board to change how they present director qualifications in the future.

What's happening to board composition in practice after all of the talk about increasing board turnover? In 2016, we actually saw a small decline in the number of new independent directors elected to S\&P 500 boards. S\&P 500 boards included in our index elected 345 new independent directors during the 2016 proxy year - averaging 0.72 new directors per board. Last year, S\&P 500 boards added a total of 376 new directors ( 0.78 new directors per board).

Nearly one-third (32\%) of the new independent directors on S\&P 500 boards are serving on their first outside corporate board. Women account for $32 \%$ of new directors, the highest rate of female representation since we began tracking this data for the S\&P 500. This year's class of new directors, however, includes fewer minority directors (defined as African-American, Hispanic/Latino and Asian); $15 \%$ of the 345 new independent directors are minorities, a decrease from $18 \%$ in 2015.

With the rise of shareholder activism, we've also seen an increase in investors and investment managers on boards. This year, $12 \%$ of new independent directors are investors, compared with $4 \%$ in 2011 and 6\% in 2006.

## INDEPENDENT BOARD LEADERSHIP

Boards continue to feel pressure from some shareholders to separate the chair and CEO roles and name an independent chairman. And, indeed, $27 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards, versus $21 \%$ in 2011, have an independent chair. An independent chair is defined as an independent director or a former executive who has met applicable NYSE or NASDAQ rules for independence over time. This actually represents a small decline from $29 \%$ last year. Meanwhile, naming a lead director remains the most common form of independent board leadership: $87 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards report having a lead or presiding director, nearly all of whom ( $98 \%$ ) are identified by name in the proxy.

In our governance survey, $12 \%$ of respondents said their board has recently separated the roles of chairman and CEO, while $33 \%$ said their board has discussed whether to split the roles within the next five years. Among boards that expect to or have recently separated the chair and CEO roles, $72 \%$ cite a CEO transition as the reason, while $20 \%$ believe the chair/CEO split represents the best governance.

In response to investor interest in board leadership structure - and sometimes demands for an independent chairman - more boards are discussing their leadership structure in their proxies, for example, explaining the rationale for maintaining a combined chair/CEO role and delineating the responsibilities of the lead director. Among the lead director responsibilities boards highlight: approving the agenda for board meetings, calling meetings and executive sessions of independent directors, presiding over executive sessions, providing board feedback to the CEO following executive sessions, leading the performance evaluation of the CEO and the board assessment, and meeting with major shareholders or other external parties, when necessary. Some proxies include a letter to shareholders from the lead independent director.

## TENURE AND TERM LIMITS

Director tenure continues to be a hot topic for some shareholders. While some rating agencies and investors have questioned the independence of directors with "excessive" tenure, there are no specific regulations or listing standards in the U.S. that speak to director independence based on tenure. And, in fact, most companies do not have governance rules limiting tenure; only 19 S\&P 500 boards (4\%) set an explicit term limit for non-executive directors, a modest increase from 2015 when 13 boards (3\%) had director term limits.

Just 3\% of survey respondents said their boards are considering establishing director term limits, but many boards are disclosing more in their proxies about director tenure. Specifically, boards are describing their efforts to ensure a balance between short-tenured and long-tenured directors. And several companies have included a short summary of the board's average tenure accompanied by a pie chart breaking down the tenure of directors on the board (e.g., directors with less than five years tenure, between five and 10 years, and more than 10 years tenure on the board).


Boards setting an explicit term limit for non-executive directors


Average board tenure

## 19\%

Boards with an average tenure of וו or more years

## 39\%

Boards with a mandatory retirement age of 75 or higher

Among S\&P 500 boards overall, the average board tenure is 8.3 years, a slight decrease from 8.7 five years ago. The median tenure has declined as well in that time, from 8.4 to 8.0. The majority of boards, $63 \%$, have an average tenure between six and 10 years, but $19 \%$ of boards have an average tenure of 11 or more years.

We also looked this year at the tenure of individual directors: $35 \%$ of independent directors have served on their boards for five years or less, $28 \%$ have served for six to 10 years, and $22 \%$ for 11 to 15 years. Fifteen percent of independent directors have served on their boards for 16 years or more.

## MANDATORY RETIREMENT

In the absence of term or tenure limits, most S\&P 500 boards rely on mandatory retirement ages to promote turnover. About three-quarters ( $73 \%$ ) of S\&P 500 boards report having a mandatory retirement age for directors. Eleven percent report that they do not have a mandatory retirement age, and $16 \%$ do not discuss mandatory retirement in their proxies.

Retirement ages have crept up in recent years, as boards have raised them to allow experienced directors to serve longer. Thirty-nine percent of boards have mandatory retirement ages of 75 or older, compared with $20 \%$ in 2011 and just $9 \%$ in 2006. Four boards have a retirement age of 80 . The most common mandatory retirement age is 72 , set by $45 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards.

As retirement ages have increased, so has the average age of independent directors. The average age of S\&P 500 independent directors is 63 today, two years older than a decade ago. In that same period, the median age rose from 61 to 64 . Meanwhile, the number of older boards has increased; $37 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards have an average age of 64 or older, compared with $19 \%$ a decade ago, and 15 of today's boards (3\%) have an average age of 70 or greater, versus four (1\%) a decade ago.

## BOARD EVALUATIONS

Another topic on which large institutional investors have become more vocal is board performance evaluations. Shareholders are seeking greater transparency about how boards address their own performance and the suitability of individual directors - and whether they are using assessments as a catalyst for refreshing the board as new needs arise.

We have seen a growing trend in support of individual director assessments as part of the board effectiveness assessment - not to grade directors, but to provide constructive feedback that can improve performance. Yet the pace of adoption of individual director assessments has been measured. Today, roughly one-third (32\%) of S\&P 500 boards evaluate the full board, committees and individual directors annually, an increase from $29 \%$ in 2011.

In our survey of corporate secretaries, respondents said evaluations are most often conducted by a director, typically the chairman, lead director or a committee chair. A wide range of internal and external parties are also tapped to conduct board assessments, including inhouse and external legal counsel, the corporate secretary and board consulting firms. Thirty-five percent use director self-assessments, and $15 \%$ include peer reviews. According to proxies, a small number of boards, but more than in the past, disclose that they used an outside consultant to facilitate all or a portion of the evaluation process.

## SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT

In light of investors' growing desire for direct engagement with directors, more boards have established frameworks for shareholders to raise questions and engage in meaningful, two-way discussions with the board. In addition to improving disclosures about board composition, assessment and other key governance areas, some boards include in their proxies a summary of their shareholder outreach efforts. For example, they detail the number of investors the board met with, the issues discussed and how the company and board responded. A few boards facilitate direct access to the board by providing contact information for individual directors, including the lead director and audit committee chair.

Going further, many boards now proactively reach out to their company's largest shareholders. In our survey, $83 \%$ of respondents said management or the board contacted the company's large institutional investors or largest shareholders, an increase from $70 \%$ the year prior. The most common topic about which companies engaged with shareholders was proxy access (52\%), an increase from $33 \%$ in 2015. Other topics included "say on pay" (51\%), CEO compensation (40\%), director tenure (30\%), board refreshment ( $27 \%$ ), shareholder engagement approach (27\%) and chairman independence (24\%). Survey respondents also wrote in more than a dozen additional topics, including majority/cumulative voting, disclosure enhancements, environmental issues and gender pay equity.


Average age of independent directors


Boards that evaluate the full board, committees and individual directors annually

## ENHANCING BOARD PERFORMANCE

The topic of board refreshment can be a highly charged one for boards. But having the right skills around the table is critical for the board's ability to provide the appropriate guidance and oversight of management. Furthermore, the capabilities and perspectives that a board needs evolve over time as the business context changes. Boards can ensure that they have the right perspectives around the table and are well-equipped to address the issues that drive shareholder value - which, after all, is what investors are looking for - by doing the following:
» Viewing director recruitment in terms of ongoing board succession planning, not one-off replacements.
Boards should periodically review the skills and expertise on the board to identify gaps in skills or expertise based on changes in strategy or the business context.
» Proactively communicating the skill sets and expertise in the boardroom - and the roadmap for future succession.
Publishing the board's skill matrix and sharing the board's thinking about the types of expertise that are needed on the board - and how individual directors provide that expertise - signals to investors that the board is thoughtful about board succession.
» Setting expectations for appropriate tenure both at the aggregate and individual levels.
By setting term expectations when new directors join, boards can combat the perceived stigma attached to leaving a board before the mandatory retirement age. Ideally, boards will create an environment where directors are willing to acknowledge when the board would benefit from bringing on different expertise.
» Thinking like an activist and identifying vulnerabilities in board renewal and performance.
Proactive boards conduct board evaluations annually to identify weaknesses in expertise or performance. They periodically engage third parties to manage the process and are disciplined about identifying and holding themselves accountable for action items stemming from the assessment.
» Establishing a framework for engaging with investors. This starts with proactive and useful disclosure, which demonstrates that the board has thought about its composition, performance and other specific issues. In addition, it is valuable to have a protocol in place enumerating responsibilities related to shareholder engagement.

## OTHER HIGHLIGHTS FROM THIS YEAR'S INDEX

» Only $19 \%$ of new independent directors are active CEOs, chairs, presidents and chief operating officers, compared with $24 \%$ in $2011,29 \%$ in 2006 and $49 \%$ in 1998, the first year we looked at this data for S\&P 500 companies.
» Active executives with financial backgrounds (CFOs, other financial executives, as well as investors and bankers) represent $15 \%$ of new independent directors this year, an increase from $12 \%$ last year. Another $10 \%$ of new directors are retired finance and public accounting executives.
» On average, S\&P 500 directors have 2.1 outside corporate board affiliations, although most directors aren't restricted from serving on more.
» The number of boards with no female directors dropped to the lowest level we have seen; six S\&P 500 boards (1\%) have no women, a noteworthy decline from 2006, when 52 boards ( $11 \%$ ) included no female members. Women now constitute $21 \%$ of all S\&P 500 directors.
» Among the boards of the 200 largest S\&P companies, the total number of minority directors has held steady at $15 \%$ since $2011.88 \%$ of the top 200 companies have at least one minority director, the same as 10 years ago.
» Only $43 \%$ of S\&P 500 CEOs serve on one or more outside corporate boards in addition to their own board, the same as in 2015. In 2006, $55 \%$ of CEOs served on at least one outside board.
» Boards met an average of 8.4 times for regularly scheduled and special meetings, up from 8.1 last year and 8.2 five years ago. The median number of meetings rose from 7.0 last year to 8.0.
» The average annual total compensation for S\&P 500 directors, excluding the chairman's compensation, is $\$ 280,389$.
» Over time, the compensation mix for directors has evolved, with more stock grants and fewer stock options. Today, stock grants represent 54\% of total director compensation, versus 48\% five years ago, while stock options represent $6 \%$ of compensation today, down from $10 \%$ five years ago. Cash accounts for $38 \%$ of director compensation, versus $39 \%$ in 201.

》 $95 \%$ of the independent chairmen of S\&P 500 boards receive an additional fee, averaging $\$ 165,112$. Nearly two-thirds of lead and presiding directors, $65 \%$, receive additional compensation. The average premium paid to lead and presiding directors is \$33,354.

## Editor's Note

## S\&P 500 Boards: Trends over One, Five and 10 Years

|  | 2016 ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | $2015{ }^{(b)}$ | $2011^{(c)}$ | 2006 ${ }^{\text {d }}$ | 5-year \% change | 10-year \% change | Comments |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Board composition |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average board size | 10.8 | 10.8 | 10.7 | 10.7 | 1\% | 1\% | Board size remains constant over the past decade |
| Independent directors | 85\% | 84\% | 84\% | 81\% | 1\% | 5\% | The representation of independent directors has increased by $5 \%$ in the last decade |
| Average age of independent directors | 63.0 | 63.1 | 62.4 | 61.0 | 1\% | 3\% | Independent directors are two years older on average than 10 years ago |
| New independent directors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total number | 345 | 376 | 294 | 391 | 17\% | -12\% | $17 \%$ more new independent directors than five years ago |
| Women | 32\% | 31\% | 21\% | 23\% | 52\% | 39\% | Nearly one-third of new directors are women |
| Active CEO/chair/president/ COO/vice chair | 19\% | 20\% | 24\% | 29\% | -21\% | -34\% | Sitting CEOs and other top executives are steadily decreasing as a source of new directors |
| Retired CEO/chair/president/ COO/vice chair | 19\% | 18\% | 19\% | 11\% | 0\% | 73\% | Boards continue to tap retired senior executives |
| Financial backgrounds | 25\% | 24\% | 18\% | 24\% | 39\% | 4\% | Demand for directors with financial expertise grows |
| Other corporate executives | 23\% | 25\% | 21\% | 15\% | 10\% | 53\% | Other C-level executives have become an important source of new directors |
| Women directors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Women as a \% of all directors | 21\% | 20\% | 16\% | 15\% | 33\% | 42\% | Female representation continues to grow |
| Boards with at least one woman director | 99\% | 97\% | 91\% | 89\% | 8\% | 10\% | Still 6 boards have no female directors |
| CEO profile |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \% of CEOs serving on an outside board | 43\% | 43\% | 46\% | 55\% | -7\% | -22\% | CEOs continue to reduce their outside board commitments |
| Women CEOs | 24 | 22 | 15 | 12 | 60\% | 100\% | The number of female CEOs has doubled, but women still lead just 6\% of S\&P 500 companies |
| Boards where CEO is the only non-independent | 60\% | 61\% | 57\% | 39\% | 5\% | 54\% | $50 \%$ decline in boards with more than one executive member in the past decade |
| Average age | 57.2 | 57.0 | 56.5 | 55.2 | 1\% | 4\% | The average age of CEOs has increased gradually over the past 10 years |
| Average tenure with company | 19.4 | 18.8 | 16.4 | 14.4 | 18\% | 35\% | Average CEO company tenure is 3 years longer than 5 years ago |
| Board leadership |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CEO is also chairman | 52\% | 52\% | 59\% | 67\% | -12\% | -22\% | Nearly half of boards separate the chair and CEO roles |
| Independent chairman | 27\% | 29\% | 21\% | 10\% | 29\% | 170\% | The percentage of boards with an independent chair has almost tripled in a decade, despite small decline from last year |
| Boards with lead or presiding director | 87\% | 89\% | 92\% | 96\% | -7\% | -10\% | Fewest lead directors in past decade, but more independent chairs |
| Board meetings |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average number of board meetings | 8.4 | 8.1 | 8.2 | 8.4 | 2\% | 0\% | Board meeting frequency returns to 2006 level |
| Median number of board meetings | 8 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 0\% | 0\% | Median consistent with 5- and 10-year levels |


|  | 2016 ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | $2015{ }^{(b)}$ | $2011^{\text {(c) }}$ | $2006{ }^{\text {d }}$ ( | 5-year \% change | 10-year \% change | Comments |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Retirement age |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Boards with mandatory retirement age | 73\% | 73\% | 73\% | 78\% | 0\% | -6\% | Boards with a mandatory retirement age remain unchanged from 2011 |
| Boards with mandatory retirement age of 75+ | 39\% | 34\% | 20\% | 9\% | 95\% | 333\% | Director retirement ages continue to rise |
| Boards with mandatory retirement age of 72+ | 95\% | 94\% | 83\% | 61\% | 14\% | 56\% | Nearly all S\&P 500 boards with a retirement age set it at 72 or higher |
| Committee meetings |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average number of audit committee meetings | 8.6 | 8.8 | 8.7 | 9.5 | -1\% | -9\% | Audit committees do not meet as often as they did a decade ago |
| Average number of compensation committee meetings | 6.1 | 6.1 | 6.6 | 6.0 | -8\% | 2\% | Compensation committee meeting frequency returning to average from 10 years ago |
| Audit committee chairmen |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Active CEO/chair/president/ vice chair | 6\% | 7\% | 11\% | 19\% | -45\% | -68\% | Fewer active executives serve as audit committee chair as time commitment increases |
| Financial exec/CFO/treas/ public acct exec | 39\% | 40\% | 32\% | 23\% | 22\% | 70\% | Boards more likely to tap financial executives to chair audit committee |
| Non-employee director compensation |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total average compensation ${ }^{(\mathrm{e})}$ | \$285,065 | \$277,237 | \$232, 142 | $\mathrm{n} / \mathrm{a}$ | 23\% | n/a | $23 \%$ increase in total director compensation in five years |
| Average annual retainer ${ }^{(f)}$ | \$118,521 | \$112,144 | \$88,858 | \$63,594 | 33\% | 86\% | Average retainer grew by more than $85 \%$ in 10 years |
| Median annual retainer ${ }^{(f)}$ | \$100,000 | \$90,000 | \$75,000 | \$50,000 | 33\% | 100\% | Median retainer has doubled in the past decade |
| Boards paying retainer of at least \$100,000 | 50\% | 77\% | 29\% | 15\% | 72\% | 233\% | $72 \%$ increase in boards paying a retainer of $\$ 100,000$ or more in 5 years |
| Boards paying board meeting fee | 16\% | 21\% | 37\% | 57\% | -57\% | -72\% | The number of boards paying meeting fees has fallen below 20\% |
| Average board meeting fee | \$2,155 | \$2,041 | \$2,284 | \$1,955 | -6\% | 10\% | Average meeting fee is also on the decline |
| Boards offering stock option program | 14\% | 16\% | 28\% | 51\% | -50\% | -73\% | Most boards have dropped stock options as a component of director compensation |
| Boards paying equity in addition to retainer | 76\% | 77\% | 77\% | 64\% | -1\% | 19\% | Three-quarters of boards provide equity in addition to a cash |
| Committee compensation |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Boards paying committee chair retainer | 95\% | 95\% | 91\% | 84\% | 4\% | 13\% | Nearly all boards provide a retainer to committee chairs |
| Average committee chair retainer | \$15,370 | \$14,399 | \$12,476 | \$9,106 | 23\% | 69\% | Committee chair retainers continue to rise |
| Boards paying committee member retainer | 41\% | 41\% | 37\% | 29\% | 11\% | 41\% | Retainers for committee service more common in lieu of meeting fees |
| Average committee member retainer | \$8,947 | \$8,926 | \$7,917 | \$6,431 | 13\% | 39\% | Committee member retainers also on the rise |
| Boards paying committee meeting fees | 21\% | 26\% | 35\% | 59\% | -40\% | -64\% | About 20\% of boards compensate for committee meeting attendance |
| Average committee meeting fees | \$1,677 | \$1,678 | \$1,635 | \$1,499 | 3\% | 12\% | The average meeting fee has increased modestly |

${ }^{(a)}$ Data based on proxy year May 15, 2015, through May 15, 2016.
${ }^{(b)}$ Data based on proxy year May 20, 2014, through May 15, 2015.
${ }^{(c)}$ Data based on proxy year May 15, 2010, through May 15, 2011.
${ }^{(d)}$ Data based on proxy year May 15, 2005, through May 15, 2006.
${ }^{(e)}$ Based on non-employee director compensation tables included in 477 and 493 proxies for 2016 and 2011, respectively.
${ }^{(f)}$ Not including stock beyond retainer

## Board Composition



## SLIGHT DECLINE IN NEW DIRECTOR RECRUITING

» S\&P 500 boards included in our index elected 345 new independent directors during the 2016 proxy year — averaging 0.72 new directors per board. Last year, S\&P 500 boards added a total of 376 new directors ( 0.78 new directors per board).
» Among the 482 boards in our study, $48 \%$ added at least one new director. The 345 new directors joined 233 boards, with 87 boards welcoming more than one director.
» The number of new independent directors decreased $8 \%$ from last year. This is still the third most since 2008, when S\&P 500 boards added 380 new directors.

## FEWER ACTIVELY EMPLOYED EXECUTIVES JOINING OUTSIDE BOARDS THAN IN THE PAST

» More than half (53\%) of new independent directors are active senior executives and professionals. Over the past decade, we have seen a decline in the number of actively employed executives taking on outside board appointments; active executives made up $59 \%$ of new directors in 2011 and $66 \%$ a decade ago.
» Only $19 \%$ of new independent directors are active CEOs, chairs, presidents and chief operating officers, compared with $24 \%$ in $2011,29 \%$ in 2006 and $49 \%$ in 1998, the first year we looked at this data for S\&P 500 companies.
» With fewer active CEOs taking new outside board roles, we have seen a rise in the representation of active corporate executives a level or two below the CEO among new independent directors. Corporate executives such as division and subsidiary presidents and line and functional leaders now make up $23 \%$ of new independent directors, compared with $21 \%$ in 2011.
» Active executives with financial backgrounds (CFOs and other financial executives, as well as investors and bankers) represent $15 \%$ of new independent directors this year, an increase from $12 \%$ last year. Another $10 \%$ of new directors are retired finance and public accounting executives.
" Among the 36 new independent directors classified as line and functional leaders, $16 \%$ are technology executives.

## ONE-THIRD OF NEW DIRECTORS ARE SERVING ON THEIR FIRST OUTSIDE CORPORATE BOARD

» Nearly one-third of new independent directors (32\%) are serving on their first outside board. This represents an increase from $26 \%$ last year, but a decrease from 2014 when $39 \%$ of new directors were first-time board members, the largest influx of first-time directors we have seen since we began tracking this data in 2006.
» First-time directors are more likely to be actively employed than new directors with previous board experience: $68 \%$ of first-timers are active executives compared with $27 \%$ of experienced directors.
» Current or retired CEOs are more likely to have outside public company board experience, defined as membership on a board other than their employer's board. Only $24 \%$ of new directors who are current or former CEOs are serving on an outside board for the first time.

## NEARLY ONE-THIRD OF NEW DIRECTORS ARE WOMEN

» Female representation among new directors rose to $32 \%$ in 2016 , from $31 \%$ in 2015 and $21 \%$ in 2011 . This is the highest rate of female representation since 1998 when we began tracking this data for the S\&P 500 .
» New female independent directors are more likely than their male counterparts to be line and functional leaders; $20 \%$ of women are in line or functional roles, compared with $6 \%$ of male directors. Another $18 \%$ of female directors are division or subsidiary presidents, versus $10 \%$ of male directors. By contrast, male directors are significantly more likely than female directors to be active or retired CEOs and other top leaders: $47 \%$ versus $18 \%$.
» $28 \%$ of new directors have global professional experience - defined in this report as having worked at an international location - compared with $35 \%$ in 2015. New directors have working experience in diverse global locations, including Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America.

## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: Board renewal

$69 \%$ of survey respondents said their board has a strategy to encourage regular board succession, unchanged from last year. This represents a significant increase over $41 \%$ in 2014, however, reflecting the increasing attention to composition and board succession planning.

Respondents cited three main drivers of their refreshment strategies: director retirements (91\%), the desire to add new skills ( $79 \%$ ) and the goal to increase the diversity of the board ( $62 \%$ ).

When asked how many new directors their board intends to recruit in the current year, $37 \%$ of respondents said their board intends to recruit one new director, $13 \%$ intend to recruit two new directors, and $2 \%$ intend to recruit three or more directors. $36 \%$ expect their boards will recruit one or more directors in 2017. Director retirements are the main driver of board recruitment, cited by $79 \%$ of respondents. Adding new skills ( $70 \%$ ) and increasing the diversity of the board ( $47 \%$ ) were the two other primary reasons for adding directors.

In light of the growing interest in board composition by shareholders, this year's survey asked whether boards have made changes to the way directors' qualifications are presented in the proxy. $34 \%$ of respondents said their boards had changed the way they reported director bios/qualifications; among those that have not made changes, $15 \%$ expect the board to make changes to the presentation of director backgrounds in the future.

## Director recruiting profiles

Boards are prioritizing women when recruiting new directors, the survey found: $64 \%$ of respondents said their boards are looking to bring a woman on board, a $10 \%$ increase from last year.

Other recruiting priorities are active and retired CEOs/COOs, at $63 \%$ and $58 \%$ of respondents, respectively. More than half of respondents indicated that minority directors and those with financial expertise and global perspective were recruiting priorities. $37 \%$ of respondents said their boards are prioritizing specific industry expertise, compared with $27 \%$ last year.

Interest in recruiting directors with technology, digital and marketing expertise is on the rise, the survey found. In the 2016 survey, $44 \%$ said technology expertise was on their board's wish list, versus $41 \%$ last year. We also saw an increase in demand for digital and social media expertise ( $21 \%$ versus $16 \%$ ) and marketing expertise ( $19 \%$ versus $14 \%$ ). Demand for cybersecurity experts fell slightly to $19 \%$ from $20 \%$ last year.

Wish list for new director backgrounds*

| Women | $64 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Active CEO/COO | $63 \%$ |
| Retired CEO/COO | $58 \%$ |
| Minority | $55 \%$ |
| Financial expertise | $55 \%$ |
| Global perspective | $55 \%$ |
| Technology expertise | $44 \%$ |
| Specific industry expertise | $37 \%$ |
| Digital/social media expertise | $21 \%$ |
| Regulatory/government experience | $19 \%$ |
| Marketing expertise | $19 \%$ |
| Cybersecurity expertise | $19 \%$ |
| Other | $7.7 \%$ |

$N=96$ survey respondents
*Percentages add up to more than 100 as respondents could select more than one category.

[^0]
## NEW DIRECTORS REPRESENT DIVERSE INDUSTRY AND

## FUNCTIONAI BACKGROUNDS

> Demand for financial backgrounds has been rising modestly in recent years; as noted below, 25\% of new directors are active or retired executives with banking, finance, investment or accounting credentials, compared with $24 \%$ last year, $20 \%$ in 2014 and $18 \%$ in 2013 . Specifically, we are seeing an increase in directors coming from investing and investment management, together accounting for $12 \%$ of new directors, up from 9\% last year.
» The top three industry backgrounds for new independent directors are tech/telecommunications, consumer goods and services, and private equity/investments, representing $15 \%, 13 \%$ and $12 \%$ of new director backgrounds, respectively.

## New Independent Director Backgrounds*

|  | Year |  |  | 2016 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2006 | 2011 | 2016 | Men | Women |
| CEO/chair/president/ COO/vice chair | 40\% | 43\% | 38\% | 47\% | 18\% |
| Active | 29\% | 24\% | 19\% | 24\% | 9\% |
| Retired | 11\% | 19\% | 19\% | 23\% | 9\% |
| Other corporate executives | 15\% | 21\% | 23\% | 16\% | 38\% |
| Division/subsidiary presidents | 5\% | 13\% | 13\% | 10\% | 18\% |
| Line and functional leaders | 10\% | 8\% | 10\% | 6\% | 20\% |
| Financial backgrounds | 24\% | 18\% | 25\% | 28\% | 19\% |
| Financial executives/CFO/treasurers | 11\% | 9\% | 9\% | 9\% | 7\% |
| Bankers/investment bankers | 4\% | 3\% | 2\% | 3\% | 2\% |
| Investment managers/investors | 6\% | 4\% | 12\% | 14\% | 7\% |
| Public accounting executives** | 3\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 3\% |
| Academics/nonprofit | 8\% | 7\% | 4\% | 3\% | 6\% |
| Consultants | 5\% | 4\% | 3\% | 1\% | 6\% |
| Lawyers | 2\% | 1\% | 1\% | 2\% | 0\% |
| Others*** | 6\% | 6\% | 6\% | 3\% | 13\% |

$\mathrm{N}=236$ men and 109 women in 2016
*Except where noted, all include both active and retired executives
**All former partners or executives of public accounting firms.
***Includes former government employees, medical executives, a real estate broker, a sports/entertainment agent and an author, among others.

## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: Director onboarding

» $90 \%$ of respondents said new directors meet with the company's outside auditor as part of the director orientation program, and 50\% have new directors meet with the company's compensation adviser. $8 \%$ said new directors meet with outside legal counsel.
> 68\% of respondents said new directors get to know the company through site visits, while $20 \%$ said new directors participate in third-party development/education. 18\% require new board members to attend meetings of all the committees during their first year.

## AVERAGE BOARD SIZE HOVERS NEAR 11

» For more than 10 years, the average size of S\&P 500 boards has fallen within a consistent range between 10.7 and 10.9 members. S\&P 500 boards have 10.8 members on average today, the same as last year.
» Boards range in size from five to 19 members. Over the past decade, more boards have settled into the nine to 12 member range; $72 \%$ of boards have nine to 12 members today, compared with $66 \%$ in 2006. Larger and smaller boards are less common; $12 \%$ of boards have eight or fewer directors, compared with $15 \%$ in 2006; and $16 \%$ of boards have 13 or more members, versus $19 \%$ in 2006 .
» BlackRock tops the list of largest boards with 19 members, followed by BB\&T with 18 members and Chubb with 17.
» As of their latest proxy filings, the smallest boards - D.R. Horton, Garmin and Microchip Technology - have five directors, and two boards have six members.


## INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR REPRESENTATION STABILIZES NEAR 85\%

» Independent directors make up $85 \%$ of all S\&P 500 board members, up slightly from $84 \%$ last year. The ratio of independent directors to non-independent directors on S\&P 500 boards is 5.4 to 1 , with boards averaging 9.1 independent directors and 1.7 non-independent directors. In $2006,81 \%$ of directors were independent.
» As boards have become more independent over time, the CEO has emerged as the only non-independent director on most boards; the CEO is the only non-independent director on $60 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards, compared with $57 \%$ in 2011 and $39 \%$ in 2006.

## ANNUAL DIRECTOR ELECTIONS ARE NOW STANDARD

» $92 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards are declassified, unchanged from last year. The remaining boards have three-year terms.
» The move toward declassified boards has accelerated in recent years, often in response to shareholder demands; $56 \%$ of boards in 2006 and $76 \%$ in 2011 had annual director elections.

》 We also have seen an increase in boards establishing policies requiring directors to offer their resignation if they fail to receive a majority vote from shareholders; $88 \%$ of boards have such policies today, up from $79 \%$ in 2011. While these policies have become widespread, boards retain the discretion to accept or decline a director's resignation.

## MOST BOARDS HAVE RESIGNATION POLICIES FOR CHANGING DIRECTOR STATUS

＞Consistent with the past several years， $85 \%$ of S\＆P 500 boards require directors who experience a change in employment status or significant change in job responsibilities to notify the chairman and／or the nominating committee and offer their resignation from the board．Typically，the chair or nominating committee has the discretion to accept or decline the resignation．
» $37 \%$ of boards report having a policy requiring the CEO to submit his or her resignation from the board when the CEO＇s employment with the company ends．In all cases，however，boards retain the discretion to accept or decline the resignation．This provision is somewhat more common than in 2011 ，when $32 \%$ of boards had such a policy．

## MAJORITY OF DIRECTORS FACE RESTRICTIONS ON ADDITIONAL BOARD SERVICE

» Nearly three－quarters of S\＆P 500 boards（74\％）have established some limit on their directors＇ability to accept other corporate directorships，an increase from $27 \%$ in 2006 ．The prevalence of these restrictions has grown in response to concerns about directors becoming＂overboarded，＂with insufficient time to devote to board responsibilities．

》 $61 \%$ of boards set a numerical limit for other board service applying to all directors；of those， $5 \%$ cap additional directorships at two， $36 \%$ at three， $40 \%$ at four，and $19 \%$ at five or six．No company limits other directorships to one．

》 $40 \%$ of S\＆P 500 boards restrict the number of other audit committees on which their members may serve； $97 \%$ of these boards allow audit committee members to serve on up to two other audit committees．

》 $20 \%$ of boards set restrictions for directors who are public company CEOs or are otherwise fully employed；most often，these directors are limited to two other outside public company boards．No board allows directors who are employed executives to serve on more than three additional boards．

》 Among the 125 boards that do not specify a limit on other corporate directorships， $90 \%$ report that they require directors to notify the chairman prior to accepting an invitation to join another company board and／or encourage directors to＂reasonably limit＂their other board service．

》 Most companies do not restrict their CEOs from serving on outside boards．Only 20\％of S\＆P 500 boards set a specific limit in their corporate governance guidelines on the CEO＇s outside board service； $97 \%$ of those boards limit CEOs to one or two outside boards．One board does not allow the company CEO to serve on any outside corporate boards．

## THE AVERAGE DIRECTOR SERVES ON TWO CORPORATE BOARDS

» On average, S\&P 500 directors have 2.1 outside corporate board affiliations, although most directors aren't restricted from serving on more. While the average has remained unchanged for the past five years, we've seen a decline in the number of directors serving on more than four boards; 88 directors (2\%) today serve on five or six outside corporate boards, versus $165(4 \%)$ in 2011.

》 $63 \%$ of independent directors have two or more outside affiliations; $11 \%$ have four or more. 15 directors (less than 1\%) serve on six boards.

Number of Corporate Board Affiliations for Independent Directors


## DIRECTOR TERM LIMITS RARELY USED AS A TOOL TO PROMOTE TURNOVER

» 19 S\&P 500 boards (4\%) set an explicit term limit for non-executive directors, a modest increase from 2015 when 13 boards (3\%) had director term limits. The use of term limits has been consistently low; the number of boards with term limits today is exactly the same as in 2011, 19 (4\%). $65 \%$ of boards explicitly state in their corporate governance guidelines that they do not have term limits, and $31 \%$ do not mention term limits at all.
» Of the 19 boards with a specific term limit, nine cap director service at 15 years, four at 12 years, three at 10 years, one at 18 years, and two at 20 years. The longest term limit is 20 years, and no board has a term limit less than 10 years.
» Rather than set term limits or a mandatory retirement age, many boards report that they consider whether individual directors should be re-nominated during the evaluation process.

## Boards with Term Limits

| Company | Term limits | Company | Term limits |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Patterson Companies | 20 years | Varian Medical Systems | 15 years |
| Target Corporation | 20 years | Xcel Energy | 15 years |
| The Procter \& Gamble Company | 18 years | AvalonBay Communities | 12 years |
| Alaska Air Group | 15 years | CBRE Group | 12 years |
| Frontier Communications Corporation | 15 years | International Flavors \& Fragrances | 12 years |
| General Electric Company | 15 years | Wal-Mart Stores | 12 years |
| MasterCard | 15 years | Allegion Public Limited Company | 10 years |
| Qorvo | 15 years | Illumina | 10 years |
| Signet Jewelers Limited | 15 years | Juniper Networks | 10 years |

The Walt Disney Company 15 years

## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: Director term limits

» Scrutiny of board tenures has increased in recent years, but boards have not taken the step to establish director term limits as a means of limiting tenure. Only 4\% of survey respondents said their boards have term limits today, and just 3\% reported their boards are considering this step.
» $6 \%$ of respondents report their board is considering other means of ensuring director turnover, such as a mandatory retirement age, annual evaluations and a robust self-assessment process.

## INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS ARE TWO YEARS OLDER THAN A DECADE AGO

» The average age of S\&P 500 independent directors increased by two years in the past decade, from 61 in 2006 to 63 today, while the median age increased from 61 to $64.19 \%$ of S\&P 500 independent directors are 70 to 79 , and $4 \%$ are younger than 50 .
» Fewer boards than in the past have an average age of 59 or younger: $15 \%$ today compared with $28 \%$ a decade ago. By contrast, the number of older boards has increased. $37 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards have an average age of 64 or older, compared with $19 \%$ of boards a decade ago, and 15 of today's boards (3\%) have an average age of 70 or greater, versus four ( $1 \%$ ) a decade ago.
» Among new independent directors, the average age increased since last year. The new independent director class of 2016 has an average age of 57.3 , compared with 56.8 in 2015 . The median age increased from 57 to 58 . The oldest new director elected in the 2015 proxy year is 77 , and the youngest is 35 . Eight boards added a new independent director aged 70 or older.

## Ages of Independent Directors

|  | 2016 | 2011 | 2006 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average age of all independent directors | 63.0 | 62.4 | 61.0 |
| Youngest average board age | 47 | 50 | 49 |
| Oldest average board age | 76 | 72 | 75 |

\% of all S\&P 500 boards with average age ...

| 59 and younger | $15 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $28 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $60-63$ | $48 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $53 \%$ |
| 64 and older | $37 \%$ | $37 \%$ | $19 \%$ |

## MANDATORY RETIREMENT AGES KEEP RISING

» Consistent with the past 10 years, about three-quarters (73\%) of S\&P 500 boards report having a mandatory retirement age for directors. $11 \%$ report that they do not have a mandatory retirement age, and $16 \%$ do not discuss mandatory retirement in their proxies.
» While the number of boards with mandatory retirement ages has remained consistent, retirement ages have continued to increase. $39 \%$ of boards have retirement ages of 75 or higher, compared with just $9 \%$ in 2006. Four boards have a retirement age of 80 . In 2006, $38 \%$ set their retirement age at 70 , or lower; today just $5 \%$ of boards have a retirement age of 70 , and no board has set it lower than that.
» The most common mandatory retirement age is 72 , set by $45 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards, a decrease from $50 \%$ last year.

## Mandatory Retirement Age

|  | 2016 | 2011 | 2006 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 70 and younger | $5 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $38 \%$ |
| 71 | $1 \%$ | $1 \%$ | $1 \%$ |
| 72 | $45 \%$ | $55 \%$ | $48 \%$ |
| 73 | $4 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $3 \%$ |
| 74 | $6 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $1 \%$ |
| 75 and older | $39 \%$ | $20 \%$ | $9 \%$ |

$\mathrm{N}=$ Boards that have set a mandatory retirement age: 352 for 2016, 362 for 2011, 376 for 2006.

## SMALL DECLINE IN AVERAGE BOARD TENURE

» The average tenure of S\&P 500 boards is 8.3 years, a slight decrease from 8.7 five years ago. The median tenure has declined as well in that time, from 8.4 to 8.0.
» The majority of boards, $63 \%$, have an average tenure between six and 10 years.
» $19 \%$ of boards have an average tenure of 11 or more years, compared with $21 \%$ in 2015 and $19 \%$ in 2011 . $18 \%$ have an average tenure of five years or less, up from 17\% last year.
» The longest average board tenure is 21 years, and the longest-tenured director has served 48 years.
》 $35 \%$ of independent directors have served on their boards for five years or less, $28 \%$ have served for six to 10 years, and $22 \%$ for 11 to 15 years. $15 \%$ of independent directors have served on their boards for 16 years or more.
» With the average tenure for sitting CEOs at 7.2 years, most boards will serve with two CEOs.

## Board Average Tenure



## FEMALE REPRESENTATION ON BOARDS NOW TOPS 20\%

» Women now constitute $21 \%$ of all S\&P 500 directors. Female representation has increased from $15 \%$ a decade ago. On average, boards have 2.3 female directors, compared with 1.6 in 2006.
» Six S\&P 500 boards (1\%) have no women directors, a noteworthy decline from 2006, when 52 boards ( $11 \%$ ) included no female members. More than three-quarters of boards ( $76 \%$ ) include two or more women, a significant increase from $51 \%$ a decade ago and $58 \%$ five years ago. One-quarter of boards have three women directors, compared with just $12 \%$ of boards in 2011.

》 24 S\&P 500 companies ( $4.8 \%$ ) had a woman serving as CEO as of our May 15, 2016, proxy cut-off date, an increase from 3.0\% five years ago. Since then, one female CEO (Lauralee E. Martin) stepped down in 2016 and three announced plans to retire or step down in 2017 (Susan M. Cameron, Gracia C. Martore and Ursula Burns); and five women were named CEOs: Shira Goodman at Staples, Debra Crew at Reynolds American, Tricia Griffith at Progressive Corporation, Vicki Hollub at Occidental Petroleum and Pat Kampling at Alliant Energy.
» Companies led by women tend to have more female board directors than those led by men: $31 \%$ of directors on boards of companies with a female CEO are women, versus $21 \%$ for companies with a male CEO. When the female CEO is excluded, however, the gap narrows: $24 \%$ of the remaining directors are women.

S\&P 500 Female CEOs and Their Boards*

| Company | CEO | Total directors | Women directors | Women directors as \% of total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| American Water Works | Susan N. Story | 9 | 5 | 56\% |
| TEGNA | Gracia C. Martore | 10 | 5 | 50\% |
| ULTA Salon, Cosmetics \& Fragrance | Mary N. Dillon | 11 | 5 | 45\% |
| General Motors Company | Mary T. Barra | 12 | 5 | 42\% |
| Xerox Corporation | Ursula M. Burns | 8 | 3 | 38\% |
| Hewlett-Packard Company | Margaret C. Whitman | 14 | 5 | 36\% |
| KeyCorp | Elizabeth E. Mooney | 14 | 5 | 36\% |
| Campbell Soup Company | Denise M. Morrison | 12 | 4 | 33\% |
| CMS Energy Corporation | Patricia K. Poppe | 12 | 4 | 33\% |
| Synchrony Financial | Margaret M. Keane | 9 | 3 | 33\% |
| Mondelez International | Irene B. Rosenfeld | 13 | 4 | 31\% |
| Mylan | Heather Bresch | 13 | 4 | 31\% |
| Yahoo! | Marissa Mayer | 13 | 4 | 31\% |
| General Dynamics Corporation | Phebe N. Novakovic | 10 | 3 | 30\% |
| PepsiCo | Indra K. Nooyi | 14 | 4 | 29\% |
| Lockheed Martin Corporation | Marillyn A. Hewson | 11 | 3 | 27\% |
| Sempra Energy | Debra L. Reed | 11 | 3 | 27\% |
| Duke Energy Corporation | Lynn J. Good | 12 | 3 | 25\% |
| HCP | Lauralee E. Martin | 8 | 2 | 25\% |
| Ventas | Debra A. Cafaro | 9 | 2 | 22\% |
| International Business Machines Corporation | Virginia M. Rometty | 14 | 3 | 21\% |
| Ross Stores | Barbara Rentler | 11 | 2 | 18\% |
| Oracle Corporation | Safra A. Catz | 12 | 2 | 17\% |
| Reynolds American | Susan M. Cameron | 13 | 2 | 15\% |
| Average \% women directors for companies with female CEOs |  |  |  | 31\% |
| Average \% women directors for companies with male CEOs |  |  |  | 21\% |

[^1]
## FEWER MINORITIES JOIN BOARDS; NO CHANGE IN MINORITY

 REPRESENTATION OVERALL» Fewer minority directors (defined as African-American, Hispanic/Latino and Asian) were appointed to S\&P 500 boards over the past year than the prior year. $15 \%$ of the 345 new independent directors are minorities, a decrease from $18 \%$ in 2015. Minority directors filled 53 vacant board seats. $8 \%$ of new directors are African-American, 5\% are Hispanic/Latino, and $2 \%$ are of Asian descent.
" New minority directors are more likely than non-minority directors to be line and functional leaders or division/subsidiary presidents, $41 \%$ versus $20 \%$, and less likely to be active or retired senior leaders (such as CEO, chair, president or COO), $24 \%$ versus $41 \%$.

》 Among the boards of the top 200 S\&P 500 companies, the total number of minority directors has held steady at $15 \%$ since 2011, and the number of the top 200 companies with at least one minority director remains unchanged at $88 \%$.
" Despite increased attention to the topic of board diversity, representation of minority directors at the top 200 S\&P 500 companies has not significantly changed over the past five to 10 years.
$-8.2 \%$ of directors are African-American, compared with $9.5 \%$ in 2011 and 9.2 in 2006. $75 \%$ of boards have at least one African-American director, a decline from $78 \%$ in 2011 and $80 \%$ in 2006.

- $4.8 \%$ of directors are Hispanic/Latino, up from 4.4 in 2011 and 3.6 in 2006. $47 \%$ of boards today have at least one Hispanic/Latino director, up from $45 \%$ in 2011 and $35 \%$ in 2006.
- $1.8 \%$ of directors are Asian (non-Indian), versus $1.4 \%$ in 2011 and $0.7 \%$ in $2006.18 \%$ of boards have one or more Asian directors, up from $16 \%$ in 2011 and $7 \%$ in 2006.

Minorities as \% of Directors at Top 200 Boards


| $77 \%$ | All non-minorities |
| ---: | :--- |
| $8 \%$ | African-American |
| $5 \%$ | Hispanic/Latino |
| $2 \%$ | Asian |
| $8 \%$ | Non-U.S. |

Top 200 Boards with at Least One Minority Director


## FEW TOP 200 COMPANIES LED BY MINORITIES

» Nine (5\%) of the top 200 S\&P companies are led by African-American, Hispanic/Latino or Asian CEOs, three more than in 2015. In 2011, only five of the top 200 companies were led by minority CEOs.
») Similar to the pattern seen among companies led by women, companies led by minority CEOs have more minority directors than other companies. $24 \%$ of the directors for the nine companies with minority CEOs are minorities, compared with $14 \%$ of directors of companies with a non-minority CEO. However, minority representation drops to $17 \%$ when the CEO is excluded.

Top 200 Minority-Led Companies and Their Boards*
$\left.\begin{array}{l|c|c|c} & \text { Company } & \text { CEO } & \text { Total directors }\end{array} \begin{array}{c}\text { Minority directors }\end{array} \begin{array}{c}\text { Minority directors } \\ \text { as } \% \text { of total }\end{array}\right)$
*Accurate as of each company's most recent proxy released by May 15, 2016.
${ }^{\prime *}$ Excluding the CEO, the average is $17 \%$.

## JUST OVER HALF OF THE TOP 200 COMPANIES HAVE DIRECTORS FROM OUTSIDE THE U.S.

» More than half of the top 200 S\&P 500 companies ( $53 \%$ ) have at least one non-U.S. director, a small decline from $55 \%$ in 2015 but an increase from $45 \%$ in 2006.
» A total of 191 directors of non-U.S. origin serve on the boards of the top 200 companies, accounting for $8 \%$ of all directors, consistent with the past five years. For the purposes of this report, directors of Indian descent are included within the non-U.S. group.
» International directors represent 33 different countries, but the majority of non-U.S. directors (58\%) come from the following five countries: India (16\%), the U.K. (12\%), Canada (11\%), Germany (11\%) and France (8\%).
» Among the S\&P 500, 8\% of all new independent director board seats were filled by directors from outside the U.S., a decrease from $9 \%$ last year. More than half of the new directors from outside the U.S. - 15 of 27 - are active or retired CEOs.

## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: CEO succession planning

» Nearly one-quarter of respondents (24\%) said their board formally discusses CEO succession two or three times a year, up from $15 \%$ last year. $13 \%$ report that the board addresses CEO succession four or more times per year, almost double the 2015 number of $7 \% .60 \%$ of survey respondents said their board formally discusses CEO succession annually, 3\% address succession less than once a year.
» $69 \%$ of respondents have contingency and long-term succession plans in place, while $25 \%$ have a contingency succession plan only. Three companies have only a long-term plan, and two companies have no CEO succession plan in place.
» This year, our survey delved more deeply into boards' processes for understanding the readiness of potential CEO succession candidates:

- $91 \%$ said the board's process includes a briefing on potential successors' gaps in readiness.
- $78 \%$ said the board is familiar with the development plans for addressing individuals' gaps.
- $\quad 71 \%$ said internal succession candidates undergo formal assessments.
- $53 \%$ said the board defines the desired future criteria for the CEO profile as part of its process.
» $42 \%$ said the process for reviewing potential internal successors is supported by an external adviser.
» $36 \%$ report that their succession process includes gaining insight on potential external candidates.


## Getting to know internal candidates

" $66 \%$ of respondents said their boards have a formal process for reviewing internal succession candidates.

- $99 \%$ get to know internal succession candidates through regular interactions during board meetings and presentations.
- $34 \%$ schedule individual meetings between board members and candidates.
- $8 \%$ assign formal board mentors.
- $7 \%$ said they use other methods, such as company events and feedback from an external adviser.


## THE NUMBER OF CEOS SERVING ON AN OUTSIDE PUBLIC COMPANY BOARD REMAINS AT HISTORIC LOW

» Only $43 \%$ of S\&P 500 CEOs serve on an outside corporate board in addition to their own board, the same as in 2015, when the number of CEOs with outside boards hit a new low. A decade ago, $55 \%$ of CEOs served on at least one outside board.
» $35 \%$ of CEOs serve on one outside board, and $8 \%$ serve on two. Only two CEOs have three outside board assignments. In 2006, 19\% of CEOs served on two outside boards and 4\% (20) served on three. One CEO served on four outside boards.
» CEOs serve on an average of 0.5 other corporate boards, compared with 0.6 in 2011 and 0.8 in 2006.

## 27\% OF BOARDS HAVE A TRULY INDEPENDENT CHAIR, A SMALL DECLINE

## FROM LAST YEAR

» $48 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards split the chair and CEO roles between two individuals, the same as in 2015 . During the past decade, more boards have evaluated their leadership structures, with a growing number opting to separate the roles. $41 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards in 2011 and $33 \%$ in 2006 split the roles.
» 132 boards ( $27 \%$ versus $29 \%$ in 2015) have a truly independent chair - an independent director or a former executive who has met applicable NYSE or NASDAQ rules for independence over time. Although their number decreased from last year, boards are more likely to have an independent chair than five and 10 years ago, when $21 \%$ and $10 \%$ of boards, respectively, had truly independent chairs. Eight of the independent chairs today are founders or former CEOs or COOs who met independence standards over time.
» $13 \%$ of chairs are company executives other than the CEO, and $6 \%$ had been the CEO and are no longer a company executive.
» Among the 97 boards where the chair is separate but not independent, 89 ( $92 \%$ ) have identified a lead or presiding independent director.

## Chairman's Relationship with the Company



| $52 \%$ | Current CEO |
| ---: | :--- |
| $27 \%$ | Independent director |
| $19 \%$ | Former CEO or current executive |
| $1 \%$ | Outside related director |
| $1 \%$ | Role in transition |

## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: The chairman and CEO split

» $12 \%$ of respondents said their board split the chairman and CEO roles in the last proxy year, while $33 \%$ said their board has discussed splitting the roles within the next five years.
» Of those that have recently separated (or expect to separate) the chair and CEO roles, $72 \%$ say the primary reason for the change is a CEO transition, while $20 \%$ believe the chair/CEO split represents the best governance.

## MORE THAN HALF OF INDEPENDENT CHAIRS ARE RETIRED SENIOR EXECUTIVES

》 $51 \%$ of the 132 independent chairs of S\&P 500 companies are retired chairmen, vice chairmen, presidents or CEOs. Only $5 \%$ of independent chairs are active executives in these roles, including one current publiccompany CEO. In 2011, $52 \%$ of chairs were retired senior executives and $9 \%$ were active.
" $14 \%$ of the independent chairs are investors or investment managers, and another $12 \%$ are other corporate executives, active or retired, including division presidents and line and functional leaders.
» The remaining independent chairs are financial executives, bankers/investment bankers and retired public accounting executives (12\%); academics and nonprofit executives (2\%); and others, including lawyers and consultants (4\%).
" Independent chairman are older on average than their fellow directors: 66.1 versus 63.1.
" There are 10 women serving as independent chairs, $8 \%$ of all independent chairs.

## Independent Chairman Backgrounds



| $15 \%$ | Retired chair/president/CEO |
| ---: | :--- |
| $14 \%$ | Investor/investment manager |
| $12 \%$ | Active/retired other corporate executive |
| $5 \%$ | Active chair/president/CEO |
| $12 \%$ | Bankers/financial executives/CFOs/public accounting |
| $2 \%$ | Academics/nonprofit executives |
| $4 \%$ | Others |

》 The average tenure for current independent chairs is 4 years. $57 \%$ have been in the role for three years or less, including $29 \%$ who have served as chair for one year or less. On the other end of the spectrum, $31 \%$ of independent chairmen have served in their roles for six or more years. The longest-serving S\&P 500 independent chairman has been in the position for 18 years.
" $92 \%$ of the independent chairmen previously served as directors on the board before becoming chair, serving 8.4 years on average before moving into the chairman role.

## Independent Chairman Tenure



[^2]
## DESPITE DECLINE, MOST BOARDS HAVE A LEAD OR PRESIDING DIRECTOR

» $87 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards report having a lead or presiding director, nearly all of whom (98\%) are identified by name in the proxy.
» The number of lead and presiding directors has declined over the past decade as more boards named independent chairs. $92 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards had a lead or presiding director in 2011, down from 96\% in 2006.
» $1 \%$ of boards rotate the role among independent directors and committee chairs compared to $5 \%$ of boards five years ago.
» Lead directors are more common than presiding directors; of the 417 boards with one of these titles, $71 \%$ have lead directors and $29 \%$ have presiding directors, including those identified as "chair" of executive sessions. This represents a change from a decade ago, when $64 \%$ of boards had a presiding director and $36 \%$ had a lead director.
" 74 independent chairs are also named as the lead or presiding director. Another seven boards report having a lead/presiding director in addition to the independent chair.
» Only five S\&P 500 boards do not report having a form of independent board leadership - neither an independent chairman nor a lead/presiding director. Often, this is a temporary situation during a leadership transition and restructuring.

## Lead Versus Presiding Directors

|  | 2016 | 2011 | 2006 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Lead directors | $71 \%$ | $54 \%$ | $36 \%$ |
| Presiding directors | $29 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $64 \%$ |

» 328 boards ( $81 \%$ ) disclosed how long their lead/presiding director has been serving in the role, reporting an average tenure of 3.7 years. $33 \%$ have served in the role one year or less, $36 \%$ have served for two to four years while $31 \%$ have been serving for five years or more.
» Retired CEOs, presidents and/or chairs are most likely to serve as a lead or presiding director; $47 \%$ of lead/presiding directors are retired senior executives. $11 \%$ are investors or investment managers, and another $11 \%$ are active or retired other corporate executives. Only $10 \%$ of lead/presiding directors are active CEOs, presidents and/or chairs.

Lead and Presiding Director Backgrounds*

| $47 \%$ | Retired chair/president/CEO/COO/vice chairman |
| ---: | :--- | :--- |
| $11 \%$ | Investor/investment manager |
| $11 \%$ | Other corporate executives |
| $10 \%$ | Active chair/president/CEO/COO/vice chairman |
| $5 \%$ | Academic/nonprofit |
| $5 \%$ | Banker/investment banker |
| $4 \%$ | Financial executives/CFOs/treasurers/public accounting executives |
| $4 \%$ | Consultant/other |
| $3 \%$ | Lawyer |

$\mathrm{N}=405$ lead or presiding directors identified by name
"All active and retired unless where specifically stated.

## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: Lead director

" $81 \%$ of survey respondents reported that the lead or presiding director is selected by the full board. The lead or presiding director is chosen by the nominating and governance committee at $26 \%$ of responding companies. Three boards reported that the CEO selects the lead director, and on one board, the outgoing lead director names a successor. Among the $14 \%$ of "other" responses, most indicated that the independent directors select the lead director.
" Among boards with a lead or presiding director, $46 \%$ said there is no set term length for the position. Of those that that define some limit, $19 \%$ have a one-year term, $6 \%$ have a two-year term and $4 \%$ have a three-year term. Other approaches include a three-to-five-year term guideline, a five-year term or an understanding that the board will consider rotating the position every two years.
» $90 \%$ said the lead/presiding director's term is renewable.

## Board Organization and Process



## MODEST RISE IN THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF BOARD MEETINGS

» Boards met an average of 8.4 times, up from 8.1 last year and 8.2 five years ago. The median number of meetings rose from 7.0 last year to 8.0. The annual meeting average includes regularly scheduled meetings and special meetings. These meetings may be in-person or telephonic.
» The majority of boards, $54 \%$, met six to nine times. Ten boards met 19 times or more.

## Distribution of Board Meetings*


*Includes in-person and telephonic regular and special meetings.

## BOARDS HAVE FOUR COMMITTEES ON AVERAGE

» A majority of S\&P 500 boards, $71 \%$, have more than the three NYSE-mandated committees (compensation, audit and nominating/governance).
» Boards have an average of 4.2 standing committees and a median of four committees, which has remained consistent during the past decade.

》 $21 \%$ of boards have five standing committees, and $14 \%$ have six or more.
» The most common committees beyond the compensation, audit and nominating/governance committees are the executive committee ( $33 \%$ ) and finance committee ( $31 \%$ ).
» Several committees have become more prevalent in the past 10 years, including risk, science/ technology, and environment, health and safety. In 2006, for example, 4\% of boards had a risk committee, compared with $11 \%$ today. By contrast, the number of public policy/social \& corporate responsibility committees have declined somewhat.

Number of Standing Committees


Prevalence and Independence of Standing Committees

|  | \% with this committee |  | \% composed entirely of independent directors |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2016 | 2011 | 2016 | 2011 |
| Audit | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% |
| Compensation | 100\%* | 100\% | 100\% | 99.6\% |
| Nominating/governance | 99.6\%** | 98.8\% | 99.8\% | 99.6\% |
| Executive | 33\% | 35\% | 4\% | 3\% |
| Finance*** | 31\% | 33\% | 78\% | 70\% |
| Risk | 11\% | 8\% | 85\% | 74\% |
| Public policy/social \& corporate responsibility | 10\% | 14\% | 88\% | 84\% |
| Science \& technology | 9\% | 6\% | 88\% | 77\% |
| Environment, health \& safety | 7\% | 6\% | 80\% | 86\% |
| Legal/compliance | 5\% | 5\% | 91\% | 87\% |
| Strategy \& planning | 2\% | 3\% | 60\% | 80\% |
| Investment/pension | 3\% | 2\% | 75\% | 83\% |
| Acquisitions/corporate development | 2\% | 2\% | 50\% | 64\% |

* 14 boards have a combined compensation and nominating committee. They are counted as separate committees for the purpose of this analysis.
**Includes one board with a standing corporate governance committee in addition to the nominating committee. Controlled companies are not required to have nominating committees.
*** 11 boards have a combined finance and risk management committee. They are counted as separate committees for the purpose of this analysis.


## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: Cybersecurity

" Major information security breaches to business or government systems regularly hit the news, and boards increasingly recognize that cyber crime is a risk management issue that affects the entire organization and belongs on the board agenda.
" One-quarter of survey respondents said the full board is responsible for cybersecurity oversight, while $75 \%$ said the board has assigned cybersecurity oversight to a specific board committee. Of those, $74 \%$ said the audit committee oversees cybersecurity risk, and $14 \%$ said the risk committee is responsible. Responsibility for cyber risk falls to the technology committee for $5 \%$ of boards.
» $88 \%$ of respondents said the board or a committee has discussed the company's crisis response plan to a cyber breach within the past year.

## AUDIT COMMITTEES AVERAGE MORE THAN EIGHT MEETINGS

» Audit committees averaged 8.6 meetings, a slight decrease from 8.8 last year and roughly one meeting less than the 2006 average of 9.5 .
» $68 \%$ of S\&P 500 audit committees met eight or more times annually, including $48 \%$ that had eight, nine or 10 meetings. $20 \%$ of audit committees met 11 times or more, compared with $37 \%$ a decade ago.
» Compensation and nominating/governance committees meet less often, averaging 6.1 and 4.8 meetings annually, respectively.
" $43 \%$ of compensation committees held five or six annual meetings.
» $74 \%$ of nominating/governance committees met five times or fewer annually, with $29 \%$ meeting four times.

## Distribution of Committee Meetings*

|  | Audit committee | Compensation committee | Nominating/governance committee |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 3 or fewer meetings | $1 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $20 \%$ |
| 4 | $5 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $29 \%$ |
| 5 | $11 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $25 \%$ |
| 6 | $6 \%$ | $20 \%$ | $13 \%$ |
| 7 | $9 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $9 \%$ |
| $8-10$ | $48 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $4 \%$ |
| $11-13$ | $16 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| 14 or more | $4 \%$ | $1 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| Average | 8.6 | 6.1 | 4.8 |
| Median | 9.0 | 6.0 | 5.0 |
| Maximum | 24 | 16 | 19 |

*Includes in-person and telephonic regular and special meetings.

## FINANCE PROFESSIONALS CONTINUE TO GROW AS A SOURCE FOR AUDIT COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP

》 $28 \%$ of audit committee chairmen are active/retired financial executives, including CFOs and treasurers, an increase from $21 \%$ in 2011 and $13 \%$ in 2006. Retired CEOs, chairs, presidents and COOs make up the next largest source, accounting for $27 \%$ of audit committee chairs. Retired public accounting executives are the next largest source, representing $11 \%$ of audit committee chairs.
» Meanwhile, active CEOs, chairs, presidents and COOs are much less likely to head an audit committee than in the past, reflecting the increased workload and demands of audit committee service. Just 6\% of S\&P 500 audit committee chairs are fully employed/active CEOs, chairs, presidents and COOs, compared with $18 \%$ a decade ago.
» $25 \%$ of all S\&P 500 directors have been identified as audit committee financial experts, compared with $20 \%$ of directors in 2006.

## INCREASE SEEN IN NUMBER OF WOMEN LEADING AUDIT, COMPENSATION AND NOMINATING COMMITTEES

» The representation of women in committee leadership roles increased slightly since last year. Women now chair $20 \%$ of nominating/governance committees, $15 \%$ of audit committees and $11 \%$ of compensation committees, compared with $16 \%, 13 \%$ and $10 \%$, respectively, last year. In 2011, women chaired $13 \%$ of audit committees, $8 \%$ of compensation committees and $16 \%$ of nominating/governance committees.
» Retired CEOs, chairs, presidents and COOs are the most common backgrounds of compensation and nominating/governance committee chairs; $43 \%$ of compensation committee chairs and $31 \%$ of nominating/governance committee chairs are retired top senior executives.
» Active CEOs and other top senior executives are more likely to serve as chair of the compensation and nominating/governance committees than the audit committee. $14 \%$ of directors with these profiles serve as compensation committee chair, and $13 \%$ as nominating/governance committee chair. Five years ago, $20 \%$ of compensation committee chairs and $15 \%$ of nominating/governance committee chairs were filled by active CEOs, chairs, presidents and COOs.

## Committee Chairman Backgrounds*

|  |  | $\%$ | Compensation committee |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Nominating/governance <br> committee |  |  |  |
| Retired chair/president/CEO/vice chairman | $27 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $31 \%$ |
| Active chair/president/CEO/vice chairman | $6 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $13 \%$ |
| Financial executive/CFO/treasurer | $28 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
| Public accounting executive | $11 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $1 \%$ |
| Investor/investment manager | $7 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $13 \%$ |
| Other corporate executive | $9 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $14 \%$ |
| Academic/nonprofit | $3 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $10 \%$ |
| Consultant | $3 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $5 \%$ |
| Banker/investment banker | $6 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $3 \%$ |
| Lawyer | $0 \%$ | $1 \%$ | $5 \%$ |
| Other | $0 \%$ | $1 \%$ | $3 \%$ |
| Total number of chairmen listed in proxies | 475 | 473 | 473 |

*Except where noted, all categories include active and retired executives.

## NEARLY ALL BOARDS CONDUCT AN ANNUAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

" All but seven S\&P 500 boards ( $99 \%$ ) report conducting some sort of annual performance evaluation.
" More than half of boards (54\%) evaluate the full board and committees, and nearly one-third (32\%) evaluate the full board, committees and individual directors annually. This represents an increase from 2011, when $29 \%$ examined the performance of the board, committees and individual directors as part of their annual evaluations.
" Thirteen boards disclosed that they engaged an independent third party to facilitate and conduct all or a portion of the evaluation process.

Board, Committee and Director Evaluations


[^3]
## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: Board evaluations

» $35 \%$ of survey respondents report that they assess the full board, board committees and individual directors as part of a board evaluation. $66 \%$ evaluate the full board and committees, but not individual directors. $11 \%$ said only an evaluation of the full board is conducted. (Note: Respondents could select multiple responses.)
" Evaluations are most often conducted by a director, typically the chairman, lead director or a committee chair, according to $65 \%$ of respondents. A wide range of internal and external parties are also tapped to conduct board assessments, including in-house and external legal counsel, the corporate secretary and board consulting firms. $35 \%$ use director self-assessments, and $15 \%$ include peer reviews.

## ADDED PERSPECTIVE

## Spencer Stuart Governance Survey: Shareholder engagement

» Proxy access emerged as the top issue formally raised by shareholders during the most recent proxy year, accounting for $19 \%$ of shareholder contacts, followed by inquiries related to director tenure (11\%).
» Other topics on the minds of shareholders were CEO compensation (10\%), board chair independence ( $10 \%$ ) and "say on pay" (9\%). Board refreshment and company political contributions and activities each accounted for $7 \%$ of shareholder contacts.
» As in past years, public and private pension funds were the most likely to initiate contact with the boards, although they represented a smaller share of the total contacts than in the past. Accounting for $39 \%$ of the inquiries (versus $51 \%$ in 2015), pension funds were most likely to contact boards about proxy access, director tenure and board chair independence.

Issues formally raised by shareholders in 2016*

| Proxy access | $19 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Director tenure | $11 \%$ |
| Independent board chair | $10 \%$ |
| CEO compensation | $10 \%$ |
| Say on pay | $9 \%$ |
| Disclosure of political contributions/activities | $7 \%$ |
| Board refreshment | $7 \%$ |
| Company strategy | $6 \%$ |
| Shareholder engagement approach | $5 \%$ |
| Director slate | $4 \%$ |
| Strategic alternatives (e.g., M\&A, divestiture) | $3 \%$ |
| Other | $8 \%$ |

Sources of shareholder contacts*

| Public/private pension fund | $39 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Mutual fund | $26 \%$ |
| Activist shareholder | $17 \%$ |
| Hedge fund/private equity | $6 \%$ |
| Other | $11 \%$ |

*Percentages may not total $100 \%$ due to rounding.

## ADDED PERSPECTIVE (continued)

" Inquiries from mutual funds, which represented $26 \%$ of shareholder contacts (an increase from $16 \%$ last year), tended to be about proxy access, CEO compensation, director tenure and board refreshment.
" Activist shareholders accounted for $17 \%$ of the inquiries, and their top issues were proxy access, companies' political contributions/ activities and strategic alternatives.
" Some $83 \%$ percent of respondents said management or the board proactively reached out to the company's large institutional investors or largest shareholders, an increase from $70 \%$ the year prior. The most common topic about which companies engaged with shareholders was proxy access ( $52 \%$ ), an increase from $33 \%$ in 2015 . Other topics boards discussed with large institutional investors and large shareholders included say on pay (51\%), CEO compensation (40\%), director tenure (30\%), board refreshment (27\%), shareholder engagement approach $(27 \%)$ and chairman independence ( $24 \%$ ).
» Survey respondents also wrote in more than a dozen additional topics, including majority/cumulative voting, disclosure enhancements, environmental issues and gender pay equity.
» Despite the growing interest by shareholders in board composition, only 3\% of survey respondents reported that their companies' large institutional shareholders recommended changes to board composition.
» $39 \%$ of respondents reported that they were contacted formally by large institutional investors and/or largest shareholders specifically regarding a governance-related topic.
» For most companies responding to the survey, the CEO is responsible for representing the board in non-routine matters with the public and investors: $46 \%$ said the chairman/CEO had the responsibility for representing the board, and $32 \%$ said the CEO had the responsibility when there was a separate chair. Another $30 \%$ said the lead director represented the board with investors and the public. $18 \%$ said the non-CEO chairman had the responsibility.

## Director Compensation

## 2016 Snapshot

## Average per-director compensation rose <br> 3\% \$285,065

## Annual retainers

grew by

## Additional compensation for

 independent chairmen averages$$
\$ 765,112]
$$

## AVERAGE TOTAL DIRECTOR COMPENSATION GROWS BY 3\%

» The average total compensation for S\&P 500 directors is $\$ 285,065,3 \%$ higher than the 2015 average. When premium compensation for the independent chairman is excluded, the average total compensation per director falls to $\$ 280,389$.
» Over time, the compensation mix for directors has evolved, with more stock grants and fewer stock options. Today, stock grants represent 54\% of total director compensation, versus $48 \%$ five years ago, while stock options represent $6 \%$ of compensation today, down from $10 \%$ five years ago. Cash accounts for $38 \%$ of director compensation, versus $39 \%$ in 2011.
> $73 \%$ of boards have deferred compensation plans.

## Breakdown of Director Compensation*



| $54 \%$ | Stock awards |
| ---: | :--- | :--- |
| $6 \%$ | Option grants |
| $38 \%$ | Cash fees** |
| $2 \%$ | All other compensation*** |

"Based on non-employee director compensation tables in 477 proxies for fiscal year 2016. Includes all board and committee retainers and meeting fees, non-executive chairman and lead/presiding director supplemental fees when applicable, the value of equity compensation and all other compensation paid to non-employee directors in 2015. Retiring and new directors are included when paid compensation for at least three quarters of the year.
**Includes deferred compensation amounts.
***Includes, for example, insurance premiums, charitable award programs and incremental cost to company of products provided.

Changes in Non-employee Director Compensation

|  | \% of boards paying this type |  | Average paid |  | \% of change in value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Type of compensation | 2016 | 2011 | 2016 | 2011 | 2011-16 |
| Board retainer* | 99.6\% | 99.2\% | \$118,521 | \$88,858 | 33\% |
| Board meeting fee | 16\% | 37\% | \$2,155 | \$2,284 | -6\% |
| Committee chair retainer | 95\% | 91\% | \$15,370 | \$12,476 | 23\% |
| Committee member retainer | 41\% | 37\% | \$7,947 | \$7,917 | less than 1\% |
| Committee member meeting fee | 21\% | 35\% | \$1,677 | \$1,635 | 3\% |
| Stock option program | 14\% | 28\% | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Stock grants paid in addition to retainer | 76\% | 77\% | n/a | n/a | n/a |

Dollar amounts for retainer do not include boards that do not pay a retainer or boards that do not provide a dollar value equivalent for the retainer equity amount.

## 6\% INCREASE IN AVERAGE ANNUAL BOARD RETAINER

» The average annual retainer for S\&P 500 directors is $\$ 118,521$, which is $6 \%$ more than in 2015 and $86 \%$ more than in 2006, without adjusting for inflation. During the past decade, one-year increases have ranged from as little as $1 \%$ to as much as $11 \%$. The median annual retainer, $\$ 100,000$, is double the median in 2006, \$50,000.
" Half of boards provide an annual retainer of \$100,000 or more, up from $29 \%$ in 2011 and $15 \%$ in 2006.
» 90 boards (18\%) pay a retainer of $\$ 200,000$ or more, compared with 42 boards ( $9 \%$ ) in 2011 and boards (4\%) in 2006.
» On the other end of the spectrum, $3 \%$ of boards today have retainers less than $\$ 50,000$, compared with $14 \%$ five years ago and $38 \%$ a decade ago.
" The highest annual retainer is $\$ 325,000$, which is paid by a board that does not provide meeting attendance fees. Three companies provide no retainer; one of these pays $\$ 900$ per meeting, one pays $\$ 15,000$ per meeting (not to exceed $\$ 60,000$ per year), and one only provides a stock option grant.
» Our research has shown that four boards have reduced director compensation for the upcoming fiscal year in response to pressure on the company share price and market conditions. Similarly, four boards have capped board compensation by placing a dollar limit on the value of equity compensation provided to directors.

Annual Board Retainers and Yearly Increases

- 2016 annual board retainer
- Past years annual board retainer
- Yearly percentage increase



## USE OF MEETING FEES FOR DIRECTOR COMPENSATION HITS NEW LOW

» Only 78 S\&P 500 boards (16\%) pay board meeting attendance fees in 2016, down from $21 \%$ last year, and $57 \%$ in 2006.
» The average board meeting attendance fee increased to $\$ 2,155$ from $\$ 2,041$ last year. Fees range from a low of \$900 to a high of \$15,000 at one company, where meeting fees are paid in lieu of a retainer and capped at $\$ 60,000$ per year. $38 \%$ of companies pay $\$ 1,500$ per meeting, $29 \%$ pay $\$ 2,000$ and $21 \%$ pay more than $\$ 2,000$.
» 15 boards (3\%) pay a lower fee for telephonic meetings. The average telephonic meeting fee is $\$ 1,197$. Two boards only pay a telephonic board meeting fee.
» Among the boards that pay meeting fees, 25 boards compensate directors for meetings in addition to regularly scheduled board meetings; the fee for meetings in excess of regularly scheduled board meetings averages $\$ 2,068$. Seven other boards compensate directors only for attendance at special board meetings. The average special board meeting fee is $\$ 2,000$.

## THREE-QUARTERS OF BOARDS GRANT STOCK TO DIRECTORS AS

## PART OF COMPENSATION

» $76 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards provide stock grants to directors in addition to paying a cash retainer, compared with $64 \%$ a decade ago. The average targeted dollar value of annual stock grants is $\$ 155,328$.
» By comparison, stock options for directors have become much less common. 14\% of S\&P 500 companies now offer option plans, compared with $51 \%$ in 2006. The average targeted value of annual stock option grants is $\$ 95,402$.
" $51 \%$ of boards allow directors to choose to receive their compensation in cash, stock or stock units, but only $4 \%$ offer stock options as an alternative choice.
" Eight boards, $2 \%$ of the total, pay director retainers fully in stock.
» $91 \%$ of boards disclose having share ownership guidelines for directors, which are meant to align directors' interests with those of stockholders. A decade ago, $62 \%$ disclosed director share ownership guidelines. Typically, these guidelines require directors to own a certain number of shares or a multiple of the retainer value within a specified number of years.

## Equity Compensation

|  | \% of S\&P 500 boards |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2016 | 2011 | 2006 |
| Stock option program exists | 14\% | 28\% | 51\% |
| Equity paid in addition to retainer | 76\% | 77\% | 64\% |
| Equity paid as a part of retainer | 22\% | 18\% | 21\% |
| Director can elect to receive compensation in cash, stock, or stock units | 51\% | 57\% | 60\% |
| Director can elect to receive compensation in stock options | 4\% | 5\% | 7\% |
| Retainer paid fully in stock | 2\% | 2\% | 3\% |

## MOST BOARDS PROVIDE A PREMIUM FOR BOARD LEADERSHIP SERVICE

» $95 \%$ of the 132 independent chairmen of S\&P 500 boards receive an additional fee, which ranges from $\$ 25,000$ to $\$ 820,546$ and averages $\$ 165,112$. The median premium paid to independent chairmen is $\$ 150,000$.
» $65 \%$ of the $417 \mathrm{~S} \& \mathrm{P} 500$ boards with a lead or presiding director provide additional compensation to directors serving in those roles, compared with $61 \%$ of boards one year ago.
» Lead directors are more likely than presiding directors to receive additional compensation: $80 \%$ versus $27 \%$. The average lead director premium is $\$ 33,565,5 \%$ higher than the $\$ 31,848$ average premium for presiding directors.
» Supplemental compensation for lead and presiding directors ranges from \$6,000 to \$175,000 and averages $\$ 33,354$ for the combined roles.

## NEARLY ALL BOARDS PROVIDE EXTRA COMPENSATION FOR CHAIRING A COMMITTEE

" $95 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards included in our study provide a retainer to committee chairmen, an increase from $91 \%$ in 2011 and $84 \%$ in 2006. Among these boards, $86 \%$ pay a higher retainer to the audit committee chair, and $58 \%$ pay more to the compensation committee chair.
» The average retainer for all committee chairs is \$15,370, an increase from last year's average of \$14,399.
" Retainers for audit and compensation committee chairs average $\$ 24,989$ and $\$ 20,916$, respectively.
» The lowest committee chair retainer is $\$ 3,000$, while the highest committee chair retainer - paid to an audit chair - is \$75,000.

## COMPENSATION FOR COMMITTEE SERVICE HAS BECOME MORE COMMON

» $41 \%$ of boards pay a retainer for committee member service, averaging $\$ 8,947$. A decade ago, $29 \%$ of boards provided a retainer for committee service, which averaged $\$ 6,431$.
" $87 \%$ provide a different retainer for audit committee service, which averages $\$ 13,015$.
" $39 \%$ of boards now provide a higher premium for compensation committee service, an increase from $24 \%$ in 2011 and $8 \%$ in 2006. The average compensation committee member retainer is $\$ 11,851$.

## Committee Retainers



## ONE-FIFTH OF BOARDS PAY COMMITTEE MEETING FEES

» Similar to board meeting attendance fees, committee meeting fees have declined as a component of director compensation. $21 \%$ of S\&P 500 boards pay committee meeting fees, down from $26 \%$ last year and $59 \%$ a decade ago. The average committee meeting fee is $\$ 1,677$, a $\$ 1$ less than last year's average.
» $12 \%$ of the 99 boards that provide committee meeting fees pay a higher amount for audit committee meetings than for other committee meetings. The $\$ 2,392$ average audit committee meeting fee is $43 \%$ higher than the average for all committees. Just five companies pay a higher meeting fee for compensation committee meetings, averaging $\$ 2,300$.
" $16 \%$ of the boards providing committee meeting fees pay a different amount for telephonic meetings, which averages $\$ 911$. One board pays a higher fee for telephonic audit committee meetings, $\$ 2,000$.
» Only three boards (1\%) pay meeting fees to committee chairs, compared with $11 \% 10$ years ago. The average chair committee meeting fee is $\$ 2,550$.

## SMALL NUMBER OF BOARDS PROVIDE EXTRA COMPENSATION FOR SPECIAL COMMITTEE SERVICE

» Seven boards (1\%) reported providing additional compensation to directors serving on a special committee. Supplemental retainers for service on special committees ranged in amounts from \$10,000 to \$22,500.

》 Among boards that disclosed the purposes of the special committees, reasons included: addressing shareholder demands (three boards), CEO search or succession planning (one board), overseeing equity investments (one board), SEC and internal investigation (one board), and mergers and acquisitions (one board).

## DIRECTOR COMPENSATION IN HEALTHCARE SECTOR TOPS S\&P 500 AVERAGE BY 29\%

> Director compensation within the healthcare sector averages \$369,080, which is $29 \%$ higher than the S\&P 500 average. By contrast, the $\$ 244,135$ average paid to directors in the utility sector, which has the lowest average compensation of all sectors, is $14 \%$ lower than the S\&P 500 average.
» Cash represents a larger share of compensation in industry sectors such as utilities and materials, $48 \%$ and $45 \%$, respectively, and a smaller share in the healthcare and information technology sectors, $31 \%$ and $33 \%$, respectively.

》 Stock awards account for $59 \%$ of director compensation among information technology companies and $58 \%$ in consumer staples companies, but just $50 \%$ of director compensation for materials and utilities companies.

Average Compensation per Non-employee Director by Industry*

|  | \% of total compensation |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Industry | Total average compensation | Cash fees** | Stock awards | Option grants | All other compensation |
| Consumer discretionary | \$257,811 | 38\% | 56\% | 4\% | 2\% |
| Consumer staples | \$284,354 | 36\% | 58\% | 4\% | 2\% |
| Energy | \$313,712 | 37\% | 56\% | 3\% | 4\% |
| Financials | \$258,712 | 42\% | 54\% | 2\% | 2\% |
| Healthcare | \$369,080 | 31\% | 51\% | 17\% | 1\% |
| Industrials | \$267,205 | 43\% | 51\% | 3\% | 3\% |
| Information technology | \$315,618 | 33\% | 59\% | 7\% | 1\% |
| Materials | \$266,940 | 45\% | 50\% | 1\% | 4\% |
| Telecommunication services | \$276,786 | 44\% | 55\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Utilities | \$244,135 | 48\% | 50\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Average | \$285,065 | 38\% | 54\% | 6\% | 2\% |

*Based on non-employee director compensation tables in 477 proxies for 2016 . Includes all board and committee retainers and meeting fees, nonexecutive chairman and lead/presiding director supplemental fees when applicable, the value of equity compensation and all other compensation paid to non-employee directors in fiscal year 2015. Retiring and new directors are included when paid compensation for at least three quarters of the year.
**Includes deferred compensation amounts.
***Includes insurance premiums, charitable award programs and incremental cost to the company of products provided to directors.

## SOUTHWEST SEES THE LARGEST GAIN IN DIRECTOR COMPENSATION

» Director compensation for boards in the Southwestern U.S. grew by 5\% - the largest regional increase — bringing average director compensation to $\$ 292,608$. Boards in the Northeast and Southeast regions each had $1 \%$ decreases in average director compensation.
» Average director compensation for companies in the West, already the region with the highest director compensation, rose $1 \%$ to $\$ 305,832$.

》) Average director compensation in the Midwest region rose $4 \%$ to $\$ 258,470$.
» The spread between the highest- and lowest-paying regions has decreased since last year. This year the difference between the regions with the highest and lowest average director compensation was $\$ 48,144$, compared with $\$ 51,468$ in 2015.

## GREATEST GAIN IN COMPENSATION SEEN FOR DIRECTORS OF SMALLER S\&P 500 COMPANIES

" Average compensation for directors of companies with revenue less than $\$ 2.5$ billion grew by $8 \%$ to $\$ 282,311$, bringing the compensation for these directors higher than the average for directors of companies in the $\$ 2.5-\$ 10$ billion revenue range.
" Directors of the largest companies, with revenue greater than \$10 billion, receive $\$ 293,425$ in annual compensation on average, $4 \%$ more than the average compensation for directors of companies with revenue less than $\$ 2.5$ billion.

## Average Director Compensation by Region and by Sales

| By region |  | By sales |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| West | \$305,832 | Less than $\$ 2.5$ billion | \$283,213 |
| Southwest | \$292,608 | \$2.5-\$10 billion | \$275,355 |
| Northeast | \$298,940 | Greater than \$10 billion | \$293,425 |
| Northwest | \$257,688 |  |  |
| Southeast | \$270,417 |  |  |
| Midwest | \$258,470 |  |  |

## Comparative Board Data

## Methodology:

Based on the S\&P 500 as of May 15, 2016. Fiscal year 2015 company sales data obtained from Hoovers; industry/sector categories from Capital IQ. All remaining data were culled from the most recent DEF14A proxy statements released between May 15, 2015 and May 15, 2016. Total average compensation per non-employee director is based on non-employee director compensation tables included in 477 proxies. Amount includes all board and committee retainers and meeting fees, supplemental non-executive chairman and lead/presiding director fees, the value of equity compensation, and all other compensation paid in fiscal year 2015.

## Comparative Board Data



CONSUMER DISCRETIONARY
Advertising

| Advertising |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| The Interpublic Group of Companies | 7,613.8 | 10 | 9 | N | 64 | 7 | 74 | 11 | 100,000 | b | 270,516 | 39\% | 55\% | 0\% | 6\% |
| Omnicom Group | 15,134.4 | 14 | 12 | Y | 70 | 15 | 75 | 7 | 75,000 | b, c | 262,325 | 52\% | 48\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Apparel Retail |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Foot Locker | 7,412.0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 65 | 11 | 72 | 5 | 130,000 | b,c,d | 262,381 | 39\% | 61\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| The Gap | 15,797.0 | 10 | 8 | Y | 63 | 12 | 72 | 8 | 75,000 | b | 265,749 | 44\% | 53\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| L Brands | 11,454.0 | 11 | 8 | N | 71 | 17 | - | 7 | 223,800 | d | 271,003 | 52\% | 48\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Ross Stores | 11,041.7 | 11 | 7 | Y | 61 | 13 | - | 5 | 187,500 | d | 219,187 | 38\% | 62\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| The TJX Companies | 29,078.4 | 10 | 8 | Y | 63 | 12 | 75 | 7 | 75,000 | b | 286,959 | 38\% | 62\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Urban Outfitters | 3,445.1 | 9 | 7 | N | 62 | 17 | - | 5 | 100,000 | e | 249,200 | 40\% | 60\% | 0\% | 0\% |

## Apparel, Accessories \& Luxury Goods

| Coach | 4,191.6 | 8 | 7 | Y | 53 | 6 | - | 6 | 75,000 | b,c,e | 248,977 | 40\% | 30\% | 30\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hanesbrands | 5,731.6 | 10 | 9 | N | 64 | 7 | 72 | 5 | 95,000 | b | 242,987 | 41\% | 59\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Michael Kors Holdings Limited | 4,371.5 | 8 | 6 | N | 63 | 4 | - | 5 | 60,000 | b | 245,000 | 39\% | 61\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| PVH Corporation | 8,020.3 | 10 | 9 | N | 58 | 8 | 72 | 7 | 70,000 | b | 230,777 | 41\% | 59\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Ralph Lauren Corporation | 7,405.0 | 11 | 8 | N | 72 | 12 | - | 4 | 70,000 | b | 189,253 | 47\% | 26\% | 27\% | 0\% |
| Under Armour | 3,963.3 | 10 | 8 | N | 63 | 8 | 75 | 13 | 75,000 | b,c | 213,611 | 41\% | 59\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| V.F. Corporation | 12,376.7 | 12 | 10 | N | 59 | 9 | 72 | 7 | 90,000 | b,c,e | 249,682 | 39\% | 29\% | 30\% | 2\% |
| Auto Parts \& Equipment |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| BorgWarner | 8,023.2 | 10 | 9 | Y | 66 | 11 | 72 | 7 | 92,000 | b | 235,503 | 51\% | 49\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Delphi Automotive | 15,165.0 | 13 | 12 | Y | 64 | 5 | 75 | 12 | 250,000 | c, d | 279,083 | 37\% | 63\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Johnson Controls | 37,179.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 59 | 9 | 72 | 16 | 265,000 | c, d | 279,444 | 48\% | 52\% | 0\% | 0\% |

Automobile Manufacturers

| Ford Motor Company | 149,558.0 | 14 | 11 | Y | 65 | 10 | 72 | 8 | 250,000 | c,d,f | 295,353 | 37\% | 51\% | 0\% | 12\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| General Motors Company | 152,356.0 | 12 | 10 | N | 63 | 4 | 72 | 12 | 250,000 | c,d,f | 295,534 | 27\% | 69\% | 0\% | 4\% |

## Automotive Retail

| Advance Auto Parts | 9,737.0 | 12 | 9 | Y | 59 | 8 | 72 | 5 | 85,000 | b | 232,143 | 46\% | 54\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| AutoNation | 20,862.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 51 | 7 | - | 15 | 50,000 | b | 366,867 | 18\% | 82\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| AutoZone | 10,187.3 | 11 | 10 | N | 60 | 9 | 75 | 4 | 200,000 | d,g,h | 212,653 | 13\% | 87\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| CarMax | 15,149.7 | 11 | 10 | Y | 63 | 8 | 76 | 5 | 205,000 | d | 232,950 | 43\% | 56\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| O'Reilly Automotive | 7,966.7 | 9 | 5 | Y | 69 | 13 | 78 | 4 | 50,000 | b | 198,532 | 61\% | 39\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Broadcasting |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CBS Corporation | 13,886.0 | 13 | 8 | N | 76 | 10 | - | 7 | 100,000 | b,c | 332,247 | 37\% | 61\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Discovery Communications | 6,394.0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 67 | 9 | - | 15 | 90,000 | b | 258,945 | 44\% | 55\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Scripps Networks Interactive | 3,018.2 | 12 | 11 | N | 58 | 6 | 72 | 8 | 50,000 | b,c,e | 236,445 | 37\% | 31\% | 32\% | 0\% |
| TEGNA | 3,050.9 | 10 | 9 | Y | 60 | 5 | 70 | 10 | 100,000 | b,c | 206,302 | 46\% | 52\% | 0\% | 2\% |



|  | NUMBER OF DIRECTORS |  |  | INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS |  |  |  |  | board fees (\$) |  |  |  |  | percentage of TOTAL COMPENSATION |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 㖇 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { n } \\ & \stackrel{0}{x} \\ & \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & \frac{0}{1} \\ & 0 \\ & \text { 慈 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\Gamma} \\ & \stackrel{0}{0} \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{I_{j}} \end{aligned}$ |
| Consumer Electronics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Garmin | 2,820.3 | 5 | 4 | Y | 66 | 8 |  | - |  | 4 | 85,000 | b | 205,390 | 39\% | 61\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Harman International Industries | 6,155.3 | 11 | 10 | N | 64 | 8 |  | 75 |  | 7 | 80,000 | b | 239,822 | 44\% | 56\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Department Stores |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Kohl's Corporation | 19,204.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 58 | 10 |  | 72 |  | 7 | 100,000 | b | 234,967 | 57\% | 43\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Macy's | 27,079.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 58 | 8 |  | 74 |  | 8 | 70,000 | b, c | 243,798 | 38\% | 57\% | 0\% | 5\% |
| Nordstrom | 14,437.0 | 12 | 9 | Y | 57 | 6 |  | 72 |  | 5 | 85,000 | b, c | 255,444 | 38\% | 62\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Distributors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Genuine Parts Company | 15,280.0 | 13 | 10 | N | 63 | 7 |  | 72 |  | 4 | 60,000 | b | 258,944 | 29\% | 71\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Footwear |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NIKE | 30,601.0 | 13 | 9 | Y | 60 | 9 |  | 72 |  | 5 | 85,000 | b | 283,126 | 32\% | 61\% | 0\% | 7\% |
| General Merchandise Stores |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dollar General Corporation | 20,368.6 | 8 | 7 | Y | 59 | 6 |  | 76 |  | 0 | 85,000 | b | 224,055 | 44\% | 55\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Dollar Tree | 15,498.4 | 11 | 9 | Y | 68 | 12 |  | - |  | 6 | 180,000 | c,i | 206,111 | 100\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Target Corporation | 73,785.0 | 14 | 13 | N | 59 | 7 |  | 72 |  | 7 | 260,000 | c, d | 282,105 | 33\% | 67\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Home Furnishing Retail |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bed Bath \& Beyond | 12,103.9 | 10 | 7 | Y | 64 | 13 |  | - |  | 1 | 100,000 | b, c | 201,071 | 55\% | 45\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Home Furnishings |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Leggett \& Platt | 3,917.2 | 9 | 7 | Y | 66 | 14 |  | 72 |  |  | 195,000 | c, d | 247,687 | 31\% | 61\% | 0\% | 8\% |
| Mohawk Industries | 8,071.6 | 9 | 7 | N | 63 | 8 |  | 75 |  | 5 | 80,000 | b, c | 177,877 | 49\% | 51\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Home Improvement Retail |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Home Depot | 88,519.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 58 | 6 |  | 72 |  |  | 280,000 | c,d,f | 299,545 | 21\% | 77\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Lowe's Companies | 59,074.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 62 | 5 |  | 72 |  | 5 | 80,000 | b, c | 241,456 | 36\% | 64\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| The Sherwin-Williams Company | 11,339.3 | 11 | 9 | Y | 61 | 7 |  | 72 |  | 6 | 110,000 | b, c | 262,056 | 45\% | 55\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Homebuilding |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| D.R. Horton | 10,824.0 | 5 | 4 | Y | 64 | 11 |  | 75 |  | 8 | - | b | 199,404 | 39\% | 61\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Lennar Corporation | 9,474.0 | 9 | 8 | Y | 67 | 13 |  | - |  | 5 | 90,000 | b,d,e | 253,617 | 34\% | 59\% | 6\% | 1\% |
| PulteGroup | 5,982.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 60 | 8 |  | 75 |  | 6 | 235,000 | d | 251,139 | 44\% | 56\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Hotels, Resorts \& Cruise Lines |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Carnival Corporation | 15,714.0 | 9 | 7 | Y | 65 | 11 |  | 75 |  | 6 | 110,000 | b | 295,068 | 45\% | 54\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Marriott International | 14,486.0 | 11 | 8 | Y | 63 | 8 |  | 72 |  | 7 | 75,000 | b, c | 238,329 | 39\% | 59\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. | 8,299.0 | 12 | 10 | N | 63 | 9 |  | - |  | 7 | 80,000 | b | 232,247 | 46\% | 51\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| Wyndham Worldwide Corporation | 5,536.0 | 7 | 6 | N | 66 | 15 |  | 75 |  | 5 | 210,000 | b,c,d | 478,586 | 28\% | 49\% | 0\% | 23\% |
| Household Appliances |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Whirlpool Corporation | 20,897.0 | 11 | 9 | N | 61 | 8 |  | 72 |  | 7 | 125,000 | b | 258,806 | 52\% | 48\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Internet Retail |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Amazon.com | 107,006.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 66 | 10 |  | $\cdot$ |  | 4 | 265,000 | d,g | 265,000 | 0\% | 100\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| NetFlix | 6,779.5 | 9 | 8 | N | 57 | 9 |  | - |  | 5 | - | e,g,j | 266,364 | 0\% | 0\% | 100\% | 0\% |
| The Priceline Group | 9,224.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 60 | 8 |  | - |  | 8 | 50,000 | b | 345,055 | 22\% | 78\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| TripAdvisor | 1,492.0 | 8 | 6 | Y | 47 | 4 |  | - |  | 8 | 50,000 | b, c | 67,857 | 100\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Leisure Products |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Hasbro | 4,447.5 | 12 | 11 | N | 61 | 11 |  | 72 |  | 8 | 95,000 | b, c | 324,931 | 20\% | 61\% | 0\% | 19\% |
| Mattel | 5,702.6 | 10 | 9 | N | 60 | 8 |  | 73 |  | 8 | 100,000 | b | 272,744 | 44\% | 48\% | 0\% | 8\% |
| Motorcycle Manufacturers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Harley-Davidson | 5,995.4 | 9 | 7 | Y | 62 | 12 |  | 75 |  | 5 | 100,000 | b,c | 247,000 | 49\% | 51\% | 0\% | 0\% |

## Comparative Board Data

|  | NUMBER OF DIRECTORS |  |  | INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS |  |  |  |  | board fees（\＄） |  |  |  |  | percentage of total compensation |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\stackrel{\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\hat{a}}}{\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\stackrel{ }{2}}}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \text { 否 } \\ & \frac{D}{2} \\ & \underset{\sim}{2} \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  |  | 臭 | $\begin{aligned} & n \\ & \stackrel{n}{x} \\ & \underset{x}{n} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & \stackrel{0}{1} \\ & 0 \\ & \text { 葒 } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Movies \＆Entertainment |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Time Warner | 28，118．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 65 | 10 |  | 75 |  | 7 | 145，000 | b，c，e | 289，996 | 43\％ | 34\％ | 23\％ | 0\％ |
| Twenty－First Century Fox | 28，987．0 | 13 | 8 | Y | 55 | 6 |  | － |  | 6 | 270，000 | d，f | 294，714 | 42\％ | 58\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Viacom | 13，268．0 | 11 | 6 | Y | 61 | 11 |  | － |  | 6 | 100，000 | b，c | 313，648 | 44\％ | 56\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| The Walt Disney Company | 52，465．0 | 11 | 9 | N | 61 | 9 |  | － |  | 6 | 105，000 | b，c | 324，868 | 40\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ | 5\％ |
| Publishing |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| News Corporation | 8，633．0 | 12 | 7 | Y | 52 | 3 |  | － |  | 9 | 225，000 | d，f | 241，278 | 48\％ | 52\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Restaurants |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Chipotle Mexican Grill | 4，501．2 | 9 | 7 | N | 62 | 13 |  | － |  | 5 | 195，000 | d | 221，217 | 47\％ | 53\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Darden Restaurants | 6，764．0 | 12 | 11 | Y | 56 | 2 |  | 73 |  | 19 | 75，000 | b，c，i | 210，277 | 29\％ | 54\％ | 17\％ | 0\％ |
| McDonald＇s Corporation | 25，413．0 | 12 | 11 | Y | 62 | 10 |  | － |  | 10 | 100，000 | b，c | 244，214 | 45\％ | 51\％ | 0\％ | 4\％ |
| Starbucks Corporation | 19，162．7 | 12 | 10 | N | 60 | 11 |  | 75 |  | 7 | 240，000 | c，i | 205，424 | 6\％ | 63\％ | 31\％ | 0\％ |
| Yum！Brands | 13，105．0 | 12 | 11 | Y | 58 | 6 | 6 | 72 |  | 10 | 240，000 | b，d，eg， h | n／a | n／a | n／a | n／a | n／a |
| Specialized Consumer Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H\＆R Block | 3，078．7 | 10 | 9 | Y | 62 | 7 | 7 | － |  | 8 | 190，000 | d，f | 250，609 | 35\％ | 63\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| Specialty Stores |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Signet Jewelers Limited | 6，550．2 | 10 | 9 | Y | 66 | 7 | 7 | 75 |  | 7 | 245，000 | d | 293，507 | 46\％ | 54\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Staples | 21，059．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 58 | 6 | 6 | 72 |  | 14 | 75，000 | b | 292，962 | 25\％ | 75\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Tiffany \＆Co． | 4，104．9 | 10 | 7 | Y | 69 | 14 |  | 74 |  | 6 | 80，000 | b，e | 159，099 | 0\％ | 50\％ | 50\％ | 0\％ |
| Tractor Supply Co． | 6，226．5 | 8 | 7 | Y | 63 | 7 |  | 72 |  | 5 | 75，000 | b | 214，815 | 49\％ | 51\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| ULTA Salon，Cosmetics \＆Fragrance | 3，924．1 | 11 | 10 | Y | 62 | 7 |  | － |  | 6 | 200，000 | d | 215，951 | 49\％ | 51\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Tires \＆Rubber |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Goodyear Tire \＆Rubber Company | 16，443．0 | 13 | 11 | N | 63 | 6 |  | 72 |  | 8 | 121，250 | b，c | 257，779 | 52\％ | 48\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| TOTAL CONSUMER DISCRETIONARY |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average |  | 10.5 | 8.7 |  | 62.0 | 8.8 |  | 73.3 |  | 7.4 | 128，007 |  | 257，811 | 38\％ | 56\％ | 4\％ | 2\％ |
| Median |  | 10.5 | 9.0 |  | 62.3 | 8.4 | 4 | 72.0 |  | 7.0 | 100，000 |  | 250，609 |  |  |  |  |

## CONSUMER STAPLES

| Agricultural Products |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Archer－Daniels－Midland Company | 67，702．0 | 12 | 11 | N | 60 | 8 | 75 | 8 | 275，000 | c，d | 272，455 | 32\％ | 67\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Brewers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Molson Coors Brewing Company | 3，567．5 | 14 | 9 | Y | 60 | 6 | 70 | 9 | 100，000 | b，c | 271，079 | 40\％ | 46\％ | 0\％ | 14\％ |
| Distillers \＆Vintners |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Brown－Forman Corporation | 4，011．0 | 13 | 6 | Y | 61 | 6 | 71 | 7 | 175，000 | c，d，f | 218，072 | 45\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Constellation Brands | 7，223．8 | 9 | 7 | Y | 60 | 12 | 70 | 5 | 70，000 | b，e | 221，404 | 45\％ | 32\％ | 23\％ | 0\％ |
| Drug Retail |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CVS Health Corporation | 153，290．0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 64 | 6 | 74 | 8 | 280，000 | c，d | 329，208 | 25\％ | 74\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Walgreens Boots Alliance | 103，444．0 | 11 | 8 | Y | 60 | 6 | 75 | 9 | 95，000 | b，c | 305，997 | 33\％ | 57\％ | 0\％ | 10\％ |
| Food Distributors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sysco Corporation | 48，680．8 | 12 | 10 | Y | 67 | 10 | － | 14 | 100，000 | b，c | 354，849 | 46\％ | 52\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| Food Retail |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Kroger Co． | 109，830．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 63 | 11 | 72 | 5 | 85，000 | b | 265，317 | 38\％ | 62\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Whole Foods Market | 15，389．0 | 11 | 9 | Y | 63 | 12 | － | 7 | 39，780 | b，e | 351，047 | 25\％ | 34\％ | 40\％ | 1\％ |


|  | NUMBER OF DIRECTORS |  |  | INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS |  |  |  |  | board fees（\＄） |  |  |  |  | PERCENTAGE OF total compensation |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \vec{a} \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{r} \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | － |  |  |  | 哥 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { n } \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{n} \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \circ \\ & \stackrel{0}{0} \\ & \stackrel{0}{0} \\ & \text { 仿 } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Household Products |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Church \＆Dwight Co． | 3，394．8 | 10 | 8 | Y | 59 | 9 |  | 72 |  | 6 | 100，000 | d，e，g，h | 226，750 | 9\％ | 38\％ | 53\％ | 0\％ |
| The Clorox Company | 5，655．0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 64 | 7 |  | 72 |  | 7 | 100，000 | b，c | 235，835 | 45\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Colgate－Palmolive Company | 16，034．0 | 10 | 9 | N | 62 | 9 |  | 72 |  | 9 | 55，000 | b，c，e，h | 280，337 | 25\％ | 58\％ | 16\％ | 1\％ |
| Kimberly－Clark Corporation | 18，591．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 65 | 12 |  | 72 |  | 6 | 100，000 | b | 275，100 | 35\％ | 63\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| The Procter \＆Gamble Company | 76，279．0 | 13 | 11 | Y | 62 | 7 |  | 72 |  | 8 | 110，000 | b，c | 295，500 | 41\％ | 59\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Hypermarkets \＆Super Centers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Costco Wholesale Corporation | 116，199．0 | 13 | 7 | Y | 68 | 12 |  | － |  | 5 | 30，000 | b | 343，577 | 11\％ | 89\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Wal－Mart Stores | 482，130．0 | 12 | 8 | Y | 56 | 5 |  | 75 |  | 6 | 90，000 | b，c | 297，804 | 38\％ | 61\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Packaged Foods \＆Meats |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Campbell Soup Company | 8，082．0 | 12 | 11 | Y | 64 | 13 | 3 | 72 |  | 7 | 231，000 | c，d | 275，423 | 50\％ | 50\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| ConAgra Foods | 15，832．4 | 12 | 11 | Y | 64 | 8 |  | 72 |  | 9 | 90，000 | b | 264，393 | 34\％ | 63\％ | 0\％ | 3\％ |
| General Mills | 17，630．3 | 11 | 10 | N | 65 | 11 |  | 74 |  | 7 | 75，000 | b，c | 290，129 | 27\％ | 62\％ | 0\％ | 11\％ |
| The Hershey Company | 7，386．6 | 11 | 10 | N | 64 | 7 |  | 72 |  | 10 | 100，000 | b，c | 241，111 | 44\％ | 56\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Hormel Foods Corporation | 9，263．9 | 15 | 12 | N | 60 | 7 |  | 72 |  | 8 | 70，000 | b，c | 250，827 | 34\％ | 64\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| The J．M．Smucker Company | 7，811．2 | 13 | 8 | Y | 63 | 11 |  | 72 |  | 11 | 85，000 | b | 212，833 | 44\％ | 56\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Kellogg Company | 13，525．0 | 12 | 10 | N | 60 | 6 |  | 72 |  | 10 | 250，000 | c，d | 265，921 | 42\％ | 58\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| The Kraft Heinz Company | 18，338．0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 62 | 2 | 2 | － |  | 6 | 110，000 | b | n／a | n／a | n／a | n／a | n／a |
| McCormick \＆Company | 4，296．3 | 11 | 8 | Y | 60 | 9 | － | 72 |  | 10 | 90，000 | b，e | 262，278 | 38\％ | 38\％ | 24\％ | 0\％ |
| Mead Johnson Nutrition Company | 4，071．3 | 13 | 10 | Y | 63 | 6 | 6 | 75 |  | 11 | 50，000 | b | 315，359 | 40\％ | 60\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Mondelez International | 29，636．0 | 13 | 12 | N | 65 | 5 | 5 | 75 |  | 8 | 110，000 | b | 279，716 | 43\％ | 57\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Tyson Foods | 41，373．0 | 9 | 7 | Y | 61 | 8 | 8 | 72 |  | 6 | 100，000 | b，c | 283，229 | 47\％ | 53\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Personal Products |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Estee Lauder Companies | 10，780．4 | 15 | 9 | Y | 61 | 11 | 1 | － |  | 6 | 150，000 | b，d，e | 265，181 | 35\％ | 27\％ | 38\％ | 0\％ |
| Soft Drinks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Coca－Cola Company | 44，294．0 | 15 | 13 | N | 65 | 8 |  | 74 |  | 6 | 250，000 | c，d，f | 265，985 | 22\％ | 75\％ | 0\％ | 3\％ |
| Coca－Cola Enterprises | 7，011．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 62 | 9 |  | 72 |  | 13 | 230，000 | d | 243，233 | 50\％ | 49\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Dr Pepper Snapple Group | 6，282．0 | 8 | 7 | Y | 62 | 6 |  | 70 |  | 6 | 100，000 | b，c | 249，375 | 40\％ | 60\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Monster Beverage Corporation | 2，722．6 | 10 | 6 | N | 69 | 18 | 8 | － |  | 7 | 205，000 | d，e | 223，469 | 35\％ | 65\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| PepsiCo | 63，056．0 | 14 | 13 | N | 61 | 5 | 5 | 72 |  | 7 | 275，000 | c，d | 320，707 | 35\％ | 64\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Tobacco |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Altria Group | 25，434．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 66 | 8 |  | 75 |  | 9 | 100，000 | b，c | 315，817 | 39\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ | 6\％ |
| Phillip Morris International | 73，908．0 | 12 | 9 | Y | 66 | 5 | 5 | － |  | 6 | 125，000 | b，c | 345，935 | 48\％ | 52\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Reynolds American | 10，675．0 | 13 | 9 | Y | 63 | 8 | 8 | 72 |  | 12 | 60，000 | b，c | 497，065 | $31 \%$ | 69\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| TOTAL CONSUMER STAPLES |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average |  | 11.8 | 9.4 |  | 62.6 | 8.2 | 2 | 72.6 |  | 7.9 | 125，967 |  | 284，354 | 36\％ | 58\％ | 4\％ | 2\％ |
| Median |  | 12.0 | 10.0 |  | 62.7 | 7.6 | ． 6 | 72.0 |  | 7.0 | 100，000 |  | 273，777 |  |  |  |  |
| ENERGY |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Integrated Oil \＆Gas |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Chevron Corporation | 129，925．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 63 | 6 | 6 | 72 |  | 6 | 150，000 | b，c，i | 399，678 | 33\％ | 58\％ | 7\％ | 2\％ |
| Exxon Mobil Corporation | 259，488．0 | 14 | 12 | N | 65 | 7 | 7 | 72 |  | 11 | 110，000 | b | 344，415 | 33\％ | 67\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Occidental Petroleum Corporation | 12，480．0 | 11 | 9 | Y | 65 | 7 | 7 | 75 |  | 6 | 125，000 | b | 428，990 | 30\％ | 60\％ | 0\％ | 10\％ |

## Comparative Board Data

|  | NUMBER OF DIRECTORS |  |  | INDEPENDENTDIRECTORS |  |  |  |  | board fees（\＄） |  |  | percentage of total compensation |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\stackrel{\vec{\rightharpoonup}}{\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\vec{r}}}$ |  |  |  |  | 忍 <br>  $\stackrel{\Delta}{5}$ |  | 会楞 $\stackrel{\widehat{N}}{\prod_{0}}$ |  |  |  | 宕 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { n } \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{n} \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\Gamma} \\ & \stackrel{0}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{I_{0}} \end{aligned}$ |
| Oil \＆Gas Drilling |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diamond Offshore Drilling | 2，419．0 | 11 | 6 | Y | 71 | 11 |  | － | 7 | 50，000 | e | 149，190 | 42\％ | 0\％ | 58\％ | 0\％ |
| Helmerich \＆Payne | 3，165．4 | 10 | 8 | Y | 67 | 14 |  | － | 4 | 80，000 | c，${ }^{\text {e }}$ | 236，607 | 37\％ | 0\％ | 63\％ | 0\％ |
| Transocean Ltd． | 7，386．0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 60 | 6 |  | 72 | 7 | 100，000 | b | 385，112 | 33\％ | 62\％ | 0\％ | 5\％ |
| Oil \＆Gas Equipment \＆Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Baker Hughes | 15，742．0 | 13 | 12 | N | 68 | 11 |  | 74 | 9 | 100，000 | b，i | 292，423 | 40\％ | 59\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| FMC Technologies | 6，362．7 | 12 | 11 | N | 65 | 8 |  | 73 | 9 | 60，000 | b，c | 342，363 | 20\％ | 79\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Halliburton Company | 23，633．0 | 12 | 10 | N | 64 | 9 |  | 72 | 6 | 115，000 | b，c | 413，134 | 30\％ | 43\％ | 0\％ | 27\％ |
| National Oilwell Varco | 14，757．0 | 9 | 8 | N | 63 | 9 |  | 72 | 6 | 75，000 | b，e | 283，668 | 38\％ | 62\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Schlumberger Limited | 35，475．0 | 10 | 9 | N | 63 | 7 |  | 70 | 5 | 100，000 | b | 332，595 | 36\％ | 64\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Oil \＆Gas Exploration \＆Production |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Anadarko Petroleum Corporation | 9，486．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 59 | 7 |  | 72 | 7 | 110，000 | b，c | 375，674 | 33\％ | 66\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Apache Corporation | 6，383．0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 60 | 7 |  | 75 | 16 | 300，000 | c，d，f | 316，021 | 35\％ | 64\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Cabot Oil \＆Gas Corporation | 1，357．2 | 6 | 5 | N | 64 | 5 |  | 73 | 6 | 75，000 | b | 297，183 | 30\％ | 67\％ | 0\％ | 3\％ |
| Chesapeake Energy Corporation | 12，764．0 | 9 | 8 | Y | 62 | 4 |  | 80 | 15 | 100，000 | b，c | 390，017 | 26\％ | 74\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Cimarex Energy Co． | 1，452．6 | 10 | 8 | N | 70 | 10 |  | － | 5 | 255，000 | d | 290，146 | 37\％ | 62\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Concho Resources | 18，035．6 | 8 | 5 | N | 64 | 6 |  | － | 9 | 50，000 | b | 289，124 | 34\％ | 66\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| ConocoPhillips | 29，564．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 62 | 6 |  | 72 | 5 | 115，000 | b，c | 360，082 | 37\％ | 61\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| Devon Energy Corporation | 13，145．0 | 9 | 7 | Y | 64 | 7 |  | 73 | 7 | 70，000 | b | 344，206 | 33\％ | 67\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| EOG Resources | 8，757．0 | 7 | 6 | N | 71 | 12 |  | 80 | 8 | 140，000 | b | 344，796 | 41\％ | 41\％ | 0\％ | 18\％ |
| EQT Corporation | 1，954．0 | 10 | 9 | N | 65 | 11 |  | 74 | 6 | 60，000 | b，c | 322，529 | 28\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ | 17\％ |
| Hess Corporation | 6，636．0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 65 | 6 |  | 75 | 8 | 110，000 | b | 323，449 | 46\％ | 54\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Marathon Oil Corporation | 5，596．0 | 8 | 7 | Y | 63 | 7 |  | 72 | 8 | 150，000 | b | 359，124 | 50\％ | 49\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Murphy Oil Corporation | 2，787．1 | 12 | 10 | Y | 63 | 11 |  | 72 | 6 | 60，000 | b | 314，314 | 34\％ | 64\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| Newfield Exploration Company | 1，557．0 | 9 | 8 | N | 62 | 8 |  | 72 | 5 | 75，000 | b | 291，194 | 31\％ | 69\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Noble Energy | 3，133．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 64 | 12 |  | 75 | 17 | 75，000 | b，e | 289，773 | 45\％ | 28\％ | 27\％ | 0\％ |
| Pioneer Natural Resources Company | 3，142．0 | 13 | 11 | N | 61 | 5 |  | － | 11 | 275，000 | d | 264，715 | 19\％ | 80\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Range Resources Corporation | 1，181．7 | 9 | 8 | N | 63 | 9 |  | － | 10 | 50，000 | b，c | 321，971 | 22\％ | 78\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Southwestern Energy Company | 3，133．0 | 8 | 7 | Y | 62 | 7 |  | 75 | 7 | 50，000 | b，e | 239，303 | 39\％ | 40\％ | 20\％ | 1\％ |
| Oil \＆Gas Refining \＆Marketing |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Marathon Petroleum Corporation | 72，051．0 | 10 | 8 | N | 64 | 4 |  | 72 | 13 | 150，000 | b | 364，417 | 53\％ | 46\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Phillips 66 | 98，975．0 | 8 | 7 | N | 65 | 4 |  | 75 | 8 | 125，000 | b，c | 321，361 | 43\％ | 53\％ | 0\％ | 4\％ |
| Tesoro Corporation | 28，711．0 | 10 | 9 | N | 67 | 7 |  | 75 | 11 | 270，000 | c，d | 309，557 | 45\％ | 49\％ | 0\％ | 6\％ |
| Valero Energy Corporation | 87，804．0 | 9 | 8 | N | 64 | 8 |  | 75 | 6 | 120，000 | b | 302，409 | 44\％ | 56\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Oil \＆Gas Storage \＆Transportation |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Kinder Morgan | 14，403．0 | 15 | 12 | Y | 70 | 4 |  | － | 9 | 200，000 | c | 200，734 | 85\％ | 15\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| ONEOK | 7，763．2 | 11 | 9 | Y | 62 | 8 |  | 73 | 17 | 200，000 | c，d | 204，950 | 30\％ | 66\％ | 0\％ | 4\％ |
| Spectra Energy Corporation | 5，234．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 65 | 7 |  | 74 | 12 | 225，000 | d | 238，511 | 48\％ | 52\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| TOTAL ENERGY |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average |  | 10.3 | 38 |  | 64.3 | 7.7 |  | 73.7 | 8.6 | 124，306 |  | 313，712 | 37\％ | 56\％ | 3\％ | 4\％ |
| Median |  | 10.5 | － 9.0 |  | 64.2 | － 7.0 | 73 | 73.0 | 7.5 | 110，000 |  | 318，691 |  |  |  |  |



FINANCIALS
Asset Management \& Custody Banks

| Affiliated Managers Group | 2,484.5 | 8 | 7 | N | 54 | 6 | - | 6 | 80,000 | b,e | 323,077 | 38\% | 25\% | 37\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ameriprise Financial | 12,170.0 | 8 | 7 | N | 65 | 8 | 75 | 6 | 205,000 | c, d | 280,627 | 38\% | 45\% | 0\% | 17\% |
| The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation | 15,494.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 64 | 12 | 75 | 17 | 110,000 | b,c | 286,122 | 53\% | 45\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| BlackRock | 11,401.0 | 19 | 16 | N | 65 | 6 | 75 | 7 | 75,000 | b,c,d | 266,400 | 44\% | 56\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Franklin Resources | 7,948.7 | 10 | 7 | N | 60 | 5 | 75 | 6 | 85,000 | b, c | 217,938 | 34\% | 66\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Invesco | 5,122.9 | 7 | 6 | Y | 67 | 8 | 75 | 13 | 120,000 | b | 310,459 | 53\% | 47\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Legg Mason | 2,660.8 | 11 | 10 | N | 66 | 7 | 75 | 8 | 50,000 | b,h | 243,980 | 41\% | 58\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Northern Trust Corporation | 4,856.5 | 12 | 11 | N | 59 | 8 | 72 | 9 | 220,000 | c, d | 232,267 | 52\% | 47\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| State Street Corporation | 10,760.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 63 | 10 | 75 | 8 | 75,000 | b, c | 314,300 | 35\% | 60\% | 0\% | 5\% |
| T. Rowe Price Group | 4,200.6 | 12 | 9 | Y | 64 | 6 | 72 | 7 | 100,000 | b,c,e,k | 354,106 | 35\% | 53\% | 9\% | 3\% |
| Consumer Finance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| American Express Company | 34,447.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 63 | 7 | 72 | 10 | 95,000 | b, c | 310,508 | 41\% | 53\% | 0\% | 6\% |
| Capital One Financial Corporation | 25,038.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 62 | 9 | 72 | 13 | 90,000 | b | 336,417 | 45\% | 51\% | 0\% | 4\% |
| Discover Financial Services | 10,002.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 62 | 7 | - | 15 | 90,000 | b | 249,386 | 48\% | 52\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Navient Corporation | 5,197.0 | 12 | 11 | Y | 62 | 9 | 75 | 10 | 100,000 | b | 237,036 | 56\% | 44\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Synchrony Financial | 13,620.0 | 9 | 8 | Y | 61 | 1 | 75 | 14 | 160,000 | d | 271,424 | 59\% | 41\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Diversified Banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bank of America Corporation | 93,056.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 65 | 5 | 72 | 21 | 100,000 | b, c | 329,732 | 35\% | 62\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| Citigroup | 88,275.0 | 16 | 14 | Y | 63 | 5 | 72 | 20 | 75,000 | b, c | 362,250 | 59\% | 41\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Comerica | 2,834.0 | 9 | 8 | N | 59 | 12 | 72 | 8 | 50,000 | b, c | 178,328 | 52\% | 48\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| JPMorgan Chase \& Co. | 101,006.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 65 | 9 | 72 | 11 | 75,000 | b, c | 353,000 | 28\% | 64\% | 0\% | 8\% |
| U.S. Bancorp | 21,494.0 | 14 | 13 | N | 60 | 9 | 72 | 8 | 90,000 | b, c | 258,845 | 46\% | 54\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Wells Fargo \& Company | 90,033.0 | 15 | 14 | N | 65 | 10 | 72 | 9 | 75,000 | b, c | 340,772 | 45\% | 55\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Healthcare REITs |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| HCP | 2,544.3 | 8 | 7 | Y | 68 | 14 | - | 15 | 75,000 | d,e | 236,440 | 49\% | 51\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Ventas | 3,283.9 | 9 | 8 | N | 61 | 7 | 75 | 8 | 90,000 | d,e | 236,742 | 45\% | 55\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Welltower | 3,859.8 | 10 | 9 | Y | 65 | 9 | 75 | 4 | 75,000 | d | 228,776 | 45\% | 55\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Hotel \& Resort REITs |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Host Hotels \& Resorts | 5,387.0 | 9 | 7 | Y | 64 | 11 | - | 5 | 200,000 | c, d | 251,630 | 34\% | 46\% | 0\% | 20\% |
| Industrial REITs |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ProLogis | 2,197.1 | 10 | 9 | N | 64 | 11 | 72 | 7 | 100,000 | b | 270,537 | 41\% | 55\% | 0\% | 4\% |
| Insurance Brokers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Aon plc | 11,682.0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 67 | 12 | - | 7 | 120,000 | b, c | 334,358 | 38\% | 53\% | 0\% | 9\% |
| Marsh \& McLennan Companies | 12,893.0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 64 | 7 | 75 | 9 | 110,000 | b, c | 272,743 | 49\% | 51\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Willis Towers Watson Public Limited Company | 3,829.0 | 12 | 10 | Y | 62 | 8 | - | 11 | 230,000 | d | 251,651 | 48\% | 47\% | 0\% | 5\% |
| Investment Banking \& Brokerage |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Charles Schwab Corporation | 6,380.0 | 15 | 13 | Y | 68 | 13 | - | 7 | 100,000 | b,c,e,i | 293,532 | 48\% | 28\% | 23\% | 1\% |
| E*TRADE Financial Corporation | 1,557.0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 66 | 5 | - | 13 | 50,000 | b | 249,824 | 51\% | 49\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| The Goldman Sachs Group | 39,208.0 | 13 | 10 | N | 62 | 6 | 75 | 14 | 75,000 | b,d,g,h | 607,633 | 5\% | 90\% | 0\% | 5\% |
| Morgan Stanley | 37,897.0 | 14 | 13 | N | 63 | 5 | 72 | 16 | 75,000 | b, c | 351,072 | 28\% | 71\% | 0\% | 1\% |

## Comparative Board Data



Life \& Health Insurance

| AFLAC | 20,872.0 | 13 | 8 | N | 67 | 13 | 75 | 4 | 115,000 | b,c,e,i,k | 268,458 | 48\% | 47\% | 5\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Lincoln National Corporation | 13,572.0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 69 | 13 | 75 | 4 | 247,000 | c,d,f | 283,675 | 32\% | 64\% | 0\% | 4\% |
| MetLife | 69,951.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 63 | 7 | 72 | 8 | 300,000 | d | 281,408 | 52\% | 47\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Principal Financial Group | 11,964.4 | 10 | 9 | N | 63 | 11 | 72 | 10 | 225,000 | c, d | 262,001 | 50\% | 50\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Prudential Financial | 57,119.0 | 13 | 11 | N | 62 | 7 | 74 | 10 | 300,000 | c, d | 322,963 | 54\% | 46\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Torchmark Corporation | 3,766.1 | 11 | 9 | N | 66 | 12 | 74 | 4 | 210,000 | c,d,i | 223,792 | 42\% | 36\% | 22\% | 0\% |
| Unum Group | 10,731.3 | 13 | 11 | Y | 61 | 6 | 72 | 9 | 110,000 | b, c | 253,452 | 43\% | 56\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Multi-line Insurance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| American International Group | 58,327.0 | 16 | 15 | Y | 63 | 5 | 75 | 14 | 280,000 | c,d,f | 317,805 | 59\% | 41\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Assurant | 10,325.5 | 10 | 9 | Y | 65 | 8 | 75 | 10 | 100,000 | b, c | 222,251 | 55\% | 45\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| The Hartford Financial Services Group | 18,377.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 62 | 8 | 75 | 7 | 100,000 | b, c | 280,880 | 23\% | 76\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Loews Corporation | 13,415.0 | 14 | 11 | Y | 69 | 11 | - | 9 | 100,000 | b | 177,132 | 65\% | 0\% | 35\% | 0\% |

Multi-sector Holdings

| Berkshire Hathaway | 210,821.0 | 12 | 8 | N | 68 | 12 | - | 3 | - | - | 4,170 | 100\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Leucadia National Corporation | 10,886.5 | 11 | 8 | Y | 66 | 4 | - | 7 | 115,000 | b | 240,000 | 50\% | 50\% | 0\% | 0\% |

Office REITs

| Boston Properties | 2,490.8 | 11 | 9 | Y | 67 | 9 | 75 | 7 | 67,500 | b, c | 202,595 | 43\% | 57\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| SL Green Realty Corporation | 1,662.8 | 8 | 5 | Y | 69 | 13 | - | 4 | 50,000 | b, c | 381,300 | 25\% | 75\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Vornado Realty Trust | 2,502.3 | 9 | 7 | N | 75 | 21 | - | 7 | 75,000 | b | 193,910 | 50\% | 50\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Property \& Casualty Insurance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Allstate Corporation | 35,653.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 62 | 6 | 72 | 9 | 105,000 | b, c | 267,393 | 44\% | 56\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Chubb Limited | 18,987.0 | 17 | 16 | N | 65 | 10 | 75 | 8 | 260,000 | d | 383,198 | 37\% | 54\% | 0\% | 9\% |
| Cincinnati Financial Corporation | 5,142.0 | 15 | 10 | Y | 60 | 12 | 73 | 4 | 80,000 | d | 187,382 | 51\% | 46\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| The Progressive Corporation | 20,853.8 | 9 | 8 | N | 62 | 9 | 80 | 8 | 250,000 | d,g,h | 270,566 | 0\% | 100\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| The Travelers Companies | 26,800.0 | 14 | 12 | Y | 66 | 11 | 74 | 5 | 125,000 | b, c | 302,913 | 45\% | 55\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| XL Group | 9,308.9 | 13 | 11 | Y | 68 | 7 | - | 7 | 105,000 | b, c | 288,528 | 48\% | 52\% | 0\% | 0\% |

Real Estate Services

| CBRE Group | 10,855.8 | 10 | 9 | Y | 62 | 7 | - | 5 | 75,000 | b,c | 235,350 | 36\% | 64\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Regional Banks |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| BB\&T Corporation | 10,346.0 | 18 | 16 | N | 65 | 5 | 72 | 10 | 60,000 | b | 196,512 | 50\% | 50\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Citizens Financial Group | 5,276.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 66 | 6 | 75 | 11 | 175,000 | d | 179,027 | 49\% | 50\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Fifth Third Bancorp | 7,031.0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 61 | 6 | 70 | 13 | 50,000 | b | 289,696 | 56\% | 40\% | 0\% | 4\% |
| Huntington Bancshares | 3,153.3 | 11 | 9 | N | 62 | 8 | - | 15 | 35,000 | b, c | 221,725 | 50\% | 50\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| KeyCorp | 4,502.0 | 14 | 13 | N | 60 | 6 | 72 | 11 | 70,000 | b, c | 181,500 | 50\% | 50\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| M\&T Bank Corporation | 5,010.1 | 16 | 12 | N | 72 | 16 | - | 12 | 85,000 | c | 169,040 | 45\% | 55\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| People's United Financial | 1,378.7 | 12 | 9 | Y | 68 | 13 | 76 | 12 | 24,000 | b, c | 181,294 | 47\% | 53\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| The PNC Financial Services Group | 16,270.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 63 | 8 | 72 | 10 | 67,500 | b,c | 312,790 | 37\% | 44\% | 0\% | 19\% |
| Regions Financial Corporation | 5,674.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 65 | 9 | 72 | 9 | 165,000 | c, d | 214,682 | 51\% | 49\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| SunTrust Banks | 8,533.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 62 | 5 | 72 | 6 | 70,000 | b | 231,659 | 46\% | 52\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Zions Bancorporation | 2,210.6 | 11 | 9 | N | 63 | 12 | 72 | 13 | 40,000 | b, c | 157,152 | 52\% | 48\% | 0\% | 0\% |

## Residential REITs

| Apartment Investment and Management Company | 981.3 | 8 | 7 | N | 66 | 11 | - | 5 | 25,000 | b | 209,217 | 12\% | 88\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| AvalonBay Communities | 1,856.0 | 9 | 8 | N | 63 | 7 | 72 | 5 | 70,000 | b, c | 207,585 | 23\% | 77\% | 0\% | 0\% |


|  | NUMBER OF DIRECTORS |  |  | INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS |  |  |  |  | boARD fees (\$) |  |  |  | PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL COMPENSATION |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\stackrel{\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\underset{~}{2}}}}{ }$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\underset{\infty}{\stackrel{\sim}{3}}$ |  |  |  | 哥 | $\begin{aligned} & n \\ & \stackrel{n}{\hat{n}} \\ & \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & \frac{0}{1} \\ & 0 \\ & \text { 慈 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{r} \\ & \stackrel{0}{0} \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{I} \\ & \stackrel{N}{\pi} \end{aligned}$ |
| Residential REITs (continued) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Equity Residential | 2,745.0 | 13 | 11 | Y | 61 | 11 |  | 72 |  | 7 | 180,000 | d,e,i | 207,777 | 40\% | 57\% | 3\% | 0\% |
| Essex Property Trust | 1,194.4 | 9 | 7 | Y | 67 | 11 |  | - |  | 6 | 30,000 | e,k | 102,545 | 43\% | 14\% | 43\% | 0\% |
| UDR | 894.6 | 10 | 9 | Y | 67 | 10 |  | - |  | 8 | 80,000 | b,c | 207,557 | 34\% | 64\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Retail REITs |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Federal Realty Investment Trust | 744.0 | 7 | 6 | Y | 62 | 13 |  | 72 |  | 5 | 175,000 | d | 195,329 | 42\% | 57\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| General Growth Properties | 2,403.9 | 9 | 8 | Y | 56 | 5 |  | - |  | 8 | 200,000 | c,d | 180,002 | 40\% | 60\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Kimco Realty Corporation | 1,166.8 | 8 | 6 | Y | 74 | 16 |  | - |  | 5 | 60,000 | b,c | 288,599 | 39\% | 61\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| The Macerich Co. | 1,288.1 | 10 | 7 | N | 62 | 7 |  | 75 |  | 12 | 60,000 | b,c | 207,906 | 47\% | 53\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Realty Income Corporation | 1,023.3 | 8 | 7 | Y | 63 | 10 |  | - |  | 17 | 15,000 | b | 235,516 | 20\% | 80\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Simon Property Group | 5,266.1 | 11 | 8 | N | 66 | 8 |  | - |  | 8 | 100,000 | b | 273,624 | 42\% | 58\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Specialized Finance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Intercontinental Exchange | 3,338.0 | 8 | 7 | N | 64 | 11 |  | 75 |  | 9 | 85,000 | b, c | 356,845 | 31\% | 53\% | 0\% | 16\% |
| Moody's Corporation | 3,484.5 | 9 | 8 | Y | 64 | 8 |  | - |  | 11 | 90,000 | b | 267,464 | 39\% | 60\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Nasdaq | 3,403.0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 58 | 6 |  | - |  | 20 | 80,000 | b,c | 262,200 | 37\% | 63\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| S\&P Global | 5,313.0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 66 | 9 |  | 72 |  | 9 | 70,000 | b | 232,596 | 50\% | 50\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Specialized REITs |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| American Tower Corporation | 4,771.5 | 10 | 9 | N | 64 | 9 |  | - |  | 11 | 85,000 | b | 251,203 | 36\% | 32\% | 32\% | 0\% |
| Crown Castle International Corp. | 3,663.9 | 12 | 10 | O Y | 64 | 12 |  | - |  | 8 | 75,000 | b | 214,489 | 38\% | 62\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Equinix | 2,725.9 | 10 | 8 | Y | 61 | 7 |  | 75 |  | 18 | 60,000 | b | 339,259 | 26\% | 74\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Extra Space Storage | 782.3 | 7 | 4 | Y | 67 | 7 |  | - |  | 7 | 65,000 | b | 169,063 | 50\% | 50\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Public Storage | 2,381.7 | 8 | 5 | N | 65 | 12 |  | 70 |  | 5 | 120,000 | e | 206,507 | 66\% | 34\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Weyerhaeuser Company | 7,082.0 | 13 | 11 | 1 Y | 61 | 10 |  | 72 |  | 6 | 220,000 | c, d | 244,797 | 48\% | 52\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| TOTAL FINANCIALS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average |  | 11.2 | 9.6 |  | 64.0 | 8.9 |  | 73.5 |  | 9.3 | 110,356 |  | 258,712 | 42\% | 54\% | 2\% | 2\% |
| Median |  | 11.0 | 9.0 |  | 63.7 | 8.5 |  | 73.0 |  | 8.0 | 90,000 |  | 262,200 |  |  |  |  |

HEALTHCARE
Biotechnology

| AbbVie | 22,859.0 | 9 | 8 | N | 61 | 3 | 75 | 10 | 126,000 | b,c,i | 294,290 | 46\% | 49\% | 0\% | 5\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Alexion Pharmaceuticals | 2,604.0 | 11 | 9 | Y | 64 | 6 | - | 5 | 95,000 | b,e | 343,554 | 34\% | 32\% | 34\% | 0\% |
| Amgen | 21,622.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 66 | 8 | 72 | 6 | 100,000 | b | 332,314 | 40\% | 60\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Biogen Idec | 10,763.8 | 11 | 10 | Y | 61 | 10 | 75 | 16 | 65,000 | b | 438,862 | 33\% | 65\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Celgene Corporation | 9,256.0 | 12 | 9 | Y | 67 | 8 | - | 8 | 75,000 | b, e | 574,365 | 19\% | 20\% | 61\% | 0\% |
| Gilead Sciences | 32,639.0 | 9 | 7 | Y | 70 | 10 | - | 5 | 75,000 | b,c,e | 422,148 | 28\% | 36\% | 36\% | 0\% |
| Regeneron Pharmaceuticals | 4,103.7 | 10 | 7 | Y | 68 | 18 | - | 7 | 55,000 | e | 2,061,048 | 4\% | 0\% | 96\% | 0\% |
| Vertex Pharmaceuticals | 1,032.3 | 9 | 8 | N | 59 | 10 | - | 7 | 85,000 | b,e | 1,320,797 | 5\% | 95\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Health Care Technology |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cerner Corporation | 4,425.3 | 9 | 7 | N | 70 | 11 | 75 | 4 | 66,000 | b | 337,035 | 25\% | 75\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Healthcare Distributors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| AmerisourceBergen Corporation | 135,961.8 | 10 | 8 | N | 62 | 7 | 75 | 4 | 100,000 | b,c | 243,750 | 46\% | 54\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Cardinal Health | 102,531.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 63 | 6 | 75 | 10 | 100,000 | b | 260,773 | 37\% | 63\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Henry Schein | 10,629.7 | 15 | 10 | N | 69 | 8 | 80 | 7 | 50,000 | b | 260,650 | 29\% | 71\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| McKesson Corporation | 190,884.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 66 | 10 | 75 | 7 | 75,000 | b | 270,827 | 42\% | 58\% | 0\% | 0\% |

## Comparative Board Data

|  | NUMBER OF DIRECTORS |  |  | independent DIRECTORS |  |  |  |  | board fees（\＄） |  |  | PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL COMPENSATION |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\stackrel{\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\mathrm{O}}}{\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\stackrel{ }{2}}}$ |  |  |  |  |  | 云 | $\frac{\lambda}{2}$雪 $\stackrel{\text { 荡 }}{\substack{2}}$ |  |  |  | 否 | $\begin{aligned} & \underset{\sim}{\hat{0}} \\ & \stackrel{n}{x} \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| Healthcare Distributors（continued） |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Patterson Companies | 4，375．0 | 8 | 7 | N | 60 | 8 |  | 75 | 14 | 90，000 | b | 171，468 | 40\％ | 60\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Healthcare Equipment |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Abbott Laboratories | 20，405．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 64 | 8 |  | 75 | 6 | 126，000 | b | 282，404 | 47\％ | 48\％ | 0\％ | 5\％ |
| Baxter International | 9，968．0 | 12 | 11 | N | 65 | 9 |  | 72 | 12 | 65，000 | b，e | 317，912 | 42\％ | 36\％ | 17\％ | 5\％ |
| Becton，Dickinson and Company | 10，282．0 | 12 | 11 | N | 65 | 10 |  | 72 | 6 | 92，000 | b，c | 288，927 | 33\％ | 66\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Boston Scientific Corporation | 7，477．0 | 10 | 9 | N | 57 | 3 |  | － | 5 | 90，000 | b，c，i | 292，455 | 35\％ | 57\％ | 6\％ | 2\％ |
| C．R．Bard | 3，416．0 | 12 | 10 | N | 66 | 11 |  | 74 | 6 | 62，500 | b，c | 279，313 | 34\％ | 36\％ | 0\％ | 30\％ |
| Edwards Lifesciences Corporation | 2，493．7 | 8 | 7 | N | 65 | 4 |  | 75 | 8 | 40，000 | b，c，e，i | 291，919 | 14\％ | 75\％ | 11\％ | 0\％ |
| Hologic | 2，705．0 | 10 | 9 | N | 58 | 6 |  | 72 | 6 | 60，000 | b，e | 257，900 | 30\％ | 35\％ | 35\％ | 0\％ |
| Intuitive Surgical | 2，384．4 | 9 | 7 | Y | 63 | 7 |  | － | 5 | 60，000 | b，e | 425，083 | 17\％ | 60\％ | 23\％ | 0\％ |
| Medtronic | 20，261．0 | 13 | 12 | N | 61 | 8 |  | 72 | 13 | 175，000 | b | 236，219 | 52\％ | 48\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| St．Jude Medical | 5，541．0 | 10 | 8 | Y | 62 | 10 |  | 75 | 7 | 100，000 | b，c | 271，004 | 37\％ | 63\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Stryker Corporation | 9，946．0 | 9 | 8 | N | 60 | 16 |  | － | 9 | 60，000 | b，e | 304，265 | 44\％ | 29\％ | 27\％ | 0\％ |
| Varian Medical Systems | 3，099．1 | 10 | 8 | Y | 61 | 8 |  | 75 | 8 | 100，000 | b，c | 297，007 | 46\％ | 54\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Zimmer Biomet Holdings | 5，997．8 | 12 | 11 | Y | 58 | 6 |  | 72 | 5 | 95，000 | b，c，d，f | 308，686 | 31\％ | 67\％ | 0\％ | 2\％ |
| Healthcare Facilities |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| HCA Holdings | 39，678．0 | 12 | 8 | N | 65 | 3 |  | 75 | 6 | 100，000 | b | 302，906 | 42\％ | 58\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Universal Health Services | 9，043．5 | 7 | 4 | N | 61 | 14 |  | － | 6 | 40，000 | e | 375，655 | 15\％ | 0\％ | 85\％ | 0\％ |
| Healthcare Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| DaVita Healthcare Partners | 13，781．8 | 10 | 9 | N | 63 | 11 |  | 75 | 9 | 80，000 | b，e | 315，042 | 47\％ | 30\％ | 23\％ | 0\％ |
| Express Scripts Holding Co． | 101，751．8 | 12 | 10 | Y | 63 | 9 |  | 75 | 7 | 100，000 | b，e | 287，450 | 30\％ | 35\％ | 35\％ | 0\％ |
| Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings | 8，505．7 | 10 | 9 | N | 58 | 8 |  | 75 | 6 | 100，000 | b | 253，672 | 41\％ | 59\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Quest Diagnostics | 7，493．0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 65 | 10 |  | － | 9 | 96，500 | b，c，i | 270，515 | 35\％ | 65\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Healthcare Supplies |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| DENTSPLY Sirona | 2，674．3 | 11 | 9 | Y | 65 | 12 |  | 75 | 9 | 70，000 | b，c，e | 234，889 | 36\％ | 32\％ | 32\％ | 0\％ |
| Life Sciences Tools \＆Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Agilent Technologies | 4，038．0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 66 | 9 |  | 75 | 12 | 90，000 | b，c | 298，842 | 39\％ | 61\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Illumina | 2，219．8 | 8 | 6 | N | 62 | 8 |  | － | 8 | 55，000 | b，c | 484，271 | 17\％ | 83\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| PerkinElmer | 2，262．4 | 8 | 7 | N | 64 | 11 |  | 72 | 7 | 90，000 | b | 264，310 | 34\％ | 60\％ | 6\％ | 0\％ |
| Thermo Fisher Scientific | 16，965．4 | 10 | 8 | Y | 62 | 8 |  | 72 | 13 | 100，000 | b，c | 293，300 | 44\％ | 51\％ | 0\％ | 5\％ |
| Waters Corporation | 2，042．3 | 10 | 8 | Y | 62 | 18 |  | 72 | 7 | 55，000 | b，c，e | 335，729 | 27\％ | 41\％ | 32\％ | 0\％ |
| Managed Healthcare |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Aetna | 60，336．5 | 12 | 11 | N | 68 | 12 |  | 76 | 17 | 95，000 | b，c | 311，359 | 34\％ | 51\％ | 0\％ | 15\％ |
| Anthem | 79，156．5 | 9 | 8 | N | 65 | 8 |  | 72 | 23 | 95，000 | b | 347，224 | 45\％ | 50\％ | 0\％ | 5\％ |
| Centene Corporation | 22，760．0 | 8 | 7 | N | 69 | 12 |  | － | 17 | 125，000 | b，c，e | 361，574 | 5\％ | 90\％ | 0\％ | 5\％ |
| CIGNA Corporation | 37，876．0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 62 | 9 |  | 72 | 25 | 275，000 | c，d | 319，408 | 43\％ | 56\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Humana | 54，289．0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 59 | 11 |  | 73 | 21 | 105，000 | b，c | 312，907 | 43\％ | 50\％ | 0\％ | 7\％ |
| UnitedHealth Group | 157，107．0 | 10 | 8 | Y | 70 | 15 |  | － | 10 | 125，000 | b，c | 345，628 | 50\％ | 45\％ | 0\％ | 5\％ |
| Pharmaceuticals |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Allergan plc | 15，071．0 | 12 | 10 | Y | 64 | 7 |  | － | 15 | 125，000 | b | 455，062 | 45\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Bristol－Myers Squibb Company | 16，560．0 | 11 | 9 | Y | 62 | 7 |  | 75 | 7 | 90，000 | b，c | 302，451 | 41\％ | 53\％ | 0\％ | 6\％ |
| Eli Lilly \＆Company | 19，958．7 | 14 | 13 | N | 62 | 10 |  | 72 | 9 | 110，000 | b，c | 283，467 | 45\％ | 52\％ | 0\％ | 3\％ |
| Endo International plc | 3，268．7 | 9 | 8 | Y | 63 | 8 |  | － | 9 | 140，000 | b，c | 525，714 | 43\％ | 57\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |


|  | NUMBER OF DIRECTORS |  |  | INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS |  |  |  |  | BOARD FEES (\$) |  |  |  | PERCENTAGE OF total compensation |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \overrightarrow{+} \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{r} \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{2} \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 哥 | $\begin{aligned} & \underset{\sim}{0} \\ & \underset{\sim}{n} \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{r} \\ & \stackrel{0}{0} \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{J} \\ & \text { 寺 } \end{aligned}$ |
| Pharmaceuticals (continued) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Johnson \& Johnson | 70,074.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 64 | 6 |  | 72 |  | 10 | 110,000 | b | 292,914 | 42\% | 53\% | 0\% | 5\% |
| Mallinckrodt Public Limited Company | 3,346.9 | 11 | 10 | Y | 63 | 3 |  | 72 |  | 9 | 100,000 | b | 353,150 | 33\% | 67\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Merck \& Co. | 39,498.0 | 13 | 12 | 2 N | 63 | 9 |  | 72 |  | 8 | 110,000 | b, c | 273,490 | 41\% | 59\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Perrigo Company Public Limited Company | 4,603.9 | 10 | 8 | N | 63 | 13 |  | 72 |  | 11 | 75,000 | b | 431,243 | 30\% | 70\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Pfizer | 48,851.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 64 | 7 |  | 73 |  | 13 | 137,500 | b, c | 333,733 | 47\% | 49\% | 0\% | 4\% |
| Zoetis | 4,765.0 | 11 | 9 | Y | 63 | 2 |  | - |  | 14 | 270,000 | d,f | 283,889 | 40\% | 60\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| TOTAL HEALTHCARE |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average |  | 10.5 | 8.9 |  | 63.5 | 8.9 |  | 73.8 |  | 9.5 | 97,209 |  | 369,080 | 31\% | 51\% | 17\% | 1\% |
| Median |  | 10.0 | 9.0 |  | 63.2 | 8.4 | 4 | 75.0 | 8 | 8.0 | 95,000 |  | 297,007 |  |  |  |  |

INDUSTRIALS
Aerospace \& Defense

| The Boeing Company | 96,114.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 63 | 7 | 74 | 7 | 130,000 | b, c | 329,352 | 43\% | 50\% | 0\% | 7\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| General Dynamics Corporation | 31,469.0 | 12 | 10 | $N$ | 64 | 9 | 75 | 8 | 70,000 | b,c,e | 278,473 | 48\% | 26\% | 25\% | 1\% |
| Honeywell International | 38,581.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 63 | 8 | 72 | 7 | 100,000 | b,c,e | 315,669 | 61\% | 16\% | 16\% | 7\% |
| L-3 Communications Holdings | 10,466.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 70 | 8 | - | 10 | 110,000 | b, c | 255,136 | 50\% | 47\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| Lockheed Martin Corporation | 46,132.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 66 | 9 | 75 | 10 | 290,000 | c, d | 285,956 | 53\% | 45\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Northrop Grumman Corporation | 23,526.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 66 | 6 | 72 | 9 | 262,500 | c,d,f | 289,069 | 48\% | 48\% | 0\% | 4\% |
| Raytheon Company | 23,247.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 63 | 7 | 74 | 9 | 90,000 | b,c | 316,223 | 51\% | 47\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Rockwell Collins | 5,244.0 | 9 | 8 | N | 67 | 10 | 74 | 6 | 100,000 | b,c | 263,713 | 44\% | 54\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Textron | 13,423.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 69 | 12 | 75 | 6 | 235,000 | c,d,f | 248,900 | 58\% | 40\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| United Technologies Corporation | 56,098.0 | 13 | 12 | Y | 68 | 10 | 72 | 10 | 280,000 | c,d,f | 296,764 | 23\% | 76\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Agricultural and Farm Machinery |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Deere \& Company | 28,863.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 62 | 6 | 72 | 5 | 120,000 | b,c | 249,443 | 50\% | 49\% | 0\% | 1\% |

Air Freight \& Logistics

| C.H. Robinson Worldwide | 13.476 .1 | 9 | 8 | N | 62 | 10 | - | 5 | 80,000 | b, c | 219,375 | 43\% | 57\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Expeditors International of Washington | 6,616.6 | 11 | 9 | Y | 63 | 7 | 72 | 6 | 65,000 | b | 266,812 | 25\% | 75\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| FedEx Corporation | 47,453.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 58 | 10 | 75 | 9 | 111,000 | e | 264,301 | 45\% | 55\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| United Parcel Service | 58,363.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 61 | 8 | 75 | 8 | 100,000 | b | 242,202 | 40\% | 60\% | 0\% | 0\% |

## Airlines

| Alaska Air Group | 5,598.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 60 | 9 | 72 | 10 | 150,000 | c, d | 135,427 | 37\% | 55\% | 0\% | 8\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| American Airlines Group | 40,990.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 62 | 3 | 75 | 6 | 100,000 | b | 287,542 | 42\% | 49\% | 0\% | 9\% |
| Delta Air Lines | 40,704.0 | 14 | 11 | Y | 62 | 5 | 72 | 12 | 90,000 | b | 301,522 | 38\% | 57\% | 0\% | 5\% |
| Southwest Airlines Co. | 19,820.0 | 11 | 9 | N | 67 | 8 | 75 | 6 | 70,000 | b | 244,329 | 47\% | 53\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| United Continental Holdings | 37,864.0 | 14 | 11 | Y | 60 | 4 | 75 | 11 | 85,000 | b | 312,903 | 52\% | 41\% | 0\% | 7\% |


| Building Products |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Allegion Public Limited Company | 2,068.1 | 6 | 5 | N | 62 | 3 | 70 | 5 | 140,000 | b | 273,704 | 68\% | 26\% | 0\% | 6\% |
| Masco Corporation | 7,142.0 | 10 | 8 | Y | 60 | 7 | 72 | 7 | 240,000 | d | 255,631 | 52\% | 48\% | 0\% | 0\% |


| Construction \& Engineering |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fluor Corporation | 18,114.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 65 | 9 | 75 | 6 | 115,000 | b | 261,167 | 47\% | 52\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Jacobs Engineering Group | 12,114.8 | 11 | 9 | Y | 66 | 9 | - | 9 | 88,000 | b,e | 203,649 | 43\% | 33\% | 24\% | 0\% |
| Quanta Services | 7,572.4 | 10 | 9 | Y | 60 | 8 | 73 | 13 | 75,000 | b | 268,909 | 42\% | 58\% | 0\% | 0\% |

## Comparative Board Data



Construction Machinery \& Heavy Trucks

| Caterpillar | 47,011.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 61 | 8 | 72 | 7 | 275,000 | c, d | 276,723 | 50\% | 46\% | 0\% | 4\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cummins | 19,110.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 63 | 9 | 72 | 5 | 250,000 | d | 270,131 | 41\% | 57\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| PACCAR | 19,115.1 | 11 | 8 | Y | 62 | 6 | 72 | 4 | 100,000 | b, c | 255,270 | 49\% | 51\% | 0\% | 0\% |

## Diversified Support Services

| Cintas Corporation | 4,476.9 | 9 | 6 | Y | 64 | 7 | 73 | 4 | 55,000 | b,c,e | 182,765 | 46\% | 27\% | 27\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Iron Mountain | 3,008.0 | 12 | 11 | Y | 61 | 7 | 75 | 13 | 75,000 | b, c | 242,437 | 44\% | 56\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Electrical Components \& Equipment |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Acuity Brands | 2,706.7 | 10 | 9 | N | 67 | 9 | 72 | 5 | 205,000 | c,d,f | 183,333 | 45\% | 55\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| AMETEK | 3,974.3 | 8 | 7 | N | 65 | 12 | 75 | 7 | 90,000 | b,c,e | 213,384 | 45\% | 29\% | 26\% | 0\% |
| Eaton Corporation | 20,855.0 | 13 | 11 | N | 64 | 10 | 72 | 5 | 265,000 | c, d | 334,511 | 48\% | 43\% | 0\% | 9\% |
| Emerson Electric Company | 22,304.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 63 | 8 | 72 | 10 | 240,000 | d | 282,558 | 47\% | 50\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| Rockwell Automation | 6,307.9 | 9 | 8 | N | 61 | 9 | 72 | 6 | 165,000 | b,c,d | 219,902 | 44\% | 52\% | 0\% | 4\% |
| Environmental \& Facilities Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Republic Services | 9,115.0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 62 | 8 | 73 | 6 | 80,000 | b | 409,571 | 26\% | 74\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Stericycle | 2,985.9 | 10 | 8 | Y | 67 | 10 | - | 8 | 125,000 | e,g,h | 130,904 | 0\% | 0\% | 100\% | 0\% |
| Waste Management | 12,961.0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 65 | 9 | 75 | 7 | 110,000 | b | 282,500 | 46\% | 54\% | 0\% | 0\% |

Human Resource \& Employment Services

| Robert Half International | 5,094.9 | 7 | 5 | N | 64 | 12 | - | 5 | 40,000 | b | 344,361 | 19\% | 81\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Industrial Conglomerates |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3M Company | 30,274.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 65 | 6 | 74 | 8 | 280,000 | c, d | 293,479 | 45\% | 54\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Danaher Corporation | 20,563.1 | 10 | 7 | Y | 66 | 17 | 72 | 8 | 110,000 | b,c,e | 265,567 | 30\% | 43\% | 27\% | 0\% |
| General Electric Company | 117,386.0 | 16 | 15 | N | 60 | 8 | 75 | 13 | 250,000 | c,d,f | 306,201 | 21\% | 72\% | 0\% | 7\% |
| Roper Technologies | 3,582.4 | 9 | 8 | N | 65 | 12 | 78 | 6 | 42,500 | b | 751,973 | 7\% | 93\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Industrial Machinery |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dover Corporation | 6,956.3 | 11 | 10 | Y | 66 | 10 | 75 | 12 | 240,000 | d | 256,591 | 52\% | 48\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Flowserve Corporation | 4,561.0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 61 | 8 | 72 | 12 | 60,000 | b,c | 223,221 | 44\% | 56\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Illinois Tool Works | 13,405.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 60 | 8 | 75 | 5 | 135,000 | b, c | 272,781 | 54\% | 46\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Ingersoll-Rand | 13,300.7 | 12 | 11 | N | 67 | 10 | 75 | 6 | 285,000 | d | 281,874 | 49\% | 51\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Parker-Hannifin Corporation | 12,711.7 | 14 | 11 | Y | 63 | 12 | 75 | 7 | 120,000 | b | 257,729 | 49\% | 49\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Pentair Ltd. | 6,449.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 61 | 9 | 75 | 5 | 123,000 | b,e | 290,134 | 53\% | 28\% | 19\% | 0\% |
| Snap-on | 3,593.1 | 9 | 8 | N | 62 | 7 | 75 | 8 | 85,000 | b,c | 246,545 | 39\% | 53\% | 0\% | 8\% |
| Stanley Black \& Decker | 11,171.8 | 11 | 10 | N | 63 | 6 | 72 | 5 | 125,000 | b,c | 260,422 | 52\% | 48\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Xylem | 3,653.0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 63 | 5 | 72 | 7 | 100,000 | b, c | 240,906 | 47\% | 53\% | 0\% | 0\% |


| Office Services \& Supplies |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pitney Bowes | 3,578.1 | 11 | 10 | Y | 65 | 11 | 72 | 8 | 75,000 | b | 216,408 | 52\% | 46\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Railroads |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CSX Corporation | 11,811.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 65 | 9 | 75 | 6 | 90,000 | b, c | 290,967 | 34\% | 52\% | 0\% | 14\% |
| Kansas City Southern | 2,418.8 | 9 | 8 | Y | 64 | 9 | 75 | 5 | 50,000 | b, c | 215,000 | 48\% | 42\% | 0\% | 10\% |
| Union Pacific Corporation | 21,813.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 68 | 9 | 75 | 6 | 250,000 | c,d,f | 282,930 | 93\% | 0\% | 0\% | 7\% |
| Research \& Consulting Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Dun \& Bradstreet Corporation | 1,637.1 | 10 | 9 | Y | 56 | 5 | 72 | 9 | 70,000 | b,c,e | 229,709 | 41\% | 52\% | 0\% | 7\% |
| Equifax | 2,663.6 | 10 | 9 | N | 64 | 10 | 72 | 4 | 80,000 | b, c | 242,358 | 38\% | 62\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Nielsen Holdings plc | 6,172.0 | 11 | 9 | Y | 61 | 5 | - | 5 | 80,000 | b, c | 229,209 | 12\% | 88\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Verisk Analytics | 2,068.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 65 | 12 | 75 | 10 | 82,500 | b,c,e,i | 242,732 | 18\% | 41\% | 41\% | 0\% |



INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Application Software

| Adobe Systems | 4,795.5 | 11 | 10 | N | 60 | 9 | 72 | 10 | 150,000 | c, d | 349,484 | 25\% | 75\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Autodesk | 2,504.1 | 10 | 9 | N | 63 | 9 | 72 | 5 | 250,000 | d | 347,753 | 25\% | 75\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Citrix Systems | 3,275.6 | 13 | 11 | N | 64 | 10 | 72 | 5 | 265,000 | c, d | 412,369 | 36\% | 64\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Intuit | 4,192.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 66 | 9 | 75 | 10 | 290,000 | c, d | 393,043 | 25\% | 75\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| salesforce.com | 6,667.2 | 11 | 10 | N | 63 | 6 | 72 | 5 | 125,000 | b, c | 600,604 | 11\% | 89\% | 0\% | 0\% |

Communications Equipment

| Cisco Systems | 49,161.0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 66 | 10 | 70 | 12 | 240,000 | d | 326,987 | 37\% | 63\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| F5 Networks | 1,919.8 | 10 | 9 | Y | 61 | 8 | 72 | 12 | 60,000 | b, c | 343,060 | 27\% | 73\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Harris Corporation | 5,083.0 | 12 | 11 | Y | 61 | 7 | 75 | 13 | 75,000 | b, c | 250,045 | 47\% | 52\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Juniper Networks | 4,857.8 | 10 | 8 | Y | 60 | 7 | 72 | 7 | 240,000 | d | 411,664 | 30\% | 70\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Motorola Solutions | 5,695.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 63 | 7 | 74 | 9 | 90,000 | b, c | 245,839 | 33\% | 67\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Data Processing \& Outsourced Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Alliance Data Systems Corporation | 6,439.7 | 13 | 12 | N | 62 | 3 | 75 | 6 | 100,000 | b | 253,581 | 27\% | 72\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Automatic Data Processing | 10,938.5 | 10 | 7 | Y | 66 | 17 | 72 | 8 | 110,000 | b,c,e | 267,950 | 41\% | 55\% | 0\% | 4\% |
| Fidelity National Information Services | 6,595.2 | 12 | 10 | N | 64 | 9 | 75 | 8 | 70,000 | b,c,e | 337,683 | 59\% | 21\% | 20\% | 0\% |
| Fiserv | 5,254.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 63 | 8 | 72 | 7 | 100,000 | b,c,e | 268,588 | 36\% | 32\% | 32\% | 0\% |
| Global Payments | 2,773.7 | 12 | 11 | N | 67 | 10 | 75 | 6 | 285,000 | d | 248,125 | 42\% | 58\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| MasterCard | 9,667.0 | 14 | 11 | Y | 63 | 12 | 75 | 7 | 120,000 | b | 320,102 | 39\% | 60\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Paychex | 2,739.6 | 9 | 8 | N | 67 | 10 | 74 | 6 | 100,000 | b, c | 228,648 | 52\% | 24\% | 24\% | 0\% |
| PayPal Holdings | 9,248.0 | 9 | 8 | N | 65 | 12 | 78 | 6 | 42,500 | b | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Total System Services | 2,779.5 | 11 | 10 | N | 61 | 8 | 75 | 8 | 100,000 | b | 221,524 | 42\% | 29\% | 29\% | 0\% |
| Visa | 13,880.0 | 13 | 12 | Y | 68 | 10 | 72 | 10 | 280,000 | c,d,f | 335,149 | 43\% | 54\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| The Western Union Company | 5,483.7 | 14 | 11 | Y | 60 | 4 | 75 | 11 | 85,000 | b | 258,200 | 40\% | 41\% | 16\% | 3\% |
| Xerox Corporation | 18,045.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 63 | 13 | 75 | 7 | 85,000 | b, c | 219,479 | 43\% | 57\% | 0\% | 0\% |


| Electronic Components |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Amphenol Corporation | 5,568.7 | 9 | 8 | N | 62 | 10 | - | 5 | 80,000 | b, c | 208,611 | 40\% | 60\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Corning | 9,111.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 64 | 10 | 72 | 4 | 80,000 | b, c | 285,619 | 50\% | 50\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Electronic Equipment \& Instruments |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| FLIR Systems | 1,557.1 | 11 | 10 | N | 60 | 8 | 75 | 5 | 135,000 | b,c | 245,870 | 40\% | 31\% | 29\% | 0\% |

# Comparative Board Data 



Electronic Manufacturing Services


## Home Entertainment Software

| Activision Blizzard | 4,664.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 67 | 9 | 72 | 5 | 205,000 | c,d,f | 363,620 | 31\% | 69\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Electronic Arts | 4,396.0 | 9 | 6 | Y | 54 | 6 | 74 | 4 | 55,000 | - | 337,991 | 10\% | 38\% | 52\% | 0\% |

Internet Software \& Services

| Akamai Technologies | 2,197.4 | 6 | 5 | N | 62 | 3 | 70 | 5 | 140,000 | b | 318,018 | 21\% | 79\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Alphabet | 74,989.0 | 8 | 7 | N | 65 | 12 | 75 | 7 | 90,000 | b,c,e | 429,769 | 18\% | 82\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| eBay | 8,592.0 | 11 | 9 | Y | 63 | 7 | 72 | 6 | 65,000 | b | 297,465 | 26\% | 74\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Facebook | 17,928.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 65 | 9 | 75 | 6 | 115,000 | b | 377,922 | 19\% | 81\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| VeriSign | 1,059.4 | 11 | 10 | Y | 63 | 10 | - | 6 | 80,000 | b | 342,945 | 25\% | 75\% | 0\% | 0\% |

IT Consulting \& Other Services

| Accenture | 32,914.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 65 | 6 | 74 | 8 | 280,000 | c,d | 292,217 | 37\% | 63\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cognizant Technology <br> Solutions Corporation | 12,416.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 63 | 8 | 72 | 10 | 240,000 | d | 311,566 | 33\% | 34\% | 33\% | 0\% |
| International Business Machines Corporation | 81,741.0 | 10 | 9 | N | 70 | 8 | 72 | 10 | 110,000 | b, c | 373,303 | 82\% | 0\% | 0\% | 18\% |
| Teradata Corporation | 2,530.0 | 11 | 9 | Y | 64 | 8 | 72 | 6 | 110,000 | b | 317,437 | 11\% | 89\% | 0\% | 0\% |

Semiconductor Equipment

| Applied Materials | 9,659.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 65 | 9 | 75 | 6 | 90,000 | b,c | 299,855 | 34\% | 66\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| KLA-Tencor Corporation | 2,814.0 | 11 | 9 | Y | 61 | 5 | - | 5 | 80,000 | b, c | 286,711 | 42\% | 58\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Lam Research Corporation | 5,259.3 | 13 | 12 | N | 66 | 6 | 72 | 9 | 262,500 | c, d, f | 315,307 | 37\% | 60\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| Semiconductors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Analog Devices | 3,435.1 | 12 | 11 | N | 61 | 8 | 72 | 7 | 275,000 | c,d | 258,598 | 32\% | 34\% | 34\% | 0\% |
| Broadcom Limited | 6,824.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 62 | 6 | 72 | 5 | 120,000 | b, c | 176,086 | 44\% | 56\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| First Solar | 3,579.0 | 16 | 15 | N | 60 | 8 | 75 | 13 | 250,000 | c, d, f | 245,091 | 46\% | 54\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Intel Corporation | 55,355.0 | 9 | 8 | Y | 64 | 9 | 72 | 5 | 50,000 | b,c | 313,089 | 29\% | 70\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Linear Technology Corporation | 1,475.1 | 11 | 8 | Y | 62 | 6 | 72 | 4 | 100,000 | b, c | 214,190 | 38\% | 62\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Microchip Technology | 2,173.3 | 11 | 10 | N | 61 | 9 | 75 | 5 | 123,000 | b,e | 155,295 | 49\% | 51\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Micron Technology | 16,192.0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 65 | 11 | 72 | 8 | 75,000 | b | 380,733 | 34\% | 66\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Nvidia Corporation | 5,010.0 | 7 | 5 | N | 64 | 12 | - | 5 | 40,000 | b | 285,904 | 26\% | 74\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Qorvo | 2,610.7 | 11 | 10 | N | 62 | 9 | 72 | 6 | 65,000 | b,c | 227,266 | 39\% | 14\% | 47\% | 0\% |
| QUALCOMM | 25,281.0 | 9 | 8 | N | 62 | 7 | 75 | 8 | 85,000 | b, c | 378,343 | 40\% | 53\% | 0\% | 7\% |
| Skyworks Solutions | 3,258.4 | 11 | 10 | N | 69 | 12 | 75 | 6 | 235,000 | c, d, f | 267,763 | 31\% | 68\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Texas Instruments | 13,000.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 68 | 9 | 75 | 6 | 250,000 | c, d, f | 297,094 | 32\% | 33\% | 34\% | 1\% |
| Xilinx | 2,213.9 | 10 | 9 | Y | 65 | 9 | 75 | 7 | 110,000 | b | 265,699 | 32\% | 68\% | 0\% | 0\% |

Systems Software

| CA | 4,025.0 | 14 | 11 | Y | 62 | 5 | 72 | 12 | 90,000 | b | 356,250 | 23\% | 73\% | 0\% | 4\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Microsoft Corporation | 93,580.0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 60 | 8 | 73 | 13 | 75,000 | b | 228,583 | 41\% | 59\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Oracle Corporation | 37,047.0 | 9 | 8 | N | 61 | 9 | 72 | 6 | 165,000 | b,c, d | 780,004 | 18\% | 44\% | 38\% | 0\% |
| Red Hat | 2,052.2 | 11 | 9 | N | 67 | 8 | 75 | 6 | 70,000 | b | 332,827 | 16\% | 84\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Symantec Corporation | 6,508.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 63 | 7 | 74 | 7 | 130,000 | b, c | 326,879 | 28\% | 72\% | 0\% | 0\% |

Technology Hardware, Storage \& Peripherals

| Apple | 233,715.0 | 9 | 6 | Y | 64 | 7 | 73 | 4 | 55,000 | b,c,e | 398,762 | 36\% | 63\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| EMC Corporation | 24,704.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 58 | 10 | 75 | 9 | 111,000 | e | 353,624 | 36\% | 64\% | 0\% | 0\% |


|  | NUMBER OF DIRECTORS |  |  | INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS |  |  |  |  | board fees (\$) |  |  |  | PERCENTAGE OF total compensation |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\mid}} \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\stackrel{ }{2}} \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 岳 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { n } \\ & \stackrel{0}{n} \\ & \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| Technology Hardware, Storage \& Peripherals (continued) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company | 52,107.0 | 11 | 9 | Y | 66 | 9 | 9 | - |  | 9 | 88,000 | b,e | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| HP | 103,355.0 | 10 | 6 | Y | 59 | 9 | 9 | 72 | 2 | 4 | 200,000 | c | 311,030 | 23\% | 59\% | 16\% | 2\% |
| NetApp | 5,546.0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 62 | 8 | 8 | 73 | 3 | 6 | 80,000 | b | 337,171 | 27\% | 61\% | 12\% | 0\% |
| Seagate Technology Public Limited Company | 13,739.0 | 10 | 8 | Y | 67 | 10 | 0 | - |  | 8 | 125,000 | e,g,h | 334,149 | 31\% | 69\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Western Digital Corporation | 14,572.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 65 | 12 |  | 75 | 5 | 10 | 82,500 | b, c,e,i | 341,610 | 34\% | 66\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| TOTAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average |  | 10.8 | 9.4 |  | 63.2 | 8.4 | 4 | 73.5 | . 5 | 7.3 | 132,300 |  | 315,618 | 33\% | 59\% | 7\% | 1\% |
| Median |  | 11.0 | 10.0 |  | 63.0 | 8.6 | 6 | 74.0 |  | 7.0 | 100,000 |  | 313,089 |  |  |  |  |

## MATERIALS

Aluminum

| Alcoa | 22,534.0 | 15 | 14 | N | 66 | 6 | 75 | 8 | 240,000 | c | 252,864 | 100\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Construction Materials |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Martin Marietta Materials | 3,539.6 | 9 | 7 | N | 65 | 11 | 75 | 5 | 100,000 | b, c | 240,150 | 37\% | 42\% | 0\% | 21\% |
| Vulcan Materials | 3,422.2 | 11 | 10 | N | 62 | 7 | 74 | 5 | 110,000 | b | 290,724 | 46\% | 53\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| Diversified Chemicals |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Dow Chemical Company | 48,778.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 63 | 8 | 72 | 16 | 115,000 | b | 261,721 | 48\% | 52\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| E.I. du Pont de Nemours \& Company | 25,103.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 61 | 7 | 72 | 29 | 265,000 | d | 275,598 | 45\% | 55\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Eastman Chemical Company | 9,648.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 65 | 9 | 75 | 5 | 100,000 | b,c | 250,929 | 46\% | 30\% | 0\% | 24\% |
| Diversified Metals and Mining |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Freeport McMoRan | 15,877.0 | 8 | 7 | Y | 58 | 6 | - | 11 | 75,000 | b, c | 420,529 | 34\% | 64\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Fertilizers \& Agricultural Chemicals |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CF Industries Holdings | 4,308.3 | 10 | 9 | Y | 62 | 7 | 74 | 10 | 100,000 | b | 244,502 | 46\% | 53\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| FMC Corporation | 3,276.5 | 10 | 9 | N | 62 | 9 | 72 | 7 | 100,000 | b, c | 241,059 | 23\% | 72\% | 0\% | 5\% |
| Monsanto Company | 15,001.0 | 13 | 12 | N | 60 | 8 | 75 | 6 | 245,000 | c,d,f | 277,284 | 50\% | 50\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| The Mosaic Company | 8,895.3 | 11 | 9 | Y | 60 | 7 | 74 | 8 | 90,000 | b,h | 275,272 | 37\% | 60\% | 0\% | 3\% |
| Gold |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Newmont Mining Corporation | 7,729.0 | 10 | 9 | Y | 63 | 7 | 75 | 9 | 115,000 | b | 336,358 | 55\% | 45\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Industrial Gases |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Air Products \& Chemicals | 9,894.9 | 8 | 7 | N | 61 | 5 | 72 | 9 | 100,000 | b, c | 247,291 | 51\% | 49\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Praxair | 10,776.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 66 | 9 | 72 | 6 | 100,000 | b,c | 266,050 | 41\% | 54\% | 0\% | 5\% |
| Metal \& Glass Containers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ball Corporation | 7,997.0 | 9 | 7 | N | 65 | 11 | - | 10 | 85,000 | b | 235,493 | 31\% | 49\% | 0\% | 20\% |
| Owens-Illinois | 6,156.0 | 12 | 11 | Y | 62 | 8 | - | 12 | 67,500 | b, c | 204,154 | 55\% | 45\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Paper Packaging |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avery Dennison Corporation | 5,966.9 | 9 | 8 | Y | 61 | 9 | 72 | 5 | 100,000 | b,c | 232,479 | 42\% | 54\% | 0\% | 4\% |
| International Paper Company | 22,365.0 | 12 | 11 | N | 64 | 6 | 72 | 10 | 255,000 | c, d | 285,466 | 17\% | 81\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Sealed Air Corporation | 7,031.5 | 10 | 9 | Y | 66 | 10 | 75 | 7 | 205,000 | c, d | 211,524 | 45\% | 55\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| WestRock Company | 11,381.3 | 14 | 12 | Y | 60 | 10 | 72 | 5 | 115,000 | b | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Specialty Chemicals |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ecolab | 13,545.1 | 15 | 14 | N | 60 | 7 | 72 | 6 | 105,000 | b,c,e | 269,064 | 43\% | 37\% | 20\% | 0\% |
| International Flavors \& Fragrances | 3,023.2 | 11 | 10 | N | 64 | 6 | 72 | 5 | 225,000 | d,f | 234,596 | 51\% | 46\% | 0\% | 3\% |

# Comparative Board Data 

|  | NUMBER OF DIRECTORS |  |  | INDEPENDENT directors |  |  |  |  | board fees（\＄） |  |  | percentace of total compensation |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 唎 <br>  |  | 会另蒠 |  |  |  | 岳 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { un } \\ & \stackrel{0}{x} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & \frac{0}{1} \\ & 0 \\ & \text { 芯 } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Specialty Chemicals（continued） |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| PPG Industries | 15，330．0 | 10 | 8 | Y | 62 | 10 |  | 72 | 8 | 270，000 | c，d | 269，642 | 49\％ | 47\％ | 0\％ | 4\％ |
| Steel |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Nucor Corporation | 16，439．3 | 8 | 7 | N | 62 | 7 |  | 72 | 4 | 95，000 | b，c | 247，533 | 43\％ | 57\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| TOTAL MATERIALS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average |  | 10.9 | 9.7 |  | 62.5 | 8.0 |  | 73.1 | 8.6 | 140，729 |  | 266，940 | 45\％ | 50\％ | 1\％ | 4\％ |
| Median |  | 11.0 | 9.5 |  | 62.2 | 7.7 | 7 | 72.0 | 7.5 | 102，500 |  | 252，864 |  |  |  |  |

## TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES

| Alternative Carriers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Level 3 Communications | 8，229．0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 64 | 5 | 73 | 4 | 75，000 | b | 265，292 | 40\％ | 60\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Integrated Telecommunication Services |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| AT\＆T | 146，801．0 | 12 | 11 | N | 61 | 5 | 72 | 8 | 95，000 | b，c | 310，279 | 48\％ | 48\％ | 0\％ | 4\％ |
| CenturyLink | 17，900．0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 62 | 11 | 75 | 10 | 65，000 | b | 297，031 | 45\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Frontier Communications Corporation | 5，576．0 | 11 | 10 | Y | 62 | 8 | － | 16 | 95，000 | b，c | 225，000 | 42\％ | 58\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Verizon Communications | 131，620．0 | 13 | 12 | N | 61 | 6 | 72 | 10 | 100，000 | b | 287，026 | 42\％ | 57\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| TOTAL TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average |  | 11.6 | 10.6 |  | 61.7 | 7.0 | 73.0 | 9.6 | 86，000 |  | 276，786 | 44\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Median |  | 11.0 | 10.0 |  | 61.6 | 6.2 | 72.5 | 10.0 | 95，000 |  | 287，026 |  |  |  |  |

## UTILITIES

Utilities

| Ameren Corporation | 6，098．0 | 11 | 10 | N | 63 | 6 | 72 | 7 | 85，000 | b，c | 210，133 | 52\％ | 48\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| American Electric Power Company | 16，453．2 | 12 | 11 | N | 63 | 6 | 72 | 7 | 105，500 | b，c | 273，780 | 45\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| American Water Works Company | 3，159．0 | 9 | 8 | Y | 64 | 7 | 75 | 13 | 75，000 | b | 195，520 | 46\％ | 53\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| CenterPoint Energy | 7，386．0 | 9 | 7 | Y | 62 | 6 | 73 | 7 | 90，000 | b | 219，420 | 45\％ | 55\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| CMS Energy Corporation | 6，456．0 | 12 | 10 | Y | 61 | 5 | 75 | 8 | 95，000 | b，c | 233，222 | 49\％ | 51\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Consolidated Edison | 12，554．0 | 10 | 8 | N | 66 | 10 | 75 | 10 | 100，000 | b，c | 257，437 | 50\％ | 49\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |
| Dominion Resources | 11，683．0 | 10 | 9 | N | 63 | 8 | 72 | 10 | 205，000 | c，d | 277，165 | 46\％ | 46\％ | 0\％ | 8\％ |
| DTE Energy Company | 10，337．0 | 12 | 11 | N | 66 | 9 | 75 | 6 | 82，500 | b，c | 234，682 | 49\％ | 51\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Duke Energy Corporation | 23，459．0 | 12 | 11 | N | 64 | 6 | 71 | 14 | 215，000 | c，d | 310，491 | 59\％ | 41\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Edison International | 11，524．0 | 10 | 9 | N | 62 | 6 | 72 | 9 | 110，000 | b | 260，159 | 49\％ | 48\％ | 0\％ | 3\％ |
| Entergy Corporation | 11，513．3 | 11 | 10 | N | 64 | 7 | 74 | 14 | 95，000 | b | 244，233 | 45\％ | 45\％ | 0\％ | 10\％ |
| Eversource Energy | 7，954．8 | 12 | 11 | N | 68 | 8 | 75 | 7 | 100，000 | b | 208，655 | 51\％ | 49\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Exelon Corporation | 29，447．0 | 13 | 12 | Y | 63 | 6 | 75 | 8 | 80，000 | b | 276，417 | 60\％ | 36\％ | 0\％ | 4\％ |
| FirstEnergy Corporation | 15，026．0 | 14 | 13 | Y | 65 | 8 | 72 | 10 | 230，000 | c，d | 248，369 | 44\％ | 53\％ | 0\％ | 3\％ |
| NextEra Energy | 17，486．0 | 12 | 11 | N | 63 | 8 | 72 | 6 | 220，000 | d | 251，833 | 46\％ | 54\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| NiSource | 4，651．8 | 9 | 8 | Y | 61 | 7 | 70 | 9 | 210，000 | d | 258，000 | 53\％ | 47\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| NRG Energy | 14，674．0 | 13 | 11 | Y | 65 | 9 | 75 | 9 | 225，000 | b，d，f | 260，697 | 44\％ | 56\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| PG\＆E Corporation | 16，833．0 | 12 | 11 | N | 65 | 8 | 72 | 12 | 120，000 | b，c | 257，460 | 53\％ | 47\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| Pinnacle West Capital Corporation | 3，495．4 | 10 | 9 | N | 68 | 12 | － | 7 | 95，000 | b，c | 203，057 | 51\％ | 49\％ | 0\％ | 0\％ |
| PPL Corporation | 7，669．0 | 9 | 8 | N | 62 | 7 | 75 | 7 | 235，000 | c，d，f | 247，031 | 47\％ | 52\％ | 0\％ | 1\％ |


|  | number of DIRECTORS |  |  | INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS |  |  |  |  | board fees (\$) |  |  |  | PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL COMPENSATION |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{r}}}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\frac{\pi}{z}$ <br>  |  |  |  |  | 垔 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { n } \\ & \stackrel{n}{x} \end{aligned}$ |  | $\stackrel{?}{r}$号 |
| Utilities (continued) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Public Service Enterprise Group | 10,415.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 67 | 11 |  | 72 |  | 9 | 85,000 | b, c | 239,798 | 50\% | 50\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| SCANA Corporation | 4,380.0 | 11 | 10 | $N$ | 60 | 10 | - | 70 |  | 9 | 193,000 | c, d | 199,378 | 42\% | 58\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Sempra Energy | 10,231.0 | 11 | 10 | N | 67 | 9 |  | 75 |  | 7 | 85,000 | b, c | 246,113 | 49\% | 45\% | 0\% | 6\% |
| Southern Company | 17,489.0 | 15 | 14 | N | 65 | 6 |  | 72 |  | 9 | 110,000 | b, c | 242,657 | 47\% | 52\% | 0\% | 1\% |
| WEC Energy Group | 5,926.1 | 13 | 11 | Y | 66 | 9 |  | 72 |  | 9 | 75,000 | b | 198,474 | 41\% | 50\% | 0\% | 9\% |
| Xcel Energy | 11,024.5 | 11 | 10 | N | 62 | 10 | - | 72 |  | 6 | 90,000 | b, c | 240,229 | 20\% | 80\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| TOTAL UTILITIES |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average |  | 11.3 | 10. |  | 64.1 | 7.8 | 8 | 73.0 |  | 8.8 | 131,192 |  | 244,135 | 48\% | 50\% | 0\% | 2\% |
| Median |  | 11.0 | 10. |  | 64.1 | 7.7 | 7 | 72.0 |  | 9.0 | 100,000 |  | 245,173 |  |  |  |  |
| TOTAL S\&P500 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average |  | 10.8 | 9.2 |  | 63.1 | 8.5 | 57 | 73.3 |  | 8.4 | 118,521 |  | 285,065 | 38\% | 54\% | 6\% | 2\% |
| Median |  | 11.0 | 9.0 |  | 63.0 | 8.2 | 27 | 72.0 | 7 | 7.5 | 100,000 |  | 269,642 |  |  |  |  |

## Footnotes:

a Includes regular, special and telephonic board meetings.
b Equity (stock or stock units) is paid in addition to stated retainer.
c Directors can elect to receive cash compensation fully or partially in stock.
d Equity (stock or stock units) is paid as part of retainer.
e Stock option program for directors exists.
$f$ Equity portion of retainer paid in deferred stock.
g Retainer paid $100 \%$ in stock.
h Directors can elect to receive equity retainer fully or partially in cash.
i Directors can elect to receive cash and/or stock compensation in stock options.
j Dollar value equivalent for retainer not provided in proxy.
k Directors can elect to receive stock in lieu of stock option grant.

## Research \& Insights

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Can They Make the Leap?
What It Takes to Get to - and Succeed in - the Most Senior Functional Roles


The Four Biggest Hidden CEO Succession Risks and How to Avoid Them


How to Think About Assessing Leaders


What Directors Think 2016


Why Senior Leaders Need to Rethink Learning Intelligence


Performance in the
Spotlight: Assessment and Board Effectiveness


Data Leadership:
Defining the Expertise Your Organization Needs

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Singapore
Stamford
Stockholm
Sydney
Tokyo
Toronto
Vienna
Warsaw
Washington, D.C.
Zürich


[^0]:    Data in this and other sections labeled "Added Perspective" come from our governance survey, conducted in the second quarter of 2016. This year, we heard from 96 S $\mathcal{P} 500$ companies. Respondents include corporate secretaries, general counsel and chief governance officers.

[^1]:    *Accurate as of each company's most recent proxy released by May 15, 2016.
    **Excluding the CEO, the average is $24 \%$.

[^2]:    Average: 4.0 years
    $\mathrm{N}=132$ independent chairmen

[^3]:    $\mathrm{N}=475$ companies; 7 others did not mention evaluations in their proxies or corporate governance guidelines.

